not as the interest of a loan. Ten millions of free revenue, with a property tax producing fifteen or sixteen millions, would, we trust, go a great way towards defraying the extraordinary expense of any war in which we are likely to be engaged; but if anything more should be necessary, it must be determined at the moment, whether to raise it by additional taxation or by loan. If by loan, the comparatively small amount would enable the finance minister to raise it upon terminable annuities, or, at all events, to raise it without creating capital in excess. We are clearly of opinion, that Mr. Pitt's principle of 1792 ought to be followed up; and that a sinking fund to redeem the debt within forty-five years, as well as the interest of the loan, ought to be provided by additional taxes. Perhaps, if the state of the country should admit of it, it might be better to have a sinking fund sufficient to redeem the debt in forty-five years, without accumulation; this would require something less than two and a quarter per cent. This fund, like the former, would be applicable to the expenses of the war; but after its termination, would be applied to the redemption of debt. It is, of course, essential to the principle, that it should be so applied in addition to the former fixed sinking fund. A question would arise, whether the fund should be simply alienated, or lent under Fox's clause. Strict principle would, perhaps, require the latter, but we should be contented with the former.

Such is a safe and equitable system of finance. We do not expect that either the present ministers or their successors will accomplish so much. Lord Melbourne's speech of the 23rd of January,* 1840, gave reason to expect more than Mr. Baring has accomplished; for the First Lord of the Treasury expressed a decided approbation of the sinking fund, as it was in the administration of the Duke of Wellington, whereas the Chancellor of the Exchequer stops short of a bare surplus. We wish that we could persuade Mr. Baring that his predecessors have exhausted all the popularity that can be derived from imprudence. He will do best for his fame, as well as for his country, by gaining a character for firmness and foresight.

• Parl. Deb., li. 505.

ARTICLE IV.

Combe's Constitution of Man. Fourth edition, 1836.

ON perusal of the present article, it will be found that we are by no means disposed to coincide with the opinions to which Dr. Combe has thought proper to give publicity, under a rather ambitious title, as the constitution of man in relation to external objects. Our readers perhaps may be led hastily to presume, from this circumstance, that we are altogether opposed to the system which goes under the name of phrenology. Such, however, is not the fact. On the contrary, we are rather disposed to acquiesce in what we conceive to be the more rational and moderate phrenological views. For instance, with respect to some at least of the mental faculties, we are inclined to believe the brain to be that organ which the mind employs as its most direct instrument. Neither does any reasonable objection appear to lie against the opinion, that the brain is locally partitioned, and either that the several regions of brain are appropriated to particular mental functions, or, on the supposition that the mind is a simple uncompounded essence, that each region gives a distinct modification to the impulses of mental energy. We see no inherent improbability in the opinion which the advocates of the system advance on physiological grounds, that the size and proportion of these regions respectively can, to a certain extent, be ascertained by an examination of the external development of the cranium. These preliminaries being settled, there seems to be no speculative difficulty in the way of believing that the mental constitution is to a certain extent indicated by the cranial characteristics, if only the inference be drawn from adequate practical experiments. We cannot indeed give in our unqualified adherence to the special distribution of cranial organs, which obtains most extensively amongst those who are distinctively styled phrenologists, Still a colouring of probability is given to the theory by our familiar experience of the sympathy which exists between

the mind and the other parts of our organic system. To phrenology itself then, in our acceptation of the term, we are by no means hostile: on the contrary, we subscribe to the general principles on which it is based.

It is therefore not only upon more enlarged grounds, but also as phrenologists, that we conceive ourselves bound to enter our protest against the opinions which Dr. Combe has recorded in the work now under discussion. We do not indeed profess that the object of this article is to defend phrenology; yet, incidentally at least, we conceive we shall be doing the cause good service by disencumbering it of the extravagances and absurdities which have been broached by its professed, possibly sincere, but certainly most indiscreet advocates.

On the other hand, it is possible that our readers may feel surprised that we should expend any intellectual exertion upon a work of so unphilosophic and superficial a description as the one under review. Our justification consists simply and entirely in a reference to its extensive circulation, both at home and abroad. Under ordinary circumstances we confess that it would have been an affront to the understanding of our readers to notice it at all. The extent of circulation, however, we conceive to be an ample apology; for though the temporary currency of a work is by no means even a proximate test of its merits, it is, notwithstanding, to the regret of all true philanthropists, found to be by no means an inaccurate measure of its immediate influence*.

Since, however, the author has supplied us with a most. liberal allowance of subjects of animadversion, we shall proceed at once to business.

The first misapplication of terms-the first instance of exaggeration by abuse of language, which will be found to constitute the staple commodity in the author's reasoning-is the title, "The Constitution of Man." For by the constitu

Respecting its circulation then, we find it thus asserted in the publisher's advertisement: "Thirty-five thousand copies of the People's edition," (a cheap form for general circulation)" and nine thousand copies of the 12mo edition of this work, have been sold in Great Britain and Ireland. It has also been reprinted in America, and translated into the French and German languages." Forty-four thousand sources of error and crime opened at once upon a generation! Verily this is not to be passed unnoticed.

tion of man is meant the whole constitution of man, not a part or parts, not a fraction or fractions, but the integral constitution. Yet what does the author declare in his preface? "I confine my observations exclusively to man, as he exists in the present world." It is true that this passage is ambiguously worded. Having, however, compelled ourselves to wade through this singular production, we are qualified to assert that the work is confined to the consideration of the physical and organic and moral structure of man, in relation to the material world. At the same time, the author does not venture openly to deny the spiritual capabilities and future prospects of man. Consequently, if it be allowed that man is destined for immortality—that he has spiritual functions, which also have a reference to external objects, and has present duties in relation to eternity-the work before us does not deserve the title of "The Constitution of Man, with reference to external objects." If the author had either treated of free will, or of man's spiritual functions, as far as they relate to external objects, or, on the other hand, had denied their existence, he might thus far have had some primâ facie pretension so to designate his work. As it is, he starts with a glaring inaccuracy.

Another still more striking inaccuracy occurs in the same preface. Our philosophic author is delivered of the following passage: "But although my purpose is practical, a theory of "mind forms an essential element in the execution of the plan. "Phrenology appears to me to be the clearest, most complete, "and best supported system of human nature which has "hitherto been taught, and I have assumed it as the basis of "this work."

Now is it not evident that the author intends his readers to believe that phrenology is "a system of human nature," or, as above, "a theory of mind"? To use the gentlest words that can be used, this is a most dangerous error. All reflecting phrenologists would at once admit that phrenology is neither the one nor the other. For instance, with respect to the former misapprehension, the osseous and muscular systems are part of human nature. Does then phrenology treat generally upon those subjects? If not, how can phre

nology be styled a complete system of human nature?

Neither, again, is phrenology a theory of mind. Phrenology, regarded theoretically, according to the approved usage both of phrenologists and others, is the theory of which we have signified our humble approval. Our readers will decide at once for themselves, whether or not that meagre scheme deserves to be dignified with the appellation of a theory of mind.

If, again, we were to allow that the term phrenology might be used to denote that special system which is at present most in fashion, even this gratuitous concession would not extricate the writer from his embarassment; for the prevalent system of phrenology is nothing more than a particular distribution of the cranial organs in relation to certain supposed faculties, or impulses of mind. The most prevalent system of phrenology leaves theories of mind to a great extent an open question to phrenologists. The theory of mind of one phrenologist may be wide as the poles asunder from that entertained by another, as long as the fact is acknowledged that the brain is the most direct organic medium of mental agency. For instance, one phrenologist may conceive the mind of man to be chiefly swayed by events from without, or that he is the creature of external circumstances. Other phrenologists may hold him to be in a greater degree the creature of his own internal organization. Another may conceive him to be predominantly the creature of his own will, whilst others may maintain, that man is most strongly, though secretly, affected by spiritual influences.

It is indeed not impossible that some phrenologists may hold, that the brain is the mind, and that in the organization of the cranium consists its essential and entire constitution. By such a reasoner phrenology would very consistently be used as a convertible term with a theory of mind. Even on such a supposition, however, the truth would not be, that phrenology is in itself, but only in the opinion of the individual, a theory of mind. Mr. Combe, however, is not even entitled to this palliation. He has not ventured to assert that the brain is the mind.

The only remaining feature of the preface worthy of notice is a kind of jesuitical deprecation of theological controversy, which may be regarded as the prelude to an attack upon the