FEB. 16, 1833.] Revenue Collection Bill. [SENATE. count of the establishment of this Government presents On the other hand, the Government owes high and the most just and philosophical view of its foundation. solemn duties to every citizen of the country. It is bound The people of the several States had their separate State to protect him in his most important rights and interests. Governments; and between the States there also existed It makes war for his protection, and no other Government a confederation. With this condition of things the peo- in the country can make war. It makes peace for his ple were not satisfied, as the confederation had been found protection, and no other Government can make peace. It not to fulfil its intended objects. It was proposed, there- maintains armies and navies for his defence and security, fore, to erect a new common Government, which should and no other Government is allowed to maintain them. possess certain definite powers, such as regarded the He goes abroad beneath its flag, and carries over all the prosperity of the people of all the States; and to be earth a national character imparted to him by this Governformed upon the general model of American constitutions.ment, and which no other Government can impart. In This proposal was assented to, and an instrument was whatever relates to war, to peace, to commerce, he knows presented to the people of the several States for their no other Government. All these, sir, are connexions as consideration. They approved it, and agreed to adopt it dear and as sacred as can bind individuals to any Govas a constitution. They executed that agreement, they ernment on earth. It is not, therefore, a compact beadopted the constitution, as a constitution; and henceforth tween States, but a Government proper, operating diit must stand as a constitution until it shall be altogether rectly upon individuals, yielding to them protection on destroyed. Now, sir, is not this the truth of the whole the one hand, and demanding from them obedience on matter? and is not all that we have heard of compact be- the other. tween sovereign States the mere effect of a theoretical There is no language in the whole constitution appliand artificial mode of reasoning upon the subject? a mode cable to a confederation of States. If the States be of reasoning which disregards plain facts for the sake of parties, as States, what are their rights, and what their hypothesis? respective covenants and stipulations? And where are Mr. President, the nature of sovereignty, or sovereign their rights, covenants, and stipulations expressed? The power, has been extensively discussed by gentlemen on States engage for nothing, they promise nothing. In the this occasion, as it generally is when the origin of our articles of confederation they did make promises, and Government is debated. But I confess myself not entirely did enter into engagements, and did plight the faith of satisfied with arguments and illustrations drawn from that each State for their fulfilment; but in the constitution topic. The sovereignty of Government is an idea be- there is nothing of that kind. The reason is, that in the longing to the other side of the Atlantic. No such thing constitution it is the people who speak, and not the States. is known in North America. Our Governments are all The people ordain the constitution, and therein address limited. In Europe sovereignty is of feudal origin, and themselves to the States, and to the Legislatures of the imports no more than the state of the sovereign. It com- States, in the language of injunction and prohibition. prises his rights, duties, exemptions, prerogatives, and The constitution utters its behests in the name and by the powers. But, with us, all power is with the people. authority of the people, and it exacts not from States any They, alone, are sovereign; and they erect what Govern- plighted public faith to maintain it. On the contrary, it ments they please, and confer on them such powers as makes its own preservation depend on individual duty and they please. None of these Governments are sovereign, individual obligation. Sir, the States cannot omit to apin the European sense of the word, all being restrained point Senators and Electors. It is not a matter resting in by written constitutions. It seems to me, therefore, that State discretion or State pleasure. The constitution has we only perplex ourselves when we attempt to explain taken better care of its own preservation. It lays its the relations existing between the General Government hand on individual conscience and individual duty. It and the several State Governments, according to those incapacitates any man to sit in the Legislature of a State, ideas of sovereignty which prevail under systems essen- who shall not first have taken a solemn oath to support tially different from our own. the constitution of the United States. From the obliga But, sir, to return to the constitution itself: let me in- tion of this oath no State power can discharge him. All quire what it relies upon for its own continuance and sup- the members of all the State Legislatures are as reliport? I hear it often suggested that the States, by re-giously bound to support the constitution of the United fusing to appoint Senators and Electors, might bring this States, as they are to support their own State constituGovernment to an end. Perhaps that is true, but the tion. Nay, sir, they are as solemnly sworn to support it, same may be said of the State Governments themselves. as we ourselves are, who are members of Congress. Suppose the Legislature of a State, having the power to No member of a State Legislature can refuse to proceed, appoint the Governor and the judges, should omit that at the proper time, to elect Senators to Congress, or to produty; would not the State Government remain unorganiz- vide for the choice of electors of President and Vice-Preed? No doubt, all elective Governments may be broken sident, any more than the members can refuse, when the up by a general abandonment, on the part of those in-appointed day arrives, to meet the members of the other trusted with political powers, of their appropriate duties. House to count the votes for those officers, and ascertain But one popular Government has, in this respect, as who are chosen. In both cases the duty binds, and with much security as another. The maintenance of this con-equal strength, the conscience of the individual member, stitution does not depend on the plighted faith of the and it is imposed on all by an oath in the very same words. States, as States, to support it; and this again shows that it Let it, then, never be said, sir, that it is a matter of disis not a league. It relies on individual duty and obligation. cretion with the States whether they will continue the The constitution of the United States creates direct re- Government, or break it up by refusing to appoint Senators lations between this Government and individuals. This and elect electors. They have no discretion in the matter. Government may punish individuals for treason, and all The members of the Legislatures cannot avoid doing other crimes in the code, when committed against the either, so often as the time arrives, without a direct violaUnited States. It has power, also, to tax individuals, in tion of their duty and their oaths; such a violation as would any mode, and to any extent; and it possesses the further break up any other Government. power of demanding from individuals military service. Nothing, certainly, can more clearly distinguish a Government from a confederation of States, than the possession of these powers. No closer relations can exist be*ween individuals and any Government. Looking still further to the provisions of the constitution itself, in order to learn its true character, we find its great apparent purpose to be, to unite the people of all the States under one General Government, for certain definite objects; and, to the extent of this union, to restrain the SENATE.] Revenue Collection Bill. [FEB. 16, 1833. separate authorities of the States. Congress only can de-They were asked to continue the existing compact between clare war; therefore, when one State is at war with a foreign nation, all must be at war. The President and the Senate only can make peace; when peace is made for one State, therefore, it must be made for all. Can any thing be conceived more preposterous than that any State should have power to nullify the proceedings of the General Government respecting peace and war? When war is declared by a law of Congress, can a single State nullify that law, and remain at peace? And yet she may nullify that law as well as any other. If the President and Senate make peace, may one State, nevertheless, continue the war? And yet, if she can nullify a law, she may quite as well nullify a treaty. States; they rejected it. They rejected compact, league, and confederation, and set themselves about framing the constitution of a National Government; and they accomplished what they undertook. If men will open their eyes fairly to the lights of history, it is impossible to be deceived on this point. The great object was to supersede the confederation by a regular Government; because, under the confederation, Congress had power only to make requisitions on States; and if States declined compliance, as they did, there was no remedy but war against such delinquent States. It would seem, from Mr. Jefferson's correspondence, in 1786 and 1787, that he was of opinion that even this remedy ought The truth is, Mr. President, and no ingenuity of argu- to be tried. "There will be no money in the treasury,' ment, no subtlety of distinction, can evade it, that, as to said he, "till the confederacy shows its teeth;" and he certain purposes, the people of the United States are one suggests that a single frigate would soon levy on the compeople. They are one in making war, and one in making merce of a delinquent State the deficiency of its contripeace: they are one in regulating commerce, and one in bution. But this would be war; and it was evident that a laying duties of impost. The very end and purpose of the confederacy could not long hold together which should constitution was to make them one people in these parti- be at war with its members. The constitution was adoptculars; and it has effectually accomplished its object. All ed to avoid this necessity. It was adopted that there might this is apparent on the face of the constitution itself. I be a Government which should act directly on individuals, have already said, sir, that to obtain a power of direct le- without borrowing aid from the State Governments. This gislation over the people, especially in regard to imposts, is clear as light itself on the very face of the provisions of was always prominent as a reason for getting rid of the the constitution, and its whole history tends to the same confederation, and forming a new constitution. Among conclusion. Its framers gave this very reason for their the innumerable proofs of this, before the assembling of the convention, allow me to refer only to the report of the committee of the old Congress, July, 1785. work in the most distinct terms. Allow me to quote but one or two proofs out of hundreds. That State, so small in territory, but so distinguished for learning and talent, But, sir, let us go to the actual formation of the consti- Connecticut, had sent to the general convention, among tution; let us open the journal of the convention itself; and other members, Samuel Johnson and Oliver Ellsworth. we shall see that the very first resolution which the conven- The constitution having been framed, it was submitted to tion adopted was, "That a National Government ought to a convention of the people of Connecticut for ratification be established, consisting of a Supreme Legislature, Ju- on the part of that State, and Mr. Johnson and Mr. Ells diciary, and Executive." worth were also members of this convention. On the This, itself, completely negatives all idea of league, and first day of the debates, being called on to explain the compact, and confederation. Terms could not be chosen reasons which led the convention at Philadelphia to recommore fit to express an intention to establish a National Gov-mend such a constitution, after showing the insufficiency ernment, and to banish forever all notion of a compact be- of the existing confederacy, inasmuch as it applied to tween sovereign States. States, as States, Mr. Johnson proceeded to say: This resolution was adopted on the 30th of May. Afterwards the style was altered, and, instead of being called a National Government, it was called the Government of the United States; but the substance of this resolution was retained, and was at the head of that list of resolutions which was afterwards sent to the committee who were to frame the instrument. "The convention saw this imperfection in attempting to legislate for States in their political capacity; that the coercion of law can be exercised by nothing but a military force. They have, therefore, gone upon entirely new ground. They have formed one new nation out of the individual States. The constitution vests in the General Legislature a power to make laws in matters of national It is true there were gentlemen in the convention who concern; to appoint judges to decide upon these laws; and were for retaining the confederation, and amending its ar- to appoint officers to carry them into execution. This ticles; but the majority was against this, and was for a Na- excludes the idea of an armed force. The power which tional Government. Mr. Patterson's propositions, which is to enforce these laws is to be a legal power, vested in were for continuing the articles of confederation with ad- proper magistrates. The force which is to be employed ditional powers, were submitted to the convention on the is the energy of the law; and this force is to operate only 15th of June, and referred to the Committee of the Whole. upon individuals who fail in their duty to their country. And the resolutions forming the basis of a National Govern- This is the peculiar glory of the constitution, that it dement, which had been once agreed to in the Commitee of pends upon the mild and equal energy of the magistracy the Whole, and reported, were recommitted to the same for the execution of the laws." committee, on the same day. The convention, then in Committee of the Whole, on the 19th of June, had both these plans before them; that is to say, the plan of a con- "In republics, it is a fundamental principle that the federacy, or compact between States, and the plan of a majority govern, and that the minority comply with the National Government. Both these plans were considered general voice. How contrary, then, to republican prinand debated, and the committee reported, "That they do ciples, how humiliating, is our present situation! A single not agree to the proposition offered by the honorable Mr. State can rise up and put a veto upon the most important Patterson, but that they again submit the resolutions form- public measures. We have seen this actually take place: erly reported." If, sir, any historical fact in the world be a single State has controlled the general voice of the plain and undeniable, it is that the convention deliberated Union; a minority, a very small minority, has governed an the expediency of continuing the confederation, with us. So far is this from being consistent with republican - amendments, and rejected that scheme, and adopted principles, that it is, in effect, the worst species of monNational Government, with a Legislature, an archy. Judiciary of its own. They were askes they rejected the proposition. som the plan .. Executive, and a In the further course of the debate, Mr. Ellsworth said "Hence we see how necessary for the Union is a coercive principle. No man pretends the contrary. We all FEB. 16, 1833.] Revenue Collection Bill. [SENATE. see and feel this necessity. The only question is, shall it recognise the Divine goodness "in affording the people be a coercion of law, or a coercion of arms? There is of the United States an opportunity of entering into an no other possible alternative. Where will those who explicit and solemn compact with each other, by assentoppose a coercion of law come out? Where will they ing to and ratifying a new constitution." You will obend? A necessary consequence of their principles is a serve, sir, that it is the people, and not the States, who war of the States one against another. I am for coer- have entered into this compact, and it is the people of all cion by law; that coercion which acts only upon delin- the United States. These conventions, by this form of quent individuals. This constitution does not attempt to expression, meant merely to say that the people of the coerce sovereign bodies, States, in their political capacity. United States had, by the blessing of Providence, enjoyed No coercion is applicable to such bodies, but that of an the opportunity of establishing a new constitution, foundarmed force. If we should attempt to execute the laws ed in the consent of the people. This consent of the of the Union by sending an armed force against a delin- people has been called by European writers "the social quent State, it would involve the good and bad, the inno- compact;" and, in conformity to this common mode of cent and guilty, in the same calamity. But this legal co-expression, these conventions speak of that assent, on ercion singles out the guilty individual, and punishes him for breaking the laws of the Union." which the new constitution was to rest, as an explicit and solemn compact, not which the States had entered into with each other, but which the people of the United States had entered into. Finally, sir, how can any man get over the words of the constitution itself?"We, the people of the United States, do ordain and establish this constitution." These words must cease to be part of the constitution, they must be obliterated from the parchment on which they are written, before any human ingenuity or human argument can remove the popular basis on which that constitution rests, and turn the instrument into a mere compact between sovereign States. Indeed, sir, if we look to all cotemporary history, to the writings of the Federalist, to the debates in the conventions, to the publications of friends and foes, they all agree that a change had been made from a confederacy of States to a different system; they all agree that the convention had formed a constitution for a National Govern ment. With this result some were satisfied, and some were dissatisfied; but all admitted that the thing had been done. In none of these various productions and publications did any one intimate that the new constitution was but another compact between States, in their sovereign capacities. I do not find such an opinion advanced in a The second proposition, sir, which I propose to mainsingle instance. Every where the people were told that tain, is, that no State authority can dissolve the relations the old confederation was to be abandoned, and a new subsisting between the Government of the United States system to be tried; that a proper Government was pro-and individuals; that nothing can dissolve these relations posed, to be founded in the name of the people, and to but revolution; and that, therefore, there can be no such have a regular organization of its own. Every where thing as secession without revolution. All this follows, as the people were told that it was to be a Government with it seems to me, as a just consequence, if it be first proved direct powers to make laws over individuals, and to lay that the constitution of the United States is a Government taxes and imposts, without the consent of the States. proper, owing protection to individuals, and entitled to Every where it was understood- to be a popular constitu. their obedience, tion. It came to the people for their adoption, and was The people, sir, in every State, live under two Govto rest on the same deep foundation as the State constitu-ernments. They owe obedience to both. These Govtions themselves. Its most distinguished advocates, who ernments, though distinct, are not adverse. Each has its had been themselves members of the convention, declared separate sphere, and its peculiar powers and duties. It that the very object of submitting the constitution to the is not a contest between two sovereigns for the same people was, to preclude the possibility of its being re- power, like the wars of the rival houses in England; nor garded as a mere compact. "However gross a heresy," is it a dispute between a Government de facto and a Govsay the writers of the Federalist, it may be to maintain ernment de jure. It is the case of a division of powers that a party to a compact has a right to revoke that com- between two Governments, made by the people, to which pact, the doctrine itself has had respectable advocates. both are responsible. Neither can dispense with the duty The possibility of a question of this nature proves the which individuals owe to the other; neither can call itself necessity of laying the foundations of our National Gov-master of the other; the people are masters of both. ernment deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated This division of power, it is true, is in a great measure authority. The fabric of American empire ought to rest unknown in Europe. It is the peculiar system of Ameon the solid basis of the consent of the people.' rica; and, though new and singular, it is not incompre Such is the language, sir, addressed to the people, hensible. The State constitutions are established by the while they yet had the constitution under consideration. people of the States. This constitution is established by The powers conferred on the new Government were per- the people of all the States. How, then, can a State fectly well understood to be conferred, not by any State, secede? How can a State undo what the whole people have or the people of any State, but by the people of the done? How can she absolve her citizens from their obeUnited States. Virginia is more explicit, perhaps, in this dience to the laws of the United States? How can she particular, than any other State. Her convention, assem- annul their obligations and oaths? How can the members bled to ratify the constitution, "in the name and behalf of of her Legislature renounce their own oaths? Sir, secesthe people of Virginia, declare and make known, that the sion, as a revolutionary right, is intelligible; as a right to powers granted under the constitution, being derived be proclaimed amidst civil commotions, and asserted at from the people of the United States, may be resumed the head of armies, I can understand it. But as a practi by them whenever the same shall be perverted to their cal right, existing under the constitution, and in conforminjury or oppression." ity with its provisions, it seems to me to be nothing but a plain absurdity; for it supposes resistance to Government, under the authority of Government itself; it supposes dismemberment, without violating the principles of union; it supposes opposition to law, without crime; it supposes Among all the other ratifications, there is not one which the violation of oaths, without responsibility; it supposes speaks of the constitution as a compact between States. the total overthrow of Government, without revolution. Those of Massachusetts and New Hampshire express the The constitution, sir, regards itself as perpetual and transaction, in my opinion, with sufficient accuracy. They immortal. It seeks to establish a union among the people Is this language which describes the formation of a compact between States, or language describing the grant of powers to a new Government, by the whole people of the United States? SENATE.] Revenue Collection Bill. [FEB. 16, 1833. of the States, which shall last through all time. Or, if this authority, both by necessary implication and by exthe common fate of things human must be expected, at press grant. some period, to happen to it, yet that catastrophe is not It will not be denied, sir, that this authority naturally anticipated. belongs to all Governments. They all exercise it from The instrument contains ample provisions for its amend-necessity, and as a consequence of the exercise of other ment, at all times; none for its abandonment, at any time. powers. The State Governments themselves possess it, It declares that new States may come into the Union, but except in that class of questions which may arise between it does not declare that old States may go out. The Union them and the General Government, and in regard to is not a temporary partnership of States. It is the asso- which they have surrendered it, as well by the nature of ciation of the people, under a constitution of Government, the case as by clear constitutional provisions. In other uniting their power, joining together their highest inter- and ordinary cases, whether a particular law be in conests, cementing their present enjoyments, and blending, formity to the constitution of the State, is a question which in one indivisible mass, all their hopes for the future. the State Legislature or the State Judiciary must deterWhatsoever is steadfast in just political principles, what- mine. We all know that these questions arise daily in the soever is permanent in the structure of human society, State Governments, and are decided by those Governwhatsoever there is which can derive an enduring charac- ments; and I know no Government which does not exerter from being founded on deep laid principles of consti- cise a similar power. tutional liberty, and on the broad foundations of the public will-all these unite to entitle this instrument to be regarded as a permanent constitution of Govern ment. Upon general principles, then, the Government of the United States possesses this authority; and this would hardly be denied, were it not that there are other Governments. But since there are State Governments, and In the next place, Mr. President, I contend that there since these, like other Governments, ordinarily construe is a supreme law of the land, consisting of the constitu- their own powers, if the Government of the United States tion, acts of Congress passed in pursuance of it, and the construes its own powers also, which construction is to public treaties. This will not be denied, because such prevail, in the case of opposite constructions? And again, are the very words of the constitution. But I contend as in the case now actually before us, the State Governfurther, that it rightfully belongs to Congress, and to the ments may undertake, not only to construe their own courts of the United States, to settle the construction of powers, but to decide directly on the extent of the powers this supreme law, in doubtful cases. This is denied: and of Congress. Congress has passed a law, as being within here arises the great practical question, who is to construe its just powers; South Carolina denies that this law is finally the constitution of the United States? We all within its just powers, and insists that she has the right 30 agree that the constitution is the supreme law; but who to decide this point, and that her decision is final. How shall interpret that law? In our system of the division of are these questions to be settled? powers between different Governments, controversies In my opinion, sir, even if the constitution of the United will necessarily sometimes arise respecting the extent of States had made no express provision for such cases, it the powers of each. Who shall decide these controver- would yet be difficult to maintain that, in a constitution sies? Does it rest with the General Government, in all existing over four-and-twenty States, with equal authority or any of its departments, to exercise the office of final over all, one could claim a right of construing it for the interpreter? Or may each of the States, as well as the whole. This would seem a manifest impropriety; indeed, General Government, claim this right of ultimate decision? an absurdity. If the constitution is a Government existing The practical result of this whole debate turns on this over all the States, though with limited powers, it necespoint. The gentleman contends that each State may sarily follows that, to the extent of those powers, it must judge for itself of any alleged violation of the constitu- be supreme. If it be not superior to the authority of a tion, and may finally decide for itself, and may execute particular State, it is not a National Government. But as its own decisions by its own power. All the recent pro- it is a Government, as it has a legislative power of its own, ceedings in South Carolina are founded on this claim of and a judicial power co-extensive with the legislative, the right. Her convention has pronounced the revenue laws inference is irresistible, that this Government, thus created of the United States unconstitutional; and this decision by the whole and for the whole, must have an authority she does not allow any authority of the United States to superior to that of the particular Government of any one overrule or reverse. Of course, she rejects the authority part. Congress is the Legislature of all the people of the of Congress, because the very object of the ordinance is United States; the Judiciary of the General Government to reverse the decision of Congress; and she rejects, too, is the Judiciary of all the people of the United States. the authority of the courts of the United States, because To hold, therefore, that this Legislature and this Judishe expressly prohibits all appeal to those courts. It is ciary are subordinate in authority to the Legislature and in order to sustain this asserted right of being her own Judiciary of a single State, is doing violence to all comjudge, that she pronounces the constitution of the United mon sense, and overturning all established principles. States to be but a compact, to which she is a party, and a Congress must judge of the extent of its own powers, so sovereign party. If this be established, then the inference often as it is called on to exercise them, or it cannot act is supposed to follow, that, being sovereign, there is no at all; and it must act also independent of State control, power to control her decision, and her own judgment on or it cannot act at all. her own compact is and must be conclusive. The right of State interposition strikes at the very I have already endeavored, sir, to point out the practi- foundation of the legislative power of Congress. It poscal consequences of this doctrine, and to show how utterly sesses no effective legislative power, if such right of State inconsistent it is with all ideas of regular government, interposition exists; because it can pass no law not subject and how soon its adoption would involve the whole coun- to abrogation. It cannot make laws for the Union, if any try in revolution and absolute anarchy. I hope it is easy part of the Union may pronounce its enactments void and now to show, sir, that a doctrine, bringing such conse-of no effect. Its forms of legislation would be an idle quences with it, is not well founded; that it has nothing ceremony, if, after all, any one of four-and-twenty States to stand upon but theory and assumption; and that it is might bid defiance to its authority. Without express refuted by plain and express constitutional provisions. 1 provision in the constitution, therefore, sir, this whole think the Government of the United States does possess, question is necessarily decided by those provisions which in its appropriate departments, the authority of final deci- create a legislative power and a judicial power. If these sion on questions of disputed power. I think it possesses exist in a Government intended for the whole, the inevi FEB. 16, 1833.] Revenue Collection Bill. [SENATE. table consequence is, that the laws of this legislative still further the chances of discordant judgments. Why, power, and the decisions of this judicial power, must be sir, has it become a settled axiom in politics, that every binding on and over the whole. No man can form the Government must have a judicial power co-extensive with conception of a Government existing over four-and-twenty its legislative power? Certainly, there is only this reason, States, with a regular legislative and judicial power, and viz: that the laws may receive a uniform interpretation of the existence, at the same time, of an authority, resid- and a uniform execution. This object can be no other ing elsewhere, to resist, at pleasure or discretion, the wise attained. A statute is what it is judiciously interenactments and the decisions of such a Government. I preted to be; and if it be construed one way in New maintain, therefore, sir, that, from the nature of the case, Hampshire, and another way in Georgia, there is no uniand as an inference wholly unavoidable, the acts of Con- form law. One Supreme Court, with appellate and final gress, and the decisions of the national courts, must be of jurisdiction, is the natural and only adequate means, in higher authority than State laws and State decisions. If any Government, to secure this uniformity. The conventhis be not so, there is, there can be, no General Gov ernment. tion saw all this clearly; and the resolution which I have quoted, never afterwards rescinded, passed through vari. But, Mr. President, the constitution has not left this ous modifications, till it finally received the form which cardinal point without full and explicit provisions. First, the article now wears in the constitution. It is undeniably as to the authority of Congress. Having enumerated the true, then, that the framers of the constitution intended specific powers conferred on Congress, the constitution to create a national judicial power, which should be peradds, as a distinct and substantive clause, the following, manent, on national subjects. And after the constitution viz: "To make all laws which shall be necessary and was framed, and while the whole country was engaged in proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, discussing its merits, one of its most distinguished advoand all other powers vested by this constitution in the Gov-cates (Mr. Madison) told the people that it was true that, ernment of the United States, or in any department or officer in controversies relating to the boundary between the two thereof." If this means any thing, it means that Congress jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide is may judge of the true extent and just interpretation of to be established under the General Government. Mr. the specific powers granted to it; and may judge also of what is necessary and proper for executing those powers. If Congress is to judge of what is necessary for the execution of its powers, it must, of necessity, judge of the extent and interpretation of those powers. Martin, who had been a member of the convention, asserted the same thing to the Legislature of Maryland, and urged it as a reason for rejecting the constitution. Mr. Pinckney himself, also a leading member of the convention, declared it to the people of South Carolina. Every And in regard, sir, to the Judiciary, the constitution is where it was admitted, by friends and foes, that this power still more express and emphatic. It declares that the ju- was in the constitution. By some it was thought dangerdicial power shall extend to all cases in law or equity ous, by most it was thought necessary; but by all it was arising under the constitution, laws of the United States, agreed to be a power actually contained in the instrument. and treaties; that there shall be one Supreme Court; and The convention saw the absolute necessity of some control that this Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in the National Government over State laws. - Different of all these cases, subject to such exceptions as Congress modes of establishing this control were suggested and may make. It is impossible to escape from the generali- considered. At one time it was proposed that the laws ty of these words. If a case arises under the constitution, of the States should, from time to time, be laid before that is, if a case arises depending on the construction of Congress, and that Congress should possess a negative the constitution, the judicial power of the United States over them. But this was thought inexpedient and inadextends to it. It reaches the case, the question; it at-missible; and in its place, and expressly as a substitute for taches the power of the national judicature to the case it, the existing provision was introduced; that is to say, a itself, in whatever court it may arise or exist; and in this provision by which the federal courts should have aucase the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over thority to overrule such State laws as might be in manifest all courts whatever. No language could provide, with contravention of the constitution. The writers of the more effect and precision than is here done, for subjecting Federalist, in explaining the constitution, while it was yet constitutional questions to the ultimate decision of the pending before the people, and still unadopted, give this Supreme Court. And, sir, this is exactly what the con- account of the matter in terms, and assign this reason for vention found it necessary to provide for, and intended to the article as it now stands. By this provision, Congress provide for. It is, too, exactly what the people were escaped from the necessity of any revision of State laws, universally told was done, when they adopted the consti- left the whole sphere of State legislation quite untouched, tution. One of the first resolutions adopted by the con- and yet obtained a security against any infringement of vention was in these words, viz: "That the jurisdiction the constitutional power of the General Government. of the National Judiciary shall extend to cases which Indeed, sir, allow me to ask again, if the National Judirespect the collection of the national revenue, and ques-ciary was not to exercise a power of revision, on constitutions which involve the national peace and harmony." tional questions, over the judicatures of the States, why Now, sir, this either had no sensible meaning at all, or was any national judicature erected at all? Can any man else it meant that the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary give a sensible reason for having a judicial power in this should extend to these questions with a paramount au- Government, unless it be for the sake of maintaining a thority. It is not to be supposed that the convention intended that the power of the National Judiciary should extend to these questions, and that the judicatures of the States should also extend to them with equal power of final decision. This would be to defeat the whole object of the provision. There were thirteen judicatures already in existence. The evil complained of, or the danger to be guarded against, was contradiction and repugnance in the decisions of these judicatures. If the framers of the constitution meant to create a fourteenth, and yet not to give it power to revise and control the decisions of the existing thirteen, then they only intended to augment the existing evil and the apprehended danger, by increasing uniformity of decision on questions arising under the constitution and laws of Congress, and insuring its execution? And does not this very idea of uniformity necessarily imply that the construction given by the national courts is to be the prevailing construction? How else, sir, is it possible that uniformity can be preserved? Gentlemen appear to me, sir, to look at but one side of the question. They regard only the supposed danger of trusting a Government with the interpretation of its own powers. But will they view the question in its other aspect? will they show us how it is possible for a Government to get along with four-and-twenty interpreters of its laws and powers? Gentlemen argue, too, as if, in these cases, |