RIGHT TO CONTEST-See WILLS (7).
RIGHT TO CROSS STREET-See RAILROADS (3).
RIGHT TO USE WHOLE OF SURFACE-See WATERS AND
WATERCOURSES.
RIPARIAN OWNERS-See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
RETURN OF EXAMINING MAGISTRATE-See CRIMINAL LAW
(7).
SALE OF REALTY BY TESTATOR-See WILLS (5, 6).
SALES-See CONTRACTS (10); DAMAGES (1, 2).
SAVING CLAUSE-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (10).
SCHOOL BONDS-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (9).
SCOPE OF AGENT'S AUTHORITY—See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
(2).
SECONDARY EVIDENCE-See EVIDENCE (6, 7, 14).
SECRECY-See CRIMINAL LAW (1).
SELF-CONSTITUTED AGENT-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (2).
SERVICE-See ACTION; INSURANCE (1); PARTIES (2).
SERVICES-See HUSBAND AND WIFE (1, 2); WILLS (14, 15).
SET-OFF AND RECOUPMENT-See CONTRACTS (7).
SETTLEMENT See FRAUD (6).
SEVERAL INSTRUMENTS CONSTRUED TOGETHER -
CONTRACTS (1).
SEWERS-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5, 7).
SNOW AND ICE-See CARRIERS (3-5).
SPECIAL APPEAL-See APPEAL AND ERROR (7, 8).
SPECIAL DAMAGES-See DAMAGES (3).
SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS-See APPEAL AND ERROR (10).
In proceedings against the heirs of plaintiff's foster mother
for the specific performance of a contract between plaintiff
and his foster parents, contract construed, and held, to
support the finding of the court below that it was the
intention of the parties that plaintiff should be an heir
at law of both foster parents and have such portion of
their property as an heir at law would take. McCrilles
V. Sutton, 58.
See CONTRACTS (6); LANDLORD AND TENANT (1); RAILROADS
(11).
SPECIFICATION OF OFFENSE-See CRIMINAL LAW (7).
SPEED OF TRAIN-See RAILROADS (13).
STATE COURTS-See RAILROADS (11).
STATEMENTS OF FACT-See WARRANTY (1).
STATUTE OF FRAUDS—See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
STATUTES.
Requirements of the "motor vehicle law" for recording and
certifying the convictions thereunder, held, merely inci-
dents of the enforcement of the statute that do Lot affect
the rule of conduct therein prescribed. Brennan v. Re-
corder of the City of Detroit, 36.
See ACTION; APPEAL AND ERROR (2, 6, 7); CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (2-4); CONTRACTS (12); HUSBAND AND WIFE (3);
PARTIES (1); PLEADING (1, 2); RAILROADS (3).
STATUTORY BOND-See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (2-5).
STATUTORY RIGHT OF APPEAL-See APPEAL AND ERROR (5).
STREET RAILWAYS.
1. A railway company operating its line on a private right
of way cannot be said to be a street railway company in
the ordinary meaning of that term. People v. Detroit
United Ry., 143.
2. Municipal regulations of the use of streets by a street
railway are an exercise of the police powers of the city,
and will be upheld if reasonable. Id.
3. An ordinance of the city of Detroit requiring "all cars
carrying passengers operated upon any line of street rail-
road" in said city to "come to a full stop immediately be-
fore crossing any street or avenue in said city whenever
signaled to stop by any person desiring to take passage
thereon or to alight therefrom," held, not unreasonable.
Id.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (13).
SUBSEQUENT ACTS-See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
SUBSTITUTION-See PARTIES (2).
SUFFICIENCY OF PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY - See APPEAL
AND ERROR (3).
SUFFICIENCY OF TITLE OF ACT-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE-See CONTRACTS (6).
SURETY-See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (5, 6).
SURETY FOR HIRE-See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (1).
SURETYSHIP-See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
SURVIVAL ACT-See DAMAGES (6); DEATH (1).
On a bill by the city of Detroit to enjoin the service of a
writ of assistance, on the ground that it was entitled to
have the value of improvements admeasured and set off
to it, and that defendant tax title purchaser was entitled
to the interest in the land only, independent of the build-
ing, where said question was decided adversely to plain-
tiff's claim in a former decision by the Supreme Court,
the decree of the court below dismissing the bill was
proper. City of Detroit v. Triangle Land Co., 49.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3, 12).
TECHNICAL IRREGULARITY-See TENDER (2).
1. By long-settled practice in this State, money may be paid
into court as a tender at any time before plea, as a matter
of course, no statute or rule requiring any consent or
special order by the court to authorize such payment
before pleading, but if a defendant wishes to pay money
into court after pleading he must obtain a judge's order
for that purpose. City of Grand Rapids v. Krakowski,
2. Requirement to enter a common rule as to the payment
of a tender to the clerk of the court before pleading,
which was not complied with, held, to be merely a techni-
cal irregularity, and that the purpose was served by the
statement or voucher accompanying the check, which was
accepted and cashed, stating the title and nature of the
suit to which the payment applied, the amount and pur-
pose of the payment, with the amount to be applied on
certain assessments, to recover which the action was
brought. Id.
See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (4).
TERMINATION OF LIFE ESTATE-See WILLS (11).
TERMINATION OF TRUSTS-See TRUSTS (7).
TITLE OF ACT-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3).
TORT See ASSUMPSIT (1, 2).
TOTAL INCAPACITY-See MASTER AND SERVANT (1).
TRESPASS-See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
1. The admission of evidence of after events, although ir-
relevant, held, not prejudicial. Burtch v. Child, Hulswit
& Co., 206.
2. It was not error for the court below to refuse plaintiff's
specific requests to charge, where the charge as given
fully protected his rights, and all proper requests were
either given or covered. Interstate Construction Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 266.
3. A ruling of the court below sustaining appellant's ob-
jection to remarks of counsel, and adding "I do not think
that makes any difference and need not be considered by
the jury," held, not reversible error. Id.
4. In an action for personal injuries, caused by defendant's
automobile colliding with plaintiff's buggy at a street in-
tersection, an instruction by the trial court that the jury
were to determine whether, under all of the circumstances,
the driver of the automobile did "everything possible
after he had discovered the danger to prevent an acci-
dent," held, erroneous, as it held him to a higher degree
of care than the law demands, and may have misled the
jury. Simmons v. Petersen, 508.
5. Where it was almost obligatory upon plaintiff to put the
attending physician upon the stand in order to make his
case, the court below should have been more liberal in
allowing plaintiff to examine him as to certain incidents
between them in order to show that the doctor had be-
come adverse and unfriendly to plaintiff's cause. Marz
v. Schultz, 655.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; CARRIERS (4, 5);
CONTRACTS (10); CRIMINAL LAW (4, 9-11); DAMAGES (3,
5); DEATH (3); EVIDENCE (9); FRAUD (11); WARRANTY
(4, 5); WITNESSES.
1. A trustee having accepted the trust is bound to execute
it faithfully, and a court of equity has power to enforce
its execution in behalf of the cestui que trust. Chambers
v. Chambers, 129.
2. Where a testator bequeathed in trust to his brother, to be
disposed of by him to the two children of another brother,
deceased, "all the property, or its equivalent, I received
under the last will," of said deceased brother, leaving the
determination of said amount entirely to the judgment
and discretion of said trustee, a "determination" by him
that said amount was the sum of one dollar, held, to be in
bad faith, where at the time it was made the courts had
already determined that it was a substantial sum. Id.
3. Where the record shows that the trustee is deceased and
no new determination can be made by him, the duty rests
upon the court of equity to dispose of the question. Id.
4. The relation of trustee and cestui que trust begins with
the execution of the trust agreement; during the pre-
liminary negotiations no such relation exists. Chandler
v. Preston, 244.
5. Although prior to the execution of a trust deed and
agreement the proposed trustee offered to assume said
trust for a certain compensation, he had a legal right,
prior to its acceptance, to withdraw said offer and submit
a new one naming a larger sum, notwithstanding his
action was induced by information received from an agent
of the cestui que trust that the latter would pay more
than the sum first named. Id.
6. The withdrawal by the proposed trustee of his first offer,
and his acceptance of a counter proposal by the cestui
que trust naming a larger amount, did not constitute a
breach of trust or a fraud upon the latter. Id.
7. On a bill for the removal of the trustee, for an accounting,
for the termination of the trust, and to determine the
amount of compensation to be paid the trustee for ser-
vices already rendered, testimony held, to sustain the
finding of the court below that in the sales of trust prop-
erty made, and the prices obtained for same, the conduct
of the trustee was not open to criticism. Id.
8. The fact that the sales of land during the existence of the
trust did not amount to as much as contemplated, held,
not to justify the holding of the court below that there-
fore the compensation of the trustee was fixed under a
mutual mistake of fact and should be rescinded. Id. 245.
9. Where the trustee neglected to furnish the money at six
per cent. to take up mortgages bearing seven per cent.
when they matured, as the trust agreement provided he
should do, he should be charged with the amount paid in
interest in excess of six per cent. on the overdue mort-
gages after maturity. Id.
See EQUITY; PLEADING (3).
UNANTICIPATED ACT-See RAILROADS (7).
UNAUTHORIZED CROSSING-See RAILROADS (2).
UNDUE INFLUENCE-See CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(4).
VALIDITY OF BOND-See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (2).
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
1. In a suit to restrain summary proceedings, to set aside a
certain land contract, and for an accounting, where the
vendee denied the execution of the contract and also de-
|