[Whiston et al. v. Stodder et al., Syndics.] Our laws do grant the privilege contended for by the plaintiffs; and if it be one appertaining rather to the remedy than the contract itself, they ought to be maintained in their claim. We have not been able to find a decision directly in point, made by any other tribunal of justice; and the question is new to our own courts. In the case cited in favor of the appellants, from the author above mentioned, same discourse, n. 53, 55, it was determined that a privilege secured to sellers, by the laws of a country where the contract was made, followed the property into one, where by law no such privilege existed. This decision goes far to show that the privilege was considered as belonging to the contract itself, and not to the remedy for enforcing its execution. When men enter into agreements, they generally do so with reference to the laws of the place where they contract, and ought not to calculate on having their rights and claims enlarged or diminished by the laws of any other. We are of opinion that the judgment of the court below is erroneous. It is therefore ordered, that the property claimed and sequestered by the appellees, be restored to the syndics of the insolvents, as belonging to their estate, and that the appellees pay costs in both courts. Workman, for the plaintiffs. Seghers v. His Creditors. VIII. 136. SEGHERS, insolvent, prayed the district judge for leave to appeal in his own behalf from the decision approving the appointment of syndics; his application was rejected, whereupon he moved for a writ of mandamus. But he took nothing by his motion: an insolvent cannot contest the legality of the choice which his creditors make of syndics. United States Bank v. Fleckner. VIII. 141. DECIDED, that the act of March 1818, which provided that "when banks shall lend money on a note, or on a special mortgage, they may obtain, to wit, with regard to a note, on motion being made before any court of competent jurisdiction, a judgment and an order of seizure and sequestration," &c., &c., does not extend this summary remedy against the maker and prior endorser, in the case where he who asks money from a bank presents the note of another person to be discounted, which note was intended for no such use, in its inception. Camfrancq v. Dufour's Heirs et al. VIII. 144. In an action on a lost note, the plaintiff is held to very strict proof. APPEAL from the court of the first district.. DERBIGNY, J., delivered the opinion of the court.* The plaintiff is the representative of the commercial house of Camfrancq, Thezan & Co., formerly residing at Port au Prince, in the island of Hispaniola, and is entrusted with the settlement of its concerns. In that capacity he has brought this suit on a promissory note, subscribed in the year 1771, by one Langouran to John & Francis Depas, brothers, in part payment of a plantation bought by the maker from the payees; which note, it is said, was transferred by the Depas, to one Lockwood, and by Lockwood to the plaintiff's said commercial house. To recover the amount of that promissory note, he has called upon the present defendants, as heirs of Louis V. Dufour and John Laroque Turgeau, who, he alleges, assumed the payment of that debt. The plaintiff does not produce the note. He has endeavored to * Martin, J., did not join in this opinion, having some interest in the question. VOL. I.-53 [Camfrancq v. Dufour's Heirs et al.] show that it was lost amidst the troubles of the revolution of Hispaniola. In that, however, he has not succeeded; for the note is traced up for the last time, into the hands of one Hugon, the plaintiff's agent, who, it appears, came away from Hispaniola with all his papers. The objection, therefore, to the claim, as founded on a title which is not produced, would probably, on examination, be deemed fatal to the plaintiff. But laying aside the consideration of it, we find this action unsupported by any proof that the note, on which it is brought, ever became the property of the plaintiff's com mercial house. It is indeed shown that Dufour and Laroque Turgeau bought from Langouran the same plantation, for part of the price of which Langouran had formerly subscribed the note in question, and that they assumed the payment of that note, which it appears, was then the property of Lockwood. But there is no positive evidence that the note was ever transferred to the plaintiff's firm. There are presumptions, to be sure, that it was once in their hands. Laroque Turgeau once wrote to the plaintiff, that he and Dufour were disposed to make some arrangements to pay him an old claim against Langouran, of which he (the plaintiff) was the bearer. Edward Cauchois, one of the witnesses, "had once in his hands, for collection, several claims due to the plaintiff's firm, and among the papers belonging to that firm, there were some titles, such as judgments and others, from which it appeared that Depas, debtor of one Lockwood of a sum of 14,000 livres, had sold his estate to Langouran, and this last to Dufour and Laroque Turgeau, with delegation of that sum." Now, such information would do very well to help in the research of a title, but it surely will not suffice to prove one. After having given such evidence its due weight, it still will remain a matter of doubt, whether the note sued upon was the identical debt mentioned by Laroque Turgeau, whether it was part of the documents mentioned by Cauchois, whether that note was actually transferred by Lockwood to the plaintiff's firm; or whether the plaintiff had undertaken to collect it for Lockwood's account: for the note being due years before it is pretended to have come into the plaintiff's hands, the mere holding of it would be no proof of transfer. Upon the whole, we are satisfied that the plaintiff has failed to support his claim by sufficient evidence. It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the judgment of the district court be affirmed with costs. Seghers, for the plaintiff. Livingston, for the defendants. Hennen v. Desbois et al. VIII. 147. HELD, if an endorser ignorant that no demand was made of the maker promises to pay, he will be relieved. Bazzi v. Rose and her Child. VIII. 149. APPEAL from the court of the parish and city of New Orleans. Decided, that a written act of emancipation done in Cuba, did not confer freedom, because it wanted the attestations of the five witnesses required by the Partida 4, 22, 1, although the donor sent the act of freedom to Louisiana to be recorded by a notary public to make it valid, and, by his long silence, and treatment of the slave so begun to be emancipated, he seemed to complete and confirm the act of freedom. The admission of the master that he executed the deed, does not make full proof against him. The formality of five witnesses, required by the Spanish law, is not solely intended to guard the grantor against the perjury of one witness. The presence of a magistrate, the attendance of an unusual number of witnesses, the affixing of a seal are all circumstances, which, besides securing more evidence, are attended with this peculiar advantage: they make a strong impression on the mind of the party, excite reflection in him upon the subject he is engaged in, and are no contemptible guards against circumvention, fraud and surprise. 1 Haywood, 203. In this case, moreover, the grantor agreed at a future time to comply with the formalities required by law. His recording the deed did not give it any additional effect. Decided also, that a discharge by the president of the criminal court of one held as a slave, upon a habeas corpus, does not form res judicata as to his freedom. Ulzere et al. v. Poeyfarré. VIII. 155. HELD, the abstract proposition, that the French and Spanish governments prohibited the reduction of the Indians to slavery, is a question of law, and cannot be specially submitted to a jury. A judgment in favor of an Indian woman of the Natchez tribe, to which none of the present parties was a party, not admissible in evidence. The decrees of the governors of Louisiana, and ordinances of the Kings of France are not susceptible of proof by witnesses, until the loss or destruction of the originals, and absence of copies be established. Livaudais' Heirs v. Fon et al. VIII. 161. A master may sue for what is due to his slave. APPEAL from the court of the parish and city of New Orleans. MATHEWS, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This is a suit brought by the appellees (plaintiffs in the court below) to recover the amount of a note, given by the defendants to Frosina, a slave of the plaintiffs, by which they promised to pay to her four hundred dollars. Payment is resisted on the ground of the promise having been made in error, and consequently having created no obligation, it being a contract without cause or consideration. The execution of the note raises a presumption of a just consideration, which must be defeated by proof to the contrary, on the part of the defendants. This they have attempted by the production of a testament made by one Durand, in which he instituted Pedro, his bastard child by Frosina, the slave above mentioned, his heir, and appointed Fon, one of the appellants, his testamentary executor; and by the introduction of testimonial proof, showing that the child died in 1812, &c. Admitting that all this evidence was properly received, in the present suit against Fon and another person, on their joint note, |