THE IRISH LAND LAWS.-IX. LANDLORD AND TENANT-LEASING POWERS (concluded). THE latest legislative extension of the leasing powers of limited owners is contained in the Landed Property Improvement Act, 1860 (23 & 24 Vic., c. 153). By the 25th section limited owners are empowered to grant agricultural, improvement, or building leases, for any term, subject to the following restrictions. No improvement lease shall be valid without the consent of the Chairman of Quarter Sessions. No building lease comprising more than three acres, or reserving a rent of more than £100 per annum, shall be valid without the sanction of one of the Judges of the Landed Estates' Court, and no other building lease without that of the Chairman. The term of an agricultural lease is not exceed 21 years; of an improvement lease, 41; and of a building lease of the class which come before the Chairman, 99 years. When a judge of the Landed Estates' Court is satisfied that it is beneficial to the inheritance to grant building leases for a longer term, he may do so, and in some instances leases for 999 years have been sanctioned under this clause. Certain covenants on the part of the lessee with reference to good husbandry, &c., are implied in agricultural leases granted under this statute. The best rent, having regard to the circumstances of the case, must be reserved. The powers given by the Act are additional to whatever other leasing powers limited owners may possess.

Such is an outline of an enactment of which but little advantage has been taken, and the provisions of which it is therefore unnecessary to explain in detail. We may add that several Irish statutes have from time to time been passed to enable tenants for life, with immediate remainder to their issue, to make leases for the encouragement of mines, the reclamation of bogs, the erection of corn mills, the carrying on of the linen trade, the encouragement of cotton manufactories, and to ecclesiastical persons for religious purposes. They have been for the most part superseded by the more recent and comprehensive legislation to which we have referred, and need not be explained at length.— (1 Latouche's Furlong, 99).

Taking a general survey of the ground over which we have travelled in the present and the preceding article, we find limited owners-that is to say, the majority of landlords-in Ireland possessing equally with those in England the extended leasing powers which the more enlightened policy of later days has engrafted on the old feudal tenures. We find, moreover, a special machinery provided by the Landed Property Improvement Act of 1860 for indefinitely extending these powers by means of the Chairman of Quarter Sessions and the Landed Estates' Court. We find, as a matter of fact, that notwithstanding these reforms of the law, in which Ireland together with the rest of the empire, has shared, and the special provisions intended to meet the peculiar circumstances of the country, leases have, within the memory of the present generation, been generally superseded by tenancies from year to year. In our last article we referred to the causes, social and political, which have been assigned for this fact, which we must assume as the foundation of our remarks. We now proceed to inquire whether any legislative enactment, short of coercion, can reverse the current, and restore the practice of granting leases to tenants.

Now, it is plain that the general abandonment of leases for yearly tenancies throughout Ireland has been caused not by deficiency of leasing powers—which have been waxing as the number of leases has been waningbut by absence of desire on the part of landlord, tenant, or both, to avail themselves of these powers. This is a

cause which would still remain untouched if all the landlords in Ireland, however limited their interests, were endowed by the legislature with unlimited leasing powers. It is the will, not the power, that is wanting, and this want can be supplied (speaking broadly) only by making it for the interest of the contracting parties to substitute a lease for a certain time, with clearly defined rights and liabilities, for the tenancy from year to year. The legislature can supply this interested motive only by some species of coercion; that is to say, by attaching certain special statutory disadvantages to the tenancy which it is intended to discourage, affecting the party to the contract-landlord or tenant-whose disinclination to grant or accept a lease, as the case may be, it is the object of the legislature to overcome. It would be foreign to our purpose to inquire how far the circumstances of the country would justify a measure which would unquestionably amount to an interference pro tanto with freedom of contract between landlord and tenant. But without going the full length of attaching a penalty to yearly tenancies, it appears to us that something might be done towards their encouragement by shifting the legal presumption from the tenancy which it is sought to discourage, to one of a more advantageous character. Under the present law, as our readers are aware, a tenant who enters on the possession of land and pays rent, is presumed, in the absence of express stipulation, to hold from year to year. If in a case like this the tenancy were presumed to belong, as its terms and conditions, to whatever class the legislature might select as the most beneficial for the interests of the country, something would unquestionably have been done towards the encouragement of that particular tenancy, while it would remain open to the parties to enter into whatever special contracts they pleased. In our chapter on abortive legislation we shall have to record proposals of this character.

Although, as we have shown, no increased leasing power vested in limited owners could render it for their interest to grant leases, and thus practically remove the evil of yearly tenancies, we still maintain that a further extension of recent reforms in this direction is desirable on principle, and also in order to remove all possible obstacles to the granting of leases. Why should not an owner whose interest in land, in relation to his issue and remaindermen, is limited, yet be enabled to exercise, in relation to the general public, all the rights of absolute ownership? Anything in the nature of a fine, or a personal advantage to the limited owner, should, of course, be strictly prohibited by law, and the fullest opportunities afforded to all persons interested in the inheritance to come forward and restrain any such transactions. But, in our opinion, the onus of putting the machinery of the law in operation should be thrown upon those who object to the lease, after full notice; instead of (as at present) limited owners who desire to exceed the limited statutory leasing powers attached to their estates, being compelled to do so by means of an application to a court of justice. Experience, as well as reason, teaches us that all such enactments will prove in practice little better than dead letters.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES.

Before the Constitution of the United States fell into what, to speak plainly, must be called its present discredit, there was no institution created by it which interested the foreign observer more strongly than the Supreme Court of the Federation. Although its decisions could only be called forth by private disputes M. de Tocqueville justly speaks of a court which had the power of declaring whether a law consented to by all existing authorities was valid as "standing at the head of all known tribunals."

The language of the continental writers who described it before 1860 was invariably eulogistic and even enthusiastic, and many of them noticed, as honourably characteristic of the English race, the fact that the branch of it which organized the greatest democracy of the world had placed it under the protection, not of a string of pretended eternal truths, nor under that of the people at large, nor under that of the legislative body, but under the guardianship of a bench of irremovable judges. The writer of a very interesting paper in the Nation of New York calls attention to a crisis which is just occurring in the history of this august tribunal, and incidentally describes the fall and rise of its credit among the people of the United States. "Thirty years ago,' we are told, "the Supreme Court, and, indeed, the judiciary generally, stood as high in the estimation of the public as it is given to mortal authority ever to stand. No doubt of its purity lurked in men's minds; no political bias was believed to influence its decisions; it was looked upon by the common consent of all parties as the great landmark, the one great bulwark of society which was sure to withstand all storms, and to secure the nation whose laws it administered in the blessings of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The first sensible decline of its reputation is alleged to have occurred when it pronounced the famous Dred Scott judgment. But this loss of popularity must only be understood of the section of the population which became ultimately dominant, since it is probable that the South rejoiced as much as the North mourned over the decision of the Supreme Court that Congress was incompetent, by an enactment sanctioning a compromise, to fix for ever the territorial limits of slavery. Though most inopportune and most unfortunate in the long run for those who elicited it, this decision, though strict law, was probably good law. And indeed the Nation admits that the real quarrel of the people of the North with the court was that it would not expressly acknowledge that slavery was intrinsically wicked-a proposition which, whether true or not, it could assuredly never have laid down without a gross dereliction of duty. When, however, the temporary disruption of the Union left the Supreme Court in exclusive connexion with its Northern section, it became inevitable that suspicion should turn for the time into hatred and dread. For, if the court had decided as it very possibly must have decided if its jurisdiction had been appealed to, it would have deprived the North of all power of aggression or resistance, assuming its decisions to have commanded obedience. The least astute reader of the Constitution of the United States can see that, to say the least, a plausible case can be made out for holding that laws declaring paper money a legal tender, and permitting a conscription for the army, are inconsistent with careful provisions for the sanctity of contracts and the liberty of the person. The subjugation of the South doubtless re-established respect for the court among the nation as a whole; but the Republican party soon learned to regard it with the extremest jealousy as soon as the Reconstruction laws were determined upon. It is not likely that there is any member of the party who does not feel they are very near the wind indeed, and it was notoriously the hope that the Supreme Court would declare them unconstitutional which animated President Johnson during his struggle with Congress.

It is all but certain that, if the judges had laid down during the war the law which most lawyers expected from them, the people of the North would have set aside their authority; and in that case the wreck of the institutions of the United States would have been all but complete. But the court, we are told, gave no really important decision (if we except those on belligerency) during the whole of the war. In spite of this prudence, it seems to have been regarded by the majority of Northerners as a dangerous partisan body, and every attempt was made to change its character by filling all the seats on the bench which became vacant with persons qualified for them only by subborn devotion to the cause of the North. More open attacks were made on the court when all power fell after the war into the hands of the Legislature. An Act of Congress taking away an appeal in a case already pending threatened the most extreme measures; but an extraordinary bill rendered a majority of two-thirds of the judges necessary before a law

passed by Congress could be declared unconstitutional, but allowing a bare majority to declare it constitutional, was permitted to drop, though doubtless the Republicans could have carried it. This, however, seems to have been the last attempt on the independence of the court, and we are assured that its credit and popularity have been rising ever since. It is not without natural and justifiable pride that the writer in the Nation points to this tendency in the ship of the State to right itself. It is distinctly, he tells us, because President Johnson so disgraced himself that the dignity and self-restraint of the Supreme Court met at last with the appreciation which they deserved. We may be pardoned for adding our suspicion that the violence of Congress had much to do with the change; but we are equally of opinion that it is creditable to the American people that they should turn with relief to the deliberations of judges from the spectacle of factious contention in the Legislature and furious intemperance in the Executive.

It is fortunate for the Supreme Court that popular feeling has set in favour of the principles on which it was constructed, since never had President such an opportunity as President Grant for destroying its purity and independence. We shall make no apology for borrowing a description of the constitution of the court, and of the changes about to be made in it, which the American writer considers to be necessary even for his own countrymen. The Supreme Court has hitherto consisted of a chief justice and eight associate judges, sitting generally at Washington. All causes, however, originate locally, and are tried in the first instance by a local judge, known as a district judge of the court and appointed by the President. Appeals from the district judge, in which very large amounts are at stake, lie direct to the Supreme Court at Washington. But in the cases of lower amount, which constitute the bulk of the litigation, the appeal is to the Circuit Court, which has, up to this time, been composed of the district judge and of one of the judges of the Washington Court "on circuit." For the purpose of exercising the local jurisdiction the United are divided into as many circuits as there are judges of the Washington Court, and into a large number of districts, each State generally forming one district, though some of the larger States, e.g., New York, are divided into two or more. We can easily believe that the strength of the court, as thus constituted, has gradually become unequal to dealing with litigation, which increases proportionately to the growth of the United States in population and wealth. Accordingly an Act of the last session of Congress adds one new associate judge to the court at Washington, and creates no less than nine judges to be called circuit judges, with functions before unknown. The Circuit Court, which, as we have said, disposes of the bulk of the appeals, will now consist of the district judge, together with either a judge of the Supreme Court or one of the new circuit judges; and the Nation alleges that it will be, in fact, the new judges who will exercise the local jurisdiction. No complaint seems to be made of the particular mode of strengthening the Supreme Court adopted by Congress, but it is said that the facilities for packing it, once for all, which the Act confers are quite without precedent. It has hitherto been a rare occurrence for a President to have a seat to fill in the Supreme Court once during a single term of office; but President Grant has one new judge to nominate to the Washington Court, and nine judges of a totally new kind to spread over the country.

We are glad to perceive that telegraphic intelligence of a later date than the article we have been noticing announces that President Grant has made the very appointment which the Nation considers of the best omen, by giving the new associate judgeship to the attorney-general, Mr. Hoar. It is not wholly for selfish reasons that an Englishman rejoices at the maintenance of the judicial reputation of a tribunal to which all political thinkers look with interest and all lawyers with respect. Yet we may be forgiven for expressing a hope that the revived popularity of the Supreme Court will lead Americans to read with more attention the judgments which it gave during the war on the rights and duties of neutrals. If the authority of the court is not fatal to Mr. Sumner's arguments, we are at least justified in expecting it to be shown how the two are to be reconciled.-Pall Mall Gazette.

NOTES OF CASES. [Specially reported for this Journal by the Reporters of the Council of Law Reporting in Ireland.]

LANDED ESTATES' COURT. Reported by J. FIELD JOHNSTON, Esq., Barrister-at-law.

Coram FLANAGAN, J.

KEAYS'S ESTATE.

June 3, 5.-Re-registration of Judgment-Statute of Limitations-Effect of Registering a Judgment obtained previously to the passing of the Judgment Mortgage Act, against lands acquired subsequently to the passing of that Act under a voluntary conveyance.

The facts of this case were as follows:-By a settlement executed in 1843 upon the marriage of the owner, a judgment for £500 charged upon the estate of a third party was vested in trustees for the owner's use for life, or until bankruptcy and insolvency, and upon that event for the separate use of his wife, with remainder over for the children. The trustees were the owner's brother, Christopher Keays, and one Russell. Russell being unwilling to concur in a proposal to lend the money to the owner was induced to withdraw from the trust, and a substitute having been appointed, the fund in question was lent to the owner on the security of his own bond. Upon this bond judgment was entered in 1845. In 1849 the owner became insolvent. In 1861 he became entitled to the leasehold interest sought to be sold in this matter under an assignment from his father. In 1868 the children filed a bill in Chancery against the trustees to make them make good the trust fund improvidently lent to their father. A decree followed, and the owner's brother, Christopher Keays, paid in to the credit of the suit £500, he becoming beneficially entitled under the decree to the securities given by the owner, and entitled also to recover that sum personally from the owner. In Jan., 1869, the judgment entered on the owner's bond was registered as a mortgage against the leasehold interest acquired by the owner in 1861. A petition for sale on foot of it was presented in the Landed Estates' Court by the trustees of the owner's marriage settlement. Cause against making absolute the order was shown by the

owner.

Lawless, Q.C., and Mark S. O'Shaughnessy, for the owner, contended—1. That the judgment had not been re-registered till 1869. 2. That it was barred by the Statute of Limitations, no payment of principal or interest having been made on foot of it for twenty years. 3. That it was incapable of being registered as a mortgage under the Judgment Mortgage Act against the leasehold interest acquired by the owner, the latter being acquired under a voluntary conveyance made subsequently to the passing of that Act. 4. That the conusel of the judgment was not in a position to issue execution when he registered it as a mortgage.

Jellett, Q.C., and O'Riordan, for the petitioners. Hone v. O'Flahertie (9 Ir. Ch. R. 497); Keays v. Lane (I. R. 3 Eq. 1); Gardiner v. Gardiner (12 İr. C. L. R. 565); Darby and Bosanquet on Statutes of Limitations, p. 77 (Judgment Mortgage Act, 1850), (3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 42); (C. L. P. Act, 1853, §154) were cited.

June 5.-FLANAGAN, J., delivered judgment, holdng-1. That the omission to re-register the judgment was immaterial, since the amount of it was sought to be .ecovered from the conusor himself. 2. That the owner, under the terms of his marriage settlement, being the

person to pay and the person to receive the interest on the trust fund until his insolvency in 1849, the bar of the Statute did not apply. 3. That, though he agreed with the proposition that a judgment obtained prior to the passing of the Judgment Mortgage Act could not be registered as a mortgage against lands acquired subsequently to the passing of that Act, and acquired under a voluntary conveyance, in the present instance, the circumstance was immaterial as the judgment in that case remained a charge upon the lands under 3 & 4 Vic., c. 105 4. That there is no provision either in Pigot's Act or the Judgment Mortgage Act, analogous to that in the Sheriff's Act, requiring that a judgment creditor seeking to sell lands shall be in a position to issue execution.

Order made absolute.

[This decision was affirmed on appeal to the Court of Chancery Appeal.]

Coram FLANAGAN, J.

In the Matter of the Estate of ALONZO LAWDER,
Owner and Petitioner.

Dec. 6.-Claim for Compensation in respect of Deficiency in Rent payable by tenants from year to year.

This was an application on behalf of Dora Lynam, the purchaser of lot 3 of the lands sold in this matter, that she should be paid the sum of £89 7s. as compensation for the misstatements in the rental of the rents of the holdings of Mary Reilly and James Connor, and for rent-charge and taxes paid by said Dora Lynam.

An affidavit made by James Lynam, stated that he purchased the lands in question in trust for his sister, Dora Lynam, on the 7th May, 1869, for £2,320; that on or about the 24th July, he walked over the lands of Curgowen (the lands sold in this matter), for the purpose of comparing the boundaries with those on the map annexed to the conveyance, and the quantity with that stated in the schedule, and was then informed by Mary Reilly the tenant of 6A. 2R. 37P., as stated in said schedule that the rent of £9 9s. stated in said schedule to be payable in respect of said last-mentioned part of said lands was payable in respect of a small holding of about 2A., Irish measure, which she held under said Alonzo Lawder, on the lands of Toberpatrick (another portion of the estate of Alonzo Lawder, and not included in the present purchase), as well as in respeet of said holding in Curgowen. The affidavit stated that the fair acreable rent payable for Mary Reilly's holding in Curgowen, after deducting the rent of her holding in Toberpatrick, was £6 7s. 6d., and that at 184 years' purchase, being the rate at which the lands were purchased, the difference between £9 9s. and £6 78. 6d., viz.: £3 1s. 6d., would amount to £56 2s. 4d., which sum with interest from the date of lodgment the purchaser claimed as compensation. A claim for £27 7s. 6d. as compensation was made with respect to the holding of James Connor, another tenant upon the purchased lands, upon the same grounds. The affidavit further stated that Dora Lynam had paid sums for income tax, poor's-rate, and tithe rent-charge, payable previously to the date of the sale, and amounting in all to the sum of £5 17s. 2d.

Affidavits were made by Mary Reilly and James Connor, corroborating the statements in the purchaser's affidavit, and from which it appeared that they were both tenants from year to year.

The conditions of sale contained one providing that compensation was not to be sought for mistakes in the rental.

E. Gibson, for the purchaser, cited In re Meredyth's Estate, 3 IR. LAW TIMES, 726.

J. D. Robinson, for creditors and solicitors having carriage of the sale, contra.

FLANAGAN, J., delivered judgment, stating that the condition of sale providing against compensation had not been relied on, as anticipated by the purchaser's counsel, and which extraordinary condition would seem to go to the root of the Parliamentary title, and was one on which he (the Judge) would never act; that it had been alleged by Mr. Robinson that these tenants had notice of the execution of the conveyance, but that there was clearly a mistake with respect to these two holdings, and he would not assume that the purchaser would attempt to enforce the payment of the rents stated in the rental; that as to the rate at which the purchaser ought to be compensated, he was not prepared to give him 18 year's purchase, as had been asked for, because the reported cases (Usher's Estate), whether correct in principle or not, had decided that where compensation was sought for on account of a deficiency in the rent payable by yearly tenants, 1 year's purchase was the measure, the principle being that the purchaser got the entire of the estate he had contracted to get. The Court assumed, in reference to tenancies from year to year, that the purchaser would value the property for himself. If there was a deficiency in the rent payable by such tenants, he was entitled to compensation, but the Court was bound to act on the decision in In re Usher's Estate. The other claim would be allowed as a matter of course.

Solicitor for the purchaser, Thomas Tighe Mecredy. Solicitors having carriage, Meade and Colles. [NOTE.-See in connexion with this case, the decision in In re Meredyth's Estate, Coram LYNCH, J., 3 IR. LAW TIMES, 726.]

COURT OF BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY. Reported by JOHN LEVY Esq., Barrister-at-law.

Before HARRISON, J.

Re DUKE, a Bankrupt.

December, 1869 —Showing cause against Ajudication -Form of Notice.

The Court will not go behind the 27th General Rule, and permit cause to be shown against an adjudication where the rule is not strictly complied with.

O'Riordan, on the part of the bankrupt, appeared to show cause against adjudication, and relied on the following notice. Take notice that counsel on behalf of the said William Duke will, on Friday, the 17th day of December instant, or the first opportunity, apply to the Hon. Judge HARRISON, and show cause against the validity of the adjudication in the matter, and move that same be annulled and set aside with costs, which motion will be grounded on the examination of the said William Duke before the Court itself, and also upon affidavits filed on his behalf in the Court of Exchequer, copies of which were heretofore furnished to you, &c. Kernin, Q.C., said the motion was wholly untenable. The 27th General Rule in bankruptcy provides that if any person adjudged bankrupt intends to show cause against the validity of such adjudication, he shall cause notice in writing of such, his intention, to be served upon the petitioning creditor or his agent, and to be delivered in the chief office of the Register twenty-four hours at least before the day appointed by the Court to show cause against such adjudication, and such notice shall state which of the following matters, namely,

trading, the petitioning creditor, debt or act of bankruptcy he intends to dispute. Such not having been stated in the notice, the Court had no power to hear the motion at all, the rules were, strictly speaking, a part of the Act, and a departure from them would to that extent be repealing the Act.

After some discussion a compromise was entered into, permiting the adjudication to be affirmed, but his lordship stated that he could not go behind the rules, that the notice should state pursuant to the rule, the matters intended to be disputed.

Attorney for the bankrupt, Franklin.
Attorneys for creditor, Cleary and Blake.

MOVING THE COURT.-The Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, as every one knows, has always been distinguished by great ability and learning; and scarcely ever more so than now. Stanberry, Evarts, Hoar, Carlisle, Curtis, Carpenter, Philips, Ashton, and a host of worthies, East and West, still sustain the fame which it enjoyed in the days of Richard Stockton, William Lewis, and the Tilghmans; of Dexter, and Webster, and Ogden, and Sergeant, and Binney; this last, now at the age of ninety, but in perfect health of mind, body (and estate, too, as we are happy to hear), the sole survivor of the "old guard." But, as in old times, it has its wits and its ways; its pleasant fellows and its "diners out," nothing ludicrous is ever allowed to escape; and anything that has a funny "point" is as sure to be seen as anything that has a weak or a strong one. Some fellow's eye gives a twinkle, and in less than five minutes, while the court supposes that nothing but the depths of the law are thought of, the thing is "married to immortal verse," and circulates "privately around the favoured portion of the Bar. We understand that the Morrisons, whose book store in Washington is a sort of legal coffee house, and where the Bar assemble for everything, have a huge book in which they enter these pleasant things. In due time, we hope they will publish the volume. In the mean time we give a pleasantry of the last term. It arose on a motion in the great patent case, known as the Car Brake case, a case involving the merits of the brake now universally used on railroad cars; a case, however, not reported-the court being equally divided, and no opinion given. George Harding of Philadelphia, eminent as a patent lawyer, and whose success in patent cases is due partially to the fact of his invariably putting models of a very large size before the court, so that every member of the bench can see, from his seat, the whole mechanism as it works, was, in this case, counsel for the patentee. Acting on his usual plan (so much complimented by the reporter in the Hat-Body case--Burr v. Duryee, 1 Wallace 532-where a complete hat was manufactured under the eyes of the judges, from a beaver skin), George, on this occasion, resolved to show his car-brake "large as life." As soon as the court adjourned from hearing ordinary arguments, he accordingly got to work, and with a force of carbuilders, previously summoned, and with the parts of the gearing ready in the Capitol, constructed in the courtroom during the night, all the gearings, with brakes, levers, chains, wheels, and other mechanism as large as in regular rail cars; doing the thing, in short, in such a manner as that the court, seated on the bench, could perceive and understand the grounds of the whole motion about to be made, though a question of mechanics chiefly, as well as if they had gone as a jury of view to the Baltimore railroad station and seen the brake applied by professional brakesmen, as the cars went off or came in. Now it so happens that among the present leading practitioners at the Supreme Court Bar, is Mr. Dick, and also Mr. Dickey; gentlemen both so honourably and widely known through the United States, that when we name them, all know who they are. On the morning when Harding's motion was to be heard, these gentlemen, with a view to making motions of their own, happened to arrive in court a few minutes before the members of the Bar generally. They were naturally rather surprised to see the court-room looking so much like a railroad depot. While standing in meditation

THE OVEREND-GURNEY CASE. The acquittal of the defendants in the famous Overend and Gurney case will surprise no lawyer who read the evidence with a clear conception in his mind of the requisites to constitute the crime of fraud. There must be a representation false in fact; it must be made with knowledge that it is false; and it must be so falsely made with deliberate intent to defraud. The case broke down on the second and third ingredients. True that the assets were not so valuable as they appeared to be, and that the private property of the vendors did not suffice to cover the doubtful debts. But there was no proof whatever that the defendants knew that the doubtful bills were of so little value as they ultimately proved, or that their private fortunes would be insufficient to cover the deficit. In fact, but for the commercial panic, in all probability both items would have been largely swollen, and it is questionable whether any loss would have been incurred by the shareholders. As for the two deeds, of which so much has been said, it proved, upon inquiry, that they were not prepared with any purpose of deceiving shareholders, but only because it would have been dangerous to themselves and wrong to others to have published to the whole world a string of names as being of doubtful credit-in itself a sufficient explanation; but when it was proved that these deeds were advised and prepared by counsel, and that the defendants did merely that which their lawyers recommended, there was an end of criminal liability. A man who acts under the best legal advice could never be guilty of criminal fraud, although he would be civilly responsible for the consequences of acting on that advice. On the third point, also, the evidence wholly failed. The defendants may have sold to the company their business for more than its value; they may have represented assets to be good which were bad in fact. But this is not the offence for which they were indicted, nor, indeed, is it a criminal offence at all. The offence for which the defendants were actually tried was that of fraudulent representation, as directors, after the company was formed. The public outcry was really directed against quite another part of the transaction, not in the indictment because not indictable. In fact, the Press tried and condemned them for an offence which, if committed at all-which was not proved-was a moral, not a legal offence, and the jury tried and acquitted them of an offence which neither the Press nor the public contemplated in the verdict they so rashly pronounced before the hearing.-The Law Times.

IS IT MANSLAUGHTER ?-It was reported for some months that Sarah Jacobs, aged thirteen years, residing with her parents at Llanfihangel-ar-Arth, had not eaten for two years. People from far and near visited the Welsh fasting girl, and, we presume, paid for their curiosity in current coin of the realm. The only point for comment was the credulity of persons of good social position; but, to be sure, there are plenty of ignorant boobies with money enough to travel. The dreary farce has developed, and ended in a dreary tragedy. Some local personages, including members of the medical profession, and, we believe, the vicar of the parish, formed themselves into a committee for the purpose of well, of what? Why, of testing the truth of the statement about the Welsh fasting girl! Why, of ascertaining whether the life of Sarah Jacobs was miraculously sustained! They omitted no precautions. They had nurses from Guy's. Sarah Jacobs was thoroughly watched. She could not get a crumb on the sly. The committee and the nurses were duly vigilant, and on the eighth day Sarah Jacobs died. We cannot conceive any excuse for the conduct of the committee, unless we assume that the vicar and the doctors were so superstitious as to believe that the fasting story might be true, but

superstition is not a legal excuse for manslaughter. The medical men are doubly responsible. They ought not to have allowed Sarah Jacobs to die from inanition either to please herself or her parents. By one means or the other food ought to have been introduced into the poor girl's body. We hope it is the last time that nurses will be sent from London to watch a young girl starved to death under the superintendence of a commitee with a clergyman at its head, and attended by several members of the medical profession. We are of opinion that such grossly cruel proceedings are legally as well as morally wrong.-The Law Journal.

"CASH ON DELIVERY."- Mr. Baron Martin and a special jury tried a case of interest to merchants at the Manchester assizes recently. It was an action for breach of contract and the non-delivery of certain goods. The defendant, Mr. Thomas Morgan, commission agent, entered into two contracts with the plaintiffs, Messrs. Harrison and Lamb, manufacturers and commission agents, to supply upwards of 10,000 pieces of grey cotton goods in various lots and at fixed periods, the terms being two and a-half per cent. cash. The plaintiffs' notion of the meaning of the terms was that if the goods were supplied on the Tuesday, payment should be made on or before the following Friday; and, if delivered on a Friday, the payment to be on or before the succeeding Tuesday. Part of the goods were supplied, and the plaintiffs failed to make the payment, and tried to obtain better terms. In consequence of this the defendant took legal proceedings to compel payment, and refused to supply any more goods. The question at issue was, whether the plaintiffs, having failed in one payment, gave the defendant a right to rescind the contract. A number of witnesses were called on both sides to testify to the usages of the trade. One of the witnesses, a cloth agent, in his evidence, said that if he wanted to make a contract for cash before delivery he should think he was dealing with an unmitigated thief, but he added, "If I got the cash beforehand, I would deal with his Satanic Majesty At the conclusion of the case the jury gave a verdict for the plaintiffs for the full amount (£1,084 17s. 6d.) The Judge said that gentlemen could easily remedy any inconvenience which they thought might arise by writing in their contracts, "cash on delivery."

A LION IN COURT.-- We have heard of the production of odd evidence in court, like that of the ostler's will mentioned by Mr. Dickens, which was chalked on a stable door. We have seen a baby offered in a delicate case to show that it resembled its putative father. We remember a large door produced in a New England Court as a book of original entry; but a subpoena issued to bring in a lion is a real novelty. This actually occurred in the Superior Court at Cincinnati the other day, in the case of replevin for a lioness and her cubs. It was argued that the progeny had been appraised at too high a figure, and the court ordered a view. So one of the cubs was brought in with his negro keeper, and demeaned himself with a mildness and meekness which should have been edifying to the lawyers. The judge looked at the lion, and, like the first Daniel, was not afraid, but decided that the young beast had undoubtedly been over valued. New York Tribune.

EXTRAORDINARY FORGERIES UPON LORD ST. LEONARDs. -Lord St. Leonards writes to inform the public of the fact that for the last twelve months he has been the victim of a singular system of false orders, letters, and telegrams to professional men, tradesmen, members of his family, and others. He mentions that after a short lull in those proceedings an order was sent to one house to make great marble alterations to a tomb in the adjoining churchyard, describing the sort of marble and the length and breadth of the slabs, with a copy of the actual inscription. A jeweller was directed to send diamonds of considerable value to his lordship. Again these attacks ceased, but recently an attempt was made to procure diamonds of value by a forged signature of his lordship which is perfect, and had been produced by tracing. The best detectives of Scotland-yard have been unable to make anything of the affair. The following is the forged letter by which it was attempted to procure the diamonds:- Athenæum Club, Pall-mail, Dec. 22. Messrs. Emanuel-I wish to present my seven