Applicability of Preceding Paragraphs to Actions under Death Act. 4. The provisions of paragraphs one, two and three shall apply to any claim for the death of an employe arising under an act entitled "An act to provide for the recovery of damages in cases where the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default,' approved March third, eighteen hundred and fortyeight, and the amendments thereof and supplements thereto. Willful Negligence. Burden of Proof. 5. In all actions at law brought pursuant to Section I. of this act, the burden of proof to establish willful negligence in the injured employe shall be upon the defendant. Claim against Compensation. Approval by Judge. Notice. Lien. 6. No claim for legal services or disbursements pertaining to any demand made or suit brought under the provisions of this act shall be an enforceable lien against the amount, paid as compensation, unless the same be approved in writing by the judge or justice presiding at the trial, or in case of settlement without trial, by the judge of the circuit court of the district in which such issue arose; provided, that if notice in writing be given the defendant of such claim for legal services or disbursements, the same shall be a lien upon the amount paid as compensation subject to determination of the amount and approval herein before provided. Quaere. Does Chapter 201, Laws of 1914, repeal this paragraph? SECTION II. ELECTIVE COMPENSATION. Compensation under Agreement. Accident Arising Out of and in the Course of Employment. Employer's Negligence. Self-Inflicted Injury. Intoxication. 7. When employer and employe shall by agreement either express or implied, as hereinafter provided, accept the provisions of Section II. of this act, compensation for personal injuries to or for the death of such employe by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment shall be made by the employer without regard to the negligence of the employer, according to the schedule contained in paragraph eleven, in all cases except when the injury or death is intentionally self-inflicted, or when intoxication is the natural and proximate cause of injury, and the burden of proof of such fact shall be upon the employer. Construction-Effect of British Cases. The Supreme Court stated in Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 86 Atl. 458, that the words "by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment" being identical with the British Workmen's Compensation Act, cases in that jurisdiction will be useful in construing the same language in our own. This statement was approved in Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N. J. L. 161, 95 Atl. 1007, by the Court of Errors and Appeals. It was held by the Hudson Common Pleas that the words "by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment" are taken from the English Act and were construed by the English Courts before our statute was passed; and this being so, our legislature in adopting this verbage of the English Act also adopted the construction placed thereon by the English Courts. Phillips, Admx., v. Hamburg American, etc., 37 N. J. The effect of Zabriskie v. Erie R. R. Co., 85 N. J. L. 157, 88 Atl. 824, 86 N. J. L. 266, 92 Atl. 385, is that if an injury is of a character which under the British decisions would not be held to be by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment but is under the tests laid down by our court, the British decisions will be disregarded. It may be observed that Ex-Judge Tennant of the Hudson Common Pleas in Hanglin v. Swift & Co., 37 N. J. L. J. 81, said: "I have been unable to find any American cases on this point, and in the absence of any of our own judicial interpretation of the question I shall follow the English cases.” And in Winter v. Atkinson Frizelle Co., 37 N. J. L. J. 195, the same Judge said: "Until our courts lay down a distinct rule differing from the rulings of the House of Lords in the many cases I have reviewed, I must accept the interpretation of the English Courts made after years of consideration of a statute which reads so closely to the language of our own.” Essentials to Recovery. To warrant recovery under the act it must appear (1) that the injury was caused by accident, (2) that the accident arose out of the employment, and (3) that the accident arose in the course of the employment. Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 86 Atl. 458. Steers v. Dunnewald, 89 N. J. L. 601, 99 Atl. 345. Id. Employer's Negligence Immaterial. When Section II. of this act has been adopted, it is immaterial whether the employer was negligent or not. Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 86 Atl. 458. Scott v. Payne Brothers, 98 Atl. 927, 85 N. J. L. 446. American Radiator Co. v. Rogge, 86 N. J. L. 436, 92 Jacowicz v. D. L. & W. R. R., 87 N. J. L. 273, 92 Accident Mixed Question of Law and Fact. Whether or not an injury is by "accident" within the meaning of paragraph 7 is a mixed question of law and fact. If the facts are ascertained, it is a question of law. Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 86 Atl. 458. Id. Definition and Illustrations. An accident is an unlooked for mishap or untoward event which is not expected or designed. Whether the mishap is designed or expected is to be judged from the victim's point of view. Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 86 Atl. 458. Not all diseases contracted by a workman in the course of his employment are to be deemed injury by accident. Liondale Bleach, Dye & Print Works v. Riker, 85 Lyons v. Woodilee Coal & Coke Co., Ltd., 9 B. W. C. C. Where no specific time or occasion can be fixed upon as the time when the alleged accident happened, there is no injury "by accident" within the meaning of the act. Liondale Bleach, Dye & Print Works v. Riker, 85 Applying the rule last stated, the courts have held that gradual exhaustion from subjection to excessive heat for several days is not an accident (Pyper v. Manchester Lines, Ltd., 9 B. W. C. C. 580), that a case of typhoid fever from handling sewage was not an accident (Finley v. Guardians of Tullamore Union, 7 B. W. C. C. 973), and that conditions brought about by chemical poisoning of gradual development and by infectious disease were not by accident. (See cases following.) Id. Chemical Poisoning. Chemical poisoning caused by substances which the employe is obliged to use in the performance of his work is not an accident. Hichens v. Magnus Metal Co., N. J. L. Comp. Emp. Liab. Cases 49, 35 N. J. L. J. 327. Evans v. Dodd, Gordon's W. C. Rep. (1912) 149. A hairdresser's assistant who from continued use of a hair preparation on the heads of others contracted a skin disease (dermatitis) did not suffer an accident. Petschett v. Preis, 8 B. W. C. C. 44. In a case where a workman after ten days' service in a bleachery was affected with a rash said by the physicians to be a condition of eczema which could be caused by acids, the injury was held not one by accident. Liondale Bleach, Dye & Print Works v. Riker, 85 N. Id. Infectious Disease. Where a porter employed in an infectious disease hospital contracted scarlet fever, his condition was not by accident. Martin v. Manchester Corporation, Gordon's W. C. Rep. (1912) 289. Id. Acceleration of Disease. Pre-disposition Immaterial. If a diseased condition exists at the time of an accident and the accident accelerates the disease, such acceleration is an injury by accident. Feldman v. Westinghouse Elec. & Min. Co., N. J. L. J. McManus v. The Barbour Flax Spinning Co., 40 N. Voorhees v. Smith Schoonmaker Co., 86 N. J. L. 500, Winter v. Atkinson Frizelle, 88 N. J. L. 401, 96 Atl. 360. McArdle v. Swansea Harbor Trust., 8 B. W. C. C. 489. See also page 104. Id. Subsequent Infection. Where infection in a wound takes place without the willful |