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SENATE.]

Revenue Collection Bill.

[JAN. 31, 1833.

property. But the judge who exhibits himself as the combination, in short, would result from an apprehension zealot of a political party, freezes the generous confi- of the federal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign dence of the people, and turns it into fear and trembling. yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be volIt is well remarked in the 51st No. of the Letters of untarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force Publius, in relation to the judicial department, that "the would be made in the one case as would be made in the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the that department must soon destroy all sense of depend- Federal Government to such an extremity?" ence on the authority conferring them." Again, page 299: "The only refuge left for those who I defend the framers of the constitution from any inten- prophesy the downfall of the State Governments is the tion of conferring on the Supreme Court such transcend- visionary supposition that the Federal Government may ent powers. I will not slander the characters of the previously accumulate a military force for the objects of dead, nor of the survivors, by supposing that these zeal- ambition. That the people and the States should, for a ous patriots and enthusiastic defenders of the rights of sufficient period of time, elect an uninterrupted succesthe colonies against the central power of Great Britain, sion of men, ready to betray both; that the Governments could have been traitors to their principles. It is impos- and people of the States should silently and patiently sible, to my belief, that the statesmen who were members behold the gathering storm, and continue to supply the of the respective State conventions could have intended materials, until it should be prepared to burst on their to adopt a Government so destitute of all reasonable de- own heads, must appear to every one more like the infence against the encroachments of power and the un-coherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged compromising purposes of self-interest, as this would be, exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober if the Supreme Court were the sole expositor of the con-apprehensions of genuine patriotism. Extravagant as stitution in the last resort, and in "all cases arising under the supposition is, let it, however, be made. Let a regular the constitution and laws of the United States."

army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the Federal Government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State Governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger."

If the General Government is to be the exclusive judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, the discretion of those who administer the Government, and not the constitution, would be the measure of their powers. And if one department of that Government, the judiciary, Again, in the same No.: "Notwithstanding the militais to be the sole and final expositor, then its discretion, ry establishments, in the several kingdoms of Europe, and not the constitution, would be the measure of their which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, powers. Such a construction invites those who exercise the Governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. power to arrogate more than they have a right to, by declaring they are the sole, final, and exclusive judges of the measure of their own powers.

And it is not certain that, with this aid alone, they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local Governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia by these Governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed, with the greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned, in spite of the legions which surround it."

Far different was the language of those who made the constitution; of those who recommended it for adoption, and of those who were deliberating on its adoption. It was declared, so recommended, and so adopted, to be a Government of limited powers, few and defined; that the powers of the State Governments were numerous and indefinite, and that the State Governments were "constituent and essential parts of the Federal Government;" Again, in No. 48: "It will not be denied that power "that the State Governments would be the sentinels and the is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectauthoritative bulwarks against encroachments of the Fed-ually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it. eral Government."-Federalist, No. 45, p. 292.

After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several In the 45th No. of the Letters of Publius, p. 290, it is classes of power, as they may in their nature be legislative, declared that" the State Governments may be regarded executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult task is as constituent and essential parts of the Federal Govern- to provide some practical security for each against the invament." "Each of the principal branches of the Federal sion of the others." "Will it be sufficient to mark with preGovernment will owe its existence, more or less, to the cision the boundaries of these departments in the constitufavor of the State Governments, and must consequently tion of the Government, and to trust to these parchment feel a dependence which is more likely to beget a dispo- bargains against the encroaching spirit of power?" "Exsition too obsequious than too overbearing towards perience assures us that the efficacy of the provision has them." been greatly overrated, and that some more adequate de

Again, in the same number: "The powers delegated fence is indispensably necessary for the more feeble by the proposed constitution to the Federal Government against the more powerful members of the Government.” are few and defined. Those which are to remain in The residue of this No., and Nos. 49 and 50, are dethe State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The voted to prove, by very many examples, "that a mere former will be exercised principally on external objects, demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with the several departments, is not a sufficient safeguard which last, the power of taxation will, for the most part, against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical be connected. The powers reserved to the several concentration of all the powers of Government in the States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordina-same hands."

ry course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and prop- In No. 49, it is said: "We have found, in the last erties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, paper, that mere declarations in the written constitution and prosperity of the State." are not sufficient to restrain the several departments withAgain, in No. 46: "But ambitious encroachments of in their legal limits." the Federal Government on the authority of the State Again, in No. 51: "To what expedient, then, shall we Governments would not excite the opposition of a single finally resort, for maintaining the necessary partition of State, or a few States only. They would be signals of power among the several departments as laid down in the general alarm. Every Government would espouse the constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that common cause. A correspondence would be opened. if all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, Plans of resistance would be concerted." "The same the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior

JAN. 31, 1833.]

Revenue Collection Bill.

[SENATE.

structure of the Government, as that its several constitu- another occasion, been shown that the Federal Legislaent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of ture will not only be restrained by its dependence on the keeping each other in their proper places." people, as other legislative bodies are, but that it will be, The first safeguard suggested is, that each department moreover, watched and controlled by the several collateshould have a will of its own, and the members of each ral Legislatures, which other legislative bodies are not." should have as little agency as possible in appointing the The letters of Publius, thus explaining the principles others. In the execution of this principle rigorously, of the constitution, and the checks and balances, were "all appointments for the supreme executive, legisla- published to the people of the United States, and had tive, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the very great influence in recommending the proposed consame fountain of authority, the people, through channels stitution. In the State conventions assembled to considhaving no communication with each other." Difficulties er the proposed constitution, the same explanations were are then suggested, which render some deviations from repeated again and again, as well by distinguished memthe rigorous execution of that principle proper. In the bers of the federal convention which framed and proposconstitution of the judiciary department, in particular, it ed the new constitution, as by the other advocates for its might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle, adoption. The apprehensions that the new constitution (election by the people;) first, because peculiar qualifica- was or could be made a Government of unlimited powtions being essential in the members, the primary considers-that the rights and powers of the State Governments eration ought to be to select that mode of choice which could be absorbed by construction--that all powers, forbest secures these qualifications; secondly, because the eign and domestic, could be melted in the crucible of permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in federal power, and consolidated in one mass, to be used that department must soon destroy all sense of depend- at pleasure by the Federal Government, as its adminisence on the authority conferring them. trators might think fit and convenient for the general welAnother great security against a gradual concentration fare, were pronounced idle and visionary. Those who of the several powers in the same department consists entertained such fears were called political dreamers, arin giving to those who administer each department the guing against the plain sense and meaning of the instrunecessary constitutional means and personal motives to ment. It was over and over again explained as a Governresist encroachments from the others." "In framing a ment of defined powers, with safe and sufficient checks Government, which is to be administered by men over and balances to guard against the exercise of powers not men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable delegated by the States: as a Government deriving its the Government to control the governed; and, in the next place, oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the Government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precaution."

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powers by special delegation, leaving to the State Governments all their rights, powers, and privileges not delegated nor prohibited. In that sense, it was adopted by the States. But to render assurance doubly sure, they proposed and adopted the tenth amendment, declaring-

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." Mark! to the States "respectively," not collectively.

After reasoning upon the subject of these auxiliary precautions generally, the celebrated author of this number of Publius exhibits some as peculiarly applicable to the Federal Government, p. 326: "There are,' says he, "moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to When the new federal constitution was framed and prothe federal system in a very interesting point of view. posed for adoption, the encroaching nature of power had "First. In a single republic, all the power surrender- been severely felt and not forgotten. The necessity to ed by the people is submitted to the administration of a fortify against its usurpations was well understood, and single Government; and the usurpations are guarded the principles of republican government were adored against by a division of the Government into separate and with a frank and generous spirit. In those early seasons' distinct departments. In the compound republic of Amer- of virtue and devotion to liberty, the letters of Publius ica, the power surrendered by the people is first divided appeared, abounding with sound political maxims and elebetween distinct Governments, and then the portion allot-mentary principles of republican government, drawn from ted to each divided among distinct and separate depart- the deepest fountains of knowledge--the history of past ments. Hence, a double security arises to the rights of times, observations on the present, and the reflections of the people. The different Governments will control each the wise, the good, the philanthropic, and the patriotic. other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.

These principles are clearly stated and forcibly illustrated in the letters of Publius, that the State Governments are "Secondly. It is of great importance in a republic constituent and essential parts of the Federal Government; not only to guard society against the oppression of its ru- that the powers of the proposed Federal Government are lers, but to guard one part of society against the injustice few and defined; that those which remain to the State of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist Governments are numerous and indefinite; that the in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united change proposed by the new constitution consists much by common interest, the rights of the minority will be in- less in the addition of new powers to the Union, than in secure. There are but two methods of providing against the invigoration of the old, except only as to the regulathis evil; the one by creating a will in the community in- tion of commerce; that power is of an encroaching nadependent of the majority; the other, by comprehending ture; that it ought to be effectually restrained from passin the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as ing the limits assigned to it; that one security is, by writwill render an unjust combination of a majority of the ten constitutions; a second by distribution of powers into whole very improbable, if not impracticable." legislative, executive, and judicial; a third, that these The 52d No. concludes by adverting again to this secu-powers be intrusted to different hands; that mere demarrity arising from the control of the State Governments. cations of powers and written declarations in a constitu"The conclusion resulting from these examples will be a tion are not sufficient to restrain the legislative, executive, little strengthened by these three circumstances. The and judicial departments within their assigned limits, nor first is, that the Federal Legislature will possess a part to prevent their encroachments, the one upon the other, only of that supreme legislative authority which is vested nor to prevent the tyrannical concentration of all the powcompletely in the British Parliament; and which, with a ers of Government in the same hands; that, to oblige the few exceptions, was exercised by the Colonial Assemblies Government to control itself, and keep within its assigned and the Irish Legislature. In the second place, it has, on limits, some additional auxiliaries over and above paper

SENATE.]

Revenue Collection Bill.

[JAN. 31, 1833.

barriers, and dependence on the people, are necessary; liberty, and property will vanish; the voice of the people that these additional auxiliaries consist in providing that will be stifled, until the evils shall accumulate beyond eneach department may have a will of its own, and that each durance; and then there would be no relief but in conbe invested with the constitutional means and personal vulsion, no remedy but in revolution. Such must be the motives to resist encroachments of the other depart- inevitable result of consolidating State and federal pow ers into one Government, extended over such a wide

ments.

The Federal Government is then represented as con- spread surface, so various in climate, productions, purtaining all the securities of a single republic, by the divi- suits, habits, and interests. One central Government, sions of the several classes of executive, judicial, and with general and defined powers of legislation, cannot legislative powers among the several distinct depart- diffuse the blessings of good order, security, responsibiliments; but, also, that by the division of powers between ty, and rational liberty, throughout such a vast territory. the State Governments and the Federal Government, each The State Governments are necessary parties and towers department will watch the others; each Government will of defence. have a tendency to control itself, and the different Governments will control each other; that this Federal Government will be doubly watched and controlled by the people and by the State Governments.

The letters of Publius do most explicitly explain that the State Governments were safeguards against the encroachments of the Federal Government, not only as be ing constituent parts, but by reason of having a will of their own; capable of watching, capable of directing their force, and having the control of the militia.

In the debates in the New York convention on the adoption of the federal constitution, Mr. Hamilton urged the same security against federal encroachment. He said: "The people have an obvious and powerful protection in their State Governments. Should any thing dangerous be attempted, these bodies of perpetual observation will be capable of forming and conducting plans of regular opposition. Can we believe the people's love of liberty will not, under the incitement of their legislative bodies, be roused into resistance, and the madness of tyranny be extinguished at a blow?"

The resolutions of Kentucky and Virginia, of 1798, and of Virginia at the session of the Legislature of 1799, concur in ascribing to the State Governments the rightful power to interpose to arrest dangerous usurpations by the Federal Government.

Here it is convenient to remark that the report and resolutions of the Legislature of Virginia, of January, 1810, do not in the least conflict with the resolutions of Virginia of 1798 and 1799, and Kentucky of 1798. Those of 1810 relate to a proposition from Pennsylvania to provide, by amendments to the constitution, for cases of conflicting decisions between the State courts and the federal courts. Those of 1798 and 1799 relate to deliberate and palpable usurpations by the Federal Government of the dangerous powers, other than those delegated.

But we are providing by this bill to compel a State into submission; to exhibit the spectacle of a Government at war with itself. This power of compelling a State was proposed in the convention, and rejected. On the 15th June, 1787, Mr. Paterson, of New Jersey, submitted to the convention various resolutions. The eighth was, that the acts of the United States, and treaties, &c. "to be the supreme law," &c.

"And if any State, or any body of men in any State, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the Federal Executive shall be authorized to call forth the powers of the confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an obedience to such acts, or an observance of such treaties."

On the 19th of June, this proposition (with the others submitted by Mr. Paterson,) was voted upon in Committee of the Whole, and negatived; seven States voting against it, and only three for it.

Here Mr. B. yielded the floor to

Mr. POINDEXTER, who moved that the Senate now adjourn. Yeas 11, nays 19.

So the Senate refused to adjourn.

Mr. BUCKNER then moved to postpone the further consideration of the bill, and to make it the special order of the day for to-morrow.

Mr. WEBSTER rose to a point of order.. The gentleman from Kentucky had given way, in the usual manner, to a motion to adjourn. Such was the practice in the Senate. But if a gentleman yielded the floor for any other motion, he yielded the right to resume it.

Mr. POINDEXTER said, it must be apparent to the Senate that the question now before the Senate was one of the greatest importance. He had never before seen a disposition manifested by this body to refuse to a member an opportunity for rest and research in order to enable The inaugural address of Mr. Jefferson recommends himself to close his argument in a manner which would "the support of the State Governments in all their rights be satisfactory to himself and to the country. If the as the most competent administrators of our domestic Senator from Massachusetts were disposed to speak to concerns, and the bulwarks against anti-republican ten- the Senate for a week, he would always vote for adjourndencies." The letters of Publius, before the State con-ment when it was requested.

ventions convened; the explanation in the conventions, by The CHAIR decided that if a Senator yielded the floor the advocates of the proposed constitution; the resolu- for any other motion than a motion to adjourn, he lost the tions of Virginia and Kentucky of 1798 and 1799; and right to the floor. the inaugural address of Mr. Jefferson, all concur in asserting the rights of the State Governments to arrest and prevent the dangerous usurpations of the Federal Govern, ment.

Without these conservative principles, "these bodies of perpetual observation," the Federal Government would soon become the sole arbiter of its powers, with a faculty within itself to increase its powers and multiply its authorities without limit; to riot in irresponsibility, and dazzle by its splendor; to attract to itself all the powers of the State Governments, and, in its omnipotency, to grind the States into dust. Such a Government, overwhelmed by the multiplicity of its concerns, could not enter into the details of legislation. Large discretionary powers would be conferred on the Executive; in place of jaw, executive discretion must govern; security for life,

Mr. POINDEXTER then renewed the motion to adjourn, and asked for the yeas and nays, which were ordered. The question was then taken, and decided as follows:

YEAS.-Messrs. Benton, Bibb, Buckner, Calhoun, Clay, King, Mangum, Miller, Moore, Poindexter, Rives, Robinson, Tyler, White.--14.

NAYS.--Messrs. Chambers, Clayton, Dallas, Dickerson, Dudley, Foot, Frelinghuysen, Hendricks, Hill, Holmes, Kane, Knight, Robbins, Seymour, Silsbee, Tipton, Tomlinson, Webster, Wilkins, Wright.-20. So the Senate refused to adjourn.

Mr. BIBB then continued a few minutes longer, when he again gave way; and,

On motion of Mr. MANGUM,
The Senate adjourned.

FEB. 1, 1833.]

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 1.
REVENUE COLLECTION BILL.

Revenue Collection Bill.

The Senate having resumed the consideration of the special order of the day, which was "a bill further to provide for the collection of duties on imports"-

[SENATE.

to legislative action on the tariff, the source of complaint and grievance to South Carolina; the fruitful source of discontents elsewhere. Let us see if there is not a speedier and more effectual mode by which the discontents of South Carolina may be healed, by which gladness and joy may be diffused throughout the United States, instead of the baleful gloom which must be excited by the horrid spectacle of a nation at war with itself.

If we make war upon South Carolina to put down her principles, we ought to be certain that those principles are bad, dangerous, and repugnant to those upon which the federal constitution is based.

Mr. BIBB resumed his argument. Shall we, said he, make war upon South Carolina? Shall we clothe the President with the power to proclaim war against one of the States of this Union? If so, for what cause? In a foreign war it is of the utmost importance that it be just; that it be the only, the last sad alternative between submission forever to grievous wrong, or a forcible redress. What are her principles? That in all questions touchBefore we authorize war with a member of the confede-ing her rights and powers not delegated to the Federal racy, we should look with yet greater caution to the jus- Government, she has a right to judge as to the usurpation, tice of our cause. We should consider well the cost of and as to the mode and measure of redress. Not that she the conflict, the probable consequences, and the final re- claims the right to arrest the execution of a lawful act of sult. Lord North's fatal delusion of prostrating America Congress, but that she has a right, within her jurisdiction, at his feet, his disregard of the just complaints of the to arrest an unlawful act of Congress; such an act as the colonies, his confidence in the British power, severed the constitution has not sanctioned; which is null and void, colonies from the mother country. Let us not, by a like because it was enacted by usurpation of powers not delefatal delusion, dissever this Union. Our policy to demand gated; unlawful, because the constitution is the supreme nothing but that which is just, and to submit to nothing law, higher than the Congress, overruling the acts of that is wrong, has given us unparalleled success in our Congress; unlawful, because the genius of the constituwars and in our negotiations. The justice of our cause, tion, if consulted, pronounces it null and void. South our forbearance to seek justice by war until all other Carolina has said that the system of protection, engrafted means have been exhausted, have hitherto blessed us with the smiles of Providence. Our tower of strength, our monument of glory, will nod from on high, and totter to their fall, if we rashly and unjustly wage war upon a sister State. Have we justice on our side? What are we to get by the war? Is war the only alternative? Why shall we go to war with South Carolina? She has adopted an ordinance, and passed certain legislative acts; and she has issued a manifesto, all aimed against the system of protection, cloaked under color of revenue.

upon the imposts, is a power never granted by her to the Federal Government. She says that the system of protecting manufacturers is unjust, and oppressive to the people of South Carolina, and destructive of their interests and happiness; moreover, the people of South Carolina have said, that, if the Congress shall attempt to enforce that protective system upon them by force of arms, they will resume all the powers, rights, and prerogatives of a sovereign State, independent of the Union.

Now, Mr. President, I wish it to be distinctly underFor years South Carolina and other States have remon- stood, that, whilst I concur in the doctrines of the Virginia strated against the system of protection as oppressive to and Kentucky resolutions of 1798, 1799, and 1800, I do them, and unwarranted by the constitution. Is South not mean to approve the time, manner, and occasion in Carolina right or wrong in demanding a reduction of the which South Carolina has applied them to practice. They tariff? Is not a reduction demanded by justice and expe- are great conservative principles, not to be carried into diency? Whilst gentlemen are thrusting at others with practical effect but on great and pressing emergencies, the authoritative doctrines of the President, as announced when all other means of staying the hand of lawless agin the proclamation and message, I interpose the shield of gression have been tried--unsuccessfully tried; and when the same high authority. The President, in his message war and revolution, in Governments differently organized at the opening of the session, and again in the message from ours, would be justifiable in the eyes of liberal, ento which this bill professes to be a response, has recom- lightened, and impartial men. These great conservative mended a reduction of the tariff as due to justice and powers and privileges, like all other powers, are liable to sound policy. Instead of complying with this, another abuse in the hands of indiscreet and heated partisans. part of the message is seized, and this bill is reported to But yet, as some great conservative power is necessary to execute injustice and oppression by the sword, the bayo- control the Government itself, to hold it in subjection to net, and the cannon. Can we expect our affairs to pros- the constitution, to keep it within the limits of delegated per under such a course? Can the Union stand this? power, I believe such regulating check more safely lodged Will the other Southern States, who are smarting under a in the whole body of a State--a whole nation of people; sense of the injustice and oppression of the tariff, remain and there less liable to abuse than if lodged in the hands inactive spectators of war and carnage perpetrated in of a few, and those few exposed to many temptations to such a cause? Can we expect that an overruling Provi- sanction the usurpations, as participators in the power dence will smile upon a war so begun, and so prosecuted, and emoluments of the usurpation. against a weak sister? We should recollect that justice Having been, I hope, sufficiently explicit to defend is an attribute of God himself. The principle is of divine myself against misrepresentation in these times of political origin and institution, immutable and eternal. Human excitement, by errors unintentional, committed in reportlaw and human force cannot convert injustice into justice. ing and relating what has been spoken, I shall proceed to Our armies and our navy are but as dust in the balance, defend South Carolina and the Union against the effects compared with the power of Omnipotence to execute the of the bill before us. divine decrees of justice. Sooner or later, divine justice Mr. President, I ask to be informed when and where, will overtake and punish the guilt of nations. We have and by what instrument or act, South Carolina, or any cause to recollect that the race is not always to the swift, other State of this Union, has divested herself of the right nor the battle to the strong. There is an overruling to judge whether the great end and aim of adopting the power; a Providence which attempers the winds to the federal constitution has been attained? Of the right to shorn lamb. Let us turn our ears to the complaints of judge whether her undelegated powers have been usurpSouth Carolina. Let us hearken to the voice of reason. ed; whether the trustees and agents, intrusted with powers Let us not betray an unmanly passion, because a sister for one purpose, have abused and perverted them to has rebuked our power. Let us be just. Let us come another? Of the right, in cases of such abuse, usurpa

SENATE.]

Revenue Collection Bill.

[FEB. 1, 1833.

tion, and maladministration, to judge of the mode and they do, "in the name and on behalf of the people of manner of redress? How or when did South Carolina the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations," attempt to surrender, forever, for all generations to come, assent to and ratify the said constitution. the right to resist injustice and oppression, and engage the present and all future generations to the doctrines of non-resistance and passive obedience?

The State of Virginia, in their act of ratification, declared that the powers granted under the constitution are derived from the people, "and may be resumed by them, An axiom is engrafted into many of our State constitu- whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury tions, "that frequent recurrence to fundamental princi- or oppression;" "and that every power not granted reples is essential to the preservation of liberty." The de- mains with them, and at their will: that no right, of any claration has but too much truth; there is, I fear, great denomination, can be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or difficulty in getting men in power to hearken to the pre-modified by the Congress, by the Senate or the House of cept. There are certain rights, declared to be inherent Representatives, acting in any capacity, by the President, or and unalienable. In this, the bill of rights in State con- any department or officer of the United States, except stitutions, and the great declaration of all the colonies ad- in those instances in which power is given by the constidressed to the family of nations in 1776, will be found to tution for those purposes.' agree. Mr. B. read from the declaration of independence as follows:

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The State of South Carolina, by her act of ratification, used these words: "This convention doth also declare that no section or paragraph of the said constitution warrants a construction that the States do not retain every power not expressly relinquished by them, and vested in the General Government of the Union."

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among These ratifications, with the incorporated declarations men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new Government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."

of certain unalienable rights, and that all rights not delegated are retained, were accepted by the old Congress; and the new constitution was put into operation.

The great principles, that Governments are instituted for the happiness of the people, not for the pleasure of those who are intrusted with the administration of Government; that Governments derive their authority from It would be tedious to recite from State constitutions the people, not that the people derive their rights and all the declarations in accordance with the great principles liberties from the grants and concessions of kings, princes, asserted by the thirteen States in the declaration of inde- potentates, or governors; that happiness and liberty pendence. All the American Governments are based are the ends and aim of Governments, not the shadows and upon these great principles of human liberty; the federal incidents; that the people may resume delegated powers, constitution itself is based upon them; they make a part and alter, reform, and abolish an instituted Government, of it. All its powers and authorities must be construed in subserviency to those unalienable rights.

when experience convinces that the end and aim, liberty and happiness, are not accomplished by means of the GovThe State of New York, in the very act by which she ernment instituted-are the lights which the American ratified the new constitution, did declare "that all power revolution held up to the world; which they have stampis originally vested in, and consequently derived from, the ed with authenticity; which they have proclaimed as axipeople, and that Government is instituted by them for oms. These principles make the foundations of all our their common interest, protection, and security." "That Governments and constitutions, State and federal. They the enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi- are the pillars of light to conduct the human race to libness, are essential rights, which every Government ought erty and to happiness. They are the sacred fires which to respect and preserve." "That the powers of Govern- cheer and illumine the temple of Liberty. ment may be resumed whensoever it shall become neces- I have demonstrated that the old form of Government, sary to their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction, instituted by the articles of confederation, was adopted by and right, which is not, by the said constitution, clearly States. I have demonstrated that the new form of Govdelegated to the Congress of the United States, or the ernment was proposed to the States; adopted by the peodepartments of the Government thereof, remains to the ple of the States, acting as separate communities, not as people of the several States, or to their respective State one mass, but each State ratifying for herself. I will now Governments." After enumerating various other rights, proceed to show that the present federal constitution is the act of ratification proceeds thus: "Under these im-founded upon the practical exercise of the principles of pressions, and declaring that the rights aforesaid cannot altering and reforming, and of resuming the powers be abridged or violated, and that the explanations aforesaid granted, so as to accommodate Government to the great are consistent with the said constitution," &c., the dele-ends of human happiness and security. gates do, "in the name and on behalf of the people of By the thirteenth article of the old constitution, it was the State of New York," assent to and ratify the said provided and declared: "The articles of this confederaconstitution. tion shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the

The State of Rhode Island, in her act of ratification, Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration, at any incorporates these principles: "That there are certain time hereafter, be made in any of them, unless such alnatural rights, of which men, when they form a social teration be agreed to by a Congress of the United States, compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity; among and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the State." Nevertheless, the new constitution did declare means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, that "the ratification by the conventions of nine States and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." That shall be sufficient for the establishment of this constituthe powers of Government may be re-assumed by the tion between the States so ratifying the same." As soon people, whensoever it shall become necessary to their as the ratifications of nine States had been certified, prohappiness." "That at all times the military should be in vision was made for electing the President and Vice Pres strict subordination to the civil power. "Under these ident, Senators and Representatives. They were elected, impressions, and declaring that the rights aforesaid can- and the new Government was actually put into operation not be abridged or violated, and that the explanations on the first Wednesday in March, 1789, without the conaforesaid are consistent with the said constitution," &c., currence or consent of either North Carolina or Rhode

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