narily, however, a railroad company may use its discretion in locating its stations, as it may in selecting its route, and, for instance, is not bound to stop at the junction of a connecting road and there interchange business, although it may have established joint depot accommodations with another company elsewhere.1 § 162a. After a railroad company has once located and built its track, it has no power to change the location materially," unless a statute give it special authority. It can never be presumed that a legislature will pass a law to the detriment of the public; but it does not follow that from oversight or ignorance of all the circumstances a law may not have been passed which might be improved by amendment. Consequently a contract by a railroad company, conditioned on its receiving power from the legislature to change the location of its road, is not invalid as against public policy. When a railroad company has located its road and obtained title to the land, either the fee or the requisite easement, the mode of occupation and degree of exclusiveness necessary and proper for the convenient use of its functions are within its dis Ill. 175; Mobile & O. R. R. Co. v. Peo- | of Cases (Penn.), 650; Brigham v. ple, 132 Ill. 559; Florida Central, etc., | Agricultural Branch R. R. Co., 1 R. R. Co. v. State, 31 Fla. 482; Hol- Allen (Mass), 316; State v. New laday v. Patterson, 5 Oreg. 177; compare Harris v. Roberts, 12 Neb. 631; Wooters v. International & G. N. R. R. Co., 54 Tex. 294; Cleveland C. C. & I. Ry. Co. v. Coburn, 91 Ind. 557; Workman v. Campbell, 46 Mo. 305; Berryman v. Cincinnati Southern R. R. Co., 14 Bush (Ky.), 755. But see Cedar Rapids, etc., Ry. Co. v. Spofford, 41 Iowa, 292; First Nat. Bank v. Hendrie, 49 Iowa, 402. Haven & N. Co., 45 Conn. 331; Hart- 3 Erie R. R. Co. v. Steward, 170 4 Supervisors v. Wisconsin Central R. R. Co., 121 Mass. 460; New Haven and Northampton Co. v. Heyden, 107 Mass. 525; see § 305, last note. cretion. Nevertheless, when it takes but an easement, sufficient interest remains in the owner of the fee to prevent the railroad company from extending its use beyond the reasonable terms of its easement, since that. would be an encroachment on his residuary rights.2 An unrestricted grant to a railroad company of power to construct a road between two points, carries with it the right to cross navigable waters, if they intervene in a course or route which is otherwise proper, and the road can be constructed over them without destroying the public easement or seriously impairing it.3 § 163. The legislature cannot authorize the taking of private property for private use, even on just compensation. Moreover, the determination by the legislature that a purpose for which it directs private property to be taken is a public purpose is not conclusive, but open for determination by the courts; although if the use be public, legislative decision is conclusive as to the public exigency requiring the property to be taken.5 1 Brainard v. Clapp, 10 Cush. | ready devoted to a public use, as a (Mass.) 6; Hagen v. Boston & M. R. street or another railroad. R. Co., 2 Gray (Mass.), 577, 580; see 4 Matter of Eureka Basin, etc., Co., Prather v. Western Un. Tel. Co., 89 96 N. Y. 42; Lorenz v. Jacob, 63 Cal. Ind. 501. Compare Hudson River 73; Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Tel. Co. v. Watervliet Turnpike, etc., Falls Co., Saxton (N. J.), 695; ConCo., 135 N. Y. 393. Although a rail-tra Costa Coal Mines R. R. Co. v. road company takes but an easement, it may maintain ejectment. Rutland R. R. Co. v. Chaffee, 71 Vt. 84. See § 165. 2 See Proprietors of Locks and nals. Nashua & L. R. R. Co., 104 Mass. 1; Aldrich v. Drury, 8 R. I. 554 Blake v. Rich, 34 N. H. 282; Chapin r. Sullivan R. R. Co., 39 N. H. 564; Jessup v. Loucks, 55 Pa. St. 350. Moss, 23 Cal. 323; Consolidated Channel Co. v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 51 Cal. 269; Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; County Court v. GrisCa-wold, 58 Mo. 175; Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 479. See Bass v. Roanoke Nav. Co., 111 N. C. 439; Contra Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts., (Pa.), 63. The taking by a state of private property, without the owner's consent, for a private use is not due process of law, and is repugnant to Amendment XIV. of the Federal Constitution. Missouri, Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403. Miller v. Prairie du Chien, etc., Ry. Co., 34 Wis. 533; Fall River Iron Works Co. v. Old Colony, etc., R. R. Co., 5 Allen (Mass.) 221; Hamilton v. Vicksburg S. & P. R. R. Co., 34 La. 5 Niagara Falls, etc., R. R. Co., in Ann. 970. See § 163a for the taking re, 108 N. Y. 375; Talbot v. Hudson, by a railroad company of land al-16 Gray (Mass.), 417; Chicago, R. I. 3 The following uses have been held public purposes for which the legislature may delegate to a private corporation the power to take private property: to supply a village with wholesome water; build a bridge which by the same statute is declared a public highway; develop the mineral resources of the state; irrigate large tracts of arid land;' build (public) telegraph lines; build and operate a railroad as a common carrier. No matter how apparently necessary to a corporation the right of eminent domain may be to enable it to fulfill its corporate purposes, the possession of this right can never be implied or presumed; and express authority for its exercise must always be shown. The right of eminent domain of a railroad company, 6 & P. R. R. Co. v. Town of Lake, 71 | Co., 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 9; Beckman Ill. 333; Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. v. Saratoga, etc., R. R. Co., Paige 311; County Court v. Griswold, 58 (N. Y.), 45; Buffalo & N. Y. C. R. Mo. 175; Concord R. R. v. Greely, 17 R. Co. v. Brainard, 9 N. Y. 100; AldN. H. 47; Baltimore & O. R. R. Co. | ridge v. Tuscumbia R. R. Co., 2 Stew. v. Pittsburg, W. & K. R. R. Co., 17 & Port. (Ala.) 199; Davis v. TuscumW. Va. 812. bia R. R. Co., 4 Stew. & Port. (Ala.) 421; Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; O'Hara v. Lexington & O. R. R. Co., 1 Dana (Ky.) 232; Concord R. R. Co. v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47; San Francisco, etc., R. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 367; Raleigh & G. R. R. Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & Bat. L. (N. C.) 451; Walther v. Warner, 25 Mo. 277; Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427. Compare Niagara Falls, etc., R. R. Co., in re, 108 N. Y. 375. The power of eminent domain, together with large discretion as to route, may be given See Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & W. R. R Co., 23 Pick. (Mass.) 360; Riche v. Bar Harbor Water Co., 75 Me. 91; Tidewater Co. v. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. 518; National Docks R. R. Co. v. Central R. R., Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 755. Cf. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Long, 69 Conn. 424. But see Prather v. Jeffersonville M. & I. R. R. Co., 52 Ind. 16; Mims v. Macon & W. R. R. Co., 3 Ga. 333, 338. 1 Riche v. Bar Harbor Water Co., railroad corporations by a general 75 Me. 91. enabling act. Buffalo & N. Y. C. R. 2 Arnold v. Covington Bridge Co., R. Co. v. Brainard, 9 N. Y. 100; Weir 1 Duv. (Ky.) 372. 3 Hand Gold M'g Co. v. Parker, 59 Ga. 419 (perhaps extreme). v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 155; National Docks R. R. Co. v. Central R. R. Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 755. Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 See Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. U. S. 112. Chamberlain, 84 Ill. 333; Boston 5 New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co. v. Southern, etc., Tel. Co., 53 Ala. 211. 6 National Docks R. R. Co. v. Central R. R. Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 755; Co., Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. R. R. kirk, Thacher v. Dartmouth Bridge 18 Pick. 501; Phillips v. Dunetc., R. R. Co., 78 Pa. St. 177. moreover, extends only to property reasonably necessary to enable it to fulfill the purposes of its incorporation.1 When the legislature has not declared that the property sought to be condemned is necessary for the company, such necessity, if contested is a question for the court; for the determination of the company in this matter is not conclusive; and the scope of the right is always to be construed strictly against the corporation, so as carefully to protect the property of individuals from its exercise except for a public use. Nevertheless, statutes conferring the rights of eminent domain are not to be construed so literally as to frustrate the evident intent of the leg. islature.1 See Allen v. Jones, 47 Ind. 438; Rens- v. Alexandria and W. R. R. Co., 75 selaer, etc., R. R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N. | Va. 780; Doughty v. Somerville, etc., Y. 137. And the right always re- R. R. Co., 21 N. J. L. 442; Moorhead mains conditioned on the legality of the corporate organization. See $155. 1 Tracy v. Elizabethtown, etc., R. R. Co., 80 Ky. 259; Chicago and Western Indiana R. R. Co. v. Dunbar, 100 Ill. 110. Railroad companies cannot thus acquire lands for speculative purposes. Rensselaer, etc., R. R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137. See N. Y. and Canada R. R. Co. v. Gunnison, 1 Hun, 496. But they may take more than is necessary for their present needs, provided it be no more than reasonably anticipated future business will require. Lodge r. Phila., Wilm. and Balt. R. R. Co., 8 Phila. 345. Compare Proprietors of Locks and Canals v. Nashua and Lowell R. R. Co., 104 Mass. 1. Matter of New York Central R. R. Co., 66 N. Y. 407; S. C., 77 N. Y. 248; Rensselaer and S. R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137; Tracy v. Elizabethtown, etc., R. R. Co., 80 Ky. 259. St. Mary's Gas Co. v. Elk, 191 Pa. St. 458; See In re Rhode Isl. Sub. Ry. Co., 22 R. I. 457. Erie R. R. Co. v. Steward, 170 N. v. Little Miami R. R. Co., 19 Ohio, 340; Merritt v. Portchester, 71 N. Y. 309; Pueblo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rudd, 5 Cal. 270; Spofford v. Bucksport, etc., R. R. Co. 66 Me. 26; East and West R. R. Co. v. East Tennessee, etc., R. R. Co., 75 Ala. 275; Alabama Gt. Southern R. R. v. Gilbert, 71 Ga. 591. See § 122. 4 In re New York and Harlem R. R. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546. When for some reason a railroad company has no authority to condemn a certain right of way, it may cause another company to be formed of its own shareholders, and to be so organized as to have the requisite power; and after the subsidiary company has condemned the right of way, it may lease the same to the other company. Lower v. C. B. and Q. R. Co., 59 Iowa, 563. But one railroad company cannot condemn land for another. Swinney v. Ft. Wayne, etc., R. R. Co., 59 Ind. 205. It is no bar to the exercise of the power of eminent domain that a railroad company has the same stockholders as a private business cor|poration, and is alleged to be subsid In accordance with these principles it is held that a railroad company may condemn land for proper places to keep cars and locomotives when not in use, and for places to store merchandise between the time of its receipt and dispatch, and after its arrival till called for;1 and generally for proper terminal facilities, for necessary depots and workshops.3 § 163a. An individual, by devoting property to a public use, acquires no higher rights in that property than he had before. On the contrary, his rights as private owner become more palpably subservient to the rights of the public and to the police power of the state. Accordingly, as far as concerns the rights of the owners of property devoted to a public use, there is no reason why the legislature should not authorize it to be taken by compulsory process, and as for the rights of the people, the compulsory proceedings are authorized by themselves acting through their plenary political agent, the legislature.5 Consequently, the legislature can authorize property already devoted to a public use to be taken for another public use by compulsory proceedings; it can, for instance, authorize one railroad 6 iary to it. That cannot be inquired| into upon an application to condemn land, and the railroad company may be compelled to perform the duties imposed upon it. Kansas & Texas Coal R'y v. Northwestern Coal & Mining Co., 161 Mo. 288. 5 See Lake Shore and M. S. Ry. Co. v. Chicago and W. I. R. R. Co., 97 Ill. 506; Northwestern T. E. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 76 Minn. 334. 6 Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston and N. R. R. Co., 23 Pick. (Mass.) 1 In re New York and H. R. R. R. 360; Chicago, R. I. and P. R. R. Co. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546. 2 New York Central and H. R. R. R. Co. v. Metropolitan Gas Light Co., 63 N. Y. 326; Matter of New York Central and H. R. R. R. Co., 77 N. Y. 248. v. Town of Lake, 71 Ill. 333; Alabama and F. R. R. Co. v. Kenney, | 39 Ala. 307; Lafayette Plank Road Co. v. New Albany, etc., R. R. Co., 13 Ind. 90; New York H. and N. R. R. Co. v. Boston H. and E. R. R. Co., 36 Conn. 196; Northern R. R. v. Concord and C. R. R., 27 N. H. 183; 3 Nashville and C. R. R. Co. v. Corvardin, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 348; Gilsy v. Cincinnati U. & S. R. R. Co., | White River T. Co. v. Vermont Cen4 O. St. 308; Hamilton v. Annapolis tral R. R. Co., 21 Vt. 590; Thorpe and E. R. R. Co., 1 Md. 560; Han- v. Rutland and B. R. R. Co., 27 Vt. nibal and St. Jo. R. R. Co. v. Muder, 140; Wood v. Macon, etc., R. R. Co., 49 Mo. 165; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. 68 Ga. 539; Matter of Prospect Park Co. v. Wilson, 17 Ill. 123; Southern and C. I. R. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 371. Pacific R. R. Co. v. Raymond, 53 See Iron R. R. Co. v. Ironton, 19 O. Cal. 223. St. 299; Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 13 Gray (Mass.), 239, 247. Compare 4 See § 475, post. |