ness or deficiency as our acuteness or education may enable us to do. Such questions, I mean, as relate to the nature and destination of mankind, to the innate qualities of the human head and heart, and all those questions in general which concern the most intimate and essential

attributes of humanity. In those regions we cannot remain quiet and unconcerned until some stranger comes to instruct us; but we must look for some answer ourselves to fill up those regions of our understanding which we cannot leave without any spiritual nourishment. For those intellectual exigencies are quite as urgent as the necessity of keeping alive our bodily existence by taking breath and food. Can anybody, for instance, feel indifferent concerning the question of the immortality of our soul? Can we wait for the solution of that problem as quietly as we waited until the question of the North-west passage was settled by M'Clure? Or, if we are told that till now philosophy has not been able to give a clear definition of beauty, we do not wait for some æsthetic revelation to give us the solution of this problem; but we give our judgment on beauty and ugliness freely, and, undisturbed by scholastic controversies, as well as we may.

There is some further difference between the manners in which we receive those various kinds of instruction. In the natural sciences we acknowledge the authority of those who have excelled in these matters, and few of us will venture to doubt what Humboldt, Arago and Gauss assume to be within the limits of geography, astronomy and mathematics; and, if some discovery is made by a person of less celebrity, we perhaps wait for the consent of one of those eminent heroes of science, and in the meantime we forbear to judge in such a case. But our modesty is not the same in that other order of philosophical researches, where the ideas of virtue, friendship and beauty, are to be defined. Here no earthly authority is able to set us at ease; but we seek for information by our own understanding, and no man will think so poorly of his

own mental faculties as not to try to form a judgment for himself even in those questions which have been the problems of the most eminent ancient and modern philosophers. Aristotle, Kant and Hegel are great men; but, with all respect for their wisdom, we are bold enough to look ourselves into the business. This seeming contradiction is to be explained by two reasons. First, the empirical sciences derive their improvement from experiments, and every new and rational experiment marks an improvement. The profoundest thinker and the most learned physician could never by meditation alone have discovered that the powder of Peruvian bark cures the intermitting fever, and experience alone could teach us that iodine is less able to resist the influence of light than any other earthly substance. And so every subsequent chemist is wiser by the experience of his predecessors; and he alone who has a perfect knowledge of this whole series of experiments is able to give a judgment in the questioned cases. Such as are neither professional men nor scholars in that branch must take it for granted that the indicated cause is correct if the foretold effect takes place. Quite different is the nature of other philosophical questions. Whether our soul is immortal, and whether after death we shall be able to remember our former life is not to be proved by experience, nor by experiments, nor will any science derived from experience and experiments be able to dispel our doubts concerning these momentous questions. Therefore, as Lord Macaulay says in his Essay upon Ranke's History of the Popes: As respects na"tural religion-revelation being for the "present altogether out of the question "it is not easy to see that a philoso"pher of the present day is more favour"ably situated than Thales or Simonides. "As to the great question, what becomes "of man after death, we do not see that "a highly-educated European, left to his "unassisted reason, is more likely to be "in the right than a Blackfoot-Indian."

There is, nevertheless, one point in which the modern philosopher is more

favourably situated than the ancientthat is the possibility of avoiding some of those evident errors and prejudices by which his predecessors have been led astray. The knowledge of these errors is no other thing than the history of philosophy.

These introductory words will bring us to that point from which the attention can be best directed to the following conversation. I make use of the word conversation on purpose, because to converse is the essential form under which philosophical notions must be communicated. Philosophy will not teach facts or experiences, nor any material knowledge; philosophy is more an art than a science

it is the art of thinking correctly. An art cannot be acquired by verbal instruction, but all lessons can only serve as an instigation for the proper activity of the young artist. In the same manner philosophy can but show the way how a man may regulate his thoughts agreeably to the precepts of logic and metaphysics. Therefore it is not a series of facts, but only of suggestions, which I undertake to offer to my readers; and I should not have written in vain, if I succeeded in inducing a reflecting mind to look a little nearer into some of the most interesting provinces of the philosophy of ethics.

The notions of good and evil, therefore, shall be the subject of this conversationgood and evil in that sense in which they are synonymous with morality and immorality. Every one knows what is good and what evil; nay, he must know it. Government requires it, for government punishes the evil and sometimes rewards the good; the community requires it, for it honours good men and despises bad ones; the family requires it-so much so, that fathers and mothers are sovereign judges of the good and evil in their children. These pretensions would be absurd, if one could not reasonably presume that everybody must know what is good and what is evil. beween knowing and knowing there is a vast difference. One may well know what is an oak-tree or a chestnut-tree, and all of us are able to say what species

But

of tree it is if we look at one of them; but, if we are interrogated in general for the definition of a tree, there are many of us who would be at a loss how to answer such a question, and they would refer us to the botanist, who is the professional man in these matters. Nevertheless, we should not have been able to know that these plants which we pointed out as oak-trees and chestnut-trees were trees, if we had not harboured in our minds some general notion of a tree, if we had not got somehow an indistinct idea about the definition of a tree. Thus it is with good and evil. We all admit that gratitude is a good thing, while thieving is an evil thing; but where are we to look for that general notion of good or evil which imparts to each of these actions its specific character? As to the botanic definition of a tree, nobody needs to be ashamed of acknowledging that he never cared for troubling his mind about the essential characteristics of a tree; but certainly no one can be found who will be ready to confess that he had never been occupied with the thought what good and evil in reality are. For the good is the real element of our life, wherein we breathe and move and live; and it cannot be doubted, but every one of us possesses certain rules and principles according to which he forms his judgment upon every human action, though perhaps he never knew exactly himself that this was the case.

It being the problem of this whole disquisition to discover a correct definition of good and evil, it appears that we cannot give such a definition in the beginning, but that this must be the end and the final conclusion of the whole conversation. Nevertheless, so much may be stated already, that good and evil, synonymous with moral and immoral, are human notions. Moral or

immoral stones do not exist, nor are plants and beasts good or evil, or moral and immoral; and, if such expressions occur, they are meant in a figurative or poetical sense. The sky, sun, and stars have nothing to do with morality and immorality, and the proverb says that sunshine and rain are poured out in

;

discriminately upon good and bad men. Mankind alone on earth is good or bad and that is so true, and is to be taken in so strict a sense, that with the extinction of mankind the notions of good and bad would simultaneously cease from the earth. Man alone, or, to set it down more strictly still, man's actions alone are good and bad; or, rather, not the actions, but the will and the intention which made a man act thus. A human action, if we do not look out for the intention and feeling of the author of this action, is neither good nor bad; but such an action is a mere fact, it is an occurrence which cannot be said to be good or bad. It is not hard to prove this assertion. It was said before that gratitude is good; but it is only the grateful intention which is good, it is the craving of the soul to render good for good. The action by which we show our kindness is, as an action alone, neither good nor bad; for, if a man takes his old father and mother into his house to sustain them by the labour of his hands, and deprives himself for their sakes of his own comforts, he acts out of gratitude and thankfulness only in as much as he does so by impulse of that feeling which makes him wish to reward those persons who, from the day when he came into the world, did for him all they could to promote his welfare and happiness, regardless of their own interest and their own pleasure. If, on the other side, his good behaviour towards his parents sprang from the desire of gaining a good reputation, or from vanity and pride, so that he would not have fulfilled his obligations if he could have secured for himself the renown of a virtuous man by other means, then we shall naturally cease to praise his behaviour, and to call him a good man and a good son; we should, on the contrary, despise him, and call him a hypocrite, who endeavoured to mislead the judgment of his fellow-men by assuming the appearance of a disposition which was not his own.

This example will suffice to put it out of dispute that good and bad may in reality only be attributed to the motives of human actions, and that these ex

pressions-well understood if used synonymously with moral and immoral—are not applicable to any other thing on earth. It is true that we speak of good and evil, or good and bad, in many other instances. So we say that light, and heat, and humidity are good for vegetables-that is to say, they further their growth and thriving; or, if we speak of a good and an evil influence, of good tools and good materials, and if we call that wind ill which blows nobody good, then we have in all these cases made use of the expressions of good and evil in such a signification as has nothing to do with our present undertaking, having merely in view that good and evil which is the same as moral and immoral, and which, as we have demonstrated, cannot be applied but to the motives of human actions.

To return to our starting point, we remarked that every body who cares about being good grounds his judgment of good and evil on certain principles. These principles are not the same with all men. Three distinct manners of viewing these questions may be discerned. Man either plainly and artlessly follows his inward feeling and the unsophisticated voice of his conscience; or he every moment knows himself to be one and intimately connected with his God, and he endeavours to fulfil the Divine commandments, such as he has received them by revelation and instruction. Thus he acts from love to God, and from obedience to His behests. But men of a third class endeavour to investigate the laws of human nature, and to find out the principles which will guide them on the path of virtue and morality. They follow that truth which their intellect has shown them to be truth; and love of truth alone is the the guide who points out to them the way through life, because they do not. acknowledge any higher precepts than those which result from their philosophical investigation. They have adopted for a device the words of that ancient writer who said, "Aristotle and Plato are my friends, but truth is a better "friend than both." All these different

ways lead almost to the same end. The first class of men, who follow the voice of their conscience alone, without troubling themselves much with thinking and reasoning, do well; but they certainly will feel no necessity to inquire into the nature of good and evil. To such the words of Goethe are addressed-" To "him who does not think are given gratis "the mighty results of science." And such a man will scarcely be inclined to accompany us further in search after the true notion of good and evil, and so we may take leave of him. The second was the pious and God-living man; he also has the answer ready, when questioned, what is good and evil. Good is what is in the Scriptures, and evil what is contrary to them; so he does not want either any instruction from philosophy, and theology alone will be able to furnish him with such further explanations as he may feel the need of. But the third class of men, who are bold enough to seek for themselves their way through the mazes of life, under the guidance of their own rational understanding, -let us see whether they will be able to gain the point at which they aim, or if their understanding will be found insufficient for steering their boat through the waves and winds of human life.

As the science which treats of the rational principles of human action is called ethics, we are well entitled to call that man an ethical man, who, by conforming to the precepts of ethics, undertakes to embody the principles of that science in his own life. Such an one is quite as conscious as any of his fellow-travellers through life, of his being a creature of God Almighty, and of his being dependent upon God's will in all and in everything. And yet this consciousness of dependence is of another kind than that of the pious and religious man, who feels himself like a child of God; whose paternal hand leads him on every step of his earthly pilgrimage; who sends him affliction and adversities to try and to better him; and who causes him to prosper, and gives him success in his undertakings, to fortify his soul and to give him courage to proceed. On the other hand, that

man whom we called ethical is more inclined to consider himself as a grownup son of his heavenly father, without forgetting for a moment that he owes all his faculties and the whole of his existence to God as a gift; but he endeavours to make use of that gift, not as a child, but as an independent man-like a son whom his father sends out on a voyage, in a well-built ship, with a rich cargo, and with all supplies and instruments to secure a happy passage for him. Such a navigator would be a very bad man, and a thankless son, if he forgot that everything in his possession was given him by his father, and that without his help he would be perfectly unable to thrive in life; but the voyage itself, and the steering and directing of the ship is given into his own hand, and there is no possibility of consulting his father and benefactor in any emergency occurring on the way, but he must look out for himself, and confide in his own skill and strength. History shows History shows us such characters more than once. The ancient world looked upon Cato as an example of such a hero of independent morality, and in modern times we may proclaim the philosopher Fichte as a fitting counterpart of the ancient hero.

If we contemplate the images of these three different kinds of men, who all have the intention to do right, and to be good men-viz., the pious man; the man who, without much thinking, does follow the instincts of his nature; and, last, the ethical man-it cannot be doubted but the loveliest picture, and that which will please us most, will be that of the religious man. But the subject of our essay being to find out the philosophical notion of good and evil, we must part with him, and direct our attention to the ethical man, to wander with him in those cooler regions which are under the government of understanding and rationality. Through that domain the ethical man will be our most fitting guide. But, it being my wish to leave no doubt whatever about the manner in which I look at these three different classes of morally-acting persons, we may be permitted to illustrate our

meaning by a simile taken out of another sphere of ideas.

It is known that every euphony-for instance, the chord of three sounds-is produced by touching three strings, whose length is determined by a strict mathematical proportion. If a string of a certain length sounds C, then another string of the same thickness, but of double length, will sound C also, but an octave deeper; five quarters of the original length sounds E, and three halves give G. Struck together, these three strings, therefore, will give us the accord of C major. Now, it is apparent that the beautiful harmony of such a chord is quite as intensely felt by a man conscious of this proportion of the strings as by one who is not; but the theorist is able to calculate beforehand what must be the proportion of strings which shall sound well together. Now, these first principles of musical theory may be applied to the whole compass of the science of harmony; and Euler, the celebrated mathematician, had made himself master of this theory in such a degree, that he affirmed his ability to construct, by mere calculation, a fuga on every given musical theme. Graun, famous as composer of the Oratorio of the Death of Christ, would not believe that such a thing was possible; and both Euler and Graun agreed to lay a wager as to whether such a piece of music could be calculated by the theorist. The result was, that on the fixed day the mathematician and the composer produced each a fuga on the chosen theme. Both works were perfectly correct, and corresponding to the rules of counter-point; but the difference was this, that Graun's music was at the same time in the highest degree melodious and interesting, while the work of Euler was stiff and cold, and unable to awake any musical enjoyment in the hearers. Was it, therefore, quite worthless? As a work of art it certainly possessed scarcely any value; but, for the study of science, and for him who made himself master of the theory of composition, there was, perhaps, more to be learned by a perfect understanding of the manner in which Euler had per

formed his task, than by the delight of hearing a beautiful composition of a famous artist. If we compare these three persons-Euler, Graun, and an impartial amateur, who, perhaps, was chosen as arbiter between the betters-and if we contemplate the manner in which these three persons executed the art of music, and enjoyed the productions of this art, we then shall have a fitting counterpart to the different manner in which we saw the three different kinds of men behave toward the theory of morality, or of good and evil. The highly-gifted genius of Graun would correspond to the pious and religious, for his work came out of the depths of his soul and his heart; the musical amateur would be compared to him who, without much troubling himself about speculating, acts as his moral inclination leads him; and the theorist would then resemble him whom we called the ethical m n.

This example will be sufficient to repel the error of those who may be inclined to opine, that in our estimation 'the fulfilment of moral commandments is more praiseworthy if it is the result of speculation and of philosophy, than if a man, by his piety alone, is induced to follow the precepts of ethics and of religion; but, our problem being to define the strictest notion of good and evil, we shall come more easily to our point by the way on which philosophy leads us.

In order to gain a point from which to start, we will take it for granted that good is the rule according to which a man must regulate his actions, and that evil is the contrary thereof. In this sentence, the notion of good is in no manner defined, because there is nothing stipulated about the precepts which that rule may imply, so that it is our task to make out the substance and the meaning of such a rule for human actions; but, if good is the rule for human actions, we must begin by stating what human actions are, and that leads us to the question, What may be the notion of humanity and mankind itself? What is man? Here, again, we cannot rest satisfied with our facility of pronouncing that a being whom we see, and who