any other. Rights of property which have restriction of the defenses of contributory, nicipal law, and is no more sacred than negligence and assumption of risk, have no tendency to promote the safety of the employees, or to advance the commerce in which they are engaged; (2) because the liability imposed for injuries sustained by one employee through the negligence of another, although confined to instances where the injured employee is engaged in interstate commerce, is not confined to instances where both employees are so engaged; and (3) because the act offends against the 5th Amendment to the Constitution (a) by unwarrantably interfering with the liberty of contract, and (b) by arbitrarily placing all employers engaged in interstate commerce by railroad in a disfavored class, and all their employees engaged in such commerce in a favored class. Briefly stated, the departures from the common law made by the portions of the act against which the first objection is leveled are these: (a) The rule that the negligence of one employee resulting in injury to another was not to be attributed to their common employer is displaced by a rule imposing upon the employer responsibility for such an injury, as was done at common law when the injured person was not an employee; (b) the rule exonerating an employer from liability for injury sustained by an employee through the concurring negligence of the employer and the employee is abrogated in all instances where the employer's violation of a statute enacted for the safety of his employees contributes to the injury, and in other instances is displaced by the rule of comparative negligence, whereby the exoneration is only from a proportional part of the damages corresponding to the amount of negligence attributable to the employee; (c) the rule that an employee was deemed to assume the risk of injury, even if due to the employer's negligence, where the employee voluntarily entered or remained in the service with an actual or presumed knowledge of the conditions out of which the risk arose, is abrogated in all instances where the employer's violation of a statute enacted for the safety of his employees contributed to the injury; and (d) the rule denying a right of action for the death of one person, caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, is displaced by a rule vesting such a right of action in the personal representatives of the deceased, for the benefit of designated relatives. Second. The natural tendency of the changes described is to impel the carriers to avoid or prevent the negligent acts and omissions which are made the bases of the rights of recovery which the statute creates and defines; and as whatever makes for that end tends to promote the safety of the employees and to advance the commerce in which they are engaged, we entertain no doubt that in making those changes Congress acted within the limits of the discretion confided to it by the Constitution. Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames) 188 U. S. 321, 353, 355, 47 L. ed. 492, 500, 501, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 203, 55 L. ed. 167, 181, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 7, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164. We are not unmindful that that end was being measurably attained through the remedial legislation of the several states, but that legislation has been far from uniform, and it undoubtedly rested with Congress to determine whether a national law, operating uniformly in all the states, upon all carriers by railroad engaged in interstate commerce, would better subserve the needs of that commerce. The Lottawanna (Rodd v. Heartt), 21 Wall. 558, 581, 582, 22 L. ed. 654, 664; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 378, 379, 37 L. ed. 772, 777, 778, 13 Sup. Ct.. Rep. 914. The second objection proceeds upon the theory that, even although Congress has power to regulate the liability of a carrier for injuries sustained by one employee through the negligence of another, where Of the objection to these changes it is all are engaged in interstate commerce, enough to observe: First. "A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law. That is only one of the forms of mu that power does not embrace instances where the negligent employee is engaged in intrastate commerce. But this is a mistaken theory, in that it treats the source 09. of the injury, rather than its effect upon interstate commerce, as the criterion of congressional power. As was said in Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 27, 56 L. ed. 72, 32 Sup.Ct. Rep. 2, that power is plenary, and competently may be exerted to secure the safety of interstate transportation and of those who are employed therein, no matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it. The present act, unlike the one condemned in Employers' Liability Cases (Howard v. Illinois C. R. Co.) 207 U. S. 463, 52 L. ed. 297, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141, deals only with the liability of a carrier engaged in interstate commerce for injuries sustained by its employees while engaged in such commerce. And this being so, it is not a valid objection that the act embraces instances where the causal negligence is that of an employee engaged in intrastate commerce; for such negligence, when operating injuriously upon an employee engaged in interstate commerce, has the same effect upon that commerce as if the negligent employee were also engaged therein. Even if it be assumed that that clause is equivalent to the "equal protection of the laws" clause of the 14th Amendment, which is the most that can be claimed for it here, it does not take from Congress the power to classify, nor does it condemn exertions of that power merely because they occasion some inequalities. On the contrary, it admits of the exercise of a wide discretion in classifying according to general, rather than minute, distinctions, and condemns what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 78, 55 L. ed. 369, 377, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337. Tested by these standards, this classification is not objectionable. Like classifications of railroad carriers and employees for like purposes, when assailed under the equal protection clause, have been sustained by repeated decisions of this court. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 32 L. ed. 107, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1161; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 54 L. ed. 921, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 676; Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 55 L. ed. 78, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 226, 31 Sup. Ct. It follows that the answer to the second of the questions before stated must be that Congress has not exceeded its power by prescribing the regulations embodied in the present act. Next in order is the objection that the provision in § 5, declaring void any contract, rule, regulation, or device, the pur-Rep. 136. pose or intent of which is to enable a carrier to exempt itself from the liability which the act creates, is repugnant to the 5th Amendment to the Constitution as an unwarranted interference with the liberty of contract. But of this it suffices to say, The third question, whether those regu in view of our recent decisions in Chicago, lations supersede the laws of the states in B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, so far as the latter cover the same field, 55 L. ed. 328, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259; At-finds its answer in the following extracts lantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 55 L. ed. 167, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 7, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164, and Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce (P. 405) "If any one proposition could Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 55 L. ed. 878, command the universal assent of mankind, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621, that if Congress pos- we might expect it would be this,—that the sesses the power to impose that liability, government of the Union, though limited which we here hold that it does, it also in its powers, is supreme within its sphere possesses the power to insure its efficacy of action. This would seem to result necby prohibiting any contract, rule, regula-essarily from its nature. tion, or device in evasion of it. from the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579: The na It is the government of all; its powers are delegated by Coming to the question of classification, all; it represents all, and acts for all. it is true that the liability which the act Though any one state may be willing to creates is imposed only on interstate car- control its operations, no state is willing riers by railroad, although there are other to allow others to control them. interstate carriers, and is imposed for the tion, on those subjects on which it can act, benefit of all employees of such carriers must necessarily bind its* component parts. by railroad who are employed in inter- But this question is not left to mere reastate commerce, although some are not subson: the people have, in express terms, jected to the peculiar hazards incident to decided it, by saying, 'this Constitution, the operation of trains, or to hazards that and the laws of the United States which differ from those to which other employees shall be made in pursuance thereof,' 'shall in such commerce, not within the act, are be the supreme law of the land,' and by exposed. But it does not follow that this requiring that the members of the state classification is violative of the "due proc- legislatures, and the officers of the execuess of law" clause of the 5th Amendment. I tive and judicial departments of the states, shall take the oath of fidelity to it. The, 158 U. S. 98, 104, 39 L. ed. 910, 912, 15 government of the United States, then, Sup. Ct. Rep. 802; Southern R. Co. v. Reid, though limited in its powers, is supreme; No. 487, 222 U. S. 424, 56 L. ed. 257, 32 and its laws, when made in pursuance of Sup. Ct. Rep. 140; Northern P. R. Co. v. the Constitution, form the supreme law of Washington, No. 136, 222 U. S. 370, 56 L. the land, ‘anything in the Constitution or ed. 237, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160. laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.' (P. 426) "This great principle is that the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the Constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them." And particularly apposite is the repetition of that principle in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 473, 31 L. ed. 508, 510, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564: We come next to consider whether rights arising under the congressional act may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the states when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion. The first of the cases now before us was begun in one of the superior courts of the state of Connecticut, and, in that case, the supreme court of errors of the state answered the question in the negative. That, however, was not because the ordinary jurisdiction of the superior courts, as defined by the Constitution and laws of the state, was deemed inadequate or not adapted to the adjudication of such a case, but because the supreme court of errors was of opinion (1) that the congressional act impliedly restricts the enforcement of the rights which it creates to the Federal courts, and (2) that, if this be not so, the superior courts are at liberty to decline cognizance of actions to enforce rights arising under that act, because (a) the policy manifested by it is not in accord with the policy of the state respecting the liability of em ployers to employees for injuries received by the latter while in the service of the former, and (b) it would be inconvenient and confusing for the same court, in dealing with cases of the same general class, to apply in some the standards of right established by the congressional act, and in others the different standards recognized by the laws of the state. "The grant of power to Congress in the Constitution to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, it is conceded, is paramount over all legislative powers which, in consequence of not having been granted to Congress, are reserved to the states. It follows that any legislation of a state, although in pursuance of an acknowledged power reserved to it, which conflicts with the actual exercise of the power of Congress over the subject of commerce, must give way before the supremacy of the national authority." True, prior to the present act, the laws of the several states were regarded as determinative of the liability of employers engaged in interstate commerce for injuries received by their employees while engaged in such commerce. But that was because Congress, although empowered to regulate that subject, had not acted thereon, and because the subject is one which falls with- We are quite unable to assent to the in the police power of the states in the view that the enforcement of the rights absence of action by Congress. Sherlock which the congressional act creates was ▼. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 23 L. ed. 819; Smith originally intended to be restricted to the ▼. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 473, 480, 482, Federal courts. The act contains nothing 31 L. ed. 508, 510, 513, 514, 1 Inters. Com. which is suggestive of such a restriction, Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Nashville, and in this situation the intention of ConC. & St. L. R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. gress was reflected by the provision in the 96, 99, 32 L. ed. 352, 353, 2 Inters. Com. general jurisdictional act, "That the cir Rep. 238, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28; Reid v. Colo- cuit courts of the United States shall have rado, 187 U. S. 137, 146, 47 L. ed. 108, 113, original cognizance, concurrent with the 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. courts of the several states, of all suits 506. The inaction of Congress, however, of a civil nature, at common law or in in no wise affected its power over the sub-equity, where the matter in dispute exject. The Lottawanna (Rodd v. Heartt), ceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the 21 Wall. 558, 581, 22 L. ed. 654, 664; sum or value of two thousand dollars, and Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 arising under the Constitution or laws of U. S. 196, 215, 29 L. ed. 158, 166, 1 Inters. the United States." 25 Stat. at L. 433, Com. Rep. 382, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826. And chap. 866, § 1, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. now that Congress has acted, the laws of 508; Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 637, the states, in so far as they cover the same 28 L. ed. 542, 546, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 544; field, are superseded, for necessarily that United States v. Barnes, 222 U. S. 513, 56 which is not supreme must yield to that L. ed. 291, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 117. This is emwhich is. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hefley, phasized by the amendment engrafted upon 32 S .C.-12. the original act in 1910, to the effect that "the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this act shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several states, and no case arising under this act, and brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction, shall be removed to any court of the United States." The amendment, as appears by its language, instead of granting jurisdiction to the state courts, presupposes that they already possessed it. Because of some general observations in the opinion of the supreme court of errors, and to the end that the remaining ground of decision advanced therein may be more accurately understood, we deem it well to observe that there is not here involved any attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts, or to control or affect their modes of procedure, but only a question of the duty of such a court, when its ordinary jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is appropriate to the occasion, and is invoked in conformity with those laws, to take cognizance of an action to enforce a right of civil recovery arising under the act of Congress, and susceptible of adjudication according to the prevailing rules of procedure. We say "when its ordinary jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is appropriate to the occasion," because we are advised by the decisions of the supreme court of errors that the superior courts of the state are courts of general jurisdiction, are empowered to take cognizance of actions to recover for personal injuries and for death, and are accustomed to exercise that jurisdiction, not only in cases where the right of action arose under the laws of that state, but also in cases where it arose in another state, under its laws, and in circumstances in which the laws of Connecticut give no right of recovery, as where the causal negligence was that of a fellow servant. The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the state, and therefore that the courts of the state are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the states, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the state. As was said by this court in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 136, 137, 23 L. ed. 833, 838, 839: "The laws of the United States are laws in the several states, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the state laws are. The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several states, but is a concurrent, and, within its jurisdiction, paramount, sovereignty. If an act of Congress gives a penalty [meaning civil and remedial] to a party aggrieved, without*speci- * fying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of Congress, by a proper action in a state court. The fact that a state court derives its existence and functions from the state laws is no reason why it should not afford relief; because it is subject also to the laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to recognize these as operative within the state as it is to recognize the state laws. The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the state; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each other, nor to be treated by each other as such, but as courts of the same country, having jurisdiction partly different and partly concurrent. true, the sovereignties are distinct, and neither can interfere with the proper jurisdiction of the other, as was so clearly shown by the Chief Justice Taney, in the case of Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 16 L. ed. 169; and hence the state courts have no power to revise the action of the Federal courts, nor the Federal the state, except where the Federal Constitution or laws are involved. But this is no reason why the state courts should not be open for the prosecution of rights growing out of the laws of the United States, to which their jurisdiction is competent, and not denied." It is We are not disposed to believe that the exercise of jurisdiction by the state courts will be attended by any appreciable inconvenience or confusion; but, be this as it may, it affords no reason for declining a jurisdiction conferred by law. The existence of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty to exercise it, and that its exercise may be onerous does not militate against that implication. Besides, it is neither new nor unusual in judicial proceedings to apply different rules of law to different situations and subjects, even although possessing some elements of similarity, as where the liability of a public carrier for personal injuries turns upon whether the injured person was a passenger, an employee, or a stranger. But it never has been supposed that courts are at liberty to decline cognizance of cases of 9 a particular class merely because the rules PPEAL from the Court of Claims to of law to be applied in their adjudication A review a judgment dismissing a claim are unlike those applied in other cases. We conclude that rights arising under the act in question may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the states when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion. In No. 289 several rulings in the progress of the cause, not covered by what already has been said, are called in question, but it suffices to say of them that they have been carefully considered, and that we find no reversible error in them. In Nos. 170, 289, and 290 the judgments are affirmed, and in No. 120 the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. (222 U. S. 558.) COSME BLANCO HERRERA and José V. UNITED STATES. WAR (§ 13*)—ENEMY'S PROPERTY-LIABIL ITY TO CAPTURE. 1. Neither the capitulation of Santiago and the cessation of active military operations in the Santiago district, nor the President's proclamation of July 13, 1898, with reference to the rights of private property, changed the character of a Spanish merchant vessel lying in the harbor as enemy's property, nor exempted it from liability to capture by the military authorities for military purposes. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see War, Cent. 2. The United States is not suable in the court of claims upon a claim for the value of the use by the military authorities of a Spanish merchant vessel captured in the harbor of Santiago, since, even under the mistaken assumption that the vessel was immune from capture because of the prior capitulation of Santiago, and the President's proclamation of July 13, 1898, with respect to the rights of private property, the claim would be one "sounding in tort" within the meaning of the Tucker act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 505, chap. 359, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 752), excluding cases of that character from the jurisdiction of the court of claims. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 1163-1181: Dec. Dig. 449.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 8, pp. 7007-7009, 7817.] [No. 89.] Argued December 11 and 12, 1911. cided January 15, 1912. De for the value of the use by the military See same case below, 43 Ct. Cl. 430. Assistant Attorney General Thompson and Mr. Franklin W. Collins for appellee. Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court: Petition in the court of claims for the recovery of $88,200 for the value of the use and profits of which claimants were deprived, as it is alleged, by the taking and detention of a certain steamship by the United States during the war with Spain, and for the loss of certain property belonging to and a part of such steamship, alleged to be "fairly worth" the sum of $5,000, amounting in all to the sum of $93,200. Claimants base their right to recover upon an implied contract arising from the facts which we shall presently detail. Opposing this view, the government contends that the property was enemy property seized for military uses, and that, besides, the record does not show a "convention between the parties" or circumstances from which a contract could be implied, and that therefore the case is one sounding in tort, and claimants have no right of recovery. The court found as a conclusion of law from the facts, "on the authority of the case of J. Ribas y Hijo v. United States, 194 U. S. 315, 48 L. ed. 994, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 727, that the claim herein is one arising from the capture and use of a vessel as an act of war, and the court is therefore without jurisdiction, and the petition is dismissed." The claimants, at the time the steamship was taken, composed a commercial partnership, doing business under the firm name of Herrera Nephews. They were born in Spain, and, under the Spanish régime in Cuba, were Spanish subjects residing in Havana. After the treaty they did not, in accordance with its terms, preserve their allegiance to Spain. On the 16th day of July, 1898, the Spanish forces then occupying the territory constituting the division of Santiago, including the city and port of that name, capitulated to the United States in accordance with the terms of a military convention which provided that all hostilities between the American and the Spanish forces in that district should cease, and that the Spanish For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes *563 |