CHAPTER IX.

The condition of South Carolina and Georgia-amount of Greene's army-too small to attempt a war of general actions-Greene determines to strike the enemy in detail-conscious of the perils before himresolves to encounter them-his sentiments on the occasion-detaches Lee's legion, to join Marion-marches, with the main body, against lord Rawdon, posted at Camden-disappointed, and injured in his operations, by not meeting Sumpter, in the neighbourhood of Camden -lord Cornwallis confounded by Greene's movement-the latter takes post, in front of Camden-British garrisons fall, in successioncapture of fort Motte-Greene derives, from the captured posts, arms, provisions, and military stores-battle of Hobkirk's Hill-description of subsequent movements of general Greene and lord Rawdonsuccesses of Lee and Marion-lord Rawdon retreats towards Charleston,-his communication with his posts cut off-Lee advances on the British garrison, at Augusta-Greene invests Ninety-Six-after much gallantry and skill, in attack and defence, Augusta falls-Greene fails in an attack on Ninety-Six-account of on the advance of lord Rawdon, now reinforced, Greene retreats, and the other pursues-Greene's noble resolution-pursuit ceases-Ninety-Six evacuated-lord Rawdon now retreats, and Greene pursues—the enemy having escaped him, he retires to the high hills of Santee, to give repose to his army, during the summer heats.

WITH the exception of the districts, occupied by Marion, Sumpter, and Davie, who, with spirits invincible, still continued their partisan warfare, the two southern states, as already mentioned, were in full and quiet possession of the enemy. The range of the first of these officers, was in the north-eastern, that of the second, in the north-western, section of South

Carolina, and that of the third, along its northern frontier.

Lord Rawdon, who was now commander in chief of the British forces, in the South, held his headquarters in the village of Camden. With this position and that of Charleston, the various parts of the conquered territory were connected by chains of military posts, the strongest and most important of which, were those of Ninety-six, and Augusta.

Besides maintaining the communication between the different portions of the states, and holding in check the spirit of resistance, among the friends of Independence, these posts served as places of deposit for arms, provisions, and military stores, for such of the tories, as might be induced to join the royal standard. Add to the foregoing, that the depredations committed by the British, the royalists, and, in some instances, by parties of retaliating whigs, had so far diminished the means of the country, as wholly to disqualify it for supporting an army. Such, in the spring of 1781, was the condition of South Carolina and Georgia.

To break down this extensive and formidable establishment, containing a force of four thousand troops, general Greene, exclusive of the small bodies of militia, under the command of Marion, Sumpter,

and Davie, had not more than eighteen hundred; and was entirely unprovided with magazines and stores. Nor, owing to an alarming invasion of the state of Virginia, had he any reason to expect supplies or reinforcements from the North.

But, although fully sensible of the difficulties and personal dangers that awaited him, and of the highly critical and perilous cast, on which he was about to stake his reputation, yet, convinced that the public interest required him to encounter the risk, and submit to the toils and privations that presented themselves, he had determined on the enterprise, and nothing could shake the firmness of his resolution. His views and determination on the subject, are depicted in the following extract of a letter, written, on the occasion, to general Washington.

"I shall take every measure, to avoid misfortune. But necessity obliges me to commit myself to chance, and if any accident should attend me, I trust my friends will do justice to my reputation."

Unable to meet his adversary, in full force, yet, by the pressure of the crisis, imperiously urged to advance and attack him, Greene resolved on the policy of striking his posts, and endeavouring, thus, to conquer him in detail. The wisdom of this plan, and k k

the ability, with which it was executed, are amply attested by subsequent occurrences.

On the seventh of April, that great commander broke up his encampment at Ramsay's mill, and, with the main column of his army, moving to the south, took position in front of Camden, on the nineteenth. From that period, with but a few reverses, his career proved rapid, successful, and brilliant, beyond any thing that the war of the revolution presented. Post after post was evacuated, or fell before him, in quick succession, until, on the eight of September, he achieved the memorable victory of the Eutaw springs, which drove the enemy from the other parts of the state, to shelter and defend themselves within the lines of Charleston.

Thus, in less than five months after entering South Carolina, he became master of every part of it, except the capital, and its immediate vicinity. To procure provisions and forage, marauding parties of the enemy ventured occasionally without their lines. But even these, were almost uniformly attacked and put to flight; in several instances, with considerable loss.

By the unparalleled success of this war of posts, the American leader was doubly benefited. He wea‐ kened his adversary, by the prisoners he made; and strengthened himself, by constant accessions to his

scanty stock of ammunition and stores. This was one mode, in which he created his own resources, compelling the enemy to furnish him with materials for the subsistence of his troops, and their own annoyance. By no other plan could he possibly have maintained himself in South Carolina. All the surplus produce of the soil was collected within the British garrisons; and, from the distant state of Virginia, laboriously engaged, as already represented, in defending herself, he could not have received a sufficiency of provisions and military means, for the use of his army. But when these garrisons fell, their stores and magazines became the property of the victor. He had not only, therefore, the valour and skill, to vanquish his enemy; but the address to make him pay the price of his own overthrow.

This was, literally, visiting the British with the trouble, burthen, and miseries of the war. In no other instance, during our revolutionary struggle, did any general officer, with the same number of troops, subsist so long, and achieve so much, at so inçonsiderable a loss and expense to the country. It is believed, that the reconquest of the state of South Carolina and Georgia, cost the nation less, than the single expedition which terminated in the disaster of Gates' defeat.