Church; and at daylight, the right wing, Gen. Howard, less the necessary wagon guards, was put in rapid motion on Bentonville."

It appears that on the advance of the head of Gen. Slocum's column from his camp on the night of the 18th, it first encountered Dibbrell's cavalry, but soon found its progress hindered by infantry and cavalry. The enemy attacked his advance and gained a temporary advantage, capturing three guns of Gen. Carlin's division, and driving the two advanced brigades back on the main body. Gen. Slocum at once deployed the two divisions of the 14th corps of Gen. Davis, and brought up on their left the two divisions of the 20th corps of Gen. Williams. These were placed on the defensive, and a line of barricades prepared. Gen. Kilpatrick also massed his cavalry on the left. In this position six assaults were made on the left wing by Gen. Johnston, with the combined forces of Gens. Hoke, Hardee, and Cheatham. During the night ensuing, Gen. Slocum got up his wagon train with its guard of two divisions, and Gen. Hazen's division of the 15th corps, which enabled him to make his position impregnable. Gen. Johnston had moved by night from Smithfield, with as little incumbrance as possible, for the purpose of overwhelming the left wing before it could be relieved. The right wing, in its advance to the aid of Gen. Slocum, found the cavalry of the enemy watching its approach without being able to offer any serious resistance until the head of the column encountered a considerable body behind a barricade, at the forks of the road near Bentonville, about three miles east of the battle field of the previous day. The cavalry were quickly dislodged, and the intersection of the roads secured. As the 15th corps advanced, Gen. Logan found that the enemy had thrown back their left flank, and constructed a line of parapet connecting with that toward Gen. Slocum, in the form of a bastion, with its salient on the main road to Goldsboro; thus interposing between Gen. Slocum with the left wing on the west, and Gen. Howard with the right wing on the east, while the flanks rested on Mill Creek and covered the road to Smithfield. Gen. Howard proceeding cautiously soon made strong connection with Gen. Slocum on the left, and at 4 P. M. of the 20th, a complete and strong line of battle confronted the enemy in his intrenched position, which put Gen. Johnston on the defensive, with Mill Creek and a single bridge in his rear. Gen. Sherman having nothing to gain by a battle, now pressed the enemy steadily with skirmishers alone, using artillery on the wooded space held by him, and feeling the flanks of nis position, which were covered by swamps.

On the next day, the 21st, a steady rain pre vailed, during which Gen. Mower with his di vision, on the extreme right, had worked well to the right around the enemy's flank, and nearly reached the bridge across Mill Creek, which was the only line of retreat open to Gen. Johnston. Fearing the enemy might turn upon Gen. Mower with all his reserves, to overwhelm him, and perhaps yield his parapets for the purpose, Gen. Sherman ordered a general attack by his skirmish line, from left to right. Meanwhile Gen. Mower was able to regain his connection by moving to his left rear. During the night ensuing the enemy retreated toward Smithfield, leaving his pickets to fall into Gen. Sherman's hands, with many dead unburied and wounded in his field hospitals. At daybreak pursuit was made two miles beyond Mill Creek. The loss of the left wing about Bentonville was reported at 9 officers and 145 men killed, 51 officers and 816 men wounded, and 3 officers and 223 men missing; total, 1,247. Of the enemy, 167 dead were buried, and 338 made prisoners by the left wing. The loss of the right wing was 2 officers and 35 men killed, 12 officers and 289 men wounded, and 1 officer and 60 men missing; total, 399. Of the enemy, 100 dead were buried and 1,287 made prisoners by the right wing. The aggregate loss of Gen. Sherman, exclusive of the cavalry, was 1,646.

The result of this affair gave to Gen. Sherman full possession of Goldsboro, with the two railroads to Wilmington and Beaufort on the coast. The 22d was passed in burying the dead and removing the wounded at Bentonville, and on the next day all the troops moved to the camps about Goldsboro, already occupied by Gen. Schofield, there to rest and receive supplies of food and clothing.

During this march Gen. Sherman's army passed over an average breadth of forty miles of country, from Savannah to Goldsboro, and consumed all the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, cured meats, corn meal, &c. It was stripped so bare as to make it necessary for the enemy to send provisions from other quarters to feed the inhabitants. It caused the abandonment by the enemy of the whole sea-coast from Savannah to Newbern, with the forts, dockyards, gunboats, &c. The real object of the march, says Gen. Sherman, "was to place this army in a position easy of supply, whence it could take an appropriate part in the spring and summer campaign of 1865." The troops remained in their camps during the remainder of the month of March. Meantime Gen. Sherman visited City Point and conferred with the President, Gen. Grant, and others.

dam is across the James, the guard lock was destroyed and the James River let into the canal, carrying away its banks and washing out its bottom. The dam was also partially destroyed. Among the captures were twelve canal boats laden with supplies, ammunition, rations, medical stores, &c. Gen. Custer was next sent to Ashland, and Gen. Devens to destroy the bridges over the South Anna. At noon on March 10th, the advance of Gen. Sheridan arrived on the banks of the Pamunkey, a few miles from Whitehouse, and soon crossed the river. On the 26th he reached City Point, and took a position in Gen. Gregg's old cavalry camp on the left and rear of the army.

The line occupied by Gen. Grant's army at this time extended a distance of about thirty miles. The extreme right was at Fort Harrison at Chafin's farm, north of the James River, where were also the outposts of the cavalry under Gen. Kautz. Thence it crossed the James in front of Bermuda Hundred and the Appomattox, and extended around Petersburg as far southwest as the bank of Hatcher's Run. This line was strongly intrenched everywhere, although the greater part of the army were on the left. The Army of the James, under Gen. Ord, was north of the James, forming the right wing, and the Army of the Potomac was south of the Appomattox, and formed really the left wing. From the Appomattox to Hatcher's Run there was a strong series of connected intrenchments. The first regular work on the line was Fort McGilvery; the next Fort Steadman; the next three-eighths of a mile further on, was Fort Haskell; the next Fort Morton, &c. Between the forts were mortar batteries, as follows: No. 8 near Fort McGilvery, No. 9 between that and Fort Steadman, No. 10 on the right of the latter fort and near it, and Nos. 11 and 12 on its left. Fort Steadman and the adjoining batteries were on an eminence known as Hare's Hill.

For some days previous to the arrival of Gen. Sheridan with his command, there had been indications of a change on the part of the enemy, such as might result in a dash on some part Gen. Grant's lines. About daylight, on March 25th, Gen. Gordon's old division and Bushrod Johnson's division of Lee's army were massed for a charge upon Fort Steadman, which covered about an acre of ground and had nine guns. At the same time the rest of Gen. Lee's army was arranged for an attack further down toward the left. At dawn Gordon's troops rushed forward to the attack. The space between the lines was about one hundred and fifty yards wide. They at once cleared their own abatis, charged across the interval, and up the ascent to Fort Steadman, and working through the abatis, carried the fort almost in an instant. The surprise was complete. In the fort was the 14th New York heavy artillery, and the line was guarded by Gen. McLaughlin's brigade of the 1st division of the 9th corps. The enemy immediately turned the guns of the fort against the rest of the line, and caused the abandonment of batteries 10 and

11 on the left, and battery 9 on the right. Upon these they dashed at once, and opened fire upon the troops as they escaped. Fort Haskell, however, soon gave them a check. The 3d division of the corps under Gen. Hartranft was quickly on the ground, and the batteries from all sides were speedily massed upon Fort Steadman.. A terrible fire burst from the artillery, to which the enemy replied with the captured guns. Under this fire the division of Gen. Hartranft pressed up to retake the captured fort. The enemy at first resisted obstinately, and checked his progress with a loss of nearly two hundred killed and wounded. But the constant fire of the artillery and the pressure of Hartranft soon caused the enemy to fall back into the fort and then beyond it, down the hill, leaving all the captured guns in the endeavor to regain their own lines. A portion, however, were unable to escape, and about 1,758 were made prisoners, causing a total loss to the enemy of more than 2,000 men. The Union loss was nearly 1,000, in killed, wounded, and missing. No more firing took place at this point during the day. It was resumed at night when an attempt was made to repair the abatis. The affair was over before other Union troops arrived to give assistance. Later in the day a general forward demonstration was made along the line on the left, and a part of the enemy's skirmish lines captured with about 2,000 prisoners. Of this movement Gen. Grant reported thus:

"Our captures by the 2d corps were 365; by the 6th corps, 469, and by the 9th corps 1,049. The 2d and 6th corps pushed forward and captured the enemy's strong intrenchments, and turned them against him and still hold them. In trying to retake these the battle was continued until eight o'clock at night, the enemy losing very heavily. Humphreys estimates the loss of the enemy in his front at three times his own, and Gen. Wright, in his front, as double that of ours."

The following is Gen. Meade's congratulatory order to the army:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, March 26, 1865. General Orders No. 13.

The Major-General Commanding announces to the Army the success of the operations of yesterday. dearly, massed his forces, and succeeded, through The enemy, with a temerity for which he has paid the reprehensible want of vigilance of the 3d brigade 1st division, 9th corps, in breaking through our lines, capturing Fort Steadman, and batteries 9, 10, and 11. The prompt measures taken by Maj.-General Parke, the firm bearing of the troops of the 9th corps in the conspicuous gallantry of the 3d division of adjacent portions of the line held by the enemy, and this corps, for the first time under fire, together with the energy and skill displayed by Brigadier-General Hartranft, its leader, quickly repaired this disaster; and the enemy were driven from Fort Steadman and our lines, with heavy losses in killed and wounded, leaving in our hands eight battle-flags and over 1,900 prisoners.

The enemy being driven from the front of the 9th corps, the offensive was assumed by the 6th and 2d trenched picket line, and all his efforts to recover the corps; the enemy by night was driven from his inthe same, which were particularly determined and

persistent on the 2d corps front, were resisted and repulsed with heavy losses, leaving with the 6th corps over 400 prisoners, and with the 2d corps two battleflags and over 300 prisoners.

The troops of the 6th corps, reported by MajorGeneral Wright as engaged in these operations, were Getty's division, Keifer's brigade of Seymour's division, and Hamblin's and Edward's brigade of Wheaton's division.

Of the 2d corps, Major-General Humphreys mentions Miles' and Mott's divisions, and Smythe's brigade of Hays' division, supported by Griffin's division, 5th corps.

The result of the day was the thorough defeat of the enemy's plans, the capture of his strongly intrenched picket-line under the artillery fire of his main works, and the capture of ten battle-flags and about 2,800 prisoners-a result on which the MajorGeneral Commanding heartily congratulates the

army.

Two lessons can be learned from these operations: One, that no fortified line, however strong, will protect an army from an intrepid and audacious enemy, unless vigilantly guarded; the other, that no disaster or misfortune is irreparable, where energy and bravery are displayed in the determination to recover what is lost, and to promptly assume the offensive. The Major-General Commanding trusts these lessons will not be lost on this army.

In conclusion, the Major-General Commanding desires to return his thanks to those commands of the army not specially mentioned in this order, for the promptness displayed by all, in their movements to different parts of the lines, under the exigencies of the hour. In connection with this subject, the promptitude of Major-General Warren and of Brevet MajorGeneral Hunt, Chief of Artillery, in the early part of the operations, during the accidental absence of the Major-General Commanding, deserve commendation and thanks.

GEORGE G. MEADE, Major-General Commanding. Indications were now more and more apparent of the weakness of Gen. Lee's forces, and the fall of Petersburg and Richmond. Gen. Grant immediately prepared for new movements of the highest importance, and considered that this attack of Lee was made to cover his designed retreat from Richmond.

On the 26th some sharp skirmishing broke out between the pickets of the 1st division of the 9th corps and their opponents, and the batteries joined in. It soon quieted down. On the 27th an attack was made by the enemy on Gen. Getty's division of the 6th corps by a small force of the enemy, which was repulsed after a sharp skirmish. On the same day orders were sent to the various field hospitals to remove the sick and wounded to City Point, and to keep the hospitals in readiness for any emergency that might arise. At 12 o'clock at night the whole army was put under marching orders, and the next day, the 28th, was passed in preparations for the movement. The plan was that the cavalry, under Sheridan, should advance to the left, as had been done so often before, followed by the 5th corps under Gen. Warren, and the 2d corps under Gen. Humphreys, while the other corps held the lines around Petersburg. For this purpose, on the 27th troops were selected from the 24th under Gen. Gibbon, and 25th under Gen. Birney, corps which belonged to the Army of the James, under Gen. Ord, and during the night marched across the

river, leaving the remainder of the corps to garrison the position north of the James. At noon on the 28th, this force reached the headquarters of Gen. Meade, and early on the morning of the 29th marched into the lines as they were evacuated by the 2d corps.

About 6 A. M. of Wednesday the 29th, the cavalry began to move down the Jerusalem plank-road to Reams' station on the Weldon Railroad, in two columns, of which Gen. Crook commanded the right and Gen. Merritt the left. The bridge over Rowanty Creek was gone, and the creek not fordable. After a delay of four hours a bridge was built, and the advance under Crook crossed, and moved direct to Dinwiddie. The bad roads caused much delay. The town was occupied, and communication opened with Gen. Warren's corps on the right. It rained s little during the night, and very hard all of Thursday, the 30th. The roads became so bad as to block up the trains, and a part of the cavalry force was employed in guarding them. The rest moved up to the Boydton road.

Previous to the advance of the infantry, the left of the 6th corps extended to Hatcher's Run.

The 2d corps extended down the run from the left of the 6th, at nearly a right angle, until reaching the crossing of the Vaughan road. The 5th corps was practically in reserve, and extended back at a right angle from the left of the 2d, in rear of the 6th. Early on the morning of the 29th the 2d corps moved along the Vaughan road, and was soon thrown into position along that road from Hatcher's Run to Gravelly Run, which unite at Monk's Neck to form Rowanty Creek. Works were thrown up to cover the corps from attack, but the enemy made no opposition. The 5th corps moved at the same time, and crossed Hatcher's Run. The route was along the road to Dinwiddie, until reaching the Quaker road, when the column turned abruptly to the right. About nine o'clock a connection was formed between the right of the 5th corps and the left of the 2d. The line of the former extended across the Quaker road, and within two or three miles of Dinwiddie. Some opposition had been made to the crossing of the 5th corps at Gravelly Run by a cavalry vidette, which was driven off after a short skirmish. Expect ing an attack from the enemy, preparations were soon made by the troops, and about 3 P. M. a division, under Gen. B. Johnson, attacked and drove in the skirmishers, and a sailed with great force Gen. Griffin's division. Some batteries being in position opened upon the enemy, who had no artillery, and a sharp but short conflict ensued. Finding the force against him becoming too strong Johnson withdrew to his original position. The loss to the 5th corps was about five hundred, and that of the enemy was estimated at not far from the same number.

During the night, between 9 and 12 o'clock, a cannonade took place on the right of the