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other officers of the Bank, are officers of government. 1824. But it is contended, that, were their resemblance to contractors more perfect than it is, the right of the State to control its operations, if those opera
U.S. Bank. tions be necessary to its character, as a machine employed by the government, cannot be maintained. Can a contractor for supplying a military post with provisions, be restrained from making purchases within any State, or from transporting the provisions to the place at which the troops were stationed? or could he be fined or taxed for doing so? We have not yet heard these questions angwered in the affirmative. It is true, that the property of the contractor may be taxed, as the property of other citizens; and so may the local property of the Bank. But we do not admit that the act of purchasing, or of conveying the articles purchased, can be under State control.
If the trade of the Bank be essential to its character, as a machine for the fiscal operations of the government, that trade must be as exempt from State control as the actual conveyance of the public money. Indeed, a tax bears upon the whole machine; as well upon the faculty of collecting and transmitting the money of the nation, as on that of discounting the notes of individuals. No distinction is taken between them.
Considering the capacity of carrying on the trade of banking, as an important feature in the character of this corporation, which was necessary, to make it a fit instrument for the objects for which it was created, the Court adheres to its decision in the case of MCulloch against The State
1824. of Maryland, and is of opinion, that the act of
the State of Ohio, which is certainly much more
objectionable than that of the State of Maryland, U.S. Bank. is repugnant to a law of the United States, made
pursuance of the constitution, and, therefore, void. The counsel for the appellants are too intelligent, and have too much self respect, to pretend, that a void act can afford any protection to the officers who execute it. They expressly admit that it cannot.
It being then shown, we think conclusively, that the defendants could derive neither authority nor protection from the act which they executed, and that this suit is not against the State of Obio within the view of the constitution, the State being no party on the record, the only real question in the cause is, whether the record contains sufficient matter to justify the Court in pronouncing a decree against the defendants ? That this question is attended with great difficulty, has not been concealed or denied. But when we reflect that the defendants, Osborne and Harper, are incontestably liable for the full amount of the money taken out of the Bank; that the defendant, Currie, is also responsible for the sum received by him, it having come to his hands with full knowledge of the unlawful means by which it was acquired; that the defendant, Sullivan, is also responsible for the sum specifically delivered to him, with notice that it was the property of the Bank, unless the form of having made an entry on the books of the treasury can countervail the fact, that it was, in truth, kept untouched, in a trunk, by itself, as a deposit, to await
the event of the perding suit respecting it; We 1924 may lay it down as a proposition, safely to be affirmed, that all the defendants in the cause were liable in an action at law for the amount of this U. 8. Bumbo decree. · If the original injunction was properly awarded, for the reasons stated in the preceding part of this opinion, the money, having reached the hands of all those to whom it afterwards came with notice of that injunction, might be pursued, so long as it remained a distinct deposit, neither mixed with the money of the treasury, nor put into circulation. Were it to be admitted, that the onginal injunction was not properly awarded, still the amended and supplemental bill, which brings before the Court all the parties who had been concerned in the transaction, was filed after the cause of action had completely accrued. The money of the Bank had been taken, without authority, by some of the defendants, and was detained by the only person who was not an original wrong door, in a specific form; so that detinue migbt have been maintained for it, bad it been in the power of the Bank to prove the facts which are necessary to establish the identity of the property sued for. Under such circumstances, we think, a Court of equity may afford its aid, on the ground that a discovery is necessary, and also on the same principle that an injunction issues to restrain a person who bas fraudulently obtained possession of negotiable Dotes, from putting them into circulation; or a person having the apparent ownership of stock really belonging to another, from transferring it. The suit, tben, might be as wel} sustained in a
1824. Court of equity as in a Court of law, and the ob
jection that the interests of the State are commit
ted to subordinate agents, if true, is the unavoidaU.S. Bank.
consequence of exemption from being suedof sovereignty. The interests of the United States are sometimes committed to subordinate agents. It was the case in Hoyt v. Gelston, in the case of The Apollon, and in the case of Doddridge's Lessee v. Thompson and Wright, and in many others. An independent foreign sovereign cannot be sued, and does not appear in Court. But a friend of the Court comes in, and, by suggestion, gives it to understand, that his interests are involved in the controversy. The interests of the sovereign, in such a case, and in every other where he chooses to assert tham ,under the name of the rea' party to the cause are as well defended as if he were a party to the record.
But his pretensions, where they are not well founded, cannot arrest the right of a party having a right to the thing for which he sues. Where the right is in the plaintiff, and the possession in the defendant, the inquiry cannot be stopped by the mere assertion of title in a sovereign. The Court must proceed to investigate the assertion, and examine the title. In the case at bar, the tribunal established by the constitution, for the purpose of deciding, ultimately, in all cases of this description, had solemnly determined, that a State law imposing a tax on the Bank of the United States, was unconstitutional and void, before the wrong was committed for which this suit was brought.
We think, then, that there is no error in the de
cree of the Circuit Court for the district of Ohio, 1824. so far as it directs restitution of the specific sum
Osborn of 98,000 dollars, which was taken out of the Bank unlawfully, and was in the possession of the U. S. Bank. defendant, Samuel Sullivan, when the injunction was awarded, in September, 1820, to restrain him from paying it away, or in any manner using it; and so far as it directs the payment of the remaining sum of 2000 dollars, by the defendants, Ralph Osborne and John L. Harper; but that the same is erroneous, so far as respects the interest on the coin, part of the said 98,000 dollars, it being the opinion of this Court, that, while the parties were restrained by the authority of the Circuit Court from using it, they ought not to be charged with interest. The decree of the Circuit Court for the district of Ohio is affirmed, as to the said sums of 98,000 dollars, and 2000 dollars; and reversed, as to the residue.
Mr. Justice JOHNSON. The argument in this cause presents three questions: 1. Has Congress granted to the Bank of the United States, an unlimited right of suing in the Courts of the United States ? 2. Could Congress constitutionally grant such a right? . and 3. Has the power of the Court been legally and constitutionally exercised in this guit?
I have very little doubt that the public mind will be easily reconciled to the decision of the Court here rendered; for, whether necessary or unnecessary originally, a state of things has now grown up, in some of the States, which renders all