be seen through: if the woman was the wife of the man whom she first knew, does it not follow, that she committed adultery in marrying the husband? If so, although the husband would be justified in putting her away, could it be the meaning of the law or its sacred interpreter, that her crime should become the ground of a privilege to marry another? A privilege she had not at the time of her first marriage. Would not a second marriage be equally adulterous, equally a violation of the original law of marriage as the first, unless indeed it should be with the man she first knew? but the terms of the law or the declaration of our Lord do not thus confine her. It is not easy to reconcile such inconsistencies with the perfect purity and wisdom of our Lord's doctrines, and it is therefore fair to conjecture that we still are wide of the true construction.

The word in Deuteronomy, acxýμov, comprehends every species of impurity, as the use of the word arxnuorún, in the 23d Deut. v. 14. proves.

If the word rogveía should admit of the same extension, and in both the law and the exposition, the two words shall be construed to signify some involuntary species of impurity, and consequent cause of disgust and hatred, undiscovered by the husband till the coming together, (such as an issue of blood, or other offensive disease, imperfection, or imbecility of body, or cause of barrenness, &c.) they would harmonise, and be reconcilable to justice, as well as each other.

If the cause of hatred should be such as to justify the putting away, the bill of divorce was a condition interposed in the woman's favor, in order to restore her, as far as possible, to the condition, from which she was taken by the marriage; she was therefore to be put in possession of her goods, as well as to be freed from any impediment the vacated marriage would have raised to a second marriage. The allowance of putting away must have been founded on the idea, that the marriage was vitiated ab initio by the concealment of the impurity or defect; and therefore consistently with the original law of marriage, the woman was free to marry, having never become one flesh with the husband. It may be also taken for granted, that the cause of offence prevented the consummation, and on that account the marriage was incompletein other words, no marriage at all. The only inquiry, therefore, remaining to be pursued is, whether opvsía will admit of the proposed extension?

It is not difficult to discover that in the parallel passages in St. Mark and St. Luke, the declaration that he that puts away his wife and marries another commits adultery," is unqualified by the exception of the cause of fornication.

It is observable that in the discourses in the 10th of St. Mark,

there are two other material differences from those in St Matthew. In the 19th of St Matthew the Pharisees quote Moses, in reply to that passage from Genesis referred to by Christ. In the 10th of St Mark, our Lord, in answer to their tempting question whether it is lawful for a man to put away his wife? asks the Pharisees, "what did Moses command you?" They answer, "Moses. suffered to write a bill of divorcement, and send her away.' Christ rejoins" for the hardness of your hearts he wrote you that precept, but from the beginning of the creation God made them male and female, &c" quoting the passage from Genesis nearly in the same terms and with the same prohibition from putting asunder as in St. Matthew. The other difference is, that in St. Matt. the words "whosoever shall put away his wife," &c. appear to be part of the discourse addressed to the Pharisees: but in St. Mark, the words "whosoever shall put away his wife," &c. are addressed to his Disciples in the house, after the Pharisees had left him, and in answer to their further inquiry upon the subject. In St. Luke the preliminary and subsequent parts of the discourse in St. Matth. and Mark are omitted, and the declaration against the putting away and marrying another stands insulated, as well as unqualified. It appears to have been addressed to the Pharisees, as well as to the disciples. It is difficult to account for the omission of the exception in the two latter Evangelists. It is too important to attribute the omission to inadvertence of transcribers; and it is not less improbable that the introduction of the exception in the passages in St. Matth. should have been interpolations. There appears to be little ground for assent to Dr. Whitby's opinion, that our Lord restored marriage to its original institution as to the Jews; which would have been neither more or less than a repeal of the law of Moses, which, in the same discourse, he declares he came not to destroy, but to fulfil, and not a jot or tittle of which should be altered, till all should be fulfilled. The evident intent was to restrict the construction of the law to its true meaning and limit, while he pointed out to their consciences, the perilous consequences to which the practice of putting away their wives exposed them. Dr. Whitby says, "Christ prescribes a new law which had not before obtained among the Jews, divorce being permitted to them for other causes than adultery or fornication," which he thinks to be excluded; but his reasons do not appear to be satisfactory. The new law (if such it were) must in its operation be a partial repeal or alteration of the old, if the latter did not exclude fornication; and a total one, if it did; how could that be, in the teeth of the preceding declaration against any alteration. of the law?

OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

POETICAL CHARACTER OF POPE;

FURTHER ELUCIDATING

THE

"INVARIABLE PRINCIPLES OF POETRY," &c.

OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

POETICAL CHARACTER OF POPE,

&c. &c.

IN entering upon the remaining part of my vindication, the de

fence of Poetical Criticism, I am conscious that, as far as this point is concerned, I need not, nor should I, have made any reply, The criticism, except where the critic "unblushingly" asserted, I thought Pope "no great poet," only called in question my taste in poetry.

My principles of judging the relative characteristics of different species of poetry, are laid down, in the Estimate of Pope's Poetical Character, and in the Letter to Mr. Campbell; nor should I have thought it incumbent on me to have said one word in reply, to the nonsense of "in-door nature," or the absurdity of a critic pretending ignorance of the commonest terms of criticism, had not that "malus animus" appeared in the article, which, whilst it professedly acquitted me of dishonorable motives, " in reality," treated me as if I had been actuated by the basest.

It was on this account, and on this only, that I felt it my duty to appeal to all fair and liberal minds; at the same time, having entered on the subject, I thought I might be justified, in exposing the futility of the remarks, which the same article furnishes, against what the author is pleased to call my " THEORY," by advancing some further arguments in support of it, if a THEORY it be, and showing the fallacy of his own arguments.

I shall here make one general observation; that, IF ANY CIRCUMSTANCE MORE THAN ANOTHER, COULD WEIGH WITH

ME IN CONFIRMING THE CONVICTION, that what I said of