CHAPTER 95, LAWS OF 1911. P. L. 1911, PAGE 134. AS AMENDED.

An Act prescribing the liability of an employer to make compensation for injuries received by an employe in the course of employment, establishing an elective schedule of compensation, and regulating procedure for the determination of liability and compensation thereunder.

Short Title.

No short title is given in the act as there is in the law of some states. Soon after its passage however, the members of the bar came to call it by the titles of Employers' Liability Act and Workmen's Compensation Act.

In Gregutis v. Waclark Wire Works, 86 N. J. L. 610, 92 Atl. 354, the court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Trenchard, said the act is more properly referred to as Workmen's Compensation Act rather than Employers' Liability Act. Since this decision the act is generally referred to as Workmen's Compensation Act.

It is not amiss to remark that several members of the court (including Mr. Justice Trenchard in the Sexton . Newark District Telegraph Co. case, 84 N. J. L. 85) had previously spoken of the law as Employers' Liability Law, that the legislature recognized that as the common designation of the law in Chapter 241 of the Laws of 1911 and amendments, that Mr. Justice Swayze said in Rounsaville v. Central R. R. Co., 87 N. J. L. 371, 94 Atl. 392, that Section I. is an Employers' Liability Act, and Mr. Justice Parker said the same in Taylor v. Seabrook, 87 N. J. L. 407, 94 Atl. 399, and that in Huyett v. Penna. R. R. Co., 86 N. J. L. 683, 92 Atl. 58, in sustaining the act against

the objection that it was for a double purpose, in violation of the Constitution, the Court said:

"It seems to us that the object of the act is single-to provide for the liability of an employer to make compensation for injuries received by an employe. Whether the compensation is to be made to the employe himself, or to those who suffer pecuniary loss by reason of his injuries, it is equally a liability of the employer."

In view of these facts it is obvious that calling the statute Employers' Liability Act is not a very serious error, if indeed it be an error at all. It is, however, as the New Jersey Law Journal points out in one of its editorials, a good thing to have a uniform custom in this regard. Accordingly the statute is now spoken of by the short title— Workmen's Compensation Act.

Constitutionality.

The act has been sustained against the objection that it violated the provision of the New Jersey Constitution requiring laws to have but a single object, to be expressed in the title.

In Huyett v. Penna. R. R., 86 N. J. L. 683, 92 Atl. 58, it was held that the statute was not for a double object, nor for an object not expressed in title, because of the fact that compensation is allowed to dependents in case of death.

In Allen v. Millville, 87 N. J. L. 356, 95 Atl. 130, affd. 88 N. J. L. 693, 96 Atl. 1101, it was held that the title expressed the purpose of legislating as to employes of municipal corporations, and the same was held as to the employes of private corporations in Troth v. Millville Bottle Works, 86 N. J. L. 558, 91 Atl. 1031, affd. 89 N. J. L. 219, 98 Atl. 435.

In Young v. Sterling Leather Works, 102 Atl. 395, it was held that the constitution was not violated by the act because the title does not express the purpose of binding a minor without his election, for the reason that the statute does not seek that result but merely says how election is to be indicated.

Cross-Reference. For other notes as to constitutionality, see various paragraphs of act and references in the Index.

History of Legislation.

For a history of the legislation, see Sexton v. Newark District Telegraph Company, 34 N. J. L. J. 368 and 35 N. J. L. J. 8. In brief the history is that the theory of Workmen's Compensation was first put in operation in Germany, later adopted in Great Britain and then adopted in America. The New Jersey Act is worded in several particulars the same as the British Act.

Basis and Theory of Workmen's Compensation Laws. The law is a remedial one.

Jersey City v. Borst, 90 N. J. L. 454, 101 Atl. 1033.

Its basic principle is indemnity.

Safety Insulated Wire & Cable Co. v. Common Pleas of
Hudson County, 90 N. J. L. 114, 100 Atl. 846.

The theory is that compensation is one of the necessary expenses of the business against which the employer must protect himself by a high price for his product or a low price for his labor, that is lower wages.

Interstate Tel., etc., Co. v. Public Service Electric Co., 86 N. J. L. 26, 90 Atl. 1062.

Compensation is secured to the workmen regardless of the employer's fault because the legislature has thought such security to the advantage of our industries and our workmen. The act is a declaration by the legislature of a public policy.

American Radiator Co. v. Rogge, 86 N. J. L. 436, 92 Atl. 85, affd. 87 N. J. L. 314, 93 Atl. 1083. Appeal dismissed by U. S. Supreme Court for want of jurisdiction. 62 L. Ed. 154, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 63.

BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

SECTION I. COMPENSATION BY ACTION AT

LAW.

Compensation for Injury by Accident Arising Out of and in the Course of Employment. Willful Negligence. Submission to Jury.

1. When personal injury is caused to an employe by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, of which the actual or lawfully imputed negligence of the employer is the natural and proximate cause, he shall receive compensation therefor from his employer, provided the employe was himself not willfully negligent at the time of receiving such injury, and the question of whether the employe was willfully negligent shall be one of fact to be submitted to the jury, subject to the usual superintending powers of a court to set aside a verdict contrary to the evidence.

See notes under paragraphs 7 and 23.

Certain Defenses Abolished.

2. The right to compensation as provided by Section I. of this act shall not be defeated upon the ground that the injury was caused in any degree by the negligence of a fellow employe; or that the injured employe assumed the risks inherent in or incidental to or arising out of his employment or arising from the failure of the employer to provide and maintain safe premises and suitable appliances; which grounds of defense are hereby abolished.

There being no vested interest in a rule of the common law, the abolition of common law defenses made by this paragraph was constitutional.

Sexton v. Newark District Telegraph Co., 84 N. J. L. 85, 86 Atl. 451, affirmed 86 N. J. L. 701, 91 Atl. 1070. Brost v. Whitall-Tatum Co., 89 N. J. L. 531, 99 Atl. 315.

See also New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 61 L. Ed. 667; Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243 U. S. 210, 61 L. Ed. 678; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 61 L. Ed. 685.

Effect of Subcontracts. Independent Contractor. Negligence of Employer or His Agent.

3. If an employer enters into a contract, written or verbal, to do part of such employer's work, or if such contractor enters into a contract, written or verbal, with a subcontractor to do all or any part of such work comprised in such contractor's contract with the employer, such contract or subcontract shall not bar the liability of the employer under this act for injury caused to an employe of such contractor or subcontractor by any defect in the condition of the ways, works, machinery, or plant if the defect arose or had not been discovered and remedied through the negligence of the employer or some one entrusted by him with the duty of seeing that they were in proper condition. This paragraph shall apply only to actions arising under Section I.

A complaint which charges that the doing of the entire work, as well as the furnishing of the ways, works, machinery or plant was let to an independent contractor by the defendant through whose negligence in not discovering and removing defects complained of, the plaintiff's intestate was killed, does not state a cause of action under Section I. of this act.

Kennedy, Admx. v. Kaufman & Sons Co., 91 Atl. 99; affirmed 86 N. J. L. 685, 92 Atl. 1086.