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by this incident, &c.)'. The existence of pain in an amputated
member is also referred to in the Meditations as illustrating the
illusiveness of the testimony of the senses. (See Kuno Fischer,
Descartes, &c., p. 370.)

34. His system is briefly thus. Cp. Leviathan, i. 3. ‘All
Fancies are Motions within us, reliques of those made in the
sense and those motions that immediately succeeded each other
in the sense, continue also together after sense.' Cp. also Human
Nature, chs. ii, iii, iv.

PAGE 69 1. 11. It follows of necessity, &c.: i.e., because the
mechanical relation of cause and effect demands immediate prox-
imity in time of the phenomena so related.

...

F. N. the word 'idea'. In classical Greek, idéa usually signifies
either outward form or appearance', or 'kind, sort, or fashion'
(cp. érépar vμvov idéav, Aristoph. Ranae). H. N. Coleridge (Biog.
Lit. 1847, i. 95) quotes idéa kaλóv (Olymp. xi. 121), Beλriovas ävdpas
τὴν ἰδέαν (Aristoph. Plut. 559) and ἦν δ ̓ ἡ ἰδέα αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀστραπή
(Matt. xxvii. 3). In all these instances the sense of idea is not so
much the visual abstraction of a distinct object' as the actual
appearance of the object seen. For Plato's conception of the idéal,
as the divine archetypes of perishable forms, cp. Meno, 82-86,
Phaedo 73-79, Republic 507 B, 508 E, 569 seq.

=

Our English writers to the end of Charles 2nd's reign.
Johnson (Dict. s.v. 'idea ') quotes Hooker: 'Our Saviour Himself
being to set down the perfect idea of that which we pray and wish
for' where idea ideal. So Campion (1602), 'the Idea of her
sex.' For Coleridge's own definition of 'idea' cp. first Lay Sermon
(The_Statesman's Manual) Appendix E. (It is the antithesis
not the synonym of edwλov'); T. T., Aug. 29, 1827, and Church
and State, 1839, pp. 12 ff. See also Notes on Church Divines, i.
305, 321.

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the following .. from Bishop Jeremy Taylor. From
Sermon XII of the twenty-seven preached at Golden Grove (ref.
Biog. Lit. 1847). See Notes on Church Divines, i. 321.

Lock adopted the term. Cp. Essay concerning Human
Understanding, Introd. § 8: 'I have used it (the word Idea) to
express... whatever the mind can be employed about in thinking.'

Hume distinguishing those representations, &c. See Hume's
Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. i, Pt. i, § 1 ('Of the origin of our
ideas') 'Those perceptions which enter with most force and
violence we may name impressions; and under this name I com-
prehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make
their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint
images of these in thinking and reasoning,' &c. See also the
Enquiry, Sect. ii, p. 18 (ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge).

PAGE 70 1. 4. Long however before either Hobbs. In the 1847
edition (i. 97 n.) it is pointed out that in the substance of this

paragraph and in some part also of his remarks upon Aristotle's conception of the association of Ideas (in this and the following chapter) Coleridge draws upon the Versuch über die Einbildungskraft of J. G. E. Maass (1797) (pp. 343-6), an annotated copy of which was found among Coleridge's books. Maass (17661832) was for many years Professor of Philosophy at Halle. He belongs to the group of thinkers who reacted against Kant in the direction of Wolffian rationalism. His chief interest, however, lay in empirical psychology. As there is no question of any deep intellectual affinity between Maass and Coleridge, it is not of importance to discuss Maass' standpoint in detail. But he agrees with Coleridge in his approval of the Aristotelian, and disapproval of the Hartleian psychology of association, and it is from Maass' confutation of Hartley and interpretation of Aristotle that Coleridge has most largely borrowed.

6. Melanchthon (1497-1560) more famous as a theologian and leader of religious reform than as a philosopher. He published, however, in 1540, a treatise De Anima, which went through many editions.

He

Ammerbach. Vitus Amerbach (1487-1557), a distinguished German scholar, Professor of Philosophy at Ingolstadt. published a work on the soul-De Anima-(1542) and one on natural philosophy-De Philosophia Naturali—(1548).

Ludovicus Vives (1492-1540), philosopher and humanist. He lectured at the University of Oxford, and was for many years patronized by Henry VIII. His writings were chiefly directed against scholasticism. In vol. ii of his works (Bâle, 1555), pp. 497-593, is his treatise De Anima et Vita, to which Maass refers.

by Melanchthon, Ammerbach, and Ludovicus Vives; more especially by the last. Coleridge is here probably quoting from an imperfect memory of the following passage in Maass (p. 343):'Among the first to whom this merit belongs (of instituting empirical psychology) were Melanchthon, Ammerbach, and Lud. Vives, whose psychological writings were published all together by Getzner (Zurich, 1662). But far the most was done by Vives. He has brought together many important observations upon the human soul, and made striking remarks thereon. More especially in the theory of the association of representations, which Melanchthon and Ammerbach do not bring forward at all, he displays no ordinary knowledge' (ref. Biog. Lit. 1847).

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7. Phantasia, it is to be noticed, &c. Cp. Lud. Vives, De Anima et Vita (Opera, tom. ii. p. 509; Basil. 1553). The action of the imagination in the mind is the same as that of the eyes in the body, viz. to receive images by merely looking' (ref. Biog. Lit. 1847).

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14. the law by which the thoughts are.. presented. This as well as the other quotations are to be found in Maass, who also points out that the 'springs' are only apparent.

PAGE 71 1. 13. 'De Anima', 'De Memoria'. To Aristotle's chief psychological work, the De Anima, the Parva Naturalia forms a kind of appendix, where a number of subsidiary but important questions are discussed, which the De Anima left untouched. Among them occurs the De Memoria-'The little work on Memory and Reminiscence-in which the laws of association are laid down with a clearness scarcely to be looked for outside modern philosophy.' (Aristot. De Anima, ed. Wallace, Introd. xv.)

20. successive particles propagating motion like billiard-balls. There is no mention of billiard-balls in Hobbes's discussion of the subject (Human Nature, chs. ii, iii); but he speaks of objects producing motions in the brain, which are apparently indistinguishable from the thoughts or images themselves.

25. the followers of Des Cartes. Descartes' theory of the soul residing in the brain was developed by some of his followers in a materialistic direction—that is, they identified soul and brain: and thus we get the purely mechanical psychology of the French eighteenth century materialists. (Cp. Kuno Fischer, Descartes, &c., p. 493.) Cp. Coleridge's 'Theory of Life' (Miscellanies, p. 375): Should the reader chance to put his hand on the "Principles of Philosophy," by La Forge, an immediate follower of Descartes, he will see the phenomena of sleep solved in a copper-plate engraving.'

29. as Hartley teaches. See Hartley's Observations on Man, ch. i, sect. i (esp. Props. i-v).

PAGE 72 1. 10. he carefully distinguishes them from material motion. Cp. Bk. ii, ch. iii of De Anima, which is devoted to a refutation of the theory that movement is a characteristic of the soul. The phrase κvýσeis év tótą (movement in space) occurs in this chapter, and τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν (local movement) is also mentioned (ii. 3, §§ 1-4) as one of the powers of animals, distinct from τὸ διανοητικόν. The word Kivnoeis is frequently used in the De Memoria to denote psychical processes.

13. he excludes place and motion. Cp. De Anim. ii. 3, in initio For perhaps it is not merely false that its being is of such a kind as they affirm, who say that the soul is that which moves itself, or can move, but it may be an absolute impossibility that motion should be a quality of the soul' (quoted in Maass; see Biog. Lit. 1847, i. 104).

16. The general law of association. Aristotle does not state the law in so many words. (Cp. De Memoria 2. 451b 16, 452a 3, 452a 28.) He is discussing áváμvnois (recollection) only, and he thus analyses the process: 'When engaged in recollection, we seek to excite some of our previous movements, until we come to that which the movement or impression of which we are in search was wont to follow' (2. 451b 16). See Wallace, ib. Introduction, xcv, &c.

23. he admits five agents. More properly four-similarity,

contrast, and connexion in time or space. He continues, 'Hence we seek to reach this preceding impression, starting in our thought from an object present to us, or something else, whether it be similar, contrary, or contiguous to that of which we are in search; recollection taking place in this manner, because the movements are in one case identical, in another case contrary, and in the last case overlap' (Wallace, ib.).

27. As an additional solution. Coleridge here seems to have confused Maass' account of this matter with that of Aristotle. It is Maass who gives this explanation of 'The occasional seeming chasms': (Versuch, &c., pp. 28–9; Biog. Lit. 1847, i. 107.)

PAGE 73 1. 25. Among these volumes, &c. Sir James Mackintosh, in the note above referred to (Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, Note S), points out that the story about Hume was a mistake—the handwriting was not his, nor the book the Parva Naturalia. He further observes, not without reason, that Coleridge, in his discussion of Aristotle's theory of association, fails to note that it is brought forward in explanation of one mental process only-that of recollection. But Coleridge's contention is, that, as far as the passive element in them is concerned, memory and fancy, and indeed all the faculties of thought are identical. It is in the use which each makes of its material that they differ.

28. It remains then for me. Of the inquiry which he here sets before himself, Coleridge failed to carry out more than the preliminary stage-viz. the confutation of mistaken theories of association, and the statement of what he conceives to be its true nature. In the 'philosophical disquisition' of ch. xii he takes a fresh start.

PAGE 74 1. 2. sounding on my dim and perilous way. Coleridge is thinking of the lines in The Excursion (Bk. iii. 700-1)— The intellectual power, through words and things, Went sounding on, a dim and perilous way!

CHAPTER VI

PAGE 74 1. 4. Hartley's hypothetical vibrations. See the Observations, Pt. i, Ch. i, esp. Prop. 5; Hartley and James Mill, by G. G. S. Bower, p. 28, &c. As early as 1801, Coleridge had written to Poole that he had overthrown the doctrine of association, as taught by Hartley. His disbelief in it had been growing for some time. See Introduction, pp. xxix ff.

10. Reimarus. J. A. Reimarus (1729-1814), physician, and Professor of the Moral Sciences at Hamburg; a philosopher of the rationalistic school. The passage to which Coleridge refers is probably a passing refutation of materialism in §§ 3-7 of a treatise Ueber die Gründe der menschlichen Erkenntniss und der natürlichen Religion (Biog. Lit. 1847, vol. i, App. note B). His father, H. M.

Reimarus, was the author of a work entitled Observations, Moral and Philosophical, on the Instinct of Animals, their Industry, and their Manners, of which Coleridge thought highly. See A. P. 1804 (pp. 91-2).

16. we must bewilder ourselves, &c. Cp. Coleridge's note to his lines in Southey's Joan of Arc (first edition, 1796): 'Who deem themselves most free', &c., from which this sentence is taken verbatim, except for the significant substitution of fancy for imagination (quoted by Cottle, Early Recollections of S. T. Coleridge, ii. 242). See also Biog. Lit. i. 91, 1. 21 and note.

20. Pythagoras. See Zeller, Die Phil. der Griechen, Leips., 1892, p. 349: This is the meaning of the fundamental doctrine of the Pythagoreans: everything is number, that is, everything consists of numbers: number is not merely the form which determines the composition of things, but is also the substance and the material of which they consist.' Their theory of numbers was also applied to musical notation. (Ib., 401 ff.)

21. Plato. For Plato's mathematical and musical symbols see Timaeus, 35 B-36 B, 47 A; Rep., 443, 531; Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy, Trans., p. 348 and note; Jowett, Plato, Rep., Introd., cxxx (The Number of the State).

24. metaphysical systems become popular. Cp. letter to Wordsworth (May 1815), Letters, p. 649: The philosophy of mechanism, which... cheats itself by mistaking clear images for distinct conceptions': a fallacy to which Coleridge had drawn attention nearly twenty years before, in a note to his contribution to Southey's Joan of Arc, quoted above: 'We are restless because invisible things are not the subjects of vision.'

29. From a hundred possible confutations let one suffice. This > particular confutation is borrowed from Maass. (Versuch, &c., pp. 32, 33.)

30. According to this system. See Observations, Pt. I, Ch. i, Prop. 22.

PAGE 75 1. 10. the ideas are themselves in Hartley's system. Hartley does not go so far as actually to identify vibrations and ideas. But he makes the ideas subject to the same processes of motion and change, and governed by the same laws, as the vibrations; and Coleridge's argument is therefore not invalidated. See Observations, Pt. I, Ch. i, Prop. 2: 'The white medullary substance of the brain is also the immediate Instrument by which the Ideas are presented to the mind: or, in other words, whatever changes are made in the substance, corresponding changes are made in our ideas and vice versa'; and see ch. i, passim.

PAGE 76 1. 14. his work has been re-edited by Priestley. Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind on the Principle of the Association of Ideas: with Essays relating to the subject of it. By Joseph Priestley, LL.D., F.R.S. London, 1775. In the Preface

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