great that as the day wore on, and many still found themselves outside, they sought to gain entrance through the windows as well as doors. It is believed that 300 petitions have been filed. The only other instance of similar confusion and pressure which can be recalled is that which occurred during the railway mania of 1845, when the 1st of November was fixed by the Board of Trade as the last day for the receipt of plans, &c., of proposed lines, and when the rush of engineers, speculators, and parliamentary agents was as great as that of the impetuous bankrupts who have lately flocked into and taken possession of Basinghall-street. The object of all this rush was to avoid, as above mentioned, the penal consequences which might be incurred under the new system, and under the Imprison. ment for Debt Act, which makes the contraction of a debt through fraud, &c., a criminal offence, for which the debtor may be indicted at the Quarter Sessions.

The Daily News says that the new experiment will be watched with intense interest by two classes of the people. Under the old bankruptcy statutes the fraudulent debtor was able to work mischief with comparative impunity. Men of his class will anxiously scan the sections of the new Act in order to discover loopholes through which to escape from punishment. It is to be hoped they will look in vain. A larger class will watch the course of the new proceedings, and the operation of the new rules, in order to discern how far they promote the laudable ends of law reformers. Possibly the reality may fall short of the expectations which have been aroused. The working of the new machinery may partially fail in practice. That some shortcoming should not be disclosed is more than we can reasonably anticipate. But the possibility of this taking place should not operate in the smallest degree to prevent the Bankruptcy Act, one of the great measures of the Session of 1869, having fair play and a full trial. The essence of the new Bankruptcy Act lies in constituting the creditors the body by which the bankrupt's estate is to be administered and distributed. The court is to act with a view to aid them in their task, and to watch that everything is done in due form. No longer will the reckless or roguish trader be able to give that mockery of legal satisfaction which consists in paying dividends of a fraction of a penny in the pound. The minimum dividend is fixed at 10s. Till this is paid the bankruptcy will not terminate, nor will the bankrupt rest secure in the enjoyment of his subsequent earnings. The mere prospect of this condition has already terrified many traders; hence the rush to become bankrupts on their own petitions under the old law, and thereby avoid the chastisement in store for such as they.

THE MORAL OF THE GURNEYS' CASE.

The trial of the Gurneys' case was one of the great legal events of the year just concluded, and for many reasons it deserves attention. It illustrated in several respects the defects and anomalies of our system of criminal procedure; it exemplified the mischievous influence of popular fallacies and public clamour. It was a prosecution which ought never to have been instituted, and which was based upon gross blunder, and manifest error. The Lord Chief Justice declared that as regarded the new directors, he never remembered a prosecution more unjustifiable; and as they knew all that was known by the others, the inference is, that there ought to have been no prosecution at all. And, indeed, the Lord Chief Justice intimated that if there had been a public prosecutor he would have taken the statements of the new directors, and if, as it is evident would have been the case, they entirely exonerated the others, he would not have taken any criminal proceedings at all. Practically, of course, it would have been hopeless to do so, if the three new directors had been at liberty to appear as witnesses on behalf of the others. And probably they were included in the prosecution to exclude this evidence. How, indeed, could any public prosecutor have presumed to institute a criminal prosecution after a Judge of a Court of Equity had declared that in his belief there was no intention to defraud? Vice-Chancellor Malins took a view very adverse to the directors, and held that they were amenable to the charge of fraud in the equitable sense of the term, upon which

point, however, he was over-ruled by the Lord Chancellor ; yet the Vice-Chancellor expressly exonerated them from the charge of fraud in the legal sense, that is, wilful or intentional fraud. This entirely excluded the possibility of maintaining any legal proceedings, even civil, and rendered criminal proceedings worse than absurd-positively improper and oppressive. Yet after weeks of investigation a couple of aldermen actually presumed to commit six gentlemen of high character on a charge of fraud, in defiance of the opinion of an equity Judge, and against, as it turned out, the opinion of the Lord Chancellor; nay, for anything we can see, against the opinion of every body, except the prosecutor and his attorney, and the newspapers, who raised the outcry against the unhappy directors.

Out of the hundreds and thousands of shareholders only one was found so ill-advised as to dream of criminal proceedings, and he could not among them all find one to back him. His attorney had, it appeared, to go from pillar to post to get funds for the prosecution. He applied to the Government, and they repulsed him with quiet contempt. The application was indeed audacious and absurd to ask the Government to undertake a criminal prosecution in defiance of the opinion of two equity Judges, and one of them the Lord Chancellor. For on a bill which raised distinctly the question of equitable fraud, the Lord Chancellor absolved the directors. Then the prosecutor applied to the House of Commons, who, however, were equally deaf to his appeal. Lastly, with a sublime stretch of audacity he actually applied to the Court of Chancery, which had absolved the directors even of equitable fraud, and to the very Judge who had declared that they had no intention to defraud-the prosecutor applied to that Judge to throw the expense of the prosecution on the shareholders, who were unwilling themselves to support it. Of course the Court refused to make such a monstrous order and to waste the assets of the shareholders in a useless and hopeless prosecution. Then we heard that the prosecutor was to try and conduct the case in person, but the Lord Chief Justice would not hear of that. And then-the attorneys having thrown up the case they ought never to have taken up-we find somehow or other it is in the hands of Mr. Dawson and Mr. Dawson-Yelverton, and nine days are occupied in a trial which, from the very opening, it was seen must end in an acquittal. It was probably the most striking illustration that could be afforded of the anomalous character of our system.

The Lord Chief Justice declared with emphasis, that it had deepened in his mind the conviction that our system was most defective, and that a public prosecutor was essential to the proper administration of justice. Here were six gentlemen committed for trial, and compelled to find bail, to the enormous amount of £120,000 upon a criminal charge for which there was not a shadow of foundation; subjected for months to the annoyance and humiliation of such a charge; against the opinion of every rational person, and without the least possibility of any other result than an acquittal. The whole case had been gone into at the Mansion-house for weeks, after two years of preparation; and there was not an atom of evidence of any mis-statement in the prospectus, which the Lord Chief Justice declared was singularly devoid of adornment and was strictly truthful and correct. And the whole case rested on a supposed nondisclosure, which the merest tyro in law knows can never support a legal charge of fraud, even in a civil action, but can be at the utmost only equitable fraud; and had been declared by the Lord Chancellor not to be even that. It probably was the first case in the legal history of the country in which a magistrate had presumed to commit for trial on a criminal charge in defiance of the opinion of a superior Judge. One of the defendants read to the late Lord Mayor the passage from Vice-Chancellor Malins' judgment, in which he acquitted the directors of all intention to defraud; but it would seem that the Lord Mayor had not, even in the course of so many weeks' deliberation, learnt enough of law to know that without such intention to defraud it is impossible to maintain a charge of fraud, or perhaps he thought himself wiser than the Vice-Chancellor, or, possibly, may have thought that the Vice-Chancellor's view was erroneous, and that men might be convicted of fraud who had no intention to defraud. We hope his lordship did not

often act on that notion, or he did some grievous injustice in his mayoralty. However, the case is over, and we can understand the tremendous burst of popular enthusiasm which hailed the result. It was the old spirit of Englishmen sympathizing with those who had suffered something like oppression. It was a reaction from the prejudice which has been excited by popular fallacies and public clamour. The truth is, the whole case for the prosecution had rested on two or three blunders which was soon dissipated beneath the searching ordeal of a trial_before the Lord Chief Justice and a special jury. It was represented as a sale of assets, whereas it was the sale of a business with a guarantee of the sufficiency of assets transferred to meet the demands upon the business; that is, the usual and ordinary demands. The doubtful assets were not transferred, and therefore, properly enough, formed no part of the deed of transfer. For the same reason the company, in truth, had nothing directly to do with them. It was not, therefore, thought necessary to mention it particularly, though as the Lord Chief Justice observed, even a layman could have seen from the first deed that there must be another, for how could the assets be dealt with which were not transferred? These were dealt with by the second deed in a manner quite consistent with the first, and in no way departing from or varying it. How could a second deed which dealt with matters not included in the first, alter or affect it? The notion again, that the second deed disclosed the nature or number and amount of the excepted assets is simply a delusion. It did nothing of the kind. It mentioned only one of the debts, and did not mention any amount, so that no one from the most attentive study of it would learn more as to the nature or amount of the doubtful assets, than from the first. The pretence set up that the shareholders would have been deterred by the second deed from taking shares is as simply a false pretence. The Lord Chief Justice observed "that it would have made no differ

ence.

Hardly one of the shareholders looked at the first deed, and those who did might just as well not have looked at it, for they did not observe that (as the Lord Chief Justice remarked) it pointed to another. The truth is, however, that no one cared for deeds, and Mr. Peek acknowledged, if he had seen a dozen of them he would have read none of them. The whole case for the prosecution was based upon misrepresentation. It was a blunder from beginning to end. It arose amidst the clouds and mists of prejudice and the voice of popular clamour. Men's minds were confused and obscured by the vision of tremendous losses and the phantom of gigantic fraud. The shareholders eagerly seized hold of any pretence for setting up fraud against the directors in order to defeat the creditors. The moment they failed in that they lost all interest in it; they felt, probably, that they had not been defrauded. However they might have been impoverished they would not be parties to a prosecution. They were well aware that the real cause of the ruin of the company (as the official liquidator said truly enough) was the withdrawal of five millons, not the loss of three. If the deficient assets had all been realized, they could not have saved the company, which made a million and a half of bad debts, and had five millions of deposits withdrawn. It was the unparalleled rapidity and continuity of the rise in the rate of interest which pulled down the company-a rise for five months continuously, from 3 per cent. to 8. Every one who knows anything of the nature of the business of a bill broker and money dealer, knows that such a terrible rise in the rate of interest must be disastrous and destructive. The company was ruined through causes over which no human being had any control, and it was cruel to seek to crush by a criminal charge men already involved in the common ruin.-The Law Times.

PUBLIC PROSECUTORS.

It is to be hoped that the present session will see, among other things, some settlement of the question about public prosecutors. Indeed, we have reason to believe that the emphatic observations of the Chief Justice have not been without their effect, and that the subject is now under the consideration of the Government. The great point to be borne in mind in dealing with the subject is that whatever

scheme may be adopted must be so arranged as to harmonize with our existing system of criminal procedure. The attempt to devise an entirely new code of criminal procedure would probably fail on account of the extreme difficulty of devising any system which would be an improvement upon the existing one, and which at the same time would harmonize with the general framework of English society. We must never forget that, whatever may be the defects of our existing system, it is worked by an enormous number of persons, who understand and are interested in it, whose services it would be very difficult to replace, and who would vehemently object to being obliged to learn a completely new lesson from the very A B C of the subject upwards. If we choose to put the task of punishing crime into the hands of unpaid county and borough magistrates, assisted by clerks whom they appoint themselves, and who are paid for what they do by their ordinary professional charges, we must not throw duties upon them for which they have no special aptitude, and which are entirely different from those which they have accustomed themselves to discharge. In the course of time we may look for an organic change in this respect, but meanwhile, if we are to work with the materials which we haye, we must see what are the points at which, in practice, the present system breaks down, and consider how they might be supplied. In a certain number of cases the system which we have got already works to perfection. A regular field day in an English criminal court, a trial on which, for whatever reason, the parties concerned take sufficient interest to spend as much money as will do the thing as well as it can be done, is perhaps as impressive a spectacle of the kind as is to be seen anywhere. Subject to a few minor questions, such as the propriety of examining the prisoner, which may be decided either way consistently with the adoption of any system of procedure, such trials seem to us to approach perfection. We should doubt, for instance, whether any country could have shown a more dignified, more perfectly impartial, or more effective crimi-* nal trial than that which ended in the conviction of Palmer for the murder of Cook. The reason of this was simply that as the case happened to be one of great interest, and as the prisoner had friends who were willing to advance large sums of money for his defence, no expense was spared in doing everything as well as it possibly could be done. The problem is to provide means by which security may be given that the essential part of what was done on that occasion should be done on all occasions. What, then, was done? Simply this. Energetic attorneys, acting under the advice of experienced barristers, got up the case for the Crown and for the prisoner just as they would have got up the case in an ordinary action for damages, and when the matter finally came to trial, fees were paid which secured the services of men of eminence. The whole question of public prosecutors is to discover means by which these advantages, in so far as they are required, may be secured in all cases; and it is obvious that this is a mere question of money. Of course, it would by no means be necessary in all or even in many cases to go to an expense in the least degree resembling that which was incurred, and, as we believe, properly incurred, in prosecuting and defending Palmer. In the vast majority of criminal cases a very moderate amount of money will buy all the skill and care which is really wanted, but in all cases the same elements are required. There must always be some one to get up the case, and some one to present it to the court-in other words, there must always be a barrister and an attorney; and if each of them is competent to do his business properly, the trial will, no doubt, be satisfactorily conducted. In the case of trials at the sessions and assizes, there is no difficulty about barristers, at least in cases in which costs are allowed. The competition for business at the bar is so desperately keen that small as are the fees allowed for criminal prosecutions, plenty of thoroughly competent men will always be found who are only too eager to accept them. The difficulty is with the attorneys. In many, we believe in a considerable majority, of the cases tried in London no attorney is employed, and though this is otherwise in the country, the fees allowed are on so small a scale, and the work itself is so unpleasant, that attorneys of standing do not care about having it, and in many instances

take it only because they regard it as a part, and an unpleasant and unprofitable part, of their work as clerks to particular benches of magistrates. It does thus happen, no doubt, that in particular instances cases are carelessly got up, and a failure of justice is the result. One remedy for this is simplicity itself. Revise to a certain extent the scale of fees, make it worth the while of attorneys of standing to do the business, and direct that, whenever a man is committed for trial, the committing magistrate shall nominate some attorney to take charge of it, and empower him to do so, if he should see fit, at any time after the apprehension of the prisoner and before his committal. This simple change, with the addition of some minor alterations, such as allowing attorneys a somewhat wider discretion than they have at present in taking the opinion of counsel upon evidence, would go far to provide for the proper management of the common routine of criminal cases.

This, however, is only one branch, though probably it is the most important branch, of the subject. Two others still remain, to which we will now refer. The first of these relates to the case of prosecutions for which no costs are allowed. These form a large and important branch of criminal prosecutions. The principle by which it ought to be decided whether or not costs should be allowed is plain enough, though its application is occasionally difficult, and is sure to be more or less arbitrary. It is that they should be given in respect of crimes in the prosecution of which the public in all common cases have a direct interest. It is clearly for the public interest that, in the absence of very exceptional circumstances indeed, theft, arson, robbery, passing bad money, and the like, should be punished; but it is equally clear that it is not for the public interest that people should be encouraged to prosecute every act which could possibly be brought within the wide definitions which at present prevail of such offences as nuisance, libel, and conspiracy. We do not think that the line is at present drawn in such a way as to embody this principle completely. Many offences might be mentioned the prosecution of which is clearly for the public interest in most cases, and for which costs are not allowed; but this is a matter of detail. The line is drawn, in fact, with a reasonable approach to fairness, and we think it might well be laid down as a general principle that, except in the cases which we are about to mention, the public need not concern them. selves with prosecutions in which no costs are allowed.

This brings us to the last branch of the subject. There are a certain number of charges, of which the Gurney case is a conspicuous illustration, in the prosecution of which the public has a very deep interest, but which are so intricate and extensive, or are otherwise so situated, that it can hardly be expected that private persons should take them up merely out of regard to the public interest. There are other cases which would be prosecuted at all events by the common machinery provided for the purpose, but which are so important that it is considered undesirable to leave them to take their course in the common way. Palmer's case, Smethurst's case, and other remarkable trials for murder which have occurred in the London district, and have been prosecuted by the Solicitor to the Treasury, are instances of prosecutions of this sort. When, as is frequently the case, such cases are taken up by the Treasury, they are probably prosecuted in a more thoroughly satisfactory manner than any other cases whatever; and if a proper officer were appointed whose duty it was, whenever he was applied to, to consider and report-viz., to the law officers of the Crown-upon the propriety of conducting any particular prosecution at the public expense, and who was empowered with their consent to undertake and carry on such prosecutions at the public expense, cases of this class would be effectually provided for, and would, no doubt, be disposed of in a manner as satisfactory as the important cases to which we have referred. The duties of the new officer would differ from those of the present Solicitor to the Trea sury in the circumstance that it would be his exclusive and principal duty to do independently, and on his own discretion, that which the Solicitor to the Treasury does occasionally and under the directions of his official superiors. In other respects the result would be much the same as if the Government prosecutions, which at present are comparatively rare, were to become considerably more frequent.

We believe that these easy and slight additions to our existing system would be a great improvement, and would, at least, provide for the prosecution of offenders in a manner perfectly consistent with our habits and institutions. To complete it, a local organization, similar to that of the Procurators-Fiscal in Scotland, would certainly be desirable; but for that we could afford to wait.

It may, perhaps, be objected that the frequent reference to the law officers of the question whatever particular prosecutions should be undertaken would add very greatly to the labour of officials who are already overworked. No doubt it would; but we have also no doubt that the present position of the law officers is one which really is a scandal, and which ought to be and soon will be recognized as such. It is utterly impossible for the most vigorous, the most energetic, and the most expeditious of men to do as they ought to be done all the public duties of the AttorneyGeneral, and at the same time to carry on a large private business at the bar. To be a barrister in first-rate practice and at the very top of his profession, or to be the legal adviser of the Government upon all questions of first-rate importance is quite work enough for any one man, and is more than any one man can do. The plain truth is that the Attorney and Solicitor-General ought to be required to give up all private practice during their tenure of office. Their salaries, if necessary, ought to be raised in order to enable them to do so. If we were not so much accustomed to it, it would have been a manifest scandal that one of the legal advisers of the Crown, who was liable at any moment to be called upon to give his opinion upon matters which might involve not merely the expenditure of millions of money, but peace and war between great nations, should for more than a fortnight have expended all the energies of an active mind and vigorous body in trying to prove that Miss Saurin was right and Mrs. Starr wrong in a paltry squabble which made one wish that all the parties could have been put in the corner for half an hour and then told to come out and kiss and be friends. If the Attorney and Solicitor-General were relieved from work of this sort, and were enabled to devote their whole time to the business of their principal client, many other matters besides the question of public prosecutors would be managed better than they are at present.- Pall Mall Gazette.

VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT WITHOUT A
POWER OF REVOCATION.

It is not, we are sorry to say, a very uncommon occurrence for old ladies, whether widows or old maids, who are the fortunate possessors of a comfortable independence, secured it may be in consols or first class railway debentures, to quarrel bitterly with their nearest and dearest friends and relatives for some very trivial and generally purely imaginary cause. They have perhaps been living in the house of some nephew or grandson, whose wife and children have not shown the abject respect and subservience which aunt or grandmamma thinks due to her age and wealth. High words ensue, and the quarrel ends some day in the old lady going off in a huff, and setting herself up in solitary grandeur at a considerable distance from her offending host and his family. Of course she is very miserable and uncomfortable, and, although she would die rather than confess it, in her inmost heart wishes herself back again in her old quarters. If she were left alone, time would in all probability speedily heal all wounds, and a reconciliation would take place; but just at this time there is sure to step in some female friend or acquaintance with an invitation to spend a short time with her. The old lady of course accepts the offer, and (we need not say) is likely to find herself very well treated by her new host and hostess, and all their family; everything and everybody is made to give way to her pleasure and convenience, and those at her elbow do not forget to put the worst possible construction on the conduct of her relations. Such a course is too often successful; the short visit grows into a long one; and it is at last permanently arranged that the old lady shall make her home with her new friends, They of course are reasonably anxious that all their care and trouble shall not be expended for nothing, and the repayment they look for is the pro

perty of their guest after her death. She is ready and willing to do all in her power to prevent their being disappointed, and either promises or actually makes a will in their favour. But the prospective recipients of her bounty want something more certain; they know that promises may be broken and wills revoked; the old lady's temper is none of the best, and she may claim to exercise the proverbial privilege of her sex to change her mind. So a local solicitor is called in, and what is intended to be an irrevocable settlement of the property is executed; the difficulty is to make it absolutely irrevocable. Now, although the above state of circumstances is purely imaginary, we have no doubt that there are very few solicitors of standing and experience who have not been called upon professionally to deal with and advise upon similar cases. We do not mean to deny that there may not be circumstances which would render a voluntary settlement eminently meritorious and proper; but whether it may be so or not, there is no doubt that it is in the power of any person (who is compos mentis) to make an irrevocable voluntary settlement of property over which he or she has absolute control; and although it may be the duty of a legal adviser to advise his client most strongly against such a settlement, he should at least be able to prepare an instrument that will hold water if positively instructed to do so. For this reason we recommend to the attention of our subscribers the case of Coutts v. Acworth, lately decided by Vice-Chancellor Malins, which they will find reported at p. 694 of the December number of the Law Journal Reports. The case very fully and plainly exemplifies the present state of the law on the matter, and especially shows how strongly the Courts lean against a voluntary settlement in which there is not inserted a proper power of revocation.

The facts which led to the suit being instituted were the following:-In the year 1853, Mrs. Harvey, a married woman, aged 53, was living apart from her husband, and also was on bad terms with her son in law, the surviving husband of her only child. She was temporarily residing in the house of Joseph Acworth, her only sister's husband; and being desirous of making some disposition of a sum of £3,000, of which she was tenant-for-life, with a general power of appointment, was introduced by Joseph Acworth to his cousin George Acworth, a Rochester solicitor, and by him a deed was prepared, and executed by Mrs. Harvey, containing (without any power of revocation) an irrevocable appointment of the £3,000 to herself for life, with remainder to Joseph Acworth absolutely. George Acworth has since died, and it was not proved whether he received his instructions from Mrs. Harvey or Joseph Acworth; but it was clear that the latter paid for the deed, which also remained in his possession after its execution. In 1861 Mrs. Harvey, then a widow, married a Mr. Brenchley, and thereupon executed a second settlement of the £3,000, which, however, she afterwards revoked. Upon this occasion she told her solicitor, referring to the previous settlement, that she had executed a will in favour of Joseph Acworth, but he, on being applied to for the document, refused to give it up, and remained silent as to its nature and contents until after Mrs. Brenchley's death in 1862. She had a short time previously executed a will, revoking the second settlement, and appointing £1,000 to her husband, and £2,000 to the plaintiff Coutts, who was then her spiritual adviser, and whom she made her executor. On probate of the will by Coutts, Joseph Acworth produced the settlement of 1853, and claimed the fund. A bill was thereupon filed by Coutts to set aside the settlement, on the ground that it had been prepared without any independent professional advice; that it contained no power of revocation; and that the settler executed it in the belief that she was signing a will only, and not an irrevocable instrument.

We may mention, although much stress does not appear to have been laid upon the fact at the bar, that the defendants in the suit were the nephews and nieces of Mrs. Harvey (Joseph Acworth being dead), while the plaintiff, who was attempting to obtain, and finally succeeded in obtaining, two-thirds of the £3,000, was only her spiritual adviser, and no relation at all. This would certainly not make the learned Judge lean in his favour; but the settlement was nevertheless declared void. The judgment of the Vice-Chancellor (as all his judgments are) is very clear and plain, and will

well repay a careful and attentive perusal. We can only notice the most salient points of it. His Honour began by stating the facts of the case at length, and characterized the deed of settlement as a most improvident arrangement, which Mrs. Harvey never ought to have been permitted to execute; he commented strongly on the fact that George Acworth was not her solicitor, but Joseph Acworth's, and upon the conduct of the latter in declining to produce the document in his possession. We may notice in passing a rather curious entry in a bill of costs furnished by Messrs. Acworth and Sons to Joseph Acworth in the year 1862. 'Attending and conferring with you, when you informed us that Mrs. Brenchley had made a will and settlement, and advising you to keep quiet, which you promised to do.' It seems, however, by no means a safe course to keep quiet about such ticklish documents as irrevocable voluntary settlements. The Vice-Chancellor then referred to the great case of Haguenin v. Baseley, decided by Lord Eldon, and reported in 14 Ves. 273. The principle laid down in that case appears to be, that, whenever a voluntary settlement or deed of gift is made, it is incumbent on the defendant, and he has it thrown upon him, to prove that the transaction was fair aud proper, and was understood by the person who was the donor. Following Haguenin v. Baseley, the Vice-Chancellor held that the representatives of Joseph Acworth had not proved that the settlement in question was fair or proper, or understood by Mrs. Harvey The cases of Anderson v. Elsworth (30 Law J. Rep. N.S., Chanc. 922), and Forshaw v. Wetsby (30 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 331), carry the doctrine further, and show that, where the circumstances are such that the donor or settler ought to have been advised to retain a power of revocation, and such a power is not inserted, it is a thing fatal to the deed. His Honour's concluding words are very much to the point: 'If I had the power I should lay it down as a rule that whenever a voluntary gift of a material part of a person's property is made (unless it is prepared by an independent solicitor, and the donor distinctly repudiates and refuses to insert a power of revocation), it is the duty of the solicitor to insist that there shall be, and almost to go to the extent of refusing to prepare such an instrument unless there be a power of revoking and altering that which is done, so as to meet the various exigencies that may arise in future life. In my opinion the fact of there being no such power of revocation is all but a conclusive reason for setting aside the deed; unless it is proved to demonstration that there was a distinct intention on the part of the donor to put the bulk of her property out of her own reach, it is the duty of the solicitor, in preparing such an instrument, to see that there is a full power of revocation or right of reservation inserted.' The Vice-Chancellor ended by declaring the settlement void, and ordered the defendants to pay the costs of the suit. We hope all solicitors will take note of this case and act upon it; if they do not, and find themselves taken to task rather sharply by Vice-Chancellor Malins, they will only have themselves to blame.-The Law Journal.

PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN THE LONDON POLICE COURTSThe following notice was posted at the Worship-street Police Court on Saturday :-On and after the 1st day of January, 1870, no person will be permitted in any way to practise at this court except those entitled by law to do so, viz. :-1. Barristers-at-law. 2. Attorneys or solicitors. 3. Persons specially authorized by statute to conduct certain cases bofore magistrates. But the articled clerk to an attorney or solicitor will be allowed to represent his principal upon producing a written request that he may be permitted to do so, and upon his satisfying the presiding magistrate that the absence of such attorney or solicitor is unavoidable. This rule will be strictly adhered to.-(Signed), C. C. Ellison, R. M. Newton, Magistrates.

CONSULAR JURISDICTION IN EGYPT.-A telegram ated Cairo, January 3, states that the International Commission for reforming the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts in Egypt has elected a committee, consisting of the English, Austrian, French, and Italian representatives. Nubar Pasha has been appointed president. The committee has accepted as the basis of its deliberations a

system of three courts of justice to be established at Alexandria, Cairo, and another place. A court of appeal is to be fixed at Alexandria, and a court of last appeal at Cairo. European judges will be appointed for five years and paid by the Egyptian Government.

PAYING MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT.-The Legislative Assembly at Melbourne has lately passed a bill for payment of members. It is proposed to appropriate a sum of £30,000 annually for this purpose, each member to receive £300 a year. It was objected that by this measure a class of pauper politicians would be introduced, who would pay themselves by plundering the State, and selling the patronage which came into their power. On the other hand, it was urged that members should be compensated by a salary for the expenses to which they were put. The second reading was carried by twenty-six to seventeen; the bill subsequently passed through committee, and, having been read a third time, was transmitted to the Upper House. When we come to this in England, as we probably shall at no distant day, it will be curious to observe if, on the ground of economy, the House will reduce the number of its members, and, supposing the competitive examination mania still to be raging, whether our legislators will apply this system to themselves.-Pall Mall Gazette.

NEWSPAPERS.—The Italians led the way in the publication of newspapers, under the title of Gazettas; and the first English newspaper, of which there are inany copies in the British Museum, was entitled "The English Mercurie,' published in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and "imprinted at London by her highnesses printer, 1588."

WHAT CONSTITUTES WILFUL FIRE-RAISING.-A case in which a rather curious question was raised as to what is necessary to constitute the crime of wilful fire-raising came before the Greenock police court on Tuesday. A stout young labourer named James Johnstone was chared with having, on the 18th ult., set fire to part of the contents of a house in Wellington-lane, occupied by Mary Anne Little. Having pleaded not guilty, evidence for the prosecution was adduced at considerable length. It appeared that Johnstone, who had just completed a period of imprisonment for breach of the peace, had frequently quarrelled with the woman Little, who had newly entered into posses. sion of her house, that he had been turned out of the premises, and that shortly arterwards, in her temporary absence, he had gone in, and was observed to leave by himself, and immediately afterwards- some five minutes-the house was found to be on fire. A bed was burned, two sheets and a mat were destroyed, a table was broken, and, but for the intervention of some neighbours, more serious damage might have been the result. Bailie Neill asked if this was really a case competent for this court-they could not try wilful fire-raising. Captain Dewar replied that this case did not amount to wilful fire-raising. He had looked over the authorities, and found "it is essential to the crime of fire-raising that some part of the tenement set on fire should have been actually ignited; but if this has been done it is immaterial how small a portion that may be, or for how short a time the flames may have continued." No part of the tenement had, in this case, been set on fire. For the defence it was alleged that the woman Little had been during the whole day drunk, that Johnstone had been out the whole evening, and that the fire had been kindled before he had come near the building. The presiding magistrate (Bailie Neill) stated that he put little faith in the defence, after considering all the evidence, and sentenced the prisoner to sixty days' imprisonment.

NOTES OF ENGLISH DECISIONS.
(From the Law Times.)

COUNTY VOTE-INCUMBENT OF A DISTRICT CHURCH.K., as incumbent of the district church of St. A., in the parish of B., in the county of M., had a freehold for life in the said church and churchyard. By orders in council the sums of £150 and £50 were ordered to be paid annually to the incumbent of the said church by the Ecclesiastical

Commissioners of England and the treasurer of the governors of Queen Anne's Bounty respectively. Under and by virtue of an order in council, K., as such incumbent, was entitled to and in receipt of the fees paid in respect of marriages, baptisms, and churchings performed in the said church, and the income arising from these fees exceeded 40 shillings per annum. It was proved that K., as incumbent, was in receipt of fees paid in respect of burials of persons dying within the district attached to the said church, though the said burials took place in another parish; these fees amounted to more than 40 shillings a year. No evidence, however, was given of his right or title to these fees. No assignment of pew rents had been made, nor was K. in receipt of any income from pew rents: Held, that K. was not entitled to a vote for the county of M. in respect of the church, as the church was not itself worth, nor could K. make it worth, 40 shillings a year to him, and the fees and other emoluments, which he was as incumbent entitled to and in receipt of, could not be considered as giving the church a value: (Kirton v. Dear, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 532. C. P.)

HUSBAND AND WIFE-DESERTION-NECESSARIES.-- A husband deserted his wife and left her without means of support. She then filed a bill praying that the trustees in whose names stood a sum of Consols in which she had an interest defeasible in a certain event, might be directed to pay the dividends to her, and a decree to that effect was made. The dividends which fell due just before the date of the decree had been received by the husband, and one of the trustees advanced moneys to the wife for her maintenance till the next dividends became due. On a bill by the trustee against the husband: Held, that the husband was liable to repay the moneys so advanced: (Deare v. Soutten, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 523. M. R.)

PERSONALTY.-A

MARSHALLING ASSETS-DEFICIENT testator gave £500 and specific articles to his wife, and a moiety of his real estate to her for life, or during her widowhood, and subject thereto to his children. The personalty, including the proceeds of an advowson directed to be sold to pay debts, &c., proved insufficient to pay such debts, legacies, and funeral expenses, and it was proposed in the minutes to insert a declaration that the £500 legacy, and the specific gift in the real estate, should make up the deficiency rateably, following Hensman v. Fryer, L. Rep. 3 Eq. 420; 17 L. T. Rep. N. S. 394. The court refused to allow it to be inserted: (Dugdale v. Dugdale, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 526. V. C. M.)

DEATH OF PLAINTIFF IN EQUITY-REVIVOR-15 & 16 VICT. c. 86, s. 52. —An interested person in a suit, who had liberty to attend the proceedings, and had been served with a copy of the decree, applied on the death of a sole plaintiff to revive the suit: Held, that he was entitled to do so, and order to revive made: (Chester v. Chester, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 527. V. C. J.)

TRESPASS "NATURAL CONSEQUENCE" OF ACT.-Y., a candidate for election as member of Parliament, was accompanied through a borough by a crowd of persons forming a procession in his honour. The windows of certain houses, belonging to members of the opposite political party, were broken by the mob in their course; and Y., standing up in a carriage, waived his hat in the air, but with no intention of encouraging the mob in their acts of violence, and made no attempt to leave the carriage or stop the procession, though he remonstrated with those who could hear him on the disgraceful character of their proceedings. Under these circumstances, Y. was held not liable for the damage caused by the breaking of the windows: (Peacock v. Young, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 527. Q. B.)

INTEREST IN LAND-STATUTE OF FRAUDS, s. 4.—An agreement by the defendant to procure for the plaintiff the transfer or sale of the unexpired term of a lease for thirteen years of a public house, was held to be a contract as to an interest in lands within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds. (Keatinge, J., dubitante.): (Horsey v. Graham, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 530. C. P.)

RAILWAY-PURCHASE OF LEASEHOLD-APPORTIONMENT OF RENTS-NOTICE TO TREAT WITH LESSORS.—A railway