網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

Effect of Federal Employers' Liability Act.

The New Jersey act does not apply in the case of an injury received in interstate commerce. The Federal Employers' Liability Law is exclusive and the State has no power to create any presumption to the contrary.

Winfield v. Erie R. R. Co., 244 U. S. 170, 61 L. Ed. 1057, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556.

Rounsaville v. Cent. R. R. of New Jersey, 90 N. J. L.
176, 101 Atl. 182.

Brinsko . Lehigh Valley R. R., 90 N. J. L. 658, 102
Atl. 390.

West Jersey Trust Co. v. P. & R., 90 N. J. L. 730,
101 Atl. 1055.

N. Y. S. & W. R. R. Co. v. Newbaker, 90 N. J. L. 713, 101 Atl. 1054.

Whitecraft v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 36 N. J. L. J. 182.

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Winfield v. Erie R. R. Co., above mentioned renders obsolete what was said in several New Jersey decisions to the effect that the Federal act did not render the New Jersey act non-applicable to cases of interstate commerce where there was no negligence of the employer.

It had been recognized in New Jersey that in so far as the New Jersey act conflicts with the Federal law in regulation of interstate commerce the Federal law is paramount.

Grybowski v. Erie R. R. Co., 88 N. J. L. 1, 95 Atl. 764, affirmed 89 N. J. L. 361, 98 Atl. 1085.

In Lincks v. Erie R. R. Co., 103 Atl. 176, and Brinsko v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 90 N. J. L. 658, 102 Atl. 390, it was said that the Federal Employers' Liability Act does not preclude the application of the New Jersey act to the case of an interstate carrier's employe who at the time of accident was engaged in intrastate commerce.

Accidents Outside of the State. Contract Made in State.

In Deeny v. Wright & Cobb Lighterage Co., 36 N. J. L. J.

121, N. J. L. J. Comp. Emp. Liab. Cases 76, it was held that Section II. governs in cases where the injury happened outside of New Jersey, if the employment was begun in this State.

In Clark v. Camden Pottery Co. (unreported) a workman was allowed compensation for injury by accident which happened in Pennsylvania on the ground that the work he was doing in Pennsylvania was merely an incident of his contract which was in general for the same work in New Jersey.

In Rounsaville v. Central R. R. of New Jersey, 87 N. J. L. 371, 94 Atl. 392, it was held that the New Jersey act applies to an injury outside the State when the contract was entered within the State. (The reversal of this case in 90 N. J. L. 176, 101 Atl. 182 was on another ground.)

Effect of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.

In Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 206, 61 L. Ed. 1086, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524, a stevedore was held not entitled to recover compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law of New York as that law interfered with the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States Courts and was inconsistent with the policy of Congress as manifested by Rev. Stat., secs. 4283, 4285; c. 121, 23 Stat. 57. The same reasoning would have applied to the New Jersey act.

Congress then passed amendments to the Judicial Code, sections 24 and 256, which were approved Oct 6, 1917.

As amended those sections read as follows:

Judicial Code, sec. 24, as amended Oct. 6, 1917.
District Courts. Original Jurisdiction.

(3) Of Admiralty Causes, Seizures and Prizes.

Third. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it, and to claimants the rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law of any state; of all seizures on land

or waters not within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; of all prizes brought into the United States and of all proceedings for the condemnation of property taken as prize. (The 1917 amendment inserted the words in italics.)

U. S. Comp. Stat. (1917 Supp.) 37, 40 Stat. at Large 395.

Judicial Code, Sec. 256, as amended Oct. 6, 1917.

Cases in Which Jurisdiction of United States Courts Shall Be Exclusive of State Courts.

Third. Of all causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it, and to claimants the rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law of any state.

(The 1917 amendment inserted the words in italics.)

U. S. Comp. Stat. (1917 Supp.) 39, 40 Stat. at Large 395.

These amendments are not retroactive and do not validate previously begun proceedings over which the court had no jurisdiction.

Coons v. Kennedy, 103 Atl. 207.

In Berton v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Dock Co., 219 Fed. 763, a suit in U. S. District Court to recover workmen's compensation was dismissed.

Nature of the Presumption.

This paragraph creates an irrebuttable presumption in the absence of an express contract or notice as therein provided, of the assent of the parties to a new contract or quasicontract whereby in case of injury or death there should be compensation according to the statutory scheme.

West Jersey Trust Co. v. P. & R. Ry. Co., 88 N. J. L. 102, 95 Atl. 753.

American Radiator Co. v. Rogge, 86 N. J. L. 436, 92 Atl. 85, 87 N. J. L. 314, 93 Atl. 1083, 62 L. Ed. 154, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 63, 245 U. S. 630.

Contracts of Minors. Constitutionality.

In a suit by an infant the court will not at the request of an employer pass upon the constitutionality of so much of this paragraph as provides that the infant's contract shall be presumed to be subject to Section II.

Hoey v. Superior Laundry Co., 88 Atl. 823.

Nor will the court consider the question if neither party is an infant.

Sexton v. Newark, etc., Co., 84 N. J. L. 85, 86 Atl. 451, affirmed 86 N. J. L. 701, 91 Atl. 1070.

This paragraph does not seek to bind a minor without his election; it merely prescribes how election may be made in case of minor. Hence, Art. IV, Sec. 7, Par. 4, of New Jersey Constitution, requiring the purpose of an act to be stated in its title, is not violated because the title of this act does not express a purpose to bind minors without their

election.

Young v. Sterling Leather Works, 102 Atl. 395.

The disability of infancy, not being a property right, can be taken away by the legislature.

Young v. Sterling Leather Works, 102 Atl. 395.

Id. Avoidance by Minor.

The contract for Section II. is binding upon minor and adult alike.

Young v. Sterling Leather Works, 102 Atl. 395.

Id. Minors Employed in Violation of Child Labor Law.

The presumption of acceptance of Section II. of this law does not apply to contracts of minors hired in violation of the Child Labor Law, so an infant illegally employed may sue as at common law.

Hetzel, Jr. v. Wasson Piston Ring Co., 89 N. J. L. 201, 98 Atl. 306.

A parent, however, who violates the Child Labor Law, in permitting his child to work contrary to the said law cannot

[ocr errors]

recover anything in a common law action for expenses and loss of services.

Hetzel, Sr., v. Wasson Piston Ring Co., 89 N. J. L. 205, 98 Atl. 308.

It might be noted that in one case a bill in chancery has been filed seeking to enjoin an infant from prosecuting an action at law for more than the nature of his injury would entitle him to receive under the Workmen's Compensation Law, the basis of the bill being that the minor had falsely represented himself to be of proper age to be employed under the Child Labor Law, and that while at law an infant is conclusively presumed incapable of fraud the rule in equity as laid down in Hayes v. Parker, 41 N. J. Eq. 630, is otherwise, and that in equity the misrepresentation as to his age by the infant was such fraud as should preclude him from receiving a greater sum than he would have been entitled to receive if his representations had been true, in other words he should not be allowed to profit by his own wrong.

Liondale Bleach, Dye & Print Works v. Cline, Chancery
Docket 44, page 438.

Id. Form and Sufficiency of Notice of Non-applicability of Section II.

When the employe is a minor the notice that Section II. will not apply must be given to his parent or guardian.

Troth v. Millville Bottle Works, 86 N. J. L. 558, 91
Atl. 1031, 89 N. J. L. 219, 98 Atl. 435.

Brost v. Whital-Tatum Co., 89 N. J. L. 531, 99 Atl.
315.

No particular manner of service of the notice is required; it is sufficient if actual notice to the person to be effected be conveyed to him.

Brost v. Whital-Tatum Co., 89 N. J. L. 531, 99 Atl. 315.

A notice on the pay envelope in the following words: "Employes take notice that the provisions of Section II. of the Employers' Liability Act, approved April 4th, 1911, chapter 95, of the law of 1911 are not intended by this corporation to apply to its contract of hiring with you," in a

« 上一頁繼續 »