"Death, and his image rifing in the brain, "But fetting afide these things, as the creatures of a warm imagination, let us inquire what is death? "It is certain, that death muft either have a pofitive or relative exiftence. If the former, death muft exift whether any thing die or not; but this is abfolutely impoffible, for it fuppoles death, while it fuppofes nothing to die. If nothing were capable of diffolution or decay, it would be contradictory to admit any idea of death. It is the diffolution and decay of beings, which give rife to the idea of death; and therefore death can have no pofitive exiftence. If then death can have no pofitive exiftence, it can only exift in relation to thofe beings, which are capable of undergoing diffolution, privation, or annihilation; and therefore, in these relations it is, that we must look for every conception which we have of death. The moft fimple notion (if notion it may be termed) which we can form of death, is, that it is the reverse of life; and that it deprives of animation that fubject which falls beneath its power. When death is occafioned by diffolution, I understand it to be a feparation of thofe parts or properties of any being, which are neceflarily united, in order to the existence and identity of that being. By privation, I mean the fubtracting fomething from any being, without which that being cannot fubfist, And by annihilation, I mean, not only the deftruction of any and every modification, which it might have affumed, but the utter deftruction of all being; and the reduction of any fubftance to an abfolute non-entity. If, therefore, the foul, which is an immaterial substance, perifh, it must be in one of these three ways. "If the foul perith through diffolution, it must be by having thofe parts difunited, of which it is compofed. But this cannot poffibly be; because the foul is not an affemblage of diftinct fubftances, but, as has been already proved, a fimple, uncompounded fubftance; and therefore has no parts to be diffolved. To fuppofe any fubftance capable of being diffolved, which has no parts, is a contradiction-it fuppofes a feparation of parts, in a being which has no parts to be feparated. A being which has no parts included in the abstract idea of its existence, can never have any thing taken from it; and where nothing can be taken away, that being muft neceffarily be incapable of diffolution. An exclufion of all parts is neceflary to the existence of an immaterial fubftance; and to fuppofe a being to be diffolved, from the very nature of whofe exiftence a capacity of diffolution is neceffarily excluded, is a flat contradiction;-it is fuppofing a being to be capable, and yet incapable of diffolution at the fanie time. "Whatever has parts, cannot be immaterial; and what has no parts, can never lose them. To fuppofe an immaterial fubftance to have parts, deftroys its immateriality; for it is a contradiction to fuppofe that to be immaterial, which by its parts is demonftrated to be otherwife; and if the foul be immaterial, which has been already proved, it neceffarily follows, that it cannot perith by diffolution. "Neither can it be conceived, that the foul can perish by privation. Whatever undergoes privation, must be a subject of it; to fuppofe other, wife is a contradiction. And whatever is capable of privation, must have fomething which can be taken from it, without annihilating the fubftance itfelf. To fuppofe the fubftance to be reduced to a non-entity, is not privation but annihilation, which is not the fubject under prefent confideration. To suppose a privation poffible, which leaves nothing behind it, is a contradiction: and to fuppofe a privation, which takes nothing away, is a contradiction alfo :-In either ease, it supposes a privation, and not a privation at the fame time. Privation may reduce to a non-entity that which it takes away; yet that fubftance which it is taken from must remain in existence, and furvive its lofs. It is true, its modes of exiftence may, and muft be, confiderably changed; but this alteration of its modes cannot effect the identity of its nature. A fubftance, and the modification of that fubftance, are two diftinct things. The peculiar modification may be destroyed, while the fubftance remains; but wherever the fubftance itself is deftroyed, the modification which depended on it for its existence, must neceflarily perish with it. Privation muft alio imply a change, in the state of that being which is the fubject of it. For to admit a privation, where we exclude all change in the being which fuffers it, is a contradiction in terms; and therefore privation muft imply a change. If, then, privation imply fubduction, without deftroying the entity of that fubftance in which this fubduction takes place; and at the fame time implies a change in the internal ftate of that fubflance which thus fuffers, it will undeniably follow, that the foul cannot perish by privation. "For if the foul perish by privation, it muft fuffer lofs, without lofing its entity; but this is impoffible. The foul being a fimple immaterial fubftance, has nothing but its entity to lofe; and to imagine the foul to lose its entity, and yet to remain after its entity is deftroyed, is a contradiction. The manifeftation of consciousness and perception, are but actions of the foul; and to fuppofe that privation can deftroy an action, is a quibbling abfurdity. "An action cannot be deftroyed previous to its exiftence; and the very inftant it exists, its end being anfwered, it expires. And as actions are only relative, perifhing emanations, of a fimple fubftance, no privation can poffibly pass upon either. The fubftance of the foul forms but one fimple idea; and to make a partial fubduction from a fimple idea; and yet to fuppole that the part which remains may furvive fuch fubduction is a con tradiction; it is fuppofing the exiftence of that, which, by the fuppofition itself, can have none:-it fuppofes an idea of that which is not an idea; which is an idea and not an idea at the fame time. "As privation implies a change, there are other reafons which preclude its application to the Soul. Whatever changes, must be capable of being changed; and what is capable of being changed, cannot be a fimple uncompounded fubftance. To change the fame numerical particles, for the fame numerical particles, in material bodies, is not a change, but a nonentity. And to admit that a change has pafled upon an immaterial fubftance, when it remains the fame after this fuppofed change, that it was before, is an evident contradiction. If the foul be changed, it must be changed from itself to itself, which includes this contradiction,-that it has changed, and not changed, at the fame time. And if no change take place in the foul by privation, it must remain the fame after this privation, that it was previous to it; and this will lead us to this conclufion,that the foul has suffered a privation, and yet has not fuffered it at the fame fame time. A being which has nothing but its entity to lofe, cannot furvive privation; and that which cannot furvive privation, cannot be a subject of it. "It is a privation of animation, which all animal bodies undergo, in natural death. What remains is a lifelefs mafs; and the change which it undergoes, is from action to inaction. But this prefents to the mind the idea of a being, capable of fuch a change:-Yet after this change has passed upon the human body, it is no longer a fubject of death. It would be prepoflerous to fpeak of a dead man's dying, or to fuppofe that a dead man were capable of undergoing death, when he were known to be dead before. It would not be lefs contradictory, to imagine a dead man to be alive; it is imagining the man to be dead, and not dead at the fame time. It is no longer capable of death; the only privation in which death confifts, has already paffed upon it, and it has nothing more to lose. "The only entity which can now remain, is that of its component parts. A feparation of thefe may fucceed to this privation, but this can only annihilate their mutual contact; but in no cafe effect the entity of thofe component parts themselves. When the greateft poffible feparation has taken place through corruption, it is ftill the fame in point of entity that it was before, only it now engroffes different portions in the abyss of space. Every particle poffeffes all the eflential properties which the whole did, prior to this total feparation, only they are now differently modified. Matter can never be feparated from itfelf; it is a contradiction to fuppofe it; it fuppofes the exiftence of it, after it fuppofes it deftroyed. And if a material fubftance, after having been feparated from an immaterial nature, with which it had no phyfical connection, be incapable of undergoing any farther lofs; by the fame mode of reafoning, the immaterial principle, now feparated from its grofier companion, has nothing more to lofe. As it implies a contradiction, to fuppofe matter to be separated from itfelf; fo it implies the fame contradiction, to fuppofe an immaterial fubftance, to be capable of being separated, when it has nothing but itself to be feparated from. To fuppofe an immaterial fubftance to be deprived of itself, is to fuppofe it to exift after it is deftroyed. "A change can only take place in compounded bodies; but whatever is formed but of one fimple indivifible nature, can be feparated from nothing but thofe properties which are effential to that nature. And to fuppofe a feparation in these properties, is to fuppofe that thofe properties are essential to the existence of the foul, and not eflential at the same time. "It may, perhaps, be objected to this mode of reafoning that if the body be capable of undergoing a feparation of all its parts, and thereby ceafe to be a body, the immaterial fubfiance may undergo a fimilar change, and thereby ceafe to be a foul.' On this I would oblerve, that I conceive the objection is founded upon a grofs miftake. It is not founded upon the nature of fubftances, but upon the combination of them.The comparifon is not fairly stated. The body is a combination of atoms, the foul is but a fimple effence. "To ftate this cafe fairly, let us fuppofe (what, however, muft be admitted to be an impoffible cafe, because matter is capable of endless divifibility) a portion of matter to be divided, till it is impoffible that it can be divided any more: I then afk,-Can either of thefe particles of matter undergo any farther divifion or not? if it can, it is not yet divided, as in the the cafe fuppofed; if it cannot, we have here a cafe in point. The foul is this immaterial atom, (if I may fo fpeak) which is incapable either of divifion or change; because it is divested of all diverfity, and loft in unity. And if fo, it can neither lofe by privation, nor undergo a change. Ór if we must fill retain the idea of corporiety, let us fuppofe that there are as many diftinct independant fubftances in the foul, as there are atoms in the body, capable of divifibility: in this cafe the compariton will hold good, and the conclufions will be fair, each may be feparated into infinity, and yet each preferve its entity uninterrupted, independant, and entire, and therefore, the foul cannot perish through privation. "It now remains to be confidered, whether the foul can perifh by annihilation. If it can, all rational proof of its immortality must be given up; if not, its immortality will be ascertained. "It has been already proved, that the foul cannot perish by diffolution, because it has nothing to be diffolved. And it has alfo been proved, that it cannot perish by privation, because it has nothing to lofe, and because it can undergo no change; and if it perish by annihilation, it must be either through the tendency of its own nature, or the application of external force. If an immaterial fubftance have no parts,-have nothing to lose, and cannot change, it must follow, that fuch a fubftance cannot perish through the tendency of its own nature. To fuppofe a natural tendency, (in any fimple being) to that which is hoftile to its own exiftence, is a contradiction. A being which cannot change, can have no tendencies, but fuch as are peculiar to its nature; and that its natural tendency is to life, is demonftrated by its actual exiftence. If, then, a natural change in tendency, imply a change in that nature which produced it, and no fuch change in nature can poffibly take place in the foul, becaufe of the fimplicity of its exiflence; it muft follow, that the foul cannot perish through the tendency of its own nature. A being which has no parts cannot change: and that which cannot change, muft be the fame to-day, that it was yesterday; and that which is the fame now, that it was then, can be no farther removed from annihilation to-day, than it will be tomorrow. And to fuppofe a being, with a natural tendency to annihilation, which can make no approaches towards it, is to fuppofe it to have a tendency to annihilation, and yet to have no fuch tendency at the fame time. A being which is no nearer to annihilation to-day than it was yel terday, and which, for the fame reafon, must be as far removed from it to-day as it will be to-morrow, must always be at an equal difiance from it; and that which is always at an equal distance from any given point, can never arrive at it. "If the foul tend to annihilation, it must tend to its own contrariety; and that which tends to its own contratiety, muft act in opposition to itfelf, which is a contradiction. An action produced by any being, fuppofes in that being a capacity for fuch an action. But if an action be produced by any being, which its nature is incapable of producing, we must behold in fuch a being a capacity, and an incapacity, at the fame time, for such an action. "It may, indeed, be faid that this tendency of its nature, was impreffed upon it at its primary creation;-that it invariably accompanies the Toul in all its progreffes through exiftence; and that its final annihilation is nothing but the neceffary refult of things.' This, however, leaves the queftion queftion in much the fame state that it was before-clogged with abfurdities, and embarraffed with contradictions. "If the Almighty God, in the primary formation of things, have created a fimple, uncompounded fubftance, it can have but one physical tendency, The moment we admit a being tending to its own annihilation, that very moment we admit the diverfity of its component parts. If we admit the unity of any being, it is a contradiction to fuppofe it to have a tendency in oppofition to itfelf. That the foul has a tendency to life, is evident from its own existence. And if it have a tendency to its own annihilation, it must tend to life, and not tend to life, at the fame inftant; or, it must have a tendency to annihilation, and yet have no fuch tendency, in the fame moment. In either cafe, the contradiction is equal, and therefore no fuch tendency can poflibly exift in the foul. "If a principle of life have a tendency to its own extinction, it must, in the instant of its annihilation, exift, and yet not exist, in the same moment. That which is annihilated, cannot be in existence, and that which is in existence, cannot be annihilated. Either the foul muft exist in the moment of its annihilation, or it must not. If it exift, it cannot be annihilated while that existence continues; or if it do not exist, it can never perish through the tendency of its own nature. And if the fubftance on which this tendency depend, be not in existence at the time of its annihilation, inftead of annihilation being produced through the natural tendency of the foul, we are obliged to fuppofe the foul to be annihilated previous to its annihilation. Thus either cafe includes a naked contradiction, and the undeniable refult is,-that an immaterial, uncompounded fubfiance cannot perish through the tendency of its own nature. "As the foul cannot perish through the tendency of its own nature, the next confideration is-Whether it can perish or not, from the application of external force? All external force must be either natural, or fupernatural; and the means through which this external force must be applied, must be either material, or immaterial. "It has been already proved, that material bodies can never act but when they bring their furfaces into contact with one another. As an im material fubftance has no furface, it is a contradiction to fuppofe, that matter can ever be brought into contact with it: to fuppofe fuch a contact poffible, is to fuppofe a furface in an immaterial being, which, at the fame time, is fuppofed to exift without it. Whatever has an exterior, must have an interior; and what has both, muft neceflarily be extended; and what is extended, cannot be immaterial. An immaterial fubftance, therefore, can have no furface; and what has no furface, can never be brought into contact with that which has. The very fuppofition includes this contradiction-that there is a contact, and no contact, at the fame time. It therefore follows, that the foul must be inacceffible to all violence from matter, and that it can never perish through its inftrumentality." "An attempt to decide on the future life of brutes," fays our author, "in a few ftraggling propofitions, would be both immodeft and indifcreet." With respect to "the future life" of the Eflay before us, we would use the fame language. We cannot pretend to decide, abfolucely, on the degree of merit which it poffeffes; or the rank which |