withstanding they had themfelves discharged their own share of the impoft. In fuch cafes, and in others which might be specified, the principles are fubverted, on which the claim to allegiance is founded: And taxes may then be enforced by penalties, but will no longer be paid from any just fenfe of moral or political duty.

Subfidies may be perverted from their original defignation, and applied to the purposes of ambition, oppreffion, or the establishment of defpotic power. This occurred in the reign of James II. and occafioned his expulfion from the kingdom. And in that of Charles I. when ship-money was levied under the delufive and dangerous plea of ftate-neceffity, though England then enjoyed a profound peace with all her neighbors, we venerate the intrepid patriotifm of Hampden, for the noble ftand he individually made against its exaction. Yet the exaction had been laid with great equality; had been fo generally fubmitted to by the people, as to produce, in 1636, more than two hundred thousand pounds; and had been folemnly authorised by the twelve judges; who, by their fervile decifion, to use the words of Lord Clarendon," left no man any thing he might

call his own."

II. But it may be alleged that the oppofition of Hampden was chiefly grounded on the illegality

* Life of Turgot by the Marquis de Condorcet.

of

of fhip-money, as fubjecting the people to the arbitrary will of the prince; and that A TAX GRANTED BY PARLIAMENT is a folemn and VOLUNTARY COMPACT, between the PEOPLE, and their SOVEREIGN, binding the former, in all cafes whatfoever. This position implies the lower house of parliament to have been legally and conftitutionally chofen, and not like the packed affemblies in the reigns of Richard II. and James II. In the former, the sheriffs were commanded to fuffer none to be returned, as knights or burgeffes, but fuch as the king's council fhould nominate.* And, in the latter, the illicit practices employed in election produced complaints from every part of England. Yet fo fuccefsful were the arts of the court, that James exulted in there being only forty members, who were not entirely devoted to his intereft. † Admitting, however, the regular election of our representatives, a little confideration will evince, that the truft which is delegated can never be unconditional; and that the powers vested in them may lofe the force of moral obligation, by palpable abufe and unrelenting perverfion. Fear, felf-intereft, ignorance, or corruption may predominate in their deliberations, and prevail with them to facrifice the dearest interests of those, by whom they are commiffioned. In the reign of

Parliamentary History.

+ Burnet.

Henry

Henry VIII. the parliament refigned both their civil and ecclefiaftical liberties to the king, and, by one act, totally fubverted the English conftitution. For they gave to the king's proclamations the full force of a legal statute; and even framed the law, as if it were merely declarative, and intended only to explain the true extent of the regal prerogative. When the fame arbitrary monarch heard that the commons made a difficulty of granting a certain fupply, which he required, he was fo provoked, as to fend for Edward Montague, a member who had confiderable influence in the houfe; and laying his hand on the head of that gentleman, then on his knees before him, imperiously faid, get my bill paffed by to-morrow, or to-morrow this head of yours fhall be off. His defpotifm too well fucceeded; for, the next day, the bill was paffed. † Under the government of Edward VI. a grievous and partial tax was imposed on the whole ftock and moneyed interest in the kingdom, with an entire exemption of the land. One fhilling in the pound was to be levied yearly on every perfon who poffeffed ten pounds, or upwards; a fum equal to half the yearly income of all money-holders, according to the rate of legal intereft.+

• Hume, vol. IV. p. 210.

+ See Collins's British Peerage. Hume, vol. IV. p. 51.

Hume, vol. IV. p. 346.

In the year 1660 a perpetual excife on ale, beer, &c. was enacted, by parliament, as a commutation with Charles II. for the abolition of the court of wards and liveries. This court was an intolerable oppreffion on the nobility and gentry; as the king exercised by it the wardship of all infant heirs; and enjoyed the benefit of their eftates, till they had attained a legal majority. He had, also, the abfolute difpofal both of male and female heirs in marriage, with other powers liable to great abuse. But it is evident that thefe feudal fervices affected folely the proprietors of land; whereas the excife must fall chiefly on the lower tenantry, and laboring poor; and that, therefore, the alleged commutation was, in a confiderable degree, founded in fraud and injuftice. In this light it appeared to fome of the members of the houfe of commons: Mr. Annesley, in particular, urged, " that if the bill " was carried (which it was afterwards by a majority " of two voices only) every man who earns his bread

by the sweat of his brow muft pay excife, to excufe "the court of wards, which would be a greater grievance upon all, than the court of wards was "to a few."*

There is on record a folemn refolution, which paffed in a committee of the house of commons April 6, 1780, when no lefs than four hundred

See Harris's Life of Charles II. vol. I. p. 396. Parliamentary Hiftory, vol. XXIII. p. 21.

and

and forty-eight members were prefent, that the influence of the crown bath increased, is increafing, and ought to be diminished. (B) And in the statute of a subsequent feffion of parliament, for regulating the king's household, it is enacted, that an oath be taken by the keeper of his majesty's privy purse, that no part of it fhall be applied to the use of any member of the house of commons. We are further warranted, in our apprehensions of the danger arifing from this fource, by the authority of the Baron de Montefquieu, who predicts that the liberties of England will perish, whenever the legislative power shall have become more corrupt than the executive: or, as it should, perhaps, have been expreffed, whenever the executive power fhall have acquired a corrupt afcendency over the legislative. In the reign of Charles II. if the dispatches of Barillon may be credited, the king of France meditated the establishment of a pecuniary influence in the English Parliament. It is also well known that Charles was himself a penfioner to this monarch, and received large fums for the most illicit purposes. When the crown egregiously abuses its power, the commons, on various occafions, have thought themselves juftifiable in withholding the fupplies. If they, however, unhappily countenance and aid fuch abuses, and remain deaf to petitions, remonftrances, and every other conftitutional claim, the people may continue to fubmit, but cannot deem themselves

morally