are in liquidation. A rule of a friendly society |
provided that on the winding-up of the society
the same consequences should ensue as in the
case of a voluntary winding-up under the Com-
panies Act. Held, that in the case of a share-
holder refusing to pay the contributions due on
his share, the liquidator could proceed against
him in the District Court, under s. 15, to recover
the amount due, as that rule did not provide a
mode of settling the dispute within the mean-
ing of that section. On the winding-up of a
society, an investing shareholder is liable to pay
the contributions due on his shares. (Per A.
H. SIMPSON, J.). Ex parte MANSFIELD

75

GUARANTEE - Bond Construction Recital
and condition. J The defendant, with others,
gave a joint and several guarantee to the plain-
tiffs, limited to 2,500l., in respect of overdrafts
by a customer. Subsequently he, with others,
gave a joint and several bond reciting a desire
for advances to the same customer over and
above that amount, and securing repayment of
the balance of account current. In an action,
brought both on the guarantee and the bond,
the former was held to be invalid. Held (over
ruling the Full Court), that the condition of the
bond being plainly to secure repayment of all
moneys advanced by the plaintiffs, and not
merely those in excess of 2,500l., could not be
controlled by any recital not plainly inconsis-
tent therewith. AUSTRALIAN JOINT STOCK
BANK v. BAILEY-
258

tiff. In point of fact a proposal had been made
by him to another company and declined. Held,
that the omission to answer the question was
equivalent to an answer in the negative, the
truth of which the plaintiff must be taken to
have warranted, even though he was not then
aware whether his proposal to the other com-
pany had been declined or not. STEVENS v.
LONDON ASSURANCE CORPORATION
- 153

2. -Fraud and deception-Fraudulent
claim.] The plaintiff claimed 600l. as the
damage done to certain ostrich feathers which
were burnt on the counter in his shop. The
jury found that there was not 600l. worth of
feathers on the counter at the time of the fire,
and that the plaintiff knew it; but they found
a verdict for the plaintiff for one-third of the
amount of his claim. Held, that the claim was
a fraudulent one, and that the verdict must be
set aside.

3.

Ib.

Account - Information respecting loss.]
The plaintiff insured his stock of ostrich feathers
with the defendant companies, and, a fire
having occurred, sent in an account giving the
weight of parcels of feathers burnt, their de-
scription, such as "white" or "fancy," their
value at the time of fire, and the amount of
damage and loss claimed, which was in each
case the same as the value at the time of fire,
amounting altogether to 8367. He then esti-
mated the value of the salvage in a lump sum at
140., giving no particulars, and deducting that
from 836., brought in the amount of damage

INFORMATION. See JUSTICES.

INSANE PERSON. See LUNACY.

INSPECTION-Breach of promise of marriage--
Letters written by defendant in plaintiff's posses-
sion-Form of affidavit.] The plaintiff in an
action of breach of promise of marriage in an
affidavit of discovery disclosed certain letters
written by the defendant to her, but stated that
she was advised and believed that they related
exclusively to her own case, and did not cut
down or impeach her case, and were not in any
manner material to the defendant's case. On

an application for inspection, held on appeal,
overruling COHEN, J., that the affidavit was
sufficient to claim protection, and that as the
Court could not see that she was mistaken as to
the nature of the letters the Court was bound
by the affidavit, and could not grant inspection.
BAIRD v. CRAWFORD

195

INSURANCE Proposal-Leaving question un-
answered.] In a proposal for a policy of fire in-
surance the question "has this insurance, or
any part of it, been declined by any insurance
company?" was left unanswered by the plain-

request, he supplied a list of all articles totally
destroyed, and afterwards, but out of time
under the conditions, he forwarded an account
which shewed that at the time he sent in his
first claim he was possessed of detailed informa-
tion, which he did not then supply. Held, that
the plaintiff had not sent in as accurate an
account of the loss as the nature and circum-
stances of the case admitted.

--

Ib.

JURISDICTION Waiver of objection to. See
SMALL DEBTS RECOVERY ACT.

JUSTICES -- Information disclosing no offence.]

An information which discloses no offence is bad.
If the information omits to charge that which
is a legal offence, a conviction on that informa-
tion is bad, but the written information may
be discarded, and the accused, being then
before the Justices, may be orally charged with
that which is a legal offence, and convicted
thereof. Ex parte PRICE
- 343

2.--Information-Objection to substance or
form-Variance-11 & 12 Vic. c. 43, s. 1.] An
information omitted to state one ingredient of
the offence as constituted by the by-law under
which it was laid. Held, that this was not an
objection either to the substance or to the form
of the information within the meaning of s. 1
of 11 & 12 Vic. c. 43 (which provides that no

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION Reasonable and
probable cause-Advice of solicitor-Agent lay-
ing information.] The defendant, in an action
for malicious prosecution, can give in evidence
that before he instituted the prosecution he laid
all the facts of the case before his solicitor,
and took his advice thereon. The defendant,
who was the owner of a station, instructed H.,
his manager, to make certain enquiries as to the
loss of some sheep. H. reported the result of
those enquiries to the defendant, and the defen-
dant thereupon instructed him to lay an infor-
mation against the plaintiff. Previously to lay-
ing the information H., without the defen-
dant's knowledge, consulted the defendant's
solicitor. The defendant at the trial sought to
give in evidence the advice given by his solicitor
to H., and that evidence was rejected.
(per THE CHIEF JUSTICE and COHEN, J.; G. B.
SIMPSON, J., dissenting), that the evidence was
admissible. CHENEY. BARDWELL
401

Held

MANDAMUS-To strike rate. See MUNICIPAL-

ITIES.

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES. See DIVORCE.

MILK. See PUBLIC HEALTH.

MINING Mining on Private Lands Acts, 57
Vic. No. 32-60 Vic. No. 40-Rights of appli-
cant for lease before lease granted-Trespass
Injunction.] Held, by the Privy Council,
affirming the decision of the Supreme Court,
that a person who has complied with the pro-
visions of the Mining on Private Lands Act,
1894, and lodged a valid application for a lease,
has such an interest in the land applied for as
to entitle him to an injunction to restrain the
owner from trespassing thereon. ZOBEL v.
CROUDACE

28

-

[N. S. W. R.

2.--Trespass-Action in the Supreme Court

Regs. 123, 124, 126.] Sect. 69, which gives
the Warden's Court jurisdiction to hear and
determine actions for trespass, does not take
away the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
entertain actions for trespass in respect of lands
held under the Mining Act. On the hearing of
a summons by L. in the Warden's Court, taken
out on the 24th December, 1897, to restrain H.
from trespassing on her land, an order of the
Supreme Court dated the 26th August, 1897,
made in an action between the same parties,
was put in evidence, by which it appeared that
the title to the land in question was in L. Held,
that it was rightly received in evidence, and
that it was conclusive evidence of L.'s title up to
that date. Held, also, that under Reg. 126 of
the Mining Board Regulations, L.'s title had not
lapsed, as she had occupied the land in ques-
tion since the 26th August, 1897. Held, further,
that evidence could not be given to shew that
since the 26th August, 1897, L. had abandoned
her claim by non-working of the claim under
Reg. 124, as Reg. 123 only applies where pro-
ceedings are taken for the purpose of having
such tenement declared abandoned. LINDSAY
v. HANSON

- 43

3.Appeal Special case - Appealable
amount.] In a special case under the Mining
Act, on an appeal to the Full Court, there
should be a statement of the points of law raised,
the Judge's decision thereon, and the facts re-
lating thereto, and also of the amount in dispute.
Where the special case was deficient in these
particulars it was sent back to the Judge for
amendment, and the appellant was ordered to
pay the costs. MCKINNERY v. FALKNER GOLD
MINING CO.

- 262

on

5.-Mining Act (37 Vic. No. 13), ss. 13, 25
-Suspension of pastoral lease-Rights of lessee
suspension-Improvements-Compensation.]
Where a pastoral lease is suspended under s. 13,
for the purpose of the accommodation of the
horses, cattle, and sheep required for the sub-
sistence and convenience of miners, the Crown
cannot evict the lessee from the land. The
rights of the lessee remain as they were before,
except that the miners have the right to run
their cattle upon the land. On such suspension
the lessee is not entitled to any compensation
beyond that provided by the section. RICKET-
SON v. COOK

298

6.-Mining Act, ss. 13, 25-Suspension of
pastoral lease-Rights of Crown.] After the
suspension of a pastoral lease under s. 13 of the
Mining Act, for the purpose of providing a
water supply on a goldfield, the Government

MORTGAGE--Mortgage and promissory note as
collateral securities-Assignment of mortgage and
endorsement of note to same person-Failure to
give notice of assignment-Constructive notice of
equities between mortgagor and mortgagee-
Negotiability of promissory note.] B., being
indebted to A., gave, as security for the debt, a
promissory note; he also executed a mortgage
which was expressed to be a collateral security
for the note, and contained a covenant to pay
and retire the promissory note on its due date.
A., the mortgagee, assigned the mortgage, and
endorsed the note to P. for value, P. knowing
the circumstances under which the note was
given. B. from time to time paid to A. sums in
part liquidation of his debt. Held, that, until
P. gave notice of the assignment to B., he
could only hold the promissory note as security
for the amount due from time to time from B.
to A. Glasscock v. Balls (24 Q.B.D, 13) dis-
tinguished; Jones v. Walker (6 S.C.R. Eq. 3)
discussed. BRENNAN v. PITT, SON AND BAD.
Eq. 179

GERY

2.--Foreclosure-Trustee and executor of
mortgagor Cestuis que trustent.] In a suit to
foreclose a mortgage given by a deceased mort-
gagor the trustees and executors of the mort-
gagor sufficiently represent the cestuis que
trustent under his will. RICHARDSON V. BARBER
Eq. 69

3. - Mortgagor and mortgagee Surplus
proceeds of sale-Costs incurred by mortgagee in
respect of the mortgage transaction after pay
ment off-Interest or surplus costs.] A mort-
gagee, who had exercised his power of sale, had
a balance of 697. in his hands after payment of
his debt; he tendered to the mortgagor 54l.,
erroneously claiming the other 157. as due under
the mortgage. The mortgagor disputed the
correctness of the amount tendered, and also
charged the mortgagee with improper conduct
in the conduct of sale, and with fraudulently
swelling the amount of the mortgage debt.
The mortgagee incurred costs in corresponding
with the mortgagor on the matter of these

charges, which were unfounded. Held, that
he was entitled to deduct these costs from the
balance in hand, his error in tendering 157. too-
little having been bona fide; but that the mort-
gagor was entitled to interest on the balance,
as the mortgagee had left the money in his
business, and had not ear-marked it in any way.
A mortgagee is prima facie entitled to his costs
of a redemption suit, but, if the costs have been
increased by a mistaken claim on his part, he
may be refused costs in respect of that claim,
or may be ordered to pay them. Cotterill v.
IRVING V.
Stratton (8 Ch. 295) considered.
COMMERCIAL BANKING Co. -

Eq. 8

4.- -Costs of investigating title. See COSTS.

MUNICIPALITIES-Municipalities Act, 1897,
ss. 141, 147, and 153-Rates-Owner-Action.]
In an action to recover the rates from an owner
on the failure of the occupier to pay them, it is
not necessary to shew that the notice of the
assessment and rate has been advertised under s.
147. BOROUGH OF NARRANDERA v. GOUGH 207

2.-

to

The

Municipalities Act (1897, No. 23), 8s.
141, 158-Municipal corporation — Power
borrow Overdraft-Liability of guarantor.] A
municipal council has power to borrow and to
incur debts as necessarily incidental to the
carrying on of its ordinary business.
plaintiffs advanced money to a municipal cor-
poration upon an overdraft which was guaran-
teed by the defendants. Held, that even if the
corporation had no legal power to borrow the
money, still the defendants were liable on their
guarantee. AUSTRALIAN JOINT STOCK BANK
v. CROUDACE

- 361

3. Charge of rates on rated land-Conclu-
siveness of entries in rate book-Service of notices

Appeal to the Justices against rate-Power of
Justices-Principle of assessment—Unimproved
land which has been let.] Per THE FULL COURT:
The decision of the Justices under s. 175 of the
Municipalities Act of 1867, is conclusive both
as to the amount and principle upon which a
ratepayer's land has been assessed. Per THE
FULL COURT: If a ratepayer has received notice
of assessment under s. 164, in respect of land
for which he is liable to pay rates, and he does
not appeal under s. 175, the amount for which
he is assessed becomes a charge on the land, and
cannot be disputed. Per THE FULL COURT: If
a ratepayer appears to have been rated in the
rate book, the production of the rate book is
evidence that the rate was properly made, and
it is not necessary to prove, in suing for the
rate, that an estimate was made as directed by
s. 164 of the Act of 1867. Per THE FULL
COURT: Sect. 164 of the Act of 1867 divides
land for the purpose of assessment into two
categories-improved and unimproved. Unim-
proved lands that have been let are rateable on
the capital value. Per THE FULL COURT:
Where an owner of unoccupied rateable land
has died, his personal representatives-or if
none the persons beneficially entitled- -are