[Dillard v. Webb.] bears on this question. This all points in one direction, and it left the jury no room for doubt in their finding as to this fact. It was permissible and proper to state it without hpyothesis; for this was only charging on the effect of the evidence bearing on this question. on this question. The court might have instructed the jury, and should have done so, if thereto requested in writing, that there was no evidence before them, authorizing the defendant to seize, impound, or sell the cattle of plaintiff. The 14th charge asked and refused is in the following language: "If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the defendant (Webb) found plaintiff's cattle (sued for) on his oats, and that said Webb pounded said cattle upon his lot, and five (5) days afterwards drove them, or caused them to be driven, to Demopolis, for the purpose of selling them; and that while said cattle were in Demopolis, plaintiff caused the writ in this action to be served on defendant,-then any commission to said Webb, as pound-keeper on the Winn place, issued and directed as adduced in evidence by defendant, will not prevent a recovery in this case." This charge simply postulates a set of facts, within the purview of the evidence, that would give to plaintiff a prima facie right to recover, and then affirms the invalidity of Mr. Webb's commission, as a justification for the detention of the property. It should have been given. We do not think the Circuit Court erred in refusing the other charges asked, but we deem it unnecessary to pass them in review, and point out the varying reasons. To do so, would swell this opinion unnecessarily. The questions presented by them will not probably arise on the next trial. 6. The objection to the evidence given by the witness Stickney, was only general, to a mass of evidence, much, if not the whole of which, was legal. The grounds stated for the objection were but the specification of reasons for excluding the whole of his testimony. Such objection, and exceptions furnish no ground for reversal.-1 Brick. Dig. 558, § 122. The other objection to the introduction of evidence were not well taken. 7. One other point raised by this record, we feel it our duty to notice. The charter of the "Canebrake Agricultural District" designates certain beginning and bearing points for both the northern and southern boundaries of the district. These the commissioners have no power to change or depart from. The latest expression of the legislative will on this subject is a law to them, which they cannot disregard. Between the designated points in the boundaries, they may ascertain and establish the lines. They can not change the [Boulo v. New Orleans, Mobile & Texas Railroad Company.] beginning points, nor deflect so as not to touch the named places. For the single error above pointed out, the judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause remanded. Boulo v. New Orleans, Mobile & Bill in Equity for Injunction against Railroad Company. 1. Injunction of trespass to real estate.-The jurisdiction of a court of equity to enjoin trespasses to real estate, though of recent origin, is now firmly estab lished; but the court will never exercise this power, unless the party complaining shows a clear title, legal or equitable, and an injury not capable of prevention otherwise. 2. Tille to Fort Charlotte lots in Mobile.-The lots occupying the site of old Fort Charlotte in Mobile, surveyed and sold under the authority of an act of congress approved on 20th April, 1818, as shown by the map and plat returned to the general land-office by the surveyor-general, though fronting on the Mobile river, did not extend to the river, but were separated from it by a narrow strip of land; and neither this strip of land, nor the adjacent land in front, since reclaimed from the water, passed to a grantee by a patent from the United States for the lots. 3. Lease of lots by corporate authorities of Mobile, under statutory authority, to defray expenses of filling up and draining. The corporate authorities of the city of Mobile having been authorized, by an amendment of the city charter adopted in 1831 (Sess. Acts 1830-31, p. 54), "to require lots to be cleansed and cleared of all such nuisances as may seem necessary to be removed,” and, where the owner of any lot could not be found, to cause such cleansing to be done, and to lease the lot for such term as would cover the expense of cleansing; a lease, executed by said corporate authorities under this power, conveys only the lot so cleansed, according to its boundaries at that time; and although the lease describes the lot with enlarged boundaries, the excess does not pass to the lessee. 4. Title by prescription. To constitute a title to land by prescription, or twenty years' continuous possession under claim of title, which will raise the presumption of a grant, there must be acts of exclusive ownership, in hostility to the rights of all other persons: the exercise of rights in common with the public generally, as in the case of a public street or wharf, is not suffi cient. 5. Title to shore on tide waters.-The title to the shore, on all tide-water streams, resides in the State, for the benefit of the public; and its use by the public, for the purposes of commerce, is not only permissible, but in accordance with the trust annexed to the title. APPEAL from the Chancery Court at Mobile. Heard before the Hon. ADAM C. FELDER. The bill in this case was filed on the 13th September, 1870, by Paul A. Boulo and Philip J. Boulo; and sought to enjoin and restrain the defendant, the New Orleans, Mobile, and Chattanooga (now Texas) Railroad Company, from subject [Boulo v. New Orleans, Mobile & Texas Railroad Company.] ing to its own uses a narrow strip of land in the city of Mobile, between Commerce street and the river, and forming a part of the river front. The complainants claimed this strip of land, according to the allegations of their bill, both by documentary title, and by prescription, founded on twenty years' continuous adverse possession under claim of title. Their documentary title was deduced from a lease made by the corporate authorities of the city of Mobile, on the 8th June, 1831, by which a lot in the city, known as the "Wilson lot," was leased, for the term of seventy-five years, to Robert E. Centre; which lease was made an exhibit to the bill, and purported on its face to be executed by the corporate authorities of the city of Mobile, under authority conferred on them by an act of the legislature amending the city charter, approved January 15, 1831. This act may be found in the Session Acts of 1830-31, p. 54. The 6th section of said act, under which said lease purported to be made, is in these words: "Be it further enacted, that the said board of mayor and aldermen shall have power to require the fencing or inclosing of any vacant lot within the limits of said city; to require lots to be cleansed and cleared of all such nuisances as may to the said board seem necessary to be removed; to require side-walks to be made, fronting any vacant lots within the corporate limits; and in every instance, where no owner or agent can be found to make such cleansing and improvements, the said board may cause the same to be done, and let out such lot or lots for such term of time as will cover the expenses incurred in so cleansing or improving any such vacant lots." In this lease to Centre, the lot is described as follows: "Bounded on the east by the Mobile river, on the north by Church street, on the west by Water street, and on the south by Hogan's lot; having a frontage on the said river of about thirty feet, a front on Church street of about two hundred and twenty feet, and a front on Water street of about thirty feet, more or less, being the same lot known as the 'Wilson lot." The lease contained the following recitals: "Whereas, according to the provisions of an act of the general assembly of the State of Alabama, and the seventh section thereof, entitled 'An act to alter and amend the charter of incorporation of the city of Mobile,' the said mayor and aldermen did, on the 16th January, 1831, declare by public advertisement, in the Mobile Commercial Register,' a paper printed three times each week in the said city of Mobile, that a certain lot, situated between Church street and Hogan's property, and extending from the east side of Water street to the Mobile river, and about thirty feet in width, to be a public nuisance; [Boulo v. New Orleans, Mobile & Texas Railroad Company.] and did, in the same advertisement, require the said lot to be filled up with good earth, sand, or shells, on or before the Sth day of March ensuing; otherwise, that the said filling would be let at public auction to the lowest bidder, at 12 o'clock M. of said 8th day of March, in front of the mayor's office: And whereas the said lot had not been filled at the time specified by the said advertisement, that the mayor did proceed and let out the filling of the said lot, at the time specified as aforesaid, to Thomas Byrnes, for the sum of four hundred dollars: And whereas the said Thomas Byrnes did fill up the said lot to the satisfaction of the said mayor and aldermen, and according to the conditions of a bond given for that purpose, bearing date the 9th March, 1831, and the said mayor and aldermen did pay to the said Thomas Byrnes the said sum of four hundred dollars, as will more fully appear upon record in the mayor's office of said city of Mobile: And whereas the said mayor and aldermen did cause an advertisement to be inserted in the Mobile Patriot, a paper printed in said city, three times in each week, on the 3d day of June aforesaid, that unless the owner, agent, or claimant of the said lot, on or before the 8th day of June in the year aforesaid, would come forward, and pay to the said city authorities the said sum of four hundred dollars, with all other charges and assessments upon the said lot, that they would, at 12 o'clock M. on the said day, in front of the mayor's of fice, proceed to lease the said lot for the lowest number of years, according to the authority aforesaid, for the purpose of indemnifying the said city for the expenses in and as aforesaid: And whereas no person did appear to pay the said charges, that the said lot was struck off, at public auction, to Robert E. Centre, for seventy-five years, for the sum of four hundred and fifty dollars and eighty-nine cents, he being the lowest bidder for the same," &c. In 1840, Robert E. Centre having died, his heirs conveyed the unexpired term of the lease to James Magee, under whom the plaintiffs claimed by intermediate conveyances, as more particularly stated in the opinion of the court. Magee's deed to the complainants, dated the 2d August, 1869, containing full covenants of warranty, described the lot in controversy as follows: "Also, another lot of land on the south side of Church street, and east side of Commerce street, beginning at the south-east intersection of Church and Commerce streets, and running southwardly, along Commerce street, thirty-two feet; thence eastwardly, and parallel with Church street, to the river; thence northwardly, along the Mobile river, until it intersects the southern line of Church street; and thence westwardly, along Church street, to the place of [Boulo v. New Orleans, Mobile & Texas Railroad Company.] beginning." Magee's deed to the complainants conveyed another lot, on the west side of Commerce street, which he held by the same title, and on which the complainants afterwards erected a brick store-house; and they alleged, in their bill, that the lot in controversy "is the river front of said first piece, and the outlet thereof to the Mobile river, the highway of commerce of said city, and of all other people engaged in commercial pursuits therein.' The plaintiffs' title by prescription was thus stated in the bill: "During all of said time, said persons from whom your orators derived said title and possession, as aforesaid, and your orators' predecessors, were in the full, quiet, and uninterrupted possession of the same, as your orators are informed and believe; that said Magee, at the time they purchased from him, was in possession, claiming the same under said title; and your orators, on making said purchase, went into the possession of the same, and never heard of any one setting up or claiming any right, title, or interest in the said property, until within the last few days," &c.,,when an agent of the defendant called on them to negotiate for a purchase of the property. The bill further alleged, that the defendant "has moved a pile-driver in the river, immediately in front of said land, and is now engaged in preparing to drive piles or logs in the shallow water in front of and on said land, with the intention of making a water bulk-head, and filling in the same with earth, and using the same for the purpose of said company, and has taken possession of said land by force, and against the consent of your orators, without compensation to them, and thus obstruct the entrance and exit to their other said property by way of said river." The chancellor sustained a demurrer to the bill, for want of equity; but his decree was reversed by this court, at its June term, 1872, and the cause remanded. The case was never reported, though an able opinion was delivered by B. F. SAFFOLD, J., a copy of which is set out in the record, with the certificate of reversal. After the reversal of the cause, the defendant filed an answer, denying the plaintiffs' title to the lot in controversy, whether founded on the documentary title set out in the exhibits to the bill, or on prescription; averring that the lot in controversy was a part of the shore of Mobile river, was formerly covered by the water, and was reclaimed by the corporate authorities of the city of Mobile and the lessee of the city wharves, who erected a bulk-head, or barrier of timber in the water, and filled up the space intervening between it and the west side of Commerce street, with earth, shells, &c. As to the lot occupied by the complainants on the west side of Commerce street, |