ment was to receive a more imposing and solemn charac. ter. The Senate of Massachusetts had responded to the Governor, in this language : “We have witnessed, with “emotions of ardent gratitude to Heaven,” his (the Governor’s) “re-election, and assure him, that the papers “ and documents, mentioned in his message, shall receive “a favorable consideration.” To this end, it was moved in the Legislature, by Mr. Low, “that a committee be “appointed to confer with all the New England States, “ and see if they will agree to appoint a committee to “join them, and repair to the City of Washington imme“diately, then and there personally to make known to “the President, the general opinion of the New Eng“land States, in regard to the present war, and the man“ner in which it has been conducted ; and inform him “ that he must either resign his office as President, or “remove those ministers, and other officers of the Gene“ral Government, who have, by their nefarious plans, ruined the nation.” Sir, this resolution was read, and the next day was named for the consideration of the subject. It was afterwards withdrawn. This was in October, 1814. The opposition to the General Government did not stop here. The documents, referred to in the Governor's communication, connected with the project of the Hartford Convention, or rather the grounds on which that convention was to be formed, had been referred to a committee, when sundry resolutions were reported, and passed, providing for the appointment of delegates to the Convention. On the 9th of October, twelve delegates were appointed by the Legislature to attend the Convention which was to meet at Hartford. The Convention met, deliberated, and reported their proceedings at Hartford, which were approved by the Legislature of Massachusetts, on the 25th of January, 1815, by resolution of that body. The Governor was authorized to appoint commissioners to repair to the City of Washington, for the purpose of carrying into effect the objects of this Convention. What were the objects of this Convention 2 Were they constitutional objects Were they more constitutional than resistance to an invading enemy? Were they patriotic 2 Did they not savor of disloyalty.” Did they not lead to disunion But they were to ask the President to resign, or rather, demand his resignation. This was a modest request to be sure ; very patriotic, I have no doubt, in the estimation of the Convention of Hartford. But what must every patriot and American feel, in taking a review of these transactions Their diabolical plans were not executed. Higher destinies awaited this country. Peace was restored ; the Union was preserved. . During this period, the 8th of January, so memorable in our history, had been inscribed in the calendar of our national days—that day which had so happily illustrated our national character. 'Tis the brightest and proudest day which this country has witnessed within nearly half a century. But, Sir, I will not—nay, I cannot—utter the feelings which I cherish in the recollection of that day. It beggared the annals of the world, in the brilliancy of its achievements. It will be remembered by every American as glorious to this country, and incalculable in its results. Can this committee, with all these circumstances placed before them, say that this claim shall be paid But, we are told, that the good People ought not to be mulcted for the conduct of their officers. Their officers were of their own creation. They were re-elected by a majority of the State, with a knowledge that their politics were at war with the nation’s safety. The individuals have been paid. The State, in its character, resisted the power of the General Government. Now, it is the business of that Government, to withhold from Massachusetts a sum to which she has no right, no claim, in law or equity. In future we.shall have no more talk about

conscriptions. Let the Governor, the Legislature, and some of those eloquent leaders whose influence was so great at that day, compromise this matter with their own People. They will not again, at a period so momentous, impede the General Government in its march against for reign aggression. Let Massachusetts learn to feel and co-operate with her sister States. Let her, hereafter, make common cause in defence of our republican institutions, and no difficulties can arise in the payment of her troops. The war in which she refused to co-operate, was a war for maritime rights, and the interests of commerce. We are told that Massachusetts has six hundred miles of sea-board. She has her ships and her sailors, whilst other States of the Union have neither. The war grew out of the interests of the states bordering on the Atlantic. In the mountains we were safe, secure in our fastnesses: the enemy could not approach us. Did we wait until the enemy invaded our firesides No . But when the New England States suffered by outrages, committed on her citizens and her commerce, National pride swelled in our bosoms. We had not our brothers and sons impressed by the enemy. The mountains of the West entrenched us. We, too, could have objected, on the ground of constitutional scruples, to a participation in that war. It was not done. The limits of the Continent were not too broad for our Militia. They would have marched to the Rocky Mountains—nay, even to the shores of the Pacific, if the National safety had required them to do so. When our armies were without supplies, in the land of an enemy, not one murmur escaped them against the General Government. ...On this floor, our Representatives, true to the National interest, throughout the struggle, declared the will of their constituents. But one feeling was cherished by them, and that was an anxious solicitude for the preservation of our liberty, cost what it would. When peace was restored, we claimed nothing of the General Government but what we were fairly entitled to, by the conditions of service. If Massachusetts had pursued a similar course, not a voice would have been heard, to-day, in opposition to this claim. She chose a different course, and it is but justice that she should realize its consequences. On motion of Mr. DWIGHT, the Committee rose, and the House adjourned.

Monnay, MAnch 27, 1826. PROTECTION OF COMMERCE.

On motion of Mir. STORRS, (Chairman of the Navai Committee) the House took up the bill “to provide an additional Naval Force,” in Committee of the Whole, Mr. LATHROP in the Chair.

Mr. STORRS briefly explained the objects of the bill. It was notorious that a war had, for some time, existed between the Governments of Brazil and La Plata; and, from the situation of those countries, it must be expected that the hostilities would bring into action a vast number of privateers, as well as a class of vessels below privateers, and manned with crews which are to be considered as little, if any thing, different from pirates. In addition to the dangers arising to our commerce from this state of things, there was also issued by the Emperor of Brazil, what must be considered as a paper blockade, as it extended from Cape Horn to above the Rio de la Plata, Gan extent of coast which Brazil had not a Naval force sufficient to guard, there was a squadron at present in the La Plata for the express object of enforcing this blockade in that river, and before the ports in its vicinity. The part of the Ocean thus beset with causes of danger was in the direct track, or very near to it, pursued by our East India trade, and by that to the Pacific Ocean; and our vessels had already been put to inconvenience since the war

commenced. It was highly expedient that a part of our

Naval power should be stationed there to protect our commerce; but the Secretary of the Navy was without any appropriation for such a purpose. Vessels for this service are not provided for in the General Navy appropriation Bill; nor can any part of the force, now employed elsewhere, be with propriety withdrawn for the purpose of being transferred to this coast. The appearance of a Naval force, belonging to the United States, in those seas, was indispensable to the safety of our trade. Nothing else had been proved by experience sufficient to that end. The Secretary of the Navy had expressed his opinion that one frigate, and two sloops of war, was the smallest force that would be adequate to the object in view; and these vessels could severally be prepared for sea in forty-five, sixty, and ninety days. The appropriation in the bill extended no farther than till the first of January next. Mr. S. then went into an explanation of the details of appropriation proposed. Mr. WILLIAMS observed, that, if he had rightly understood the Chairman of the Naval Committee, he had stated that a paper blockade now existed on a part of the South American coast; and that this was one of the reasons why this bill should pass. He wished to know whetherit was intended, by the force now proposed, or by any other, that the United States should raise that blockade 2 If not, he could see no reason why that fact had been urged as a reason for the appropriation. He could, for his own part, see no more reason why a Naval force was to be sent into these seas to protect our commerce, than there would be to send a fleet into the English Channel for the same end, in case of a war between France and England. There was a great difference between civilized nations and barbarians, as to the dangers to be guarded against by an armed force—if any injuries are committed on our commerce by one of the former, this House has the power of obtaining redress—but, in the yicinity of barbarous and semi-barbarous nations, as in the Mediterranean and Gulf of Mexico, force was necessary. It seemed to him, the objects of this bill were quite as likely, and more so, to jeopardize the peace of the United States, as the so much discussed mission to the Congress at Panama. Mr. STORRS replied and explained. He had not said that the object of this armament was to raise the blockade—but only to protect our own shipping peacefully en: gaged in commerce. He then went into a brief history of the origin and present state of the contest between the Governments of Brazil and La Plata. The province immediately on the East of La Plata, and commonly known as the Banda Oriental, had been seized upon by the Emperor of Brazil, who declared that he should hold it subject to negotiation. While the Province was thus held, the inhabitants rose and dispossessed the Brazilian troops; a squadron was then sent by the Emperor into the river, and required that the Republics of Buenos Ayres (or La Plata) should disavow the acts of those who had thus resi the Brazilian power. Buenos Ayres refused to negotiate with the Commander of this squadron, and required a regular Ambassador, and afterwards claimed the Banda Oriental, as pertaining to her ; war was then declared by Brazil, and a fleet sent into the river; from this brief view, it was easy to conceive what would be the character of the war. The Brazilian Emperor considered the inhabitants of the Banda as a sort of quasi rebels, and would treat them accordingly. He need not call the recollection of the House to what had occurred in the West Indies-or what our commerce had suffered for the want of adequate and timely protection in those seas. If we would avoid the tition of such a scene, we should be before-hand with the freebooters. As to the expense of the armament, the mere duties on a single Indiaman would exceed the whole amount. He had pronounced the blockade of the

Emperor to be a paper blockade, because it was notorious that Monarch possessed no fleet to enforce it :-besides this, the adjacency of the scene of this war to the Caribbean seas, would naturally draw to it that mass of lawless depredators, who were now, for a time, at least, held in check in the West Indies and Gulf of Mexico; they will flock there in hopes of plunder, and we ought to be prepared for them. If less than a respectable force should be sent, they will laugh at it. As to causes of collision and difficulty, the presence of a respectable force was the very best safe-guard against their occurrence. Experience ought, by this time, to have taught us, that the best and cheapest mode for securing our rights on the Ocean, was to protect them, in time, against invasion; and not to let our property be seized, and then make a shew of force in demanding indemnity. The first expense was the smallest, and the present bill was dictated, in his opinion, by the soundest economy. Mr. WILLIAMS said, he had no objection to an armament to provide against pirates; but, if that was the object of this bill, its object and title did not agree. Mr. CAMBRELENG reminded the gentlemen from North Carolina that an efficient Naval force had been very usefully employed in protecting our commerce in the Pacific Ocean. He would ask that gentleman how many American vessels would probably have been captured on that coast, but for the presence of our squadron He concurred entirely with his colleague, as to the necessity of sending a strong force to the Brazilian coast. However important the Mediterranean station might be, that of Brazil would soon be infinitely more so. He hoped his apprehensions would prove to be unfounded, but he feared the war which had recently broke out in that quarter of the world, was destined, and at no distant period, to be. come one of the most important wars of modern times. He thought it would soon be necessary to have a stronger force there than that proposed in the bill, and under that impression he intended to suggest to his colleague the propriety of amending the bill, in order that the Navy Department might be at liberty to transfer the frigate proposed to the Mediterranean, and that the North Carolina, or some other 74, might be ordered to the Brazilian coast, where she would be more serviceable to our commerce. Mr. WEBSTER said, no law was necessary to authorize the President to transfer a vessel from one station to another. Mr. CAMBRELENG was aware of that ; but the gentleman from Massachusetts, by examining this bill, would find that it contemplated a specific appropriation of a specific force, for a special purpose. It contained a provision similar to that found in the bill of last year, for building ten sloops of war for suppressing piracy. In like manner, this bill had a special reference to the Brazilian war. In order to leave the Department authorized to substitute a 74m place of the frigate, it would be necessary to strike out the particular words, and to make the appropriation as all our other Naval appropriations were made. . He accordingly moved to strike out the specific words in the bill. After accepting a modification proposed by Mr. STORRS, the amendment was adopted. The bill, after another amendment, was then reported, as amended, and ordered to its third reading.

UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AMERICA.

The resolution offered by Mr. WICKLIFFE, on Satur day last, relative to the pledge said to have been given by our Minister to Mexico, came up as the unfinished business.

Mr. VERPLANCK observed, that, in this resolution, the character of our Minister seemed to him to be confounded with another, and a much more important subject : to avoid this, he had prepared another resolution, which he wished now to offer as an amendment, to come in after the word “Resolved.” “That the Committee on Foreign Relations be instructed to inquire and report to this House, whether the United States has, in any manner, by any authority recognized by the Constitution, made any pledge to the Governments of Mexico and South America, that the United States would not permit the interference of any foreign power with the independence or form of Government of those Nations in what manner and to what extent * Mr. WICRLIFFE expressed his approbation of the amendment, which he accepted as a modification of his resolution. He disclaimed, however, all intention of making any attack upon our Minister to Mexico : he felt not the slightest hostility to that gentleman, for whom, on the contrary, he entertained great respect; his only wish had been to obtain an expression of the sense of this House, as to an important declaration of one who was the acknowledged and responsible organ of this Government. Mr. MALLARY said, that he was glad the resolution had been offered—his only objection was to the form in which the subject was referred. When information was wished for, touching our foreign relations, it had been usual for this House to direct its call to the Executive, and not to one of its own Committees. . A highly respectable individual had gone abroad as our Diplomatic Agent to a neighboring Republic—he had, in his intercourse with that Government, made a declaration which appeared to have excited great interest. This was to have been expected— it was right it should—it was natural that the nation should wish to know how far they are understood by other Governments, as pledged to a particular line of policy. The present was a very proper inquiry, as going to correct false impressions, if any had been received, and presenting an occasion on which the House might, if it thought fit, make a stand as to the policy to be pursued by this Government. It was highly expedient that the facts of this case should be fully known. The reference of our Minister seemed to him to be to no other pledge than that which may be understood as given in Mr. Monroe's message. Yet, when that message was closely examined, it would be found to contain no express pledge as to what this Government would do in the case supposed. [Here Mr. M. quoted the part of the message refer. red to.] Here, sir, is nothing so very alarming, unless it be considered as preparing the way for a future war—it gives no pledge to that effect—yet its language is such that an inference may, by possibility, be drawn from it, that this Government is committed to the South American States to an extent farther than it is committed to the rest of the World. But the language held by our Minister is not of this vague and indefinite description—it is explicit—it is decisive—and, if the Government have taken the ground he states, I think it deserves the most serious consideration, and that speedily. I own, sir, that I can conceive a state of things to occur in relation to these Republics which might induce us to change the policy we have thus far pursued—but it is a state of things most unlikely to happen. If all the European Governments should combine and commence a crusade against Republican Governments as such, and should commence their operations by an invasion of the South American States in our own immediate vicinity, a serious uestion might present itself, how far we ought, in self. defence, to take the ground intimated by President Monroe, and maintain it by force of arms. But no such state of things exists, or seems likely to exist; the inquiry, however, is proper, and ought to be made. Mr. POWELL moved to amend the resolution, as now modified, by striking out all after the word “Resolved,” and inserting the following :

“That the President of the United States be requested to inform this House whether the United States have, in any manner, made any pledge to the Governments of Mexico and South America, that the United States would not permit the interference of any foreign power with the independence or form of Government of those Nations; and, if so, in what manner 2 and to what extent * Mr. P. said, that, as he understood the gentleman from . Kentucky, (Mr. Wicklipfe) the object of that gentle. man and his own were, in substance, the same—their propositions differed only in the mode by which that object was to be attained. His resolution, Mr. P. said, proposed to direct the inquiry to be made by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, mine directs the inquiry immediately to the Executive. I think the latter course is the most proper and becoming. That proposed by the gentleman is unusual. The Parliamentary practice, when even a committee of this House wants any information touching our soreign relations, is to ask it through the House, and of the President; and though I should be far from sacrificing principle to considerations of courtesy, yet, when the principle is the same, I prefer that course which is most courteous to a co-ordinate branch of the Government—and I think it is in the present case more courteous for this House to ask the information in question from the President of the United States than from one of its own committees. It is certainly very important that this House should have the knowledge whether this country does or does not stand pledged in the manner stated. I should like to obtain the opinion of the President himself on this point: I should like to know whether the Executive believes that this Government is under any such pledge. If such is the opinion, and still more, if such is the wish, of the Administration, I am very far from believing it is sanctioned by the People of the United States; and it is highly proper, that, on so serious a matter, the People should be informed directly by the President himself. Mr. WICKLIFFE observed, that, if the resolution proposed by the gentleman from Virginia, had called for." copy of the instructions given to our Minister, he should have had no objection to its adoption; but it called for information only as to what authority the Minister had to say that the Government is pledged. For himself, he was not much acquainted with diplomacy—and he was not certain whether a call like that proposed would induce the President to send the instructions. What, asked Mr. W., are we to have 2 Are we only to get an answer saying that the expression of the Minister appears only to refer to the message of President Monroe His own object was to bring out an expression by the officers of this Government of their understanding whether such a pledge was or ought to be given. He should have drawn his resolution so as to include a copy of the letter of instructions; but he knew that it was usual for the President to send such documents as are ealled for by the House, and it might be improper to send the entire letter, as part of it might relate to pending negotiations; a treaty with Mexico is still in fieri, and he did not wish a disclosure of anything that might be injurious to the public interest. He had accomplished the end for which he had first introduced his resolution. He had presented to the House the objectionable part of what had been submitted in our negotiations, and in this matter had done his duty; the House would now dispose of the matter as they might deem most expedient; if they wish the opinion of the President in preference to the sight of documents filed with him, he was content, and should make no objection to that course. Mr. POWELI. answered, that, in offering his amendment, he had not for a moment contemplated the calling for copies of the Minister's instructions. He could not, by any means, sanction a call of that kind; and, if it were proposed by others, he should vote against it. All he wished to ask was, whether the Minister had authority for the language he used; and, if he had, from whence it was

derived The response must be a plain one. If he had authority, the President will answer affirmatively, and will also, if he acts towards this House in good faith, disclose what is that authority, and where it is to be found. If instructions to this effect have been given by the Secretary of State, he will say so if Mr. Poinsett only referred to the message of President Monroe, he will tell us that; and if the declaration was made without any authority at all, he can tell us that. In the latter case, the Government is bound, on every consideration, tolet it be distinctly known that there exists no such pledge. Sir, I feel very confident that this is the case; and, I hold, not only that there is no such pledge, but that there ought not to be ; and, if there has such pledge been given, I, for one, am prepor. ed to resist it to the utmost extremity, in which the law and the Constitution will support me. I hold such engagements by the Executive to be dangerous and unwarrantable. Mr. HAMILTON, in rising to submit an amendment, observed, that, if the House made any inquiry, he thought they ought to make one immediately pertinent to the subject under discussion. Although he believed there was abundant evidence, from the documents which had accompanied the President's message, that our Minister was justified, either by the letter or spirit of his instructions, to hold the language which he had done on the occasion of this memorable pledge, yet, if we do inquire, let us go to the pith and marrow of the thing at once, and ask for a copy of Mr. Clay's answer to Mr. Poinsett's letter of the 28th September, where our Minister relates his conference with the Mexican Plenipotentiaries. He hoped that the gentleman from Virginia would accept his amendment as a substitute for his entire resolution, and if that gentleman desired to add anything to it, he was willing it should be in the shape of an explicit call for more facts, more documents, and not for opinions and arguments. Mr. H. said, he confessed that he was, in the first place, opposed to any call on the subject, because he thought it an act of supererogation, as the very point of inquiry was sufficiently elucidated by the information we already pos. sessed, but he confessed he entertained the most unreserv. ed and decided objections to the shape in which the gentleman from Virginia had thrown his inquiry. It seemed to him merely to furnish the President with a friendly admonition, that some new flaw had been discovered in this splendid project of his Secretary of State, and we should then have another long homily, ad captandum, “to wash the Black-a-Moor white.” Now, sir, let us confine our Chief Magistrate to facts, and endeavor to restrain the excursions of that genius which seems happiest in declamation; which supplies, with abundant facility, the argument (in spite of the fetters of the correspondence of his own Ministers) just at the point it is wanted, either for popular effect, or general proselytism. He confessed that he felt some apprehension, he could not say alarm, that, if the gentleman's resolution prevailed, we should have a most ingenious disclaimer from the President, in a highly beautiful and eloquent dissertation, got up for the taste of the lovers of fine writing and sentiment, without one jot of a lain matter of fact substance in the whole paper. And e, for one, was at least desirous that he should give us a certain letter, if there was a certain letter; or to assign an adequate reason for its non-existence, or non-production. Mr. H. then moved to amend the amendment of Mr. POWELL, by striking out all after the word requested, and inserting the following : “To transmit to this House a copy of the answer of the Secretary of State to Mr. Poinsett's letter to Mr. Clay, dated México, 28th September 1825.” Mr. POWELL replied, that, if the gentleman from South Carolina believed that he would co-operate in the process of whitewashing the acts of the President of the United States, or of any other functionary of the Government, he was greatly mistaken. He did not come here

blindly to pursue a course prescribed to him, nor dishonestly to conceal the defects of the officers of Government. The resolution he had offered, was dictated by no such motives—he had, in the discharge of his duty as a Representative, endeavored that it should be distinctly known to the Nation, whether any pledge had been given to a foreign Government, which might involve this country in the quarrels of other Nations. He considered this due to the Executive, and to the Minister too. Sir, I did say that I believed no such pledge to exist. I do believe so, and I hope, I earnestly hope, I shall be sustained by the facts when they are disclosed. I shall certainly regret it exceedingly, if I am not. I shall regret it, sir, because I always regretto see the officers of my Government actimproperly ; and I shall be unfeignedly sorry, if it should turn out that the President of the United States has ventured on such a high-handed measure as seems to be imputed to him. Sir, I cannot accede to the proposition of the gentleman from South Carolina : it completely defeats the efid I had in view. What I want to know is, whether Mr. Poinsett made this declaration by authority or not. This, sir, is a fact, not an argument—he was authorized, or he was not; and the fact must be stated. Then it may be followed by any explanations or palliations, which the Executive may judge proper. And, should the fact turn out that such a pledge has been authorized, however I may disapprove of the course, I hope this House will not be indisposed to listen to any explanations the President may offer. The gentleman from South Carolina wants a copy of the reply off. Secretary of State. Sir, that reply may not answer ourinquiry : it may not even advert to the pledge at all. I want to know from whence the Minister derived his authority. If any gentleman would prefer to have the call contain the usual restriction with reference to disclosures, in the President's opinion, injurious to the public welfare, I have no objection to its being added. But the point 1 aim at, is the authority for the ond I cannot consent to strike out the proposed part of my resolution, or to adopt that of the gentleman from South Carolina, under any other conditions than the securing of this inquiry. The answer of Mr. Clay may, very possibly, contain matters which it would be very indiscreet to publish to the World. Sir, I care not one cent whether Mir. Clay reprobated the conduct of the Minister or not : his censures will not answer my inquiry. He may censure Mr. Poinsett ever so severely, and yet the pledge may, nevertheless, have been given, and it may have been warranted. Mr. DRAYTON regretted that so protracted a discussion sheuld have taken place in reference to what he could not but consider as an apparent, and not a real difference. He conceived the difference was occasioned by a mere misapprehension. The object of the gentleman from Vir. ginia meets the idea of his colleague from South Carolina, and the proposition of his colleague is not at variance with that of the gentleman from Virginia; one proposition was more general—the other more specific. He had, therefore, risen to propose to his colleague, to let both propositions stand. The Executive will then be called on first to answer the query of the gentleman from Virginia, and then to transmit the letter of Mr. Clay. Mr. HAMILTON said, he wished to make a single remark, in reply to the gentleman from Virginia. I do not desire, said Mr. H. by useless opposition to mere matters, apparently, of form, to protract the debate, or consume the time of the House. But I feel great reluctance in assenting to his proposition, that I should modify my amendment, and restrict the call, only, to certain parts of Mr. Clay's letter, in answer to Mr. Poinsett's, of the 28th of September, 1825. It is true, in diplomacy, as in unathematics, that certain parts, only, are not equal to the whole: and I think, that the manner in which a co-ordinate branch of Congress has been treated, on this very subject, ought

to admonish us of the imprudence of allowing, under an over nice and cautious discretion, too wide a latitude to those who hold the shears, who are able, in the record, to cut in and cut out, just as suits their convenience or necessity. The very different exhibition which the documents, on the same subject, makes before each House, now, shows to what purposes of practical utility these angular cuts, in and out, may be applied. . He could not, therefore, consent to this modification, unless advised by the indication of a general wish, on the part of the House, that it should be instituted. Before he took his seat, Mr. HAMILtoN said, that he must be allowed to say one word to the gentleman from virginia, who had declared that he did not believe Mr. Poinsett had had any authority from his own Gonernment, to hold the language which he had held to the Mexican Plenipotentiaries, which is disclosed in the despatch to Mr. Clay, No. 22. A contrary belief, with him, he confessed, was strengthened, by a confidence which he had in the discretion and intelligence of Mr. Poinsett, whom, he believed, was incabable of holding such language, except by the unreserved sanction of his Government. Did I say believed 2 said Mr. HAMILTON. I might, more properly, use astronger term ; for here, [holding up the documents] I have the proof : Ay; not collateral or contingent, but, direct and positive. In a more essential particularas to the meaning of the Government—what does Mr. clay say, in his letter to Mr. Poinsett, under date the 9th November, 1825, in which he goes the whole, in extenso, on the subject of the pledge 2 “There is a striking inconsistency in the line of policy which the United Mexican States would seem disposed to pursue towards the United States. They would regard these States as an American mation or not, accordingly as it shall suit their own purposes. In respect to commerce, they would look upon us as an European Nation, to be excluded from the enjoyment of privileges conceded to other American Nations. But when an attack is imagined to be menaced by Europe, upon the independence of the United Mexican States, then an appeal is made to those fraternal sympathies which are justly supposed to belong to our condition as a member of the American Family. No longer than about three months ago, when an invasion by France, of the Island of Cuba, was believed at Mexico, the United Mexican Government promptly called upon the Government of the United States, through you, to fulfil the memorable pledge of the President of the United States in his message to Congress, of December, 1823. What they would have done, had the contingency happened, may be inferred from a despatch to the American Minister at Paris, a copy of which is herewith sent, which you are authorized to read to the Plenipotentiaries of the United Mexican States.” The contingency of our interference, then, in the event of the Island of Cuba being invaded by France, or, ergo, by any other European Power, is one, and the most important, illustration which the Administration puts on Mr. Monroe's pledge of December, 1823. Now, I will ask any man who hears me, whether the invasion of Cuba by an European power, or its peaceful transfer, is not a much more probable event than any attempted colonization of the American Continents, or any concerted effort of the eombined Powers of Europe against the independence of the South American Republics Our Secretary of State, in authorizing Mr. Poinsett to read this despatch of Mr. Brown's to the Mexican Plenipotentiaries, has indeed authorized him to pledge Mr. Monroe’s memorable declararation (not pledge) in the only contingency of probable danger that is ever likely to occur. The Secretary of State has indeed taken the bull by the horns, and it is useless for us to talk about what Mr. Ponsett may have said in a loose diplomatic talk, arguendo, when, by virtue of the previous instructions, he was subsequently authoriz

ed to pledge the country as bail for the whole sum of a larger and more probable danger. The House will appreciate the truth of this remark when they weigh the import of Mr. Clay’s letter to Mr. Brown, in which he instructs him to say to the French Government, that “we could not consent to the occupation of Cuba by any other European power than Spain, under any contingency whatever.” This consent must mean fight, or it is sheer bullying. This, then, is the commentary which the Administration have given to Mr. Monroe's mere expression of an opinion; they have made it applicable to an event altogether probable and full of danger. Whereas, Mr. Poinsett’s had reference to animprobable contingency, although no doubt with instructions. For what man, who does not articipate in the dreams of the hero of Cervantes, beieves that the Powers of Europe will undertake a crusade to re-colonise the South American Republics, or assail their independence 2 But, that Spain may transfer Cuba, and that it may be occupied by an European Power, under circumstances which would render it folly, or something worse, for us to interfere, is, to say the least of it, not beyond the pale of a reasonable possibility. Mr. Poinsett has, therefore, given the pledge of his Government, under a contingency where we shall never be called upon to redeem it. Mr. Clay has authorized him to stake it, where the hazard is probable, perilous, and, perhaps, immediate. I think, therefore, having discovered that the Administration has given the most comprehensive range to the declaration in question, which they have made a pledge, it supersedes the necessity of an inquiry on a subordinate point; though, I repeat, if we are to have an inquiry, let us have facts, not imposing and seductive statements, in which a pretty eloquence of a certain kind, is to stand in the place of everything else. Mr. TRIMBLE said, that he had no other information on the subject before the House, than that which had been printed, and laid upon the tables of all the members; but, from an examination of these, he felt fully satisfied that no such pledge had been given, as gentlemen seemed to apprehend, nor had any authority been given to make such a pledge. He had risen to correct a mistake of the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. HAMILtoN) in the exposition he had given of Mr. Monroe's message. [Here Mr. T. quoted the letter of Mr. Clay to Mr. Poinsett, and of the former Secretary of State, to the American Minister at Paris.] All that is contained in this despatch amounts to this—that we will not consent that any other Power than Spain shall take possession of the provinces immediately in our own vicinity. Now, I ask of gentlemen if we ought to consent Certainly not ; and this is all the letter, as expounded by reference to former instructions, declares. How far we should be inclined to go, in extremities, we do not say; nor is it prudent that we should. At the time the late President Monroe sent his Message to Congress, in which the declaration is made, which has been so often referred to, a Congress of Allied Sovereigns had been held at Troppau and Laybach, and another was proposed at Verona. The labor of these Congresses had been, in part, made public ; and a communication is said to have been, in consequence, made, in some way, by the British Government to that of the United States. A clause of the secret treaty of Verona contained the following declaration : . “Art. 1. The high contracting parties, well convinced that the system of Representative Government is as incompatible with the monarchical principle as the maxim of the sovereignty of the People is opposed to the principle of divine right, engage, in the most solemn manner, to employ all their means, and unite all their efforts, to put an end to the system of Representative Government, wherever it is known to exist, in the States of Europe,

and to prevent it from being introduced into those States where it is not known.”