ABATEMENT-See NUISANCE (1).
ABILITY TO FULFILL CONTRACT-See FRAUD (7).
ABSENT WITNESS-See CRIMINAL LAW (3, 6).
ABUSE OF DISCRETION-See CRIMINAL LAW (3, 6); DISMISSAL
AND NONSUIT.
ABUSE OF PROCESS-See FALSE IMPRISONMENT (2).
ACCELERATION-See WILLS (12).
ACCEPTANCE-See WILLS (15).
ACCIDENT INSURANCE-See INSURANCE (4-7).
ACCIDENTAL INJURY-See MASTER AND SERVANT (10).
ACCOUNTING-See FRAUD (13); PARTNERSHIP; TRUSTS (7, 9);
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
ACQUIESCENCE-See BOUNDARIES.
Under the judicature act (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 12407),
suits may be commenced by simply filing the declaration
with indorsed notice thereon; it being the evident inten-
tion of the legislature to change the former rule requir-
ing service by omitting any reference whatever thereto.
Christe v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 12.
ACTS OF AGENT-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
ADEMPTION-See WILLS (4-6).
ADMISSIONS-See EVIDENCE (4, 12, 13).
On a bill to quiet title to land, testimony of plaintiffs held,
to show such an open, notorious, continuous, exclusive,
distinct, and hostile possession to the land in question
as to make out a title by adverse possession. Woodruff
v. Venia, 177.
AFFIDAVITS - See CRIMINAL LAW (3); FALSE IMPRISONMENT
(1); NEW TRIAL.
AFTER EVENTS-See TRIAL (1).
AGENCY-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
AGENT TO CONVERSE-See EVIDENCE (1).
AGENT'S AUTHORITY-See CONTRACTS (11); WARRANTY (2, 3).
AGENT'S RIGHT TO RECOVER-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (1).
AGGRAVATION-See ASSUMPSIT (1).
AGREEMENT-See BOUNDARIES (1).
ALIGHTING FROM CAR-See CARRIERS (3-5).
AMBIGUITY-See EVIDENCE (3).
AMENDMENT IN AFFIRMANCE OF JUDGMENT-See PLEAD-
ING (1).
AMENDMENT NUNC PRO TUNC-See PLEADING (2).
AMENDMENT OF DETROIT CHARTER-See MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS (7).
AMENDMENTS-See PARTIES (2).
ANNUAL EXPENSES-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (11).
APPEAL AND ERROR.
1. Where plaintiff administrator, in ejectment for the posses-
sion of a farm devised to the defendant son of testator,
subject to the debts of the estate, did not appeal from
that part of the judgment in favor of the purchaser of a
part of said farm from defendant, whether said part of
the judgment was erroneous, held, not before the court.
Sylvester v. Button, 24.
2. Where a claim of appeal was not filed within 20 days
after the entry of decree, as provided in 3 Comp. Laws
1915, § 13754, the court has no jurisdiction to entertain
the appeal. Munroe, Boyce & Co. v. Ward, 369.
3. On appeal from a directed verdict for defendant, the
question as to whether plaintiff's testimony is sufficiently
convincing to support a verdict is not before the court.
Ottaway v. Gutman, 393.
4. Where the record in a criminal case does not contain a
report of the argument of counsel for defendant, the
Supreme Court will assume that the argument was made
exactly as indicated in the charge of the court. People
v. Eamaus, 442.
5. The right of appeal is a statutory one, and unless the
mandatory provisions of the statute are complied with,
APPEAL AND ERROR-Continued.
the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
Bishop v. Judge of Recorder's Court of Detroit, 537.
6. Under Act No. 118, § 23, Pub. Acts 1891, appeals from
the police court of the city of Detroit are controlled by
the general laws of this State applicable to appeals from
convictions by justices of the peace to the circuit court
in criminal cases. Id.
7. In the absence of any provision in the general laws of
the State or in the charter of the city of Detroit author-
izing the recorder's court of said city to extend the time
for appeal from the police court to said recorder's court
beyond the limit of 10 days fixed in the statute (3 Comp.
Laws 1915, § 15786), said court has no authority to grant
leave for a special appeal after the expiration of said 10
days. Id.
8. Mandamus will lie to compel the judge of the recorder's
court of the city of Detroit to vacate an order granting
special leave to appeal from a conviction in the police
court of said city to said recorder's court after the ex-
piration of the 10 days fixed in the statute; there being
no showing that said appeal was prevented by any action
or nonaction on the part of the court or its officers beyond
the control of appellant. Id.
9. This court will only reverse a case upon the question of
the weight of the evidence when the verdict is against
the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Simmons v.
Petersen, 508.
10. An assignment that "the court erred in directing a ver-
dict in favor of the defendants," where defendants offered
no testimony, and there could be no possible uncertainty
as to what was meant by the assignment, held, sufficiently
specific. Marx v. Schultz, 655.
11. The weight of the testimony is primarily for the jury. Id.
See CERTIORARI; CONTRACTS (3); MASTER AND SERVANT (6);
PLEADING (4).
APPROVAL BY BOARD OF ESTIMATES-See MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS (3).
ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL-See APPEAL AND ERROR (4); CRIM-
INAL LAW (4).
ASSAULT-See CRIMINAL LAW (7); NEW TRIAL.
ASSIGNMENTS-See WILLS (7).
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR-See APPEAL AND ERROR (10).
ASSUMPSIT.
1. Where a declaration alleged that defendant promised to
sell plaintiff certain land at its cost price, but that he
207-Mich.-45.
charged more than the cost price, and it is expressly
stated that the action is in assumpsit to recover the over-
payment, and reliance is had upon defendant's promise,
the action is one of assumpsit, and it is immaterial that
tortious conduct is alleged by way of aggravation. Straus
Land Corporation v. Dupuis, 399.
2. The conduct of the trial court in treating the action as
one of fraud and deceit and in instructing the jury that,
for plaintiff to recover, the necessary elements of fraud
and deceit must be found, held, reversible error. Id.
3. The action being to recover the overpayment, evidence of
the value of the land was inadmissible. Id.
ASSUMPTION-See APPEAL AND ERROR (4).
A letter introduced in evidence, written by one of the de-
fendants in disbarment proceedings to the complaining
witnesses subsequent to the misconduct charged, bearing
upon defendants' good faith, even if mailed (which the
court ruled was not proven), held, insufficient to justify
defendants' contention that the proceedings should be dis-
missed, since an act subsequent to the misconduct com-
plained of would not preclude subsequent inquiry into
their conduct. In re Coburn and Glocheski, 351.
ATTORNEYS' FEES-See PARTNERSHIP (2).
AUTHORITY TO BOND-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2-11).
AUTOMOBILES-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1); NEGLIGENCE
(1-3); RAILROADS (13-16); TRIAL (4).
BANKS AND BANKING-See BILLS AND NOTES (3, 4).
BEQUEST OF PROCEEDS OF REALTY-See WILLS (5, 6).
BILL IN AID OF EXECUTION-See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.
BILLS AND NOTES.
1. Between the immediate parties to a bill or note, parol
evidence is admissible to show that the instrument was,
to the knowledge of the parties, intended to be the obli-
gation of the principal, and not of the agent, and that it
was given and accepted as such. Lexington State Bank
v. Rose City Creamery Co., 81.
2. Where the evidence shows that in the making of a mort-
gage by a corporation, certain of its directors indorsed
the note given therewith in their official capacity, intend-
ing thereby to give validity to the instrument executed,
the mortgagee, on foreclosure proceedings, is not entitled
BILLS AND NOTES-Continued.
to a decree for deficiency against said directors personally.
Id.
3. A bank which discounts a note for a customer, crediting
the proceeds thereof to his account, is not a bona fide
purchaser for value, unless such credit was drawn upon
before the maturity of the note, and before notice of
facts invalidating it in the hands of the payee. Central
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Stotter, 329.
4. Where, in an action upon promissory notes by the trans-
feree thereof, there was proof of fraud in the inception,
and upon the record the plaintiff failed to establish its
bona fide holding, the court below was in error in striking
out the evidence of fraud and directing a verdict for
plaintiff. Id.
BONA FIDE HOLDER-See BILLS AND NOTES (3).
BONDS-See FRAUD (1, 2); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2-11);
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
BOOKS OF ACCOUNT-See EVIDENCE (3-6).
1. To establish a boundary line by agreement and acqui-
escence, not only must there have been an express agree-
ment, and monuments erected and acquiesced in, but a
doubt or controversy must have existed as to the true
line; otherwise the statute (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 11975)
prohibiting the conveyance of land by parol renders the
agreement inoperative. Phelps v. Brevoort, 429.
2. Where there was no dispute between the parties as to the
true line and no agreement as to the location of a fence
erected by one of the parties separating their several
holdings, the party advantaged by the erroneous location
of the dividing line may not profit by the mistake. Id.
3. A description in a deed "600 feet in width," held, to mean
600 feet at right angles. Id.
BREACH OF CONTRACT-See CONTRACTS (2, 4, 5); DAMAGES
(1, 2); RAILROADS (11, 12).
BREACH OF TRUST-See TRUSTS (6, 7).
BREACH OF WARRANTY-See WARRANTY.
BUILDING CONTRACT-See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (7, 8).
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS-See COVENANTS.
BURDEN OF PROOF-See CONTRACTS (4); NEGLIGENCE (6);
VENDOR AND PURCHASER (2).
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