CHAPTER VI.

The difficulties Greene had to encounter, in first entering on the command of the southern army-weak state of the army-provisions and military stores wanting-the system pursued, by him, the only one calculated to save from ruin-The plans of military operation, in America, more extensive, than in Europe, and, therefore, require more genius for execution-reasons for this opinion-campaigns of Greene, compared with those of Napoleon and Wellington-America not degraded by works of inferiority-the reverse, nearer the truth-instances in proof of this-Frederick and Napoleon, perhaps, excepted, Greene, an abler commander, than any Europe has produced for centuries-Greene, by his wisdom and industry, greatly meliorates the condition of his army-the composition of his army -sketches of the characters of his principal officers-of general Morgan-of colonel Washington-of colonel Howard-of colonel Williams-of colonel Lee.

In entering on the duties of his command, general Greene found himself in a situation, that was fearfully embarrassing.

Although by deep reflection, on the enterprise before him, he had informed himself sufficiently of its magnitude and importance, the real difficulties of its achievement, had been hitherto concealed from him, because, he was now, for the first time, apprized of the total incompetency of his means.

His army, consisting mostly of militia, amounted to less than two thousand men. Notwithstanding the exertions of his predecessor, to establish magazines

and military stores, he found, on hand, but three days' provision, and a very defective supply of ammunition.

In front, was an enemy, proud in victory, and too strong to be encountered; around,, and in his rear, was a country exhausted, dispirited, and, in many parts, disaffected; and Virginia, at the distance of two hundred miles, and struggling, herself, against a formidable invasion, was the only source, to which he could reasonably look for succour.

With such means, and under such circumstances, to recover two states, already conquered, and protect a third, very seriously menaced, constituted a task that was almost hopeless.

The kind of warfare, that alone was suited to these purposes, was of the most perplexing and arduous character; and, to conduct it, successfully, called for consummate, and diversified abilities.

It was not, merely, to meet an enemy in the field, to command skilfully, and fight bravely, either in proffered, or accepted battle. These operations, are among the simplest that present themselves to the leader of an army. They depend on mere professional qualifications, that can be readily acquired, by moderate capacities.

But, to raise, and provide for, an army, in a dispirited and devastated country, creating resources where they do not exist, to operate, with an incompetent force, on an extended and broken line of frontier, to hold in check, in many points, and avoid coming into contact with him, in any, an enemy superior in numbers and discipline, to institute a vast system of military policy, so comprehensive, provident, and efficient, as to protect and encourage the friendly, overawe the disaffected, and confirm the wavering, when these different descriptions of characters, reside in settlements and districts, remote from each other-To conduct a scheme of warfare like this-and such, precisely, was that which tested the abilities of general Greene-requires a genius of the highest order, combined with indefatigable industry, and skill.

With foreigners, the belief is, perhaps, universal, that the operations of our revolutionary war, compared to the military operations of Europe, were on a diminutive scale; and, that the conducting of them, therefore, was no evidence of superior intellect, or masterly talent.

An opinion more palpably erroneous, than this, can scarcely be imagined. Reverse it, and you approach much nearer to the truth.

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As a general rule, the commanders of Europe, operate on a limited theatre, with a large force. Under such circumstances, it is scarcely possible, that any great extent of military policy can be displayed. The armies must either remain in their positions, or meet and fight. They have too little room for manœuvre or stratagem. To march and countermarch, advance, retreat, waste time, detach parties to attract and distract attention, effect diversions, and pursue every varying measure to overreach and gain advantage, is, there, a practice comparatively rare. But, with general Greene, it was, for a time, the common and necessary employment of his life. Such was the condition of his army, that to risk battle, was to court' ruin. To attain the great object, in view, therefore, with the very limited means, which were placed at his disposal, required that his mind should be constantly, and vigorously on the alert, and that he should avail himself, through the medium of stratagem and policy, of every advantage, that genius could suggest.

Necessity compelled him to cover a large country, with a small force; which required a great military plan. This was, in fact, to operate on an extensive scale, and called, of course, for extensive talents. But, to cover a small country, with a large force, requires but little of either policy or plan. Directed with com

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mon circumspection, the means are, of themselves, perfectly adequate to the contemplated end. In a comparative point of view, then, the scale of operation is small; and needs, for its superintendence, but moderate abilities.

The writer of these Memoirs, pretends to no military experience, nor has he any attainments in the science of war. The positions he has, here, ventured to advance, he regards as the result of common sense; and, without any serious apprehension of being found in the wrong, appeals, for their correctness, to the judgment of those, who are bred to arms, and versed in the practical operations of the field. Strange, and extravagant, as, to most readers, perhaps, the opinion may appear, he has no hesitation in believing, that general Greene's campaigns, in the southern department, required more of military talent to conduct them, than did those of the emperor Napoleon, in which he humbled Italy, Prussia, and Austria. The latter, whose means were in his sword, overwhelmed, by the direct operation of superior force; but the former, destitute of force, employed, chiefly, the weapon of policy, dextrously wielded by the hand of Genius. The conquests of the one, were more the result of physical power, heightened and emboldened, by a confidence of victory; while the success of