question with their grants, and as a result of such unification and practical combination, even though in name and form it may retain the original corporate organization of the subsidiary companies, it has made them, as to the city and within the city, an integral part of the whole and subjected them to the restrictions contracted for in the original city ordinances, thus defining and limiting its own rights under the township grants, within city territory, as subordinate to and dominated by said city ordinances." Counsel say these cases were overruled in Detroit United Railway v. Michigan, 242 U. S. 238 (37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 87). They contend the last-named case is controlling of the instant case and requires that a decree should be entered as prayed in the bill of complaint. Some language used in the opinion may be helpful. It was said, speaking of the franchises involved: "These several village and township grants were for terms that have not yet expired, and contain provisions for five-cent fares within the territory covered by them." In speaking of the two cases appealed from this court which were heard as one: "In each case plaintiff in error seasonably and expressly insisted that the several township and village grants above referred to were subsisting and valid contracts when the legislature of Michigan passed the acts extending the city limits, and that those acts, if so construed or applied as to affect or modify the contracts, were in conflict with section 10 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States. And it is upon the overruling of these contentions that the cases are brought here, under section 237, Jud. Code. * * * "Coming then to the merits: Not only is it not disputed, but it is not open to serious dispute, that the original village and township grants were contractual in their nature. It appears that the recipients of those grants, like their successor, the plaintiff in error, became incorporated under the street railway act of 1867, of which section 13 provides that consent for the construction and maintenance of a street railway is to be given by the corporate authorities in an ordinance to be enacted for the purpose, and under such rules, regulations and conditions as may be prescribed by such ordinance, but that no such railway shall be constructed until the company shall have accepted in writing the terms and conditions upon which they are permitted to use the streets. By section 14, after any city, village or township shall thus have consented to the construction and maintenance of street railways or granted rights and privileges to the company, and such consent and grant shall have been accepted by the company, the consent shall not be revoked or the company deprived of the rights and privileges conferred. And by section 20 the rates of toll or fare to be charged by the company are to be established by agreement between it and the corporate authorities, and are not to be increased without consent of such authorities. It is plain, as was pointed out by this court in Detroit v. Railway Co., 184 U. S. 368, 385 (22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410), that the legislature regarded the fixing of the rate of fare as a subject for agreement between the municipality and the company. And in these cases, as in that, the terms of the several ordinances are such as clearly to import a purpose to contract under the legislative authority thus conferred." And the court held: "Because of the provision of section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, it was not within the power of the State of Michigan by any subsequent legislation to impair the obligations of those contracts, and since the judgments of the Supreme Court of that State gave such an effect to the annexation acts of 1905 and 1907, in conjunction with the ordinances of 1889, as to impair those obligations, the judgments must be reversed." While the Federal court reversed this court in the two cases named it placed its decision upon the ground that the practical effect of the decisions was to impair the obligation of contracts. The opinion indicates that the court agrees with this court in holding that the acquisition of the suburban lines was in effect an extension of the city railways. In the instant case, before the bill of complaint was filed the West Bay City franchise had expired. There was no claim that any of its provisions in the nature of a contract were annulled by the provisions of the Bay City franchise. The defendant concedes that under its present franchise it must comply with all of its provisions as indicated in a letter addressed to the common council reading in part as follows: "In accordance with section No. 220 of the consolidation charter of 1905, the rights, terms and conditions of the franchise under which the Saginaw-Bay City Railway company is operating on the east side of the river will, after October 10, 1917, extend over the territory on the west side of the river and the company will then be operating its street car lines upon both sides of the river under the franchise granted to the company upon the east side of the river. "The duties and obligations of the Saginaw-Bay City Railway Company, as expressed in these franchises, will, therefore, have to be performed by the company on both sides of the river in the same manner. "After October 10, 1917, the company will be obliged to pay for the construction and maintenance of the pavement between its rails and for 14 inches outside of its rails, the same as has been done in the past on the east side of the river. All of the restriction and regulation in the franchise under which the company is now operating on the east side of the river, will have to be borne by the company on the west side of the river." We do not deem it necessary to discuss the other questions raised by counsel, though we have considered them. The decree is affirmed with costs to the defendant. BIRD, C. J., and STEERE, BROOKE, FELLOWS, STONE, and KUHN, JJ., concurred. The late Justice OSTRANDER took no part in this decision. PHELPS v. BREVOORT. 1. BOUNDARIES-AGREEMENT ACQUIESCENCE-CONTROVERSY. To establish a boundary line by agreement and acquiescence, not only must there have been an express agreement, and monuments erected and acquiesced in, but a doubt or controversy must have existed as to the true line; otherwise the statute (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 11975) prohibiting the conveyance of land by parol renders the agreement inoperative. 2. SAME-ADVERSE POSSESSION. Where there was no dispute between the parties as to the true line and no agreement as to the location of a fence erected by one of the parties separating their several holdings, the party advantaged by the erroneous location of the dividing line may not profit by the mistake. 3. SAME DESCRIPTION. A description in a deed "600 feet in width," held to mean 600 feet at right angles. 4. EVIDENCE-DEEDS-AMBIGUITY-PAROL EVIDENCE. Where there is no ambiguity in an instrument, parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or explain its meaning. Error to Wayne; Mayne, J., presiding. Submitted June 4, 1919. (Docket No. 37.) Decided October 6, 1919. Rehearing denied December 23, 1919. Ejectment by Ralph Phelps and another against Henry N. Brevoort and another. Judgment for plaintiffs on a directed verdict. Defendants bring error. Affirmed. Millis, Griffin, Seely & Streeter, for appellants. In an action of ejectment plaintiffs seek to recover possession of a strip of land about 20 feet wide and about 2,200 feet in length located on Grosse Isle, Wayne county, Michigan. On October 20, 1859, by a |