of citizens because some of them, if left their constitutional freedoms, might corrupt the political process. All political corruption is not traceable to state and federal employees. Therefore, it is possible that other groups may later be compelled to sacrifice their right to participate in political activities for the protection of the purity of the Government of which they are a part.

It may be true, as contended, that some higher employees, unless restrained, might coerce their subordinates or that government employees might use their official position to coerce other citizens. But is such a possibility of coercion of a subordinate by his employer limited to gov-. ernmental employer-employee relationships? The same

quality of argument would support a law to suppress the political freedom of all employees of private employers, and particularly of employers who borrow money or draw subsidies from the Government. Nor does it seem plausible that all of the millions of public employees whose rights to free expression are here stifled might, if they participate in elections, coerce other citizens not employed by the Government or the States. Poole, one of the petitioners here, is a roller in a United States mint. His job is about on a par in terms of political influence with that of most other state, federal, and private business employees. Such jobs generally do not give such employees who hold them sufficient authority to enable them to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the political world. If the possibility exists that some other public employees may, by reason of their more influential positions, coerce other public employees or other citizens, laws can be drawn to punish the coercers. It hardly seems consistent with

"Many states have laws protecting non-government employees from employer interference with their voting independence. See Note, Pay While Voting, 47 Col. L. Rev. 135, 136, note 9 (1947).

BLACK, J., dissenting.

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our system of equal justice to all to suppress the political and speaking freedom of millions of good citizens because a few bad citizens might engage in coercion."

It may also be true, as contended, that if public employees are permitted to exercise a full freedom to express their views in political campaigns, some public officials will discharge some employees and grant promotion to others on a political rather than on a merit basis. For the same reasons other public officials, occupying positions of influence, may use their influence to have their own political supporters appointed or promoted. But here again, if the practice of making discharges, promotions or recommendations for promotions on a political basis is so great an evil as to require legislation, the law could punish those public officials who engage in the practice. To punish millions of employees and to deprive the nation of their contribution to public affairs, in order to remove temptation from a proportionately small number of public officials, seems at the least to be a novel method of suppressing what is thought to be an evil practice.

Our political system, different from many others, rests on the foundation of a belief in rule by the people-not some, but all the people. Education has been fostered better to fit people for self-expression and good citizenship. In a country whose people elect their leaders and decide great public issues, the voice of none should be suppressed at least such is the assumption of the First Amendment. That Amendment, unless I misunderstand its meaning, includes a command that the Government must, in order to promote its own interest, leave the people at liberty to speak their own thoughts about government, advocate their own favored governmental causes, and work for their own political candidates and parties.

"The Act, in fact, leaves free the higher officials whose positions give them the actual power to coerce subordinates and other citizens not employed by the Government. § 9a; 18 U. S. C. 61h.

75

DOUGLAS, J., dissenting in part.

The section of the Act here held valid reduces the constitutionally protected liberty of several million citizens to less than a shadow of its substance. It relegates millions of federal, state, and municipal employees to the role of mere spectators of events upon which hinge the safety and welfare of all the people, including public employees. It removes a sizable proportion of our electorate from full participation in affairs destined to mould the fortunes of the nation. It makes honest participation in essential political activities an offense punishable by proscription from public employment. It endows a governmental board with the awesome power to censor the thoughts, expressions, and activities of law-abiding citizens in the field of free expression, from which no person should be barred by a government which boasts that it is a government of, for, and by the people-all the people. Laudable as its purpose may be, it seems to me to hack at the roots of a Government by the people themselves; and consequently I cannot agree to sustain its validity.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting in part.

I disagree with the Court on two of the four matters decided.

First. There are twelve individual appellants here asking for an adjudication of their rights. The Court passes on the claim of only one of them, Poole. It declines to pass on the claims of the other eleven on the ground that

1 Elkin, Senior Economic Statistician, Railroad Retirement Board; Abelson, Associate Financial Analyst, Social Security Board; Phillips, Labor Economist, War Shipping Administration; Mitchell, Wage Analyst, National War Labor Board; Fagan, Area Director, War Manpower Commission; Winegar, Senior Officer, Bureau of Prisons; Hindin, Procedural Assistant, Federal Security Agency; Rieck, Stock Clerk, Veterans Administration; Poole, Roller, United States Mint; Shane, Lens Grinder, Frankford Arsenal; Weber, Machinist Specialist, Frankford Arsenal; Tempest, Electric Welder, Philadelphia Navy Yard.

DOUGLAS, J., dissenting in part.

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they do not present justiciable cases or controversies. With this conclusion I cannot agree.

It is clear that the declaratory judgment procedure is available in the federal courts only in cases involving actual controversies and may not be used to obtain an advisory opinion in a controversy not yet arisen. Coffman v. Breeze Corporations, 323 U. S. 316, 324–325, and cases cited. The requirement of an "actual controversy," which is written into the statute (Judicial Code § 274d, 28 U. S. C. § 400) and has its roots in the Constitution (Article III, § 2), seems to me to be fully met here.

What these appellants propose to do is plain enough. If they do what they propose to do, it is clear that they will be discharged from their positions. The analysis of the situation by the District Court seems to me to be accurate and conclusive:

"The mere existence of the statute, saying that they shall not engage in political activity, the penalty in the statute that they shall be dismissed if they do, and the warning addressed to them by the Civil Service Commission in their posters certainly prevent them from engaging in such activity, if the statute is constitutional. If the statute is unconstitutional, they are being prevented from things which they have the right to do. If the statute is constitutional, it is mandatory that they be dismissed for doing such things. The provisions of Civil Service Rule XV that in case of any violation of the Civil Service Act or Rules or of any Executive Order or any regulation of the Commission the Commission shall certify the facts to the proper appointing officer with specific instructions as to discipline or dismissal is now controlled by the provisions of the Hatch Act that in case of violation of Section 9 (a) of that Act, dismissal is mandatory." 56 F. Supp. 621, 624.

75

DOUGLAS, J., dissenting in part.

Their proposed conduct is sufficiently specific to show plainly that it will violate the Act. The policy of the Commission and the mandate of the Act leave no lingering doubt as to the consequences.2

On a discharge these employees would lose their jobs, their seniority, and other civil service benefits. They could, of course, sue in the Court of Claims. United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303. But the remedy there is a money judgment, not a restoration to the office formerly held. Of course, there might be other remedies available in these situations to determine their rights to the offices from which they are discharged. See White v. Berry, 171 U. S. 366, 377. But to require these employees first to suffer the hardship of a discharge is not only to make them incur a penalty; it makes inadequate, if not wholly illusory, any legal remedy which they may have. Men who must sacrifice their means of livelihood in order to test their rights to their jobs must either pursue prolonged and expensive litigation as unemployed persons or pull up their roots, change their life careers, and seek employment in other fields. At least to the average person in the lower income groups the burden of taking that course

The case is, therefore, unlike those situations where the Court refused to entertain actions for declaratory judgments, the state of facts being hypothetical in the sense that the challenge was to statutes which had not as yet been construed or their specific application known. See Electric Bond & S. Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 303 U. S. 419, 443; Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450.

Where the legal remedy is adequate, it may be the more appropriate one. Thus in Coffman v. Breeze Corporations, supra, declaratory relief was denied a licensor of a patent who sued his licensee for an adjudication that the Royalty Adjustment Act was unconstitutional since it appeared that a suit to recover royalties was an adequate legal remedy and that the constitutional issues could be litigated there.