award is a moiety of the res saved; and that wrecking companies are governed by the law of salvage as well as ordinary vessel owners.

Held, also, that the services were no less salvage because performed upon request.

J. K. Kerr, Q.C., and Moss, Q.C., for the plaintiffs.
Osler, Q.C., and R. Gregory Cox, for the defendant.

CANADA ATLANTIC R. W. CO. v. CAMBRIDGE.

By-law-Bonus-Aid to Dominion Railway-Promulgation--Effect of Clerk casting rot-Majority of electors-Advertisement-Engineer's certificate. A by-law was passed by the defendants granting aid to plaintiffs' railway -a Dominion railway. The vote for and against the by-law was equal, and the clerk gave a casting vote in favor of the by-law, and it was then finally passed by the council. There was no resolution passed by the council designating the paper in which the notice was published, but the paper was the one usually employed for such purpose, and the account rendered therefor was passed and paid by the council:

Held, following the judgment of Proudfoot, J., in Canada Atlantic v. Corporation of Ottawa, that under sec. 559, sub-sec. 4, of the Municipal Act, R. S. O. cap. 174, (sec. 628 of Act of 1883,) a grant by way of bonus may be made to a Dominion railway.

Held, also, that the promulgation of a by-law, though validating any defect in the form or substance of the by-law, does not affect a matter not within the proper competency of the council to ordain; and therefore would not apply to cure the defect of the council finally passing a by-law which had not received as required a majority of the votes of the electors: but,

Held, there was a majority in this case, as the clerk had the right to give the casting vote.

Held, also, the advertisement was sufficient.

It was objected that the work had not been performed, and that a certificate to that effect given by the engineer was untrue; but,

Held, that not only did the evidence not sustain the objection, but the question was for the engineer and he had given his certificate.

McCarthy, Q.C., and Chrysler, for the plaintiffs,

Maclennan, Q.C., for the defendants.

[THE DIVISIONAL COURT, 6TH MARCH, 1886.

SCOTT v. CRERAR.

Libel-Publication, evidence of Nonsuit.

Action for libel. The libel was contained in certain letters or circulars written on a type-writer sent to several members of the legal profession in Hamilton, imputing unprofessional conduct to the plaintiff in sending "bummers" around touting for business, and inducing the clients of other solicitors to leave them and employ the plaintiff's firm. There was no direct evidence to show that the defendant was the writer; and the plaintiff relied on circumstantial evidence as proving the fact. As part of the plaintiff's case the defendant's examination before trial was put in by the plaintiff, which examination contained a denial by the defendant that he was the writer.

Held, Rose, J., dissenting, that on the evidence, as set out in the case, there was not sufficient to go to the jury to prove that defendant was the writer, and that a nonsuit was properly entered.

McCarthy, Q.C., for the plaintiff.

Robertson, Q.C., and Mackelcan, Q.C., for the defendant.

In re THE MASSEY MANUFACTURING CO.

Company -Increase of capital stock- Notice by Provincial Secretaries—

Ministerial act-Mandamus.

An application was made by the Massey Manufacturing Company to the Provincial Secretary for the issue of notice under his signature pursuant to sub-sec. 18 of sec. 5 of 27 and 28 Vict. cap. 23, for publication as required by said Act, the application stating that a by-law of the company had been passed increasing the capital stock thereof by $300,000, making the total capital stock $500,000, and declaring the number and amount of the shares of the new stock to be 30,000 shares of $100; that none of the said stock had been subscribed for, and nothing paid thereon. A duly authenticated copy of said by-law was filed on the application with the Provincial Secretary.

Held, that the duty of the Provincial Secretary in the matter on the issuing of the notice was ministerial; and that on the requirements of the statute being complied with the Provincial Secretary had no discretion in the matter, but must issue the notice.

Held, also, that the proper mode of enforcing the issue of the notice is by mandamus.

Robinson, Q.C., and Lash, Q.C., for the applicants.

Irving, Q.C., for the Provincial Secretary.

McCarthy, Q.C., and Neville, for the dissatisfied shareholders.

DYMENT v. NORTHERN & N. W. RAILWAY CO.

Parol evidence—Admissibility--Consignor and consignee-Which has right to

sue-Costs.

The plaintiff's agent at Gravenhurst shipped two car loads of shingles on defendants' cars. The shipping bill, signed by the agent, was in the usual form, and requested defendants to receive the under-mentioned property in apparent good order, addressed to "N. Dyment" (the plaintiff), "Wyoming, to be sent subject to their tariff, etc." Then, in the appropriate columns, followed the description of the shingles.

Parol evidence was admitted to show that the meaning of the shipping bill was that the first-named carload was to go to plaintiff at Wyoming, and the other to Henry James, at Mitchell; and that the agent so told the defendants' station agent when shipping the goods.

Held, that the evidence was properly admitted.

An objection was taken in term that the action should have been brought by the consignee James, because, as was alleged, the evidence showed that the property had passed to him; but the objection was not raised at the trial or on the pleadings; and if it had been made it would have been shown that the property was still in the plaintiff; and in any event the consignee James consented to be added as a co-plaintiff.

Held, that the objection could not now be raised; but even if there were anything in it, the Court would allow James to be added as a co-plaintiff. At the trial, the learned Judge only allowed County Court costs. On showing cause to the defendants' motion, the plaintiff, who had not moved, asked to have the direction as to costs varied and full costs allowed.

The Court, under the circumstances, refused to interfere.

McCarthy, Q.C., and Pepler, for the plaintiff.

D'Arcy Boulton, Q.C., for the defendants.

VOL. VI., C.L.T.

11

CARTER v. GRASETT.

Easement-Light and air-Implied grant-Equity of redemption.

P., the owner of lots 8 and 9, by his will devised the same to trustees in trust to sell. In 1869, the plaintiff purchased from the trustees lot 8, on which there was a house with windows overlooking lot 9 immediately adjoining it to the north, the said lot 9 being then open and not built upon. In 1873, the trustees sold lot 9 to Mrs. Priestman, who sold to T., who erected a house thereon. T. sold to G., under whom defendant claimed title. At the time P. became the owner of lot 9, he did so subject to a mortgage thereon, and he continued at the time of his death to have only an equity of redemption therein. The mortgage was discharged by G., who obtained the usual statutory discharge, which was duly registered by him. The plaintiff claimed that he was entitled by implied grant to the right to the light and air to the said windows, and that the same had been infringed upon by the erection of the house by T.; and he brought this action claiming damages and an injunction.

Held, that, by reason of P.'s trustees, at the time they sold to plaintiff. only having an equity of redemption in lot 9, no such implied grant to light and air could arise.

McCarthy, Q.C., and G. Bell, for the plaintiff.
Robinson, Q.C., for the defendant.

PIRIE v. WYLD.

Letters written without prejudice—Admissibility.

Letters written or communications made without prejudice, or offers made for the sake of buying peace or to effect a compromise, are inadmissible in evidence, it being considered against public policy as having a tendency to promote litigation and to prevent amicable settlements; but it may be said that no ground of public policy requires that a letter written to intimidate containing an admission should be held inadmissible.

Where a letter, written without prejudice, was deprecatory and complaining rather than abusive or with the object of intimidating, and written for the purpose of expressing the writer's views on the matter of litigation, and contained offers of settlement or 'compromise, it was held to be inadmissible.

G. T. Blackstock, for the plaintiff.
McCarthy, Q.C., contra.

[O'CONNOR, J.

GORING v. LONDON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

Insurance-Variation of statutory conditions-Fire Insurance Policy ActMutual Insurance Company-Attorney-General-Minister of Justice.

The defendants, a mutual insurance company, were incorporated by an Act of the Dominion Parliament, 41 Vict. cap. 40, by sec. 28 of which it is provided that "any fraudulent misrepresentation contained in the application therefor, or any false statement respecting the title or the ownership of the applicant, or his circumstances, or the concealment of any encumbrance on the insured property, or the failure to notify the company of any change in the title or ownership of the insured property, and to obtain the written consent of the company thereto, shall render the policy void."

Held, on demurrer, that the matters provided for by the above section were subject matters of the Fire Insurance Policy Act" of Ontario, and over which the Province has exclusive jurisdiction; and although they might be proper subjects of legal contract, they would have no force or vitality through the Dominion Act per se, but only by being used as required or modified by said Ontario Act, namely, in the manner provided for variations to the conditions therein contained.

Citizens Insurance Company v. Parsons, and Queen's Insurance Company v. Parsons, 7 App. Cases 96, commented upon.

The 28th section of the Mutual Fire Insurance Companies Act, 1881, makes the Fire Insurance Policy Act applicable thereto, 'except where the provisions of the Act respecting Mutual Fire Insurance Companies are expressly inconsistent with or supplementary," and in addition to the provisions of the Fire Insurance Policy Act.

Held, this includes all Mutual Insurance Companies doing business in the province; and it was not alleged in the pleadings herein that there was anything in the defendant's Act "expressly inconsistent with " the Fire Insurance Policy Act, but merely that the matters were variations, &c., of the statutory conditions.

Held, also, that the question, so far as raised, was not of a constitutional character, so as to require notice to the attorney-general of the Province and the minister of justice of the Dominion.

Osler, Q.C., for the plaintiff.

Moss, Q.C., for the defendants.

[O'CONNOR, J.

FUNSTON v. CORPORATION OF TILBURY EAST.

Municipal Corporation-Drainage by-law-Revision of assessments by Court of Revision-Necessity for alterations in by-law-Locus standi — Motion to quash, whether to Divisional Court or single judge.

In a drainage by-law the assessments as made by the engineer and contained in the schedule to the by-law were revised by the Court of Revision