the arid plain of the Metidja under the Bedoween rifles, may form a pleasing landscape in the eyes of over-fervent philanthropists, and even answer the ends of scheming land-jobbers; but common sense will say, that to perpetrate such economics would be throwing money away, and sending the paupers to almost

certain extermination.

The home-colonization is not so easily disposed of. In old and peopled countries, where property and industry are tolerably free from restraints, waste lands are not susceptible of profitable culture, unless under peculiar circumstances, which, because they are peculiar, call for the severest scrutiny. An unfavourable suspicion therefore attaches itself à priori to these colonies, which is strengthened in no small degree, when it is considered that in France the cultivation is not to be carried on under the only motive that has ever succeeded in drawing a profit from business exposed to open competition, private interest, but under the management of the government. Examples, even when successful, are to be little relied upon; for minute differences--more important under such circumstances than in ordinary situationsmay prevent successful imitation. But even the examples themselves would seem-as to one of the two solitary cases cited, to be enveloped in obscurity-and, as to the other, to exhibit a signal failure, although both were distinguished from the French project, by being worked by private companies from motives of profit. M. de Villeneuve, who visited the Dutch and Belgic settlements, furnishes a description that is so singularly incomplete and unsatisfactory, that we are obliged to have recourse to another economist,* to whose account M. de Villeneuve also refers us. According to M. de Pommeuse, (p. 89,) the debtor and creditor account for the colony of Frederick's Oord, in North Holland, for the year 1829, stands thus,

This statement exhibits a great balance; but our readers will observe that there is no item for expenses of management, sala

*M. Huerne de Pommeuse, Des Colonies Agricoles, 1832.

ries, repairs, replacing stock and utensils, or losses; an omission which deprives it of all trustworthiness. And, as if this were not sufficient, M. de Pommeuse sets down such uncertain receipts, as pauper-paid rent and voluntary subscriptions, as parts of a regular income. On turning to his estimate of the profit and loss of the cottage-farms-(too long for our pages)-for the purpose of ascertaining their capabilities for maintaining the paupers -we find the items calculated with a regularity and nicety well known to be impracticable in agricultural concerns. M. de Pommeuse avers that his estimate is grounded on the mean profit and loss of all the farms during "several years;" but a collective average of this description is totally inadmissible under such extraordinary circumstances, which require an account from each farm, in order that it may be seen whether their profits and losses are equal in all, or whether-as we suspect-the losses of the great portion are not compensated by the extraordinary returns of a few possessing peculiar advantages. The suspicions excited by the mysterious defects in the statements of MM. de Villeneuve and de Pommeuse are strengthened by the recent fate of the other of the two examples. The Belgian colonies-which received as much eulogy from those gentlemen as those of Holland-have been recently abandoned, at the end of fourteen years' existence, loaded with a debt of two or three hundred thousand florins.

M. de Villeneuve takes great pains to show the feasibility of home-colonization in France, where wastes abound, the climate admits of more varied produce, and the original outlay would be less, from greater cheapness, than in Holland. His views may be true, but, unless he succeeds in every instance in proving the practicability of the scheme, the "original sin" of waste-cultivation will adhere to it in the eyes of prudence.

But it must not be omitted, that a deficiency in profit, or even a positive loss, is not sufficient for the condemnation of such establishments. Either must be weighed against the expense of existing modes of relief, the public inconvenience of pauperism, and its injuriousness to the working people; and in this respect, home-settlements may peradventure be best confided to the government.

It has been urged against them, that they would give an undue

The company borrowed its capital on condition of repaying it by an annual sinking fund of 190,000 florins, which even according to this account would leave a deficit of 89,500 florins. To supply this, M. de Pommeuse composes a fund, 1st, of the rent already once counted; and 2dly, of the net profit of the farms, which belongs not to the company, but to the tenants; a whimsical blunder, characteristic of a sanguine projector.

impulse to population, by making, on one side, a void in the labour-market that would encourage the breeding of fresh labourers, and by breeding, on the other, additional labourers in the colonies themselves. The objections are not without weight. But upon the first it may be observed, that they would only take off unoccupied labourers, and the absence of these would not leave a void in the supply of occupied labour, as this objection erroneously supposes. Whether the occupied labourers remaining would not breed fresh paupers is another question; and, if put forth as an objection, must not be urged so much against the colonies in particular as against pauper-relief in the abstract. The second objection is mainly of the same nature, and fails to show that the colonies would breed more additional labourers than other modes of relief. The example of the Irish cottersystem is pointed to; but does the Irish peasant breed because of his cot; or does he not take his cot because his breeding prevents him from doing better? Is not the cot effect, and not causethe cause being improvidence? Besides, examples of a directly contrary nature may be found in France and other parts of Europe, where the petit culture or cottage-farm system successfully prevails, whilst in England the paupers are most numerous where farms are largest. Overbreeding is not to be checked by the form in which property is distributed, but by proper habits and acquirements in the population, and it is in no wise apparent that these cannot be successfully imparted in agricultural colonies under proper management. Perhaps it would not be going too far, to maintain that overbreeding is in the same ratio as the means of existence are uncertain. The class living on wages in towns is notoriously prolific. Whether the home-colonies can be successfully managed with these views will be partly determined by the results of the new system of direction adopted for our own workhouses.

The leading difficulty is the inapplicability of home-colonization to the great majority of paupers, and on this account the system of well-ordered workhouses, in spite of many unfavourable features, would seem preferable.

The extirpation of pauperism is a dream; a great reduction is all that can be reasonably desired or expected. In the far largest and happiest portion of France, there is not room for extensive reduction; perhaps it is not much desired. But there are other parts, as we have seen, where a change would appear unavoidable, and, it is to be hoped, will be successfully accomplished.

ART. IX.-L'Angleterre, La France, La Russie, et La Turquie. Paris, 1835.*

NOTWITHSTANDING the all-absorbing interest of the questions relative to our internal policy now under discussion, public attention has been turned to the actual state of our foreign relations with an earnestness hitherto almost unknown. We hail this circumstance as a happy omen: such is the intelligence of a British public, that, we doubt not, when once engaged to study the question, a solution will be found of all the difficulties with which it seems at present beset. We must, however, declare that the question is as yet little understood by the majority; and we lament that the moment chosen for discussing it, and even learning what it is exactly that is to be apprehended, is one when circumstances imperatively call for decision and instant action. The public perceive that a crisis is at hand. They feel that we are on the eve of one of those momentous events which give a name to eras in history, and that, unless a course of foreign policy be adopted by our ministers, far different from that which has been pursued of late years, a gloomy morning will arise when we shall find the established order of things violently changed, not for the better but frightfully for the worse, and the balance of power destroyed. We are aware that this phrase has, of late years, been so indefinitely used that its import has been weakened. But if our readers will take the trouble of a moment's reflection they will find that it implies neither more nor less than the maintenance of the independence, and even political existence, of the states forming the European confederacy. If, then, we can show that the balance of power is at present in danger, we think we shall have made good our position, that it is to the interest of every state in Europe, but especially of England, which holds such a commanding station, to do the utmost to avert a catastrophe pregnant with such awful consequences.

The quarter whence we look for this catastrophe is too obvious to require mention.-It cannot escape the most careless observer of passing events that it is Russia.-It is no less obvious that this catastrophe is consequent on the occupation by that ambitious and uncivilized power of the commanding position of Constantinople,-consequent on her taking into her own hands. the important passage of the Dardanelles and rendering herself then for the first time, really inaccessible and invulnerable, capa

It may be right to mention that the pamphlet to which this title belongs, is of English origin, being a translation. We trust that the great importance of the political question which it affords occasion to discuss will be a sufficient apology for a slight deviation from the general practice of this Review.-Editor.

ble of turning at her leisure against the states of Europe her formidable means of aggression and subversion.

After all that has been left on record by the most enlightened statesmen of every country-after all that has been written in books, pamphlets, and reviews-it were needless to Occupy our pages with proving that Russia entertains designs incompatible with the tranquillity and independence of Europethat she does exercise powerful and hitherto almost uncontrolled agency in the furtherance of these designs-that she pursues them with perseverance and undivided attention-that she looks on the possession of Turkey and the subjugation of Persia not as an end, but as the means of attaining an end. But there are points connected with these designs, which must be brought home to the mind, before we can appreciate their object and our critical position. While the designs, the views, and progress of Russia are on all hands admitted, the admission is deprived of its practical utility in various ways; as if men sought refuge in fallacies, to save themselves from being obliged to follow out reasonings that lead to inevitable conclusions, but which they dread to arrive at. Some think Russia too weak to be feared, and deem that no danger can accrue to the civilization and power of Europe from designs entertained by a poor and savage state. They conceive that it is impossible for her to consummate the acquisition of Turkey so as to draw from it financial, commercial, or military resources; that the possession of Constantinople will destroy the power she actually possesses, and tend to the dismemberment of her empire, although it does appear somewhat a gratuitous supposition that the increase of strength should have a tendency to weaken. Few, very few, can appreciate the real value of Constantinople, because the want of centralization of the power that at present holds it prevents its importance from being injuriously felt. Fewer still can appreciate the danger impending over our Indian possessions, because they have only taken into consideration a danger which does not exist, viz. a military expedition through a country impracticable for her; we say impracticable, as we want to make out an à fortiori case.

We are aware that this expedition is not considered so imprac ticable by enlightened travellers who have gone over the ground: still we maintain that this expedition will never take place, because, uncalled for, Russia is not led astray by romance; she does not strike a blow when it can be done for her by others. Her every motion is the result of calculation; and she knows that she has only to establish a military camp at Herát to turn to account those solvents which she has found so successful elsewhere, and to avail herself of those means, which, with a fore