among the people an individual should be found who is so unfortunate as to be honest, the prince should be cautious how he avails himself of his services; so true it is, that virtue is not the principle of this species of government."* Montesquieu farther remarks, that "in place of virtue, monarchy has for its principle honour, or in other words, the prejudices arising from the education and the condition of each individual. . . . Thus,” says he, Thus," says he, "in a well-regulated monarchy, you will everywhere meet with men who approach to the character of good citizens: but good men will occur very rarely; for to be good one must have the disposition to be so."† He adds, that "philosophically speaking, it is a false honour which conducts all the parts of which the state is composed." In another part of this work, he points out the education which is fitted for a monarchy. He observes, that "the virtues which there appear, always result more from a sense of what we owe to ourselves, than of what we owe to others; that the actions of men are less valued for their rectitude than for their splendour; that honour is either the judge who renders them lawful, or the sophist who pleads their apology; that it sanctions gallantry, intrigue, flattery; that it admits of a certain species of openness, but despises that of the people which is founded on truth and simplicity:—and above all, that it exalts that politeness which originates from pride and the love of distinction. . . . To communicate all these qualities, is the great object of education in forming the man of honour, (pour faire ce qu'on appele l'honnête homme,) who has all the virtues which are necessary under this form of government."§ In the last place, Montesquieu remarks, that "monarchies encourage, in the other sex, a licentiousness of morals." || For supporting that honour which is the principle of this government, he recommends the preservation of all those hereditary privileges which have arisen from the Feudal system. He does not even leave the people the right of granting their * [Ibid.] [Ibid. chap. vi.] § [Ibid. Liv. IV. chap. ii.] [Ibid.] consent to the taxes they are to pay; he only recommends to those who are in authority, "not to make their burdens heavier than what is necessary." 66 In these passages, as well as in various others, there is unquestionably a mixture of delicate satire, which has been often overlooked by Montesquieu's commentators. He seems indeed to have dreaded nothing so much as a hasty perusal of his political speculations. "I entreat," says he in his Preface, one favour of my readers, which I fear will not be granted me;-that they may not judge by a few hours' reading of the labour of twenty years." Voltaire, too, although he has on various occasions expressed himself sarcastically with respect to this great man, particularly on account of the inaccuracy of his facts and quotations, has, in one instance, remarked in strong and beautiful terms that depth of reflection which he often conceals from common observers by a style epigrammatic and oracular, and adorned with the delicate lights and graces which so frequently accompany superficial attainments:-"That masculine and rapid genius, which dived to the bottom of every subject, while it seemed only to glance upon the surface."1 From what has been already said of the Athenian government, considered as a model of Democracy, and of the French Government as a model of Monarchy, it appears how difficult it is to judge of the political state of a nation from an examination of their written laws; and that a constitution approaching in theory to one of the simple forms may, in fact, be a mixed constitution in its exercise. We now proceed to make some remarks on governments, which are professedly mixed, and which, by the plan of their constitution, admit different orders of the community to a share in the legislative authority. That those governments which approach nearly to the simple forms, are all attended with inconvenience, and that the business of political wisdom lies in properly combining them together, was remarked by some of the great writers of anti * [Ibid. Liv. V. chap. ix.] "Ce génie male et rapide qui approfondit tout en paroissant tout effleurer."-[Discours à l'Académie Française, (Euvres, Tome VIII. p. 661, edit. 1817.)] quity. On this subject they have left us many valuable observations, although their limited acquaintance with the history of mankind necessarily rendered their views of the subject, in many respects, partial and erroneous. The history of modern Europe has furnished us with many important experiments and facts unknown to them, and has pointed out to us clearly a variety of their mistakes. But still our stock of facts is small when compared with the boundless field of speculation which the theory of government presents to the mind; and therefore it is highly probable that many of the maxims which are now current among our most enlightened politicians, will be treated with ridicule by our wiser posterity. Nor is it going too far to say with Mr. Hume, that "the world is too young as yet to entitle us to form political predictions with confidence from the history of past ages."* "It is customary among writers to establish three sorts of government," says Polybius, " Kingly governments, Aristocracy, and Democracy; upon which one may very properly ask them, whether they mean to state these as the only forms of government, or as the best; for in both cases they seem to be in an error, since it is manifest that the best form of government is that which is compounded of all three. This," says he, is founded not only on reason, but in experience; Lycurgus having set the example of this form of government in the institution of the Lacedemonian Commonwealth." "This legislator then," Polybius continues, "having considered with himself, that, according to the necessary and established course of all things, the several accidents and changes that have now been mentioned were inevitable, formed this conclusion; that every simple and single kind of government was insecure, on account of its proneness to degenerate into that more vicious kind, which was most nearly allied to it by nature. For as rust is the inbred bane of iron, and worms of wood; and as these substances, even though they should escape all external violence, at last fall a prey to the evils that are, as it were, congenital with them; in the same manner likewise, * [Essays, Vol. I.—Essay, Of Civil Liberty; apparently quoted from memory.] every single kind of government breeds within itself some certain kind of vice, which is attached by nature to its very form, and which soon causes its destruction. Thus Royalty degenerates into tyranny; Aristocracy into oligarchy; and Democracy into savage violence. Nor is it possible, as we have already shewn, but that, in the course of time, these conversions must be thus produced. Lycurgus, therefore, foreseeing this necessity, instead of adopting any one of the single forms of government, collected what was excellent in them all, and so joined together the principles that were peculiar to each several form, that no one of them might be extended beyond proper bounds, and slide into the evil to which it was inclined by nature. But that each separate power, being still counteracted by the rest, might be retained in due position, and the whole government be preserved in equal balance, as a vessel when impelled to either side by the wind, is kept steady by a contrary force. Thus, the dread of the people, to whom a certain share was allotted in the government, restrained the excesses and the abuse of royalty. The people, on the other hand, were retained in a due submission to the kings, by their apprehension of the power of the senate. For the members of the senate being all selected from the best among the citizens, were always ready to support the cause of justice; and by throwing their own weight into the scale when either was in danger of being oppressed by the other, to give such strength to the weakest party as the constitution of the state required. By these means the Lacedemonians preserved their liberty entire for a much longer time than other people."1 The same author remarks, that "all the three forms were blended in the Roman Commonwealth, in such a manner as to render it impossible even for a Roman citizen to assert positively whether the Government was on the whole Aristocratical, Democratical, or Monarchical; for when we attend to the power of the consuls, the government plainly appears to approach to a monarchical description; when we attend to the 1 Hampton's Polybius, Vol. III. p. 19.-[In the original History, Book VI. chapter ix., seq.] senate, it seems to be an Aristocracy; and when to the people, a Democracy." This observation of Polybius with respect to the state of the Roman Government, at the time when he had an opportunity of studying it, has always appeared to me to reflect peculiar honour on his penetration, and that on account of the very circumstance which has led Grotius to criticise it. "But neither,” says Grotius, "in this instance, do I follow the authority of Polybius, who refers the Roman Commonwealth to the class of mixed governments; for at the time of which Polybius speaks, it was purely a popular government, if, abstracting from its actual administration, we attend to the constitutional claims of the people."1 Among the numerous commentators of Grotius, there is one who has very modestly suggested the true answer to this objection. "Auctor inter eos qui circa formas imperii falluntur, etiam Polybium refert, qui Rempublicam Romanam suis temporibus mixtam fuisse dicent. At bene notandum, Polybium non loqui de mixtura status, sed administrationis; forma enim reipublicæ erat mere popularis, sed administratio divisa fuit inter Consules, Senatum et Populum."* It is here very justly observed, that Polybius is not, in the foregoing passage, speaking of the theory of the Roman Constitution, (about which there could be no diversity of opinion,) but of what common observers (as I formerly remarked [supra, p. 404,]) are so apt to overlook, -the actual state of that constitution, modified as it was by time, and chance, and experience. That he was perfectly aware, too, of this distinction himself, appears from the following passage, (immediately following that already quoted concerning the constitution of Sparta,) in which, with admirable sagacity, he 1 "Sed nec Polybii hic utor auctoritate, qui ad mixtum genus reipublicæ refert Romanam rempublicam, quæ illo tempore, si non actiones ipsas, sed jus agendi respicimus, mere fuit popularis: Nam et senatus auctoritatis, quam ad optimatum regimen refert, et consulum, quos quasi reges fuisse vult, subdita erat populo. Idem de aliorum politica scribentium sententiis dictum volo, qui magis externam speciem et quotidianam administrationem quam jus ipsum summi imperii spectare, congruens ducunt suo instituto."-[De Jure Belli, &c.,] Lib. I. cap. iii. [§ 19.] [See the Commentary of Henry de Cocceii, on Lib. I. c. iii. § 19.] |