377

19.

sales, with interest, is allowed; and
an addition of 10 per cent. some-
times made, where the property
has been sold under disadvanta-
geous circumstances. Id.
11. Counsel fees may be allowed, either
as damages or costs, both on the
Instance and Prize side of the
Court. Id.
379 19.
12. A libel of information does not re-
quire all the technical precision of
an indictment at common law. If
the allegations describe th offence,
it is all that is necessary; and if
founded upon a statute, it is suffi-
cient if it pursues the words of the
law. The Emily and the Caro-
line,
J. An information, under the Slave
Trade Act of 1794, c. 187. [xi.]
s. 1. which describes, in one count,
the two distinct acts of preparing
a vessel and of causing her to sail,
pursuing the words of the law, is
sufficient. ld.

331

387
14 Stating a charge in the alternative,
is good, feach alternative consti-
tutes in offence for which the thing
is forfeited. ld.
387
15. Under the above act, it is not ne-
cessary, in order to incur the for-
feiture, that the vessel should be
completely fitted and ready for
sea. As soon as the preparations
have proceeded so far as clearly
to manifest the intention, the right
of seizure attaches. ld. 388
16. The former decision of this Court,
in the case of the Emily and the
Caroline, (7 Cranch, 496.) recon-
ciled with its determination in the
present case. Id.
387
17. The technical niceties of the com-
mon law are not regarded in Ad-
miralty proceedings. It is suffi-
cient, if an information set forth
the offence so as clearly to bring
it within the statute upon which
the information is founded.
not necessary that it should con-

It is

20.

21.

22.

clude contra formam statuti. The
Merino et al.
391.401
The District Court of the district
where the seizure was made, and
not where the offence was com-
mitted, has jurisdiction of pro-
ceedings in rem, for an alleged
forfeiture. Id.
402
If the seizure is made on the high
seas, or within the territory of a
foreign power, the jurisdiction is
conferred on the Court of the
district where the property is car-
ried and proceeded against. Id.

402

A municipal seizure, within the
territory of a foreign power, does
not oust the jurisdiction of the
District Court into whose district
the property may be carried for
adjudication. Id. 402, 405
The prohibitions in the Slave
Trade Acts of the 10th of May,
1800, c. 205. [li.] and of the
20th of April,, 1818, extend as
well to the carrying of slaves on
freight as to cases where the per-
sons transported are the property
of citizens of the United States;
and to the carrying them from
one port to another of the same
foreign empire, as well as from
one foreign country to another.
Id.
403, 404
Under the 4th section of the act
of the 10th of May, 1800, c. 205.
[li.] the owner of the slaves trans-
ported contrary to the provisions
of that act, cannot claim the same
in a Court of the United State,
although they may be held in ser-
vitude according to the laws of
his own country. But if, at the
time of the capture by a commis-
sioned vessel, the offending ship
was in possession of a non-com-
missioned captor, who had made
a seizure for the same offence, the
owner of the slaves may claim;
the section only applying to per-

407

dons interested in the enterprise
or voyage in which the ship was
employed at the time of such cap-
ture. Id.
23. A question of fact, under the
Slave Trade Acts. Condemna-
tion pronounced. Id. 409
24. The claim of seamen, for wages,
on a voyage undertaken in viola-
tion of the Slave Trade Acts, out
of the proceeds of the forfeited
vessel in the registry, rejected.
Id.
414, 415
25. The claims of seamen, for wages,
and of material men, for supplies,
where the parties were innocent
of all knowledge of, or participa-
tion in, the illegal voyage, prefer-
red to the claim of forfeiture on
the part of the government. Id.

30.

31.

32.

26. Material men have a lien, which
may be enforced by a proceeding
in the Admiralty, in rem, for ne-
cessaries or supplies, furnished in
a port to which the vessel does
not belong. Id.
417
27. A transfer of a registered vessel of
the United States, to a foreign
subject, in a foreign port, for the
purpose of evading the revenue
laws of the foreign country, with
an understanding that it is to be af-
terwards reconveyed to the for-
mer owner, works a forfeiture of
the vessel, under the 16th section
of the Ship Registry Act of the
31st of December, 1792, c. 1.
unless the transfer is made known
in the manner prescribed by the
7th section of the act. The Mar-
garet,
421
28. The statute does not require a be-
neficial or bona fide sale; but a
transmutation of ownership, " by
way of trust, confidence, or other-
.wise," is sufficient. Id. 424
29. Quare, Whether, in such a case,

a reconveyance would be decreed

34.

35.

by a Court of justice in this coun-
try? Id.

424

The proviso in the 16th section of
the Ship Registry Act, being by
way of exception from the enact-
ing clause, need not be taken no-
tice of in a libel brought to enforce
the forfeiture. It is matter of de-
fence to be set up by the party in
his claim. Id.
425,426
The proviso applies only to the
case of a part owner, and not to
a sole owner of the ship. Id.

426
The trial, in such a case, is to be
by the Court, and not by a jury,
in seizures on waters navigable
from the sea by vessels of ten tons
burthen and upwards. Id. 427,
428

A registered vessel, which con-
tinues to use its register, after a
transfer under the above circum-
stances, is liable to forfeiture under
the 27th section of the act, as using
a register without being actually
entitled to the benefit thereof. Id.

429
In a libel of information, under the
67th section of the Collection Act
of 1799, c. 128. against goods,
on account of their differing in de-
scription from the contents of the
entry, it is not necessary that it
should allege an intention to dé-
fraud the revenue. 200 Chests
of Tea,
430. 436
A question of fact, as to the rate
of duties payable upon certain
teas, imported as bohea. That
term is used in the duty act in its
known commercial sense; and
the bohea tea of commerce is pot
usually a distinct and simple sub-
stance, but is a compound, made
up in China, of various kinds of
the lowest priced black teas. Id.
436

36. But, by the duty acts, it is liable

436

to the same specific duty, without
regard to the difference of quality
and price. Id.
37. In judicial sales, there is no war-
ranty, express or implied. The
Monte Allegre,
616. 644

38. Upon a sale by the Marshal, under
an order of Court, no warranty is
implied. Id.

645
39. Neither the Marshal, nor his agent,
the auctioneer, has any authority
to warrant the article sold. Id.

645
40. Quære, How far the Marshal is
responsible to the vendee, in his
private capacity, if he undertake
to warrant, or to do what would
imply a warranty in a private
sale? Id..
645
41. Upon an Admiralty proceeding, in
rem, where the proceeds of the
sale are brought into Court, they
are not liable to make good loss
sustained by the purcha er, in
consequence of a defect being
discovered in the article sold. Id.
648, 649

ALIEN.

1. Under the 9th article of the treaty
between the United States and
Great Britain, of 1794, it is not
necessary for the alien to show
that he was in the actual posses-
sion or seisin of the land, at the
date of the treaty, which applies
to the title, whatever that may
be, and gives it the same legal va-
lidity as if the parties were citi-
zens. The title of an alien mort-
gagee is protected by the treaty.
Hughes v. Edwards, 489.496
2. But, independent of the stipula-
tions of the treaty, an alien mort-
gagee has a right to come into a
Court of equity, and have the
property, which has been pledged
for the payment of the debt, sold
for the purpose of raising the mo-

1. In a declaration upon a promissory
note, the omission of the place
where it is payable is fatal. Se-
bree v. Dorr, 558. 561, 562
2. By the custom of the Banks in the
District of Columbia, payment of
a promissory note is to be de-
manded on the fourth day after
the time limited for the bayment
thereof, in order to charge the en-
dorser, contrary to the general
law merchant, which requires a
demand on the third day. Ren-
ner v. Bank of Columbia, 581-

584
3. Evidence of such a local custoin
is admissible, in order to ascertain
the understanding of the parties,
with respect to their contracts
made with reference to it. Id.

587

4. Cases in which evidence of com-
mercial usage is admissible, in
order to ascertain the meaning of
contracts. Id.
588
5. The declaration against the endor-

ser, in such a case, must lay the
demand on the fourth, and not on
the third day. Id.

594
6. Quære, Whether a declaration, in
such a case, not averring the local
usage, would be good upon de-
murrer? Id.
594
7. Secondary evidence of the contents

of a lost note is admissible, wher-
ever it appears that the original is
destroyed, or lost by accident,
without any fault of the party. Id.

596

8. In the case of a lost note, it is not
necessary that its contents should
be proved by a notarial copy.
All that is required is, that it
should be the best evidence the
party has it in his power to pro-
duce. Id.
597
9. To admit secondary evidence of a
lost note, it is not necessary that
there should be a special count in
the declaration upon a lost note.
Id.
597
10. Where the maker of the note has
removed into another State, or
another jurisdiction, subsequent
to the making of the note, a per-
sonal demand upon him is not ne-
cessary to charge the endorser,
but it is sufficient to present the
note at the former place of resi-
dence of the maker. M'Gruder
v. Bank of Washington,

C.

CHANCERY.

598

1. A bill in equity, brought to rescind
a purchase made under the decree
of this Court, in Terrett v. Tay-
lor, (9 Cranch, 43.) upon the
ground, that the title to the pro-
perty was defective, and could not
be made good by the Vestry and
other persons, who were parties

to the former suit. Bill dismissed.
Mason v. Muncaster,
445
2. Where the mortgage deed contain-

ed a defensance that the mortga-
gor should pay the debt, accord-
ing to the condition of a bond re-
cited in the deed, by which it was
payable on a day already past, at
the time of the execution of the
deed: Held, that this circum-
stance did not avoid the mortgage
deed in equity, where it was to be
considered as a conveyance, ab-
solute at law, bat intended as a

security merely, and to be treated
in the same manner as an ordinary
mortgage. Hughes v. Edwards,
489-493
3. A Court of equity looks to the
substantial object of the convey-
ance, and will consider an abso-
lute deed as a mortgage, wherever
it is shown to have been intended
merely as a security for the pay-
ment of a debt. Id.
495
4. In the case either of a legal or
equitable mortgage, the mortgagee
may pursue his legal remedy by
ejectment, and, at the same time,
file his bill to foreclose the equity
of redemption. Id.
494
5. A mortgagor cannot redeem after
a lapse of twenty years, after for-
feiture and possession by the mort-
gagee, (which period has been
adopted in equity by analogy to
the statute of limitations,) no inte-
rest having been paid in the mean
time, and no circumstances ap-
pearing to account for the neglect.
Id.
497
6. Where the mortgagee brings his
bill of foreclosure, the mortgage
will, after the same length of time,
be presumed to have been dis-
charged, unless circumstances can
be shown to repel the presump-
tion, as, payment of interest, a
promise to pay, an acknowledg-
ment by the mortgagor that the
mortgage is still subsisting, and
the like. Id:
497, 498
7. A bɔnæ fidei purchaser under the
mortgagor, with actual notice of
the mortgage, or constructive no-
tice by means of a registry, can
only protect himself, by the lapse
of time, or other equity, under
the same circumstances which
would afford a protection to the
mortgagor. Id.
499
8. Such a purchaser is not entitled to
have the value of the improve-
ments made by him deducted

9. Practice of Courts of Equity on ju-
dicial sales. The Monte Allegre,
616. 649

10. In all cases of concurrent jurisdic-
tion, the Court which first has
possession of the subject, must
determine it conclusively. Smith
v. M'Iver,

532

11. Although Courts of equity have
concurrent jurisdiction with
Courts of law, in all matters of
fraud, yet, where the cause has
already been tried and determi-
ned by a Court of law, a Court of
equity cannot take cognizance of 1.
it, unless there be the addition of
some equitable circumstance to
give jurisdiction. Id. 534
12. In such a case, some defect of
testimony, or other disability,
which a Court of law cannot re-
move, must be shown, as a
ground for resorting to a Court of
equity. Id.
534
13. In general, the answer of one de-
fendant in equity, cannot be read
in evidence against another. But
where one defendant succeeds to
another, so that the right of the
one devolves on the other, and
they become privies in estate, the
rule does not apply. Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, 738 2.
14. Where the defendant is restrained

by an injunction, from using mo-
ney in his possession, interest 3.
will not be decreed against him.
Id.
837
15. An injunction will be granted to
prevent the franchise of a corpo-
ration from being destroyed, as
well as to restrain a party from
violating it, by attempting to par- 4.
ticipate in its exclusive privile-
ges. Id.
838
16. In general, an injunction will not

be allowed, nor a decree render- 5.
ed, against an agent, where the

principal is not made a party to
the suit. But if the principal be
not himself subject to the juris-
diction of the Court, (as in the
case of a sovereign State,) the
rule may be dispensed with. Id.

842

A Court of equity will interpose
by injunction, to prevent the
transfer of a specific thing, which,
if transferred, will be irretrieva-
bly lost to the owner, such as ne-
gotiable securitie, and stocks. Id.
845

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The acts of the Legislature of the
State of New-York, granting to
Robert R. Livingston and Robert
Fulton, the exclusive navigation
of all the waters within the juris-
diction of that State, with boats
moved by fire or steam, for a term
of years, are repugnant to that
clause of the constitution of the
United States, which authorizes
Congress to regulate commerce,
so far as the said acts prohibit
vessels licensed, according to the
laws of the United States, for car-
rying on the coasting trade, from
navigating the said waters by
means of fire or steam. Gibbons
v. Ogden,
1. 186.
The power of regulating commerce,
extends to the regulation of navi-
gation. Id.
189
The power to regulate commerce
extends to every species of com-
mercial intercourse between the
- United States and foreign nations,
and among the several States. It
does not stop at the external
boundary of a State. Id. 193
The power to regulate commerce
is general, and has no limitations,
but such as are prescribed in the
constitution itself. Id. 196
The power to regulate commerce,
so far as it extends, is exclusively