As a physical or sentient being, man is entitled to life; as a being of intelligence and will, he is entitled to liberty; as a being of moral affections, hopes, desires, sympathies, he is entitled to happiness: these are natural rights with which he is endowed by his Creator, and for which he is in no way obliged to his fellows. But man is also a political being, adapted to live in society and under government; and it is impossible to conceive of him in that relation except as owing duties to his fellows, and deriving benefits from his fellows; so that every right that he acquires as a member of political society is of the nature of an obligation to the members in common of the same society. Hence such rights are distinct in their ground and tenure from natural rights, and can never be brought within the same category.

No political philosopher of recent times has gone farther than John Stuart Mill in maintaining natural liberty, or "the sovereignty of the individual over himself." Yet Mill has also shown, with his accustomed clearness, that there is a "rightful limit " to that sovereignty, at which "the authority of society" begins. "Every one," says Mill, "who receives the protection of society, owes a return for the benefit; and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another, or rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and, secondly, in each person bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation. These conditions society is justified in enforcing, at all cost, to those who endeavor to withhold fulfilment." Nor is this all that society may do. "If one has infringed the rules necessary for the protection of his fellow-creatures, individually or collectively, the evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on others; and society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate on him, must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficiently severe.'

Mill goes on to argue that misapplied notions of liberty are a real obstacle to the fulfilment by the State of its duties." He asks, "Is it not almost a self-evident axiom, that the State should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen?" And he does not scruple to say that "the laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage, unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the State; and, whether such laws be expedient or not, they are not objectionable as violations. of liberty.'

Without following Mr. Mill in all his specific applications, we must agree that this large concession to the rights and powers of the State by so sturdy a champion of individualism and so acute a philosopher, and especially his insisting that the State should not be impeded in its duties by misapplied notions of the liberty of the citizen, points to a radical distinction in fact and kind between natural rights, and rights originating in, or conferred by, society. That Mr. Jefferson perceived this distinction, and therefore purposely omitted all mention, in the Declaration of Independence, of voting or ruling from his enumeration of the rights with which all men are endowed by their Creator, is plain from his correspondence. Thus, in his letter to Mr. Coray, dated Oct. 31, 1823, after fortyseven years' experience of the doctrines of the Declaration, in recommending a government for Greece, Mr. Jefferson says, "The equal rights of man, and the happiness of every individual, are now acknowledged to be the only legitimate objects of government. Modern times have the signal advantage, too, of having discovered the only device by which these rights can be secured; to wit, government by the people, acting not in person, but by representatives chosen by themselves; that is to say, by every man of ripe years and sane mind who either contributes by his purse or person to the support of his country." Could any thing be clearer or wiser than this statement? Immediate participation in the government by each and every man as a man is not at all necessary to the idea of popu

1 On Liberty, by John Stuart Mill, pp. 134, 142, 189, 194.

lar government. The people govern by representatives; and this government by the people is not itself one of the equal rights of man, but is a " device by which these rights can be secured." Nor has every man an equal right to choose representatives in this government by the people: for, according to Mr. Jefferson, he must be of mature age, and capable of forming a sound judgment; and he must serve his country with his purse or his person; or, as he puts it in another letter, "among the men who either pay or fight for their country, no line of right can be drawn.”1 This political right of sharing in the government requires evidence of capacity, and proof of service rendered, or duty done. It is not, therefore, a natural right, but a right or trust fixed by society upon its own terms. Mr. Jefferson argues truly, that it is safe to commit this trust largely to the people; but he never loses sight of the fact, that it is a trust to which are appended certain qualifications and conditions. Speaking of juries, he says, "The people, especially when moderately instructed, are the only safe, because the only honest, depositaries of the public rights, and should, therefore, be introduced into the administration of them in every function to which they are sufficient." The words that I have emphasized qualify the right or trust by the capacity or sufficiency; and Jefferson shows his meaning by urging Mr. Coray to prepare his countrymen for independence "by improving their minds, and qualifying them for self-government.'

In a letter of May 8, 1825, to Henry Lee, Jefferson states this to have been the object of the Declaration of Independence: "Not to find out new principles or new arguments never before thought of, not merely to say things which had never been said before, but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent, and to justify ourselves in the independent stand we are compelled to take." He admits that the leaders of the Revolution were novices in the science of government, by which he intends that they had not, in advance, framed a system of independent government; and it is evident, that, at the date of the Declaration, they had not decided what form

1 To John Hampden Pleasants, April 19, 1824: Works, vol. vii. 345.

of government they should adopt. Those who now regard suffrage as one of the natural, inalienable rights of man, can find no warrant for this doctrine in the Declaration of Independence, nor in the writings of the apostle of American democracy, Thomas Jefferson. In his view, suffrage was a prerogative of society, to be intrusted to individuals competent and worthy to exercise it. Does any ask, How comes society by this prerogative? The

answer is, By the right and necessity of caring for its own existence. History, philosophy, experience, teach but one lesson; and no amount of theorizing can ever make it otherwise than that, in point of fact, in every political society, they who can rule will and must rule, though bound to rule with equal justice toward all. This is nature, equity, common sense, and leads to true republicanism.

Mr. Jefferson's theory of the best government was, that the actual governing power should be in the hands of the few who by nature and by training have both character and capacity for administering affairs; and these he designates the "natural aristocracy." In an elaborate letter to John Adams,1 -more an essay than a letter, — written after both had filled the office of President, Jefferson says, "I agree with you, that there is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents. .. This natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society." Observe here how far Jefferson was from accounting all men equal to the function of governing, or endowed for this by the Creator, and entitled to it as a personal and inalienable right. "An artificial aristocracy, founded on wealth and birth, without either virtue or talents," he said, "is a mischievous ingredient in government; and provision should be made to prevent its ascendency." But an aristocracy of nature, born to rule, Jefferson believed in, as he had reason to; "and indeed," as he says, "it would have been inconsistent in creation to have formed man for the social state, and not to have provided virtue and wisdom enough to manage the concerns of the society. May we not even

1 Oct. 28, 1813: Works, vi. 223.

say, that that form of government is the best which provides the most effectually for a pure selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of government?"

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This selection for office of the persons qualified and designated by nature to rule he would leave to the body of the people, as being entitled to a voice in the composition of their government, and as likely, in their own interest, to select good and true men for this trust. He would leave to the citizens the free election and separation of the aristoi from the pseudo-aristoi, of the wheat from the chaff. In general, they will elect the really good and wise. In some instances, wealth may corrupt, and birth blind them, but not in sufficient degree to endanger the society." It is clear, then, that the Declaration of Independence does not confound political powers with natural rights, the right of living and enjoying life with the right of ruling.1

To point the distinction between the rights with which man is endowed by his Creator, and rights that are intrusted or conceded to him by the political society of which he is a member, we may refer conclusively to the trial by jury. This is regarded as the very kernel of the Magna Charta of King John, which makes that instrument the palladium of every Englishman in respect of life, liberty, and property, the possession of which last is, to most men, a synonyme for happiness. The Charter declares, "No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freedom or liberties or free customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or any otherwise damaged, nor will we pass upon

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1 Some years ago, in an address to the Phi Beta Kappa Society at New Haven, on How to build a Nation, I argued for a guild of the cultivated to crown a republican society, and give order and beauty to its affairs. The objection, that this would be to create an aristocracy, I met by pointing out that the Church of Christ is the most presumptuous aristocracy under heaven, claiming to be composed of the saints," "the holy," "the sons of God," and to constitute upon earth a 'kingdom of heaven," above all other kingdoms. But, at the same time, the Church is the one example on earth of a pure and ennobling democracy: for this hierarchy of Gol is open to every man to enter it, simply by purifying and ennobling his own character; and, once within its pale, all are brethren. So should it be with the governing hierarchy in the republic, -open to all men through conditions of intelligence, character, worth, that would make them personally nobler, and at the same time lift them to the noblest sphere of equality. Such a "guild of the cultivated" would, I think, stand higher than Jefferson's " natural aristocracy," and yet open a wider or more democratic range of selection of the instruments of power.