People of the United States, who had but recently broken the chains of their slavery, and shaken off aforeign yoke— who were about to form for themselves a system, a free and republican system, of Government—is it reasonable, I repeat it, Sir, that they should have intended to disfranchise themselves in this important particular—the election of the first officer of the Republic what, Sir, is their lanuage, in the preamble of this Constitution “We, the eople of the United States,” &c. “do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” But I will not fatigue the Committee, by reiterating the able aruments of the honorable member from South Carolina, Mr. DRAyrox) drawn from the Constitution itself, upon this part of the subject. It is fresh in the recollection of every gentleman, and proves satisfactorily and conclusively, to my mind, that the framers of the Constitution contemplated and intended, that the People should be the electors of President and Vice President; that they viewed a recurrence of this election to the House of Representatives as a remote possibility, and one which would seldom, if ever, occur. We are not, however, left to ferret out their intention by the letter, or by construction of the Constitution alone. Other evidences are within our reach. And here, Sir, suffer me to say, that, when I seek information upon great political questions like this, I choose rather to apply to those sages who participated in the deliberations of the convention whose work this Constitution is—I choose rather to be informed by the political writings and essays of able statesmen, who were their contemporaries, than to rely—if we are to regard the statement of his colleague (Mr. CAMBRELENs)—upon the fluctuating and uncertain political notions of the gentleman from New York. What were the opinions of a distinguished member of that convention, as contained in the writings of the Federalist, so frequently referred to in the course of this debate—the opinions, too, of an individual who had no predilections for democracy no partialities in favor of extensive powers, vested in the People; who had a strong bias in favor of aristocracy, and more energetic Government; who was said to have been even favorably disposed to limited monarchy—what, Sir, were the opinions of Alexander Hamilton With all his antidemocratic principles, did he contend, in the numbers of the Federalist, written by himself, and designed, together with the numbers of his able coadjutors, (Mr. Madison and Mr. Jay) to furnish to the American People a fair exposition of the new Constitution—written at that critical period, too, when this Constitution was suspended before the Conventions of the States, for ratification or rejection ? Did he contend that the President was not to be elected by the People 2 No, Sir Whatever might have been his own individual opinion of what the Constitution ought to have been, he knew too well the intention of the Convention as to what it was. In the 68th No. of that work, he says, it was desirable that the sense of the People should be ascertained in this important election ; that, for this purpose, the election was not made to depend on any pre-existing or pre-established body of men, who might be tampered with, to prostitute their votes; but the choice was referred to an immediate act of the People of America; and that it was intended that the President should be independent of all others, but the People, for his election. I have not the number to which I refer, before me, but I state it substantially correct. In the Convention in Virginia, to whom this Constitution was submitted, for ratification or rejection, what were the opinions entertained by its distinguished members * Did they understand that the People were not to elect the President’. No, Sir. Governor Randolph, in answering an objection which had been made to this part of the Constitution—that foreign influence would operate in the election of the President—says : “The electors must be elect

ed by the People at large. To procure his re-election,

his influence must be co-extensive with the Continent ; and there can be no combination between the electors, as they elect him on the same day in every State. When this is the case, how can foreign influence or intrigue enter?” The late venerable President of the United States, (Mr. Monroe) who has gone into retirement, and, I am sorry to say it, Sir, in penury and want—for, whatever else may be said of him, it may be truly said, he was a faithful and useful public servant, in those trying times when his country realized the value of his services—he said, upon this occasion : “The President ought to act under the strongest impulses of rewards and punishments, which are the strongest incentives to human actions. There are two ways of securing this point. He ought to depend on the People of America for his appointment and continuance in office. He ought, also, to be responsible, in an equal degree, to all the States, and to be tried by dispassionate judges. His responsibility ought, further, to be direct and immediate.” Mr. Mason, and Mr. Madison, too, who were distinguished members of the Convention of Virginia, do not seem to have understood this subject as the gentleman from New York professes to do. They maintained that “the choice of the People ought to be attended to.” But, at the period when this Constitution was presented to the States for ratification, it was an alarming crisis to the People of this country. The Articles of Confederation had proved inadequate to the great purposes of self-government. The question presented to the States was, ratification or rejection of the new Constitution. Rejection, and anarchy, and confusion, with despotism in their train, were most likely to be the consequences; and though some objections might have existed to the Constitution, in this particular, as possible, in a remote degree, yet, under the circumstances, ratification was better than rejection. At that period, it was thought by the sages of that day; distinguished for their talents and political sagacity, that it was barely possible that the election could devolve on Congress. They had fixed their eyes upon that distinguished man, “the Father of his Country,” as the first who was to fill this high office—an individual upon whom all united with one voice. They could not pierce the veil of futurity, and see the new system fully develop itself. : What they could not anticipate or foresee, we have realized. Is there any gentleman here, with his past observation and experience, who will hazard the opinion, that this election will hereafter but seldom devolve upon Congress? Is there any gentlemau here, who will deny that, under existing circumstances, this important election, under the present provisions of the Constitution, must, in all probability, most generally, terminate in this House * if such must probably be the result, is not the intention of the Constitution, and of its framers, that the People should elect the President, defeated If, by the unforeseen operations of the Constitution, the People have, in effect, been deprived of an important right, which they ought to possess and exercise, and which I maintain was intended to be given to them, are we not called upon, by the most solemn obligations, to restore it to them But, to consider this subject more systematically—the resolutions under consideration naturally divide themselves into two distinct propositions: 1st. That the Constitution shall be so amended, that the election of President and Vice President shall, in no event, devolve upon the respective Houses of Congress. And, 2d. That the Constitution shall be so amended, that each State in the Union shall be divided into as many districts as there are Senators and Representatives in Congress, from each respective State, and that each district shall give one vote. In examining these two propositions, although distinct in themselves, I shall not view them as distinct and substantive propositions, unconnected with each other in

their effects and ions, as some gentlemen have done. in the view which I take of this subject, they are intimately connected and blended together, in their effects : and it will be necessary to take this view of them, in order to appreciate, properly, the respective amendments which they propose. In support of the first proposition, it will be necessary briefly to notice some of the defects of the present Constitution, and why it is that the election of o high officer should, in no event, devolve upon Congress. The first reason which suggests itself to my mind, why it should not there devolve, is, that the President is not an officer of Congress; he is not an officer of the House of Representatives, but he is the Chief Magistrate of the whole People of the Union, and should be directly responsible to the People for his conduct in office, and be dependent upon them for his re-election. The surest guarantee that, in his administration, he will consult the interests of his constituents, and, to the extent of his ability, pursue a wise policy, is the certainty, that, at the expiration of his term, he must return again to the body of society, and submit his public conduct to the scrutiny of impartial examination ; is the certainty that, if he has disregarded or negligently mistaken the best interests of the country, he will not be again elevated to that high station, but must seek the “post of honor in a private stations” must share with the body of his fellow-citizens their burdens, and must participate with them, the evil effects of his own policy. But if he is remotely responshle to the People, and dependent directly upon a select or pre-existing body of men for his appointment, it is human nature, and he will study more to conciliate his immediate electors, than to advance the interest of the community. But, sir, the election ought, in no event, to devolve upon the House of Representatives, for a much more important reason, and one which, with me, is conclusive. It is, because a minority as well in the Electoral Colleges, under the present provisions of the Constitution, as a minority of Representatives in Congress, may elect him, and thereby destroy and overturn in practice what all admit in theory—that a majority should rule. According to the present provisions of the Constitution, there are as many electors for President and Vice President, as there are Senators and Representatives in Congress. By the last apportionment, which I shall take, as an example, for the purpose of illustrating the argument, the number of electors is 261. A majority of the whole number of electors is necessary to a choice in the primary Colleges; and if the Colleges of Electors fail to elect, then, out of the three highest on the list of those voted for by the electors, the House of Representatives, voting by States, is to choose the President. Suppose, for example, sir,

unat.1 and B are the prominent candidates before the People for the Presidency. C is likewise a candidate. .d receives 120 electoral votes, B receives an equal number, and C receives the remaining 21 votes; C may have been supported by one or two of the States, or may have received the votes of a part of the People of some one of the larger States. .4, B, and C, in this event, are presented to the House of Representatives, the three highest on the list of the electoral votes, out of whom the House is to choose the President. An election, under these circumstances, takes place in the House, where the votes are taken by states; and C, who has received a small minority of electoral votes, may be elected President of the United States by thirty-one Representatives, upon this floor, out of two hundred and thirteen, the whole number of Representatives : for thirty-one Representatives here, from the thirteen smaller States in the Union, have it in their power to control and to give the votes of thirteen. states, and thereby elect the President against the will of

[H. of R.
No. of Reps. Reps.

Misssissippi has 1, a majority is 1
Illinois - 1 do. I
Missouri 1 do. 1.
Delaware , 1 do. 1.
Rhode Island 2 do. 2
Alabama 3 do. 2
Louisiana 3 do. 2
Indiana 3 do. 2
Vermont 5 do. 3
New Hampshire 6 do. 4.
Connecticut 6 do. 4.
New Jersey 6 do. 4.
Maine 7 do. 4.

45 31

Thus the whole number of Representatives upon this floor, from thirteen of the smaller States in the Union, is only forty-five. A majority of the representation from each State have it in their power to control, and give the vote of that State; and thirty-one Representatives here constitute the sum of the majorities of the delegations of thirteen States of the Union. Thus C, with only twenty-one electoral votes, against the remaining two hundred and forty electoral votes, and with thirty-one Representatives, against the remaining one hundred and eightytwo Representatives, may be elected the President of the United States. But suppose a case still more extreme— it is certainly possible it may occur, and therefore I am justifiable in using it—suppose C receives but one solitary electoral vote, and the remaining two hundred and sixty are equally divided between .1 and B. In this event C is constitutionally presented to the House of Representatives as one of the three highest on the list. With but one single electoral vote, thirty-one gentlemen upon this floor, have it in their power to elect him the President of the United States. Will gentlemen say these are extreme cases, and will probably never occur I answer, it is possible they may occur, and cases o to them, and the same in principle, will, in all probability, of ten occur. But shall I be told that the Representatives of freemen will never be so lost to a sense of duty and responsibility to the People, as to disregard their will, and palm upon them a President not of their choice Experience is the best of tutoresses, and from her we may learn many salutary lessons. I refer gentlemen to the memorable contest in the House of Representatives, of 1801, between the venerable Jefferson and Aaron Burr. The latter had not received a single vote in the contemplation of the People, or of the electors, for the Presidency ; the friends of the former for the Presidency, had supported the latter for the Vice Presidency. Yet, having received an equal number of votes, the one evidently intended to be President, and the other Vice President, under the then provisions of the Constitution it became necessary for the House of Representatives to determine, voting by States, which of them should be President. With all these facts staring them in the face, a portion of the Representatives of the People at that day, were not so scrupulous of violating the People's will, as to surrender, without astruggle, the Chief Magistracy to the man of their choice. No, sir; a doubtful issue ensued, when the sable curtains of the night were drawn around; midnight balloting after balloting followed; this mighty Confederacy was shaken to its centre : for days the result was suspended. Fortunately, the American People in that struggle ultimately prevailed; a victory of principle and of the People was obtained ; a majority still ruled. And who can tell, sir, what might have been the consequences, if it had terminated otherwise 2 I shudder to contemplate what might have been the fate of this happy country. But I shall not fatigue the Com

the remaining one hundred and eighty-two Representauves, as is demonstrable thus:

mittee, by indulging in conjecture upon this unpleasant

subject. I have referred gentlemen to this part of our history to show, that if, in that case, the contest was rendered doubtful for a season, where the individual had not, in contemplation of the People, received a single vote for the Presidency; that it may occur, under the present provisions of the Constitution, where an individual may have received a very small number of Electoral votes, as in the cases I have supposed. It may happen, sir, that a minority may thus elect the President, when the election devolves upon this House, from personal partialities to the individual elected, and thus palm upon the Nation a President evidently not the choice of a majority of the People of the United States : not the choice of the immediate constituents of those gentlemen, upon this floor, who may elect him ; and not the choice of a majority of the Representatives in Congress. It may happen, sir, that the first choice of the Representative here, holding in his hands the power of controlling the vote of his State, may not be returned to the House as one of the three highest upon the list. The second choice of the Representative may be essentially different from the second choice of his constituents, if the election were again referred back to them. The Representative may be ignorant of the will of his constituents, or if he know their will, he may affect ignorance of it. But the doctrine is maintained by some politicians in this country, and I appeal to your experience to know, sir, whether it has not been openly avowed upon this floor, that there is no connexion between the Representative here, and his constituents at home ; that the Representative here is not bound to regard or obey the instructions of those who send him here; that, in the election of a President, when it shall devolve upon this House, he is, by the Constitution, made the umpire to decide it; and though his constituents might be in a body, knocking at the door of this Hall, and proclaiming to their Representative, upon this floor, from the galleries, “our will is thus and thus ; you are our agent, delegated by us to execute our will, and it is our will that the vote of the State which you hold in your hand, should be given to the individual of our choice;” yet the Representative, entertaining the opinion that his constituents have no right to interfere or instruct him upon this subject, disregards their voice, and exercises his own arbitrary will in disposing of the vote of his State. I must confess, sir, that, for myself, I have never entertained such opinions, but believe, upon all questions of expediency, that the Representative is bound to regard and obey the known will of his constituent. Other gentlemen, however, entertain different opinions; and when such opinions are entertained and openly avoved, what security have the People that their rights will be preserved, when the preservation of them depends upon the accidental, interested, or capricious will of their public servants Thus the President may be elected by a minority of the Representatives in Congress, who may be of opinion that they have conscientiously discharged their public duty. But is there no danger, sir, when the election of the first officer of the first Nation in the World is to be made by a select and pre-existing body of men, that even the Representatives of freemen may, in an evil hour, be tempted to depart from the path of duty, receive the wages of iniquity, and prostrate at the shrine of some ambitious aspirant to the Presidency, the public will, and with it the best interests of the Country Shall we assume to ourselves the high prerogative of being uncontaminated and incorruptible, when the same attributes are denied to all the rest of mankind 2 Is immaculate purity to be found within these walls, and in no other corner of the earth 2 . Have you not yourselves, sir, in your legislation in relation to this very subject—the election of a President—given incontestible evidence that you are distrustful of human nature? Why is it, that, by the act of Congress of 1792, designed

as it was to carry into effect that part of the Constitution in relation to the election of a President, you provide that the electors in each State shall be elected within the thirtyfour days immediately preceding the first Wednesday in December, in every fourth year, the day upon which the electors, throughout the Union, are required to give their votes Why this short intervening period between the choice of the electors, and the day upon which they shall give their votes ? It was a wise provision, made to prevent the possibility of tampering with them 5 to prevent intrigue, corruption, bargaining, and sale ; to prevent the interference of political jugglers; and to keep pure the stream as was the fountain, the People, from which it flowed. So particular have you been upon this subject, and so cautious to preserve the purity of the electors, that you have given them but a short and transitory existence; and if any one of them should be elected more than thirtyfour days before the day upon which he is required to vote, the presumption of your law is against him, and his vote will not be received. But is not the House of Representatives likewise a pre-existing body of men 2 Are they not collected together at one point for weeks together, between the period when it is ascertained that the primary electors have failed to make a choice, and the day upon which they are called upon to vote 2 Is it not as probable, to say the least of it, that they may be tampered with to prostitute their votes, and that they may be corrupted, as that twenty-four separate electoral colleges, dispersed over the twenty-four States of the Union, might be In the one case you have been distrustful, and have provided against the possibility of undue influence of any kind, so as to thwart the public will. In relation to the electoral colleges, you have adopted, by your laws, the salutary maxim, “ lead us not into temptation.” Would it not be quite as safe to adopt it in relation to ourselves Is there any thing inauspicious to corruption, intrigue, and management, in your locality Where are you situated Within the limits of the same city where the President, in office, is, and who may be a candidate for reelection—where all the other candidates may be, and where their respective friends and partisans will be. Is your situation here less exposed than that of the electoral colleges But we are told by the honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr. Storrs) that, for the honor of this House, a suspicion should not be indulged that its members could be corrupted. I.etit not be told, says he, at the court of St. James, or upon the continent of Europe, that even suspicion had been openly entertained upon the floor of the American Congress, that any of its members were corruptible. And the gentleman from Massachusetts, too, (Mr. Even err) denies in broad terms the corruptibility of this House. Sir, it is a humiliating idea, a painful thought I admit, that the Representatives of freemen could, under any circumstances, barter away or disregard the rights of the People for their own individual aggrandizement. But human nature is the same in all ages of the world. All past history has shown that it is unsafe to rely upon virtue alone when strong temptations are presented. And what stronger temptation to corruption and the abandonment of principle than the Presidency, can be held out to an ambitiousman aspiring to that high office The President of the United States, when elected, has an immense patronage to bestow ; has many honorable and lucrative offices in his gift. And what stronger temptation than to receive the patronage in his power, can be held out to the few assembled here who have it in their power to elect him 2 1 apprehend, sir, if this election shall frequently devolve upon Congress, that a door will be opened to corruption, intrigue, and to office hunters; and i apprehend, further, that through that door the evil doer may one day enter, and sap the foundations of this happy Republic. Other countries have been revolutionized and in

volved in anarchy and confusion, upon whose ruins despotism has erected her throne. I hope, sir, my apprehensions may be unfounded; but surely it is prudent in us to take warning from their example, and close the door through which unprincipled men may enter, and obtain an advantage. Surely there is as much virtue in the People—surely it is as safe to permit them to be the electors of their Chief Magistrate as to arrogate it to ourselves. But, sir, as to the corruptibility of this House, which is denied by the honorable member from Massachusetts, (Mr. Evenorr.) That honorable gentleman not only denies the existence of corruption in this House, but he goes further, and denies the corruptibility of its members. Will that honorable gentleman tell me what charter of exemption ree have from the frailties of human nature ? Will he tell me through what purifying crucible we have passed when we take our seats upon this floor 2 Until he shall do so, I shall believe that human nature is the same here that it is elsewhere. And from my earliest infancy I have been taught to believe, that, from the fall of our first great parent until the present hour, man has been deprawed, fail, and impure. I do not contend that he is naturally more so here than he is in other situations; but I contend he is as much so, and that he is more exposed to temptation here than in ordinary situations. But, says the gentleman from New York, (Mr. Stoans) if men in power may, by wielding their patronage, by favoring and flattering, bribe or corruptus, may we not by the same means bribe and corrupt the People How sophistical Corrupt the People! No, sir; the great body of the People are of necessity virtuous, because it is their interest to be so you cannot extend patronage to all ; you cannot corrupt all ; a select body of men you may. But, says the gentleman from New York, if the members of this House are corrupt, is not the corrective at hand * Do they not return to the body of the People, in less than thirty days after a Presidential election takes place in this House And if they have acted incorrectly, or disobeyed the will of their constituents, will not the People signify their disapprobation at the polls at the next election, and turn them out of their service Sir, the evil deed may be committed, and the perpetrator of it may receive the reward for his perfidy and his crime, in being elevated to some high station, beyond the reach of an indignant, insulted, and an injured community. Yes, sir, he may be elevated, too, by the individual whom he has assisted to place in the Presidential chair, and may never again return, or put himself in the power of his constituents, so as to receive the sovereign remedy of the gentleman from New York at the polls of the next election. His constituents may frown upon his conduct and reprobate his course: he is elevated above them; he looks down upon them with contempt, and sneers at their discontent; and yet this is the sovereign corrective of the gentleman, and will, as he conceives, ensure purity in this Hall. That gentleman should remember, too, that, in many of the States of the Union, the Congressional elections, for the next Congress, have transpired some twelve or eighteen months before the Presidential election; the member is either defeated by a more favored citizen of his district, who is to supply the place here, and his direct and immediate responsibility to the People is destroyed; or he has been previously elected, and is assured that he will at least hold his seat here, if he desire it, for another term. If he has been defeated at home, he seeks elevation and promotion elsewhere; if he has been successful at home, he hopes his good constituents may forget his political sin before the next election ; if he should still desire to hold the seat, he hopes, by the assistance of Executive influence, he may effect some local measure that may reconcile his constituents, or balance in their estimation the evil deed he has committed. That gentleman, too, pronounces it a cold-blooded judgment to entertain a suspicion that corruption can enter here.

Sir, we should not be so sensitive upon this subject as to shut out from our eyes all past experience “The purest gold has some alloy ; the great Sun of day has his spots ; and among the chosen disciples of our Lord there was a Judas.” And in pronouncing this judgment, coldblooded as it may seem to the gentleman, we are only recording the history of human nature as it is, and ever has been, #. that fatal hour when man came under the curse of a violated law. Another argument, Mr. Chairman, of the gentleman from N. York, struck me with peculiar force. If, says he, this Government is ever destroyed, it will not be by men in power, but by men out of power. And the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Evenport) who succeeded him, used a similar argument, and told us that, if the Government was ever destroyed, it would not be by a President elected by a minority of the People, but by a President elected by an overwhelming majority of the People : by some “military chieftain,” that should arise in the land. Yes, sir, by some “military chieftain,” whose only crime it was to have served his country faithfully at a period when that country needed and realized the value of his services. I know, sir, there are some politicians in this country who are continually in alarm, or affect to be so, lest the People should destroy the Government. And I know, sir, there are others, and I am bold to say I am of the number, who are of opinion that, if this happy Government is ever destroyed, (which God forbid!) it will be by the encroachments and abuse of power, and by the allur. ing and corrupting influence of Executive patronage. Rely upon it, sir, that if you should ever see an Administration of this country, whose elevation, whose measures, and whose policy, are not supported by the good feelings and opinions of the People, there will be more danger, infinitely more danger to be apprehended from them, than all the ideal dangers which the gentlemen seem to apprehend are covertly lurking among the great body of the People of this Union. To what inevitable conclusion does the argument of the gentleman from Massachusetts lead 2 If the President, according to his argument, is elected by a majority of the People, he is a dangerous President; if elected by a minority of the People, the irresistible inference is, that he will not be a dangerous President. And, according to his argument, I suppose it would be dangerous for a majority of the People to elect the President. Sir, this is a doctrine which may be congenial to the feelings and opinions of some gentlemen; but I must confess, that I am far, very far, from being prepared to adopt it as one of the rules of my political faith. I hold the converse of the gentleman's propositions. We are at issue on these points, and the committee will decide between us. Another reason why the election of President should not devolve upon this House, is, that members of Congress should not only be virtuous and pure, but, like Caesar's wife, above suspicion. Next to doing right, is to inspire public confidence, and give public satisfaction. Whenever this election shall come here, are not the most virtuous and correct, subject to dark suspicions and unkind reflections? If some act incorrectly, or corruptly,isit not calculated to affect the reputation of all who may necessarily be associated with them, however correct their course may be 2 and is not the inevitable tendency to impair public confidence, and to destroy the harmonious operation of the Government * I shall not, said Mr. P. dwell upon another argument, which has been very properly used by some gentlemen in the course of this debate—that when the election comes to this House, it is calculated to interfere with, and impede the ordinary business of legislation. It has not been my fortune to witness the effects of an election here; this is the first time I have had the honor to be a humble Representative of a portion of this People upon this floor. I could wish, upon this great occasion upon which we de

liberate, that they were more ably represented. But though, sir, I have not witnessed the scene, I have read of its effects upon two occasions, in the history of my country, and can well conceive that Members of Congress will be too apt to neglect all the important subjects of legislation, in devising plans, intriguing, and manag ing, to promote the success of their favorite candidate. If there should be no corruption, still it is calculated to distract their deliberations. It will produce excitement; arouse all the angry feelings of our nature ; create heartburnings, party feelings, and sectional jealousies, detrimental to the public welfare, and dangerous to the duration and stability of the Government. The effects produced will not, probably, terminate with the election itself, but will mingle and be felt in your deliberations for years afterwards. But, sir, after all that can be said upon this subject, it resolves itself into this at last 5 and I wish gentlemen distinctly to answer me the question. Are we prepared to hold out to the People, the ignus fatuus of popular elections ; to tell them they are sovereign, and shall elect the President ; and, at the snme time, by the operations of your present Constitution, put it virtually out of their power to do so : unless, indeed, by a combination of the large States, as I shall presently attempt to show, by literally immolating large masses of their citizens, and de

stroying their weight in the election, and thereby ena

bling an inconsiderable portion of the People of the Union, by presenting a solid front, and impressing into their service their respective minorities, to elect the President in the primary colleges? and in this event, as I shall attempt to show, the remedy is almost as bad as the disease. shall we any longer hold out the delusion to the People, that they are the electors of the President, when, in practice, they have ordinarily only, the power of nomination They may, indeed, nominate three individuals to the House of Representatives, but they do not choose the President. That important power devolves upon their Representatives in Congress—a power which they are competent to exercise themselves. Judging from our past experience upon this subject, what will probably be the result of future elections of this distinguished officer Much of the larger portion of that long list of worthies who personated the drama of the American Revolution, have past from the stage of action, and are numbered with “the years beyond the flood.” We can no longer, as our fathers did, contemplate the immortal Father of his Country, upon whom all united in elevating to this high station ; nor can we call into our service the immortal author of the Declaration of Independence. A new generation are about to assume the places of their fathers; many are the aspirants to this jigh station ; public opinion is divided, and cannot, in future, be often concentrated on any one individual. Under these circumstances, it is idle to suppose that this election can be prevented from terminating ultimately in the House of Representatives. That it will often devolve here, cannot be doubted ; that it should not do so, I have attempted, and, I hope, satisfactorily, shown. These are some of the objections to the Constitution in its present form, and some of the reasons which have presented themselves most forcibly to my mind, why the election of President and Vice President should in no event devolve upon Congress. 1 come now, said Mr. Polk, briefly to consider the second resolution, submitted to the consideration of the Committee, by the honorable gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. McDuffix) which proposes that each State in the Union shall be divided into as many districts as there are Senators and Representatives in Congress from such State. The object of this proposition is to give to the People efevery section of the Union, as near as may be, con

sistently with important rights reserved to the States, which are not proposed to be disturbed, their equal relative weight in the election. To do this, the public sentiment should be fairly ascertained—and in order to obtain a fair expression of the popular will, it is a self-evident proposition to my mind, that some uniform mode of collecting the public sentiment should be established throughout the Union. Under the present provisions of the Constitution, and the practice under them, according to the various and diversified modes of election, prescribed by the respective State Legislatures, do the People, in every section of the Union, in fact, possess and exercise their equal relative weight in the election Is the public sentiment of the whole People of the Union correctly ascertained 2 No, sir! It is demonstrable, if an election be made at all by the Electoral Colleges without involving the national calamity (for such I view it) of a recurrence to the House of Representatives, a little more than a fourth of the People of the United States may choose the President. If I succeed in establishing this fact, the necessity for uniformity and amendment will, as I conceive, be apparent, if we hold to the principle that a majority should rule. What are the various modes of election at present established in the States ? In some, the district system prevails : in others, the Legislatures have assumed to themselves the power of appointing electors; and in one State of the Union (Kentucky) a compound of the district and general ticket system is the mode prescribed by the Legislature. The State being entitled to fourteen electors, is divided into three districts, in one of which four electors are chosen, and five in each of the other two districts. I shall not here stop to inquire why this artificial arrangement of districts in that State was made. Whether it was made upon an emergency, and designed to throw majorities in each district in favor of a particular party, or of particular men, is wholly immaterial to the present inquiry. In this state

of things, a bare majority of the People of the six larger

States in the Union may, by adopting the general ticket system, the Gerrymandering system, or by assuming the election to the Legislatures, elect the President, though a respectable minority, and very nearly half of the People of those six States, and the whole of the People of the eighteen remaining states, may be in favor of some other candidate. . For example:

Electors. Electors.

New York has 36, a majority is 19
Pennsylvania, 28 15
Virginia, 24 13
Ohio, 16 - 9
Massachusetts, 15 8
Kentucky, 14 8

133 72

72

61

Thus, sir, in these six States, there are 133 electoral votes, a majority of the whole number in the Union, and sufficient, if united, to elect the President in the primary colleges.

But the People in those six States are divided in opinion, and very nearly equipoised as to numbers, between two contending candidates, A and B, for the Presidency. But A has small majorities over B, in each of those States. If the district system were established, the friends of A could give him 72 electoral votes, and the friends of B could give him 61 electoral votes. B, too, in the case supposed, might be supported by the remaining eighteen States, or by such majorities of them as, when added to his 61 votes, would be sufficient to elect him. But by compressing the friends of B in those six States, into the support of A by the effect of the general ticket system, or