yet his disobedience would entail the entire forfeiture of his wages. Before however he can be subjected to consequences so serious, it must be shewn that he was fully in possession in the most intelligible form of the real intentions of the owners."

In the present case the plaintiff had, as I have found, full and definite instructions from the owner which he wilfully disobeyed for his own purposes, that is to try, as he said, to get his money out of the vessel, and in consequence the owners were put to the heavy loss already mentioned, a loss very far exceeding the claim he puts forward, even if I include his disbursements in repairing the vessel.

It would be difficult to imagine a case of more direct disobedience of orders and of more serious consequences flowing from such disobedience; and applying the principles laid down by Dr. Lushington, which I have just quoted, to the facts as found by me, I cannot hesitate to find that the plaintiff has by his disobedience forfeited all right to wages.

This disposes of the plaintiff's claim, for in his petition he has only asked for his wages and damages for the detention of them, and he makes no claim for disbursements. The defendants have no doubt in their supplemental answer claimed that Brooks had not only forfeited his wages but is also bound to indemnify the defendants against the loss they have sustained through his improper conduct, and have asked to have an account taken of this, and if this were gone into, then the plaintiff could go into the question of his disbursements. By his disbursements I mean the money he spent in fitting out the vessel. His disbursements while the vessel was running, I understand he had deducted from the freight he had received.

Having however found in the defendants' favour that the plaintiff's claim is forfeited by his misconduct, I do not think I ought to go further in the present case. I could not do so in a satisfactory manner; the question of liability of the tug owners who rescued the vessel, is in litigation, and will have to be settled in another court.

I therefore refrain from dealing with the question of plaintiff's liability for damages sustained by the defendants, and of his claim for money paid by him in fitting out the vessel, and simply refuse the prayer of his petition, and give judgment thereon for the defendants with costs. The vessel of course will be released from arrest.

NOVA SCOTIA.

En the Supreme Court.

[20TH DECEMBER, 1884.

THOMPSON v. ACKHURST.

Assignment of chose in action-Right to sue in assignor's name—Action for

money had-Priority of contract.

W. C. A. made a bill of sale of goods to S. & M., and shortly afterwards made a conveyance of the same property to the plaintiff in trust to pay

off the debt secured to S. & M. by their bill of sale, and to pay off also all other creditors signing the deed, among whom were S. & M. The plaintiffs had before suit assigned the debt for which they were now suing to the original assignor, W. C. A. There was a verdict for the defendant. Held, that a rule nisi for a new trial should be discharged.

Per McDonald, C. J., and McDonald, J. The prior assignment of S. & M. was no defence, as S. & M. had joined in the deed for the plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs could not maintain an action in their own names under R.S. 4th series, cap. 96, sec. 356, having assigned the cause of action to W. C. A., although it appeared that the suit was brought for the benefit of W. C. A.

Per Thompson, J. The property and money sued for were not the property or money of the plaintiffs, but of S. & M., who were not estopped by joining (as creditors) in the conveyance to the plaintiffs.

Per Rigby, J. The defendant had sustained his statutory plea that before action the debt had been assigned to W. C. A., but it would have been competent to the plaintiffs to reply that they were suing for the benefit and with the consent of W. C. A.

ALMON v. WOODILL.

15TH JANUARY, 1885.

Description of land by boundaries-Inaccuracy of measurements-Falsa demonstratio-Covenant of seisin.

A lot of land conveyed by the defendant to the plaintiffs by way of mortgage, was described as bounded by lands A. & B., which had previously been conveyed to them, being originally parts of the same lot. The lines of the lot conveyed to the plaintiffs were described by measurements, but the termini were stated irrespectively of the measurement, thus: "250 feet, or until it comes to property of B." The measurements were wrong and resulted in the frontage on the street being much less than that represented.

Held, that the measurements were mere matter of description, and that there was no breach of the covenant of seisin.

[8TH JANUARY, 1885.

REGINA v. DONOVAN.

Appeal not certified by counsel—Amendment refused.

The allowance of an appeal by the Judge in Equity does not dispense with the statutory requirement of a certificate by counsel. The absence of such a certificate is not a clerical error which can be amended.

RUMSEY v. CUNNINGHAM.

Appeal from refusal of County Court Judge to amend his minutes-Rejection of evidence.

After an appeal had been perfected, an application made to a judge of the County Court to amend his minutes by adding evidence given at the trial but not noted, was refused. An appeal from this refusal was taken under cap. 2, sec. 99, of the Acts of 1880. It appeared that the evidence had been tendered at the trial and rejected as irrelevant.

Held, that an appeal would not lie from the refusal after the appeal had been perfected. Even if the Court believed the learned judge to have been wrong, it would not compel him to add evidence which he had rejected as irrelevant. Rigby, J., dissenting.

Per Rigby, J. The application was wrongly made, the evidence having been rejected at the trial, while the application was to have it added as evidence which had been received but not entered on the minutes.

Per Thompson, J. An appeal would lie, as the decision appealed from was based on a matter of law, viz., the question, whether the judge had power to amend his minutes after appeal taken on the merits.

[17TH JANUARY, 1885.

CITY OF HALIFAX v. BENTLEY.

Capias-Irregularities in order to hold to bail and affidavit.

An order to hold to bail authorized the issue of a writ of capias out of the County Court of the Province of Nova Scotia. The Commissioner before whom the affidavit for the order was sworn signed himself "Commissioner County Court, County of Halifax."

Held, insufficient ground for setting aside the writ.

[23RD JANUARY, 1885.

FRASER v. HALIFAX & C. B. R. R. CO.

Attorney and client—General retainer—Compensation for services. The plaintiff was retained as solicitor for the defendant company in arranging for the right of way and all other matters connected with their works on the Eastern Extension Railway. He rendered accounts from time to time for services rendered in obtaining titles to land through which the railway ran, and other services as barrister and attorney, amounting to about $300 a year. These accounts included cash outlay for travelling and other expenses, but no charge was made in them for consultations, advice, correspondence, and other professional work. The defendant company being about to transfer their road to the Government of Nova Scotia, the plaintiff made a demand for further compensation

for his services. His right was admitted, and an account rendered for services for six years at the rate of $1,000 a year. No exception was taken to the charge as being considered excessive, and the plaintiff was requested to act for the company in connection with other legal business. The amount claimed by the plaintiff was included as actual outlay in accounts submitted by the defendant company to arbitrators appointed to determine the amount to be paid the defendant company by the Government of Nova Scotia, and no objection was made to the charge by the company until after the rejection of the amount by the arbitrators as not included in the class of charges to be paid by the Province.

Held, that in view of the extent of the plaintiff's practice and the fact that his retainer would exclude him from all business adverse to the company, the amount claimed by him was not excessive, and that the rule to set aside a verdict for plaintiff should be discharged.

[24TH JANUARY, 1885.

REGINA v. CUNNINGHAM.

l'ttering forged order for payment of money-Uttering forged cheque-Extradition-Trial for offence other than that for which extradited.

The defendant was found guilty on the first and third counts of an indictment, the last count of which charged him with uttering a forged "order for the payment of money." The evidence was that the defendant forged the name W. McF. on the back of a cheque drawn payable to W. McF. or order, and obtained the proceeds, which he appropriated to his own use.

Held, that the cheque when endorsed became an "order for the payment of money "to any one who should present it, and that the conviction on the last count was sustained by the evidence. McDonald, C.J., and Weatherbe, J., dissenting.

The first count of the indictment charged the defendant with uttering a forged cheque.

Held, that this count was not sustained by proof of forgery of the indorsement, and that the conviction on this count must be set aside.

A question having been raised at the trial by demurrer as to the power of the Court to try or convict the defendant for another offence than that for which he was extradited, and having been decided by the presiding Judge against the defendant,

Held, that it was too late to raise the question, by case reserved for the full Court.

DOULL v. LINTON.

Conveyance in fraud of creditors-Evidence of fraud-Statute of Elizabeth. T. L. caused a deed of certain real estate to be made to a trustee for the benefit of his wife. The title of the real estate was in his son W. F.

L., by whom the deed was made, but it was proved that, although the property was purchased and the consideration money paid by W. F. L., who was then a minor, yet his father had erected part of a double house on the property with the consent of his son, and that the deed from the latter to the trustee was made with the father's concurrence. At the time of the conveyance in trust T. L. was indebted to the plaintiff, and had been "going behind-hand" for some time. There was no consideration for the deed.

Held, that it had the effect of delaying and hindering creditors within the meaning of the Statute of Elizabeth, and was therefore void.

HAWES v. HART.

Certiorari-Finality of magistrate's judgment-Power to review-Jurisdiction limited as to classes of persons-Collateral fact necessary to jurisdiction.

The plaintiff contracted with one F., who professed to be the owner of a vessel, to sail her as master at a stipulated rate of wages. After the lapse of six months F., who had up to that time been on board, left the ship, and the plaintiff discovered that he was not the owner, the possession of the ship having been demanded by the defendant, the real owner. The plaintiff then sued the defendant before the stipendiary magistrate under 36 Vict. cap. 129, secs. 52 and 59, which enable a master to sue for wages due him not exceeding $200.

Held, that the stipendiary magistrate had no jurisdiction, and that the judgment could be reviewed on certiorari. McDonald, C.J., and Rigby, J., dissenting.

Per Thompson and Smith, JJ. There was no evidence of a contract upon which the action could be based.

Per Weatherbe, J. The case came within the principles as to a jurisdiction given to try cases between persons of a specified class or classes, and the magistrate had no evidence of either of the two classes suing and being sued respectively in this case.

KEARNEY v. DICKSON.

Restraining order-Disclosure of material facts -Preliminary injunction— Convenience or inconvenience of granting injunction.

The plaintiff applied ex parte and obtained an order to restrain the defendants from laying water pipes through her land for the purpose of supplying the Provincial Asylum for the Insane. The facts upon which the order was obtained were confined to a statement that the defendants had entered upon land of which the plaintiff had been in possession for several years, and had dug a trench for the purpose of laying water pipes for the purpose mentioned; that the defendants claimed to be acting under the authority of the Provincial Government, but the Government had no right to authorize said acts, nor had the defendants, and the same