the eldest attained 25, and then the trustees were to give him $2,000. The balance of the personal estate was to be divided between the sons, the eldest being charged with his $2,000.

Held, that the children were only entitled to maintenance until they attained their majorities.

Held, also, that the widow was entitled to maintenance until the provision as to the $150 came into operation, which would be when the sons respectively attained 25. Allthough the maintenance was to be made from the personal estate, and no part of the rents were assigned for that purpose, as the devisees of the real estate were not entitled until they attained 25, the intermediate rents not being disposed of, descended to the heirs at law, i.e., the children, and might be applied for their maintenance if the personal estate was insufficient.

When a testator has himself specified the time for the duration of maintenance, that will be observed; but the right to maintenance and support when given in general terms, will cease with the marriage or forisfamiliation of a child. Knapp v. Noyes, Amb. 861; Gardiner v. Barber, 18 Jur. 508, and Wilkins v. Jodrell, 13 Ch. D. 564, considered and commented on.

A widow ceases to be entitled to support and maintenance upon marrying again.

Query, as to her rights if she should again become a widow without means of support.

Held, if the $2,000 legacy to the son absolved all the personal estate the daughters should get none of it as their legacies were charged on the land, and that the $2,000 legacy and the legacy for maintenance must abate proportionately.

Moss, Q.C., and McPhillips, for the plaintiffs.

Maclennan, Q.C., for the infant defendants.

Cassels, Q.C., and Holland, for the adult defendants.

[28TH APRIL, 1886.

REGINA ex rel. FELITZ v. HOWLAND.

In re O'BRIEN.

Contempt of Court—Publication of letter by solicitor pending appeal—Time at which offence to be considered-Right of relator to make the motionApology-Costs.

A judgment was delivered by the Master in Chambers on a quo warranto proceeding on 23rd March, 1836, and an article referring to it was published in "The Mail" newspaper on the next day. On 26th March, O'B.

who was the solicitor for the defendant gave notice of appeal against the judgment, and on the same day wrote a letter in answer to the article commenting on the conduct of the Master in reference to the case, which letter was published in "The Mail" on the next day. On a motion made by F. the relator to commit O'B. for contempt, notice of which was given on the same day as notice of the abandonment of the appeal. It was

Held, that the nature of the charge against O'B. must be determined as at the time of the publication of the letter, and could not be affected by the fact of the abandonment of the appeal on the same day that the notice for the motion to commit was given; that O'B. could not take advantage of his double character of citizen and solicitor, that it is not allowable for a solicitor engaged in a cause to comment in the press on it while pending; that the relator in the quo warranto proceeding had a right to make the application; that the letter was not an injudicious but an improper one and was a contempt of Court.

An affidavit was put in and read on the argument containing an apology by O'B. which was coupled with statements by his counsel as to the character, ability and conscientiousness of the Master, and a denial of any intention to impugn any of these.

Held, that as the appeal had been abandoned and no prejudice could now arise to the applicant, a proper disposition of the case would be to refuse the motion upon payment of the costs by O'B. the solicitor.

Bain, Q.C., for the motion.

S. H. Blake, Q.C., contra.

[FERGUSON, J., 16TH APRIL, 1886.

HIGGINS v. LAW.

Guardian of infants-Right to receive infants legacies.

This was an action brought by certain legatees against the executors of the will under which they claimed, claiming the amount of their legacies. It appeared that the will devised the real and personal estate to the plaintiffs and certain other parties share and share alike that the executors had collected the estate, converted it into money, and invested the proceeds on mortgage security, and had paid the other legatees their legacies on their attaining their respective majorities; but as to the plaintiffs' legacies, they being infants, the defendants had paid their legacies over to their guardian duly appointed by the Surrogate Court. The guardian afterwards absconded with the amount of the legacies, and the plaintiffs brought this action accordingly.

Held, that the defendants by their dealings with the estate had put themselves in the position of trustees as to the moneys, and they were wrong in paying it over to the guardian, and judgment must go for the plaintiffs, with costs.

Guthrie, Q.C., and Watt, for the plaintiffs.
Bain, Q.C. and Scanlon, for the defendants.

IN CHAMBERS.

[BOYD, C., 3RD MARCH, 1886.

In re MORPHY.

Administration order-Judgment, entry of-Execution creditor of legateeReceiver-Mistake-Action.

A summary order was made for the administration of the personal estate of M. deceased. The order was not entered as a judgment, as it should have been by Rule 485, owing to a mistake of an officer of the Court. The London & Canadian Loan & Agency Co., who were execution creditors of one of the legatees and devisees of M. obtained an order appointing the Company receiver of the share of the execution debtor, and served notice of this receivership upon the executors of M., but received no formal notice of the proceedings under the administration order. The Company, however, were informed of the proceedings and upon an ex parte motion procured the administration order to be properly entered as a judgment and then applied for the carriage of the proceedings under it.

Held, that the status of the Company was not that of assignee of the legatee but only of a chargee or lienholder upon the fund or property to which the legatee was entitled, and therefore the Company would not have been entitled in the first instance to ask in invitum for a summary order to administer; and the slip which was made in not having the order to administer properly entered did not give them any additional right in that respect; but notice of the proceedings should have been given to the Company in order that they might be bound by what was done.

A receiver appointed as the Company were here, has a right to assert his claims actively, though he may require in some instances the sanction of the Court; and a contention having been raised as to a forfeiture of the interest of the legatee, leave was given to the Company to assert their claim by an action.

Arnoldi, for the Company.

Moss, Q.C., and C. Miller, contra.

[3rd MAY, 1886.

McCAW v. PONTON.

Appeal-Setting down--Dies non-Objection.

An appeal from an order made by a local master on Saturday the 17th April, in an action in the Chancery Division was set down to be heard on Monday the 26th April, which was Easter Monday, and a dies non. The appeal was put upon the paper for the following Monday.

Held, that the practice followed was a convenient one and an objection to it was overruled.

Held, also, that the proper mode of taking such an objection was by motion to strike the appeal out of the list.

Neville, for the appellant.

E. Douglas Armour, for the respondent.

[5TH MAY, 1886.

GOULD v. BEATTIE.

Slander-Particulars-Examination.

An order for particulars, under the statement of claim in an action of slander, of the names of the persons to whom the alleged slander was spoken, was rescinded because the examination of the plaintiff gave to the defendant all the discovery that he sought to obtain by the order for particulars.

Fullerton, for the plaintiff.

Allan Cassels, for the defendant.

THOMPSON v. FAIRBAIRN.

Executors-Compensation—Administration order-Responsibility of executors -Charging executors with interest.

Executors claimed compensation in respect of collections amounting to $29,000, and of disbursements amounting to $5,000. All the work of collecting and paying over was done after an order for administration had been made, and was done under the advice of solicitors, and in the more important matters under the directions of the Master. An item

introduced on each side of the account was a transfer of a mortgage to the plaintiff, amounting to $4,684.47 which was carried out in pursuance of an arrangement made by the solicitors and sanctioned by the Master. It also appeared that the plaintiff's solicitor collected and handed over to the executors $2,400, and also made a payment to them of $10,000 for which he was personally liable.

Held, that although the administration order did not put an end to the functions of the executors, yet it greatly diminished their responsibility, and it did so in this case to an almost vanishing point; and the compensation was reduced to $440.00. Nothing was allowed in respect of the item of $4,684.47; one per cent. was allowed in respect of the items of $2,400 and $10,000; two and a half per cent., on the balance of the collections; and five per cent., on the disbursements, except the transfer.

The executors retained in their hands a sum of $100 to meet claims against the estate, and were not called upon to pay it into court.

Held, that the amount retained was not unreasonable and that the executors were not chargeable with interest in respect to it.

W. H. C. Kerr, for the plaintiff.

Hoyles, for the executors.

[PROUDFOOT, J., 12TH APRIL, 1886.

MOORE v. MOORE.

Dower-Pleading and Practice-Dower Procedure Act.

The writ of summons was indorsed under the Judicature Act with a claim for dower and arrears of dower. The defendants entered an appearance, but added to it an acknowledgment of the plainfiff's right to dower, and a consent to her taking proceedings to have the same assigned to her under the Dower Procedure Act, R. S. O. cap. 55. The plaintiff delivered a statement of claim taking no notice in it of the acknowledgment and consent, and claiming dower and arrears.

Held, that it was necessary for the plaintiff to deliver a statement of claim in order to recover her dower, and she could not, having elected to institute proceedings under the Judicature Act, be compelled to take any steps under the Dower Act.

Hoyles, for the plaintiff.

Rae and Holman, for the defendants.