Belt-Clause 16 of the Act referred to has not the application given to it by the counsel on the other side. This is simply a question of accounts, and the decree will be made in that form.

GWYNNE, J.-Modern conciseness is more useful than the verboseness of ancient times.

Belt-The form of claim is in effect the same as that given by the schedule. The defendant cannot be embarrassed.

Stow, Q.C.,-It is irrelevant matter to introduce the terms of the partnership, and the defendant must be embarrassed.

THE COURT-The claim must be amended by striking out the terms of the partnership, and by inserting instead that the partnership was "without articles." Costs of defendant to be paid by plaintiff,

The cause to be referred to the Master to take the accounts in the usual way.

MARCH 9, 1866.

In Re WILLIAM BECK, DECEASED.-Exparte HAMBRIDGE AND OTHERS.

Trustee Act No. 7, 1855-6-Appointment of New Trustees.--The will contained no power for the appointment of New Trustees.

THIS was a petition of Sarah Hambridge, wife of John Hambridge (formerly the wife of William Beck, deceased), Rebecca Beck, Sarah Beck, and Ellen Beck, infants, stating that the testator, by his will dated 4th September, 1850, gave, devised, and bequeathed to the Rev. Michael Ryan and Thomas Taylor, their heirs, executors, and administrators, all his real and personal estate upon certain trusts in the said will mentioned; that the Rev. Michael Ryan was dead; and that

the other trustee, Thomas Taylor, being in failing health, was desirous of being discharged from the trusts of the will; but the will contained no power for the appointment of new trustees-prayed that Henry Hughes and Courtnay Cook might be appointed trustees of the real and personal estate, and guardians of the infants, subject to the trusts of the will, and that the said real and personal estate might vest in such new trustees.

The Attorney-General (Mr. Boucaut) appeared in support of the prayer of the petition, but he had not the consent of the surviving trustee to the new trustees.

GWYNNE, J.-Could not the continuing trustee appoint new trustees under Act No. 7 of 1862, sec. 25?

The Attorney-General-The will was made before that Act, and its provisions are not retrospective.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE-Referring to the first few clauses of the Act, it seems to be the intention that it should be retrospective.

The Attorney-General-The Act No. 7 of 1855-6 gives this Court power to appoint new trustees if "it shall be found inexpedient, difficult, or impracticable to appoint new trustees without the assistance of the Supreme Court." It is inexpedient in this case to do without the assistance of this Court, as questions of title under this will may be involved.

GWYNNE, J.-Under this will it appears that the trusteeship was confidence placed in the two persons appointed by the will, no mention being made of their representatives or assigns; and, therefore, when one dies, the trust is at an end, and it might be doubtful whether the surviving trustee could appoint another in the stead of the deceased trustee.

THE COURT made an order that the proposed new trustees be appointed, and the trust property vested in them, under secs. 21 and 23 of Act No. 7 of 1855-6, the continuing trustee's consent to be filed before the order was drawn up.

APRIL 10, 1866.

READ against TIDEMANN.

LIEN-Action of Detinue in Local Court to recover certain Plaint Notes taken out

by Defendant, a land agent, against various debtors of Plaintiff. Pleasgeneral issue and a lien upon the plaint notes for fees paid and for commission. The Court below gave judgment for Defendant, upon the plea of lien. On motion to set aside the judgment, Held that lien did not exist.

In this case the plaintiff employed the defendant, who was a land and general agent, to collect certain of his debts at a commission of 1s. in the pound. With a view of enforcing payment the defendant took out nineteeen summonses; but a difference arising between him and his principal the plaint notes were demanded of him. On his refusal to give them up the plaintiff brought an action for their recovery, with £100 damages for their detention. The pleas were appearance, and a claim upon the plaint notes as a lien for fees paid by the defendant, and for commission. The defendant tendered the amount of money paid by the plaintiff. The Court below held that such lien existed beyond the amount tendered by the plaintiff; and that the defendant had used due diligence in endeavouring to collect the money due upon the accounts.

Way, having obtained a rule for a new trial, or that judgment be entered for plaintiff, now moved to make the rule absolute.

Ingleby (contra)—Although Tidemann by virtue of his employment as an agent did not possess the lien claimed, he did so by virtue of a special agreement. He was engaged to collect debts, and if repeated applications failed in inducing the debtors to pay it became his duty to take out summonses against them, and this he employed Mr. Mildred, his attorney, to do, with the knowledge of course that the expense of this step must be borne by himself. If the defendant had no right to sue, the plaintiff had no property in the plaint notes at all; and if, on the other hand, the plaintiff waived the tort and sued in trover, it was incumbent on him to pay for any benefit which this Act of his agent gave him.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE-By the Act regulating the legal profession the defendant was forbidden to take out the summonses.

Ingleby-He did not take them out himself, and therefore his arguing

was that the wrong person had been sued. The defendant's evidence the trial was that he retained the plaint notes as security for fees paid, commission, &c.

upon

THE CHIEF JUSTICE-Had he any right to detain them on these grounds.

Ingleby-Undoubtedly he has a lien on each plaint note for fees paid

upon it.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE-Have you a case to show that an unprofessional man, breaking the law with a view of getting fee or reward, has the rights you claim for him? Here the summonses were issued in expectation of his thus getting his commission.

Ingleby—It is not competent for the Court in this proceeding to look at the evidence. If the defendant had no right to employ Mr. Mildred to take out the summonses the papers in my client's hands were not plaint notes at all.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE-The Court below drew certain inferences, which they state. If you take a different view, must we not look at the evidence to see if it is justified? I confess that I see no grounds for calling upon Mr. Way to support his rule. The defendant's own statement shows that he claims to retain the notes for more than the amount paid by him, for which the tender was dispensed with, and this view the Court below affirms. I think there is no pretence for saying that he had a lien under the circumstances. If he says, "I don't act of myself, but employ a solicitor," so that in reality Mr. Mildred is made to act, not for him but for the plaintiff, I do not now say what the effect would be; but he does not say this. Mr. Mildred had nothing to do with the plaintiff, and the whole course of the evidence shows that the defendant would have been in no different position had he taken out the summonses himself. The plaintiff contravenes the law, and wants to be paid for it. The rule must be made absolute, and I think it should be for entering a verdict for the plaintiff.

Ingleby-The Court cannot assess the damages.

Way would be satisfied if the verdict was for the delivering up of the

plaint notes, the Court fixing the damages at £30 to ensure that

delivery.

Ingleby-According to the 61st clause of the Local Courts Act the Court could not make the rule absoluee in the way proposed.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE would not impute to the Legislature the inconsequence of authorizing the Court to grant a rule nisi without the power to make it absolute. The direction of the Court would be that the defendant had no lien whatever over the plaint notes; and if it was in their power they would give the defendant costs, including the costs of the trial. If they had no power to do that, doubtless the Magistrates in whose discretion that matter rested would respect the expression of their opinion.

Rule absolute, with costs.

WALSH against GOODALL.

(Epitome of the above case).

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court for the respondent which decided that Act No. 27 of 1862 did not repeal the Registration Act No. 8 of 1841, and that Act No. 27 was not in force on the 19th October, 1864, and was not validated by the Imperial Statute, 28 and 29th Vict., c. 63.

The contention of the respondent was that Act No. 27 of 1862 was not in force on the 19th October, 1864, and was not validated by Statute 27 and 28 Vict., c. 84, or by 28 and 29 Vict., c. 63; that the Court had no jurisdiction, being above £500; that there should have been a writ of error instead of petition of appeal, and that the appeal could not be heard, as notice had not been given under sec. 26 of Act No. 24 of 1855-6.

The Court sat on March 3, and held that they had jurisdiction; that there was no need of a writ of error; that the Act No. 27 of 1862 was in force on October 19, 1864, but reserved the question of notice till March 10, when the necessity of notice of appeal was considered waived by the respondent, even if notice were necessary, the Court giving no opinion on the necessity of notice. The costs of the appeal were allowed to the appellant.