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has legislated under the same power. This res sults from the very nature of concurrent power. Each party possessing the power, may of course use it. Each being sovereign as to the power, may use it in any form, and in relation to any subject; and to guard against a conflict in practice, the law of Congress is made supreme.

The provision, that the law of Congress shall be the supreme law in such cases, is the ground of a conclusive inference, not only that there are concurrent powers, but that those powers may be exercised by both governments at the same time. One law cannot be said to be superior to another, and to control it, unless it acts in a manner inconsistent with and repugnant to that other. The question of supremacy, therefore, can never arise, unless in cases of actual conflict or interference. If the mere exercise of a power by Congress takes away all right from the State to act under that power, then any State law, under such a power, would be void; not as conflicting with the supreme law of Congress, but as being repugnant to the provisions of the constitution itself, and as being passed by the State, in the first instance, without authority. If this doctrine were true, then the provision that the laws of Congress should be supreme, was entirely idle. It would have been sufficient to have said merely, that the constitution should be supreme." These positions

a Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. Rep. 195, 196. Per
Marshall, C. J. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 34. 45. Per
Johnson, J. Id. 49, 50. 55. Per Story, J. Livingston v. Van
Ingen, 9 Johns. Rep. 575, 576. Per Thompson, J.
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are all supported by the judgments of this Court, and of other Courts whose authority deserves to be respected.

From this mass of authority, and the reasons on which it is founded, it results, (1.) That a State may legislate in all cases of concurrent power, though Congress has acted under the same power and upon the same subject matter. (2.) That the question of supremacy cannot arise, except in the case of actual and practical collision. (3.) That such collision must be direct and positive, and the State law must operate to limit, restrict, or defeat, the effect of a statute of Congress. (4.) That in such case, the State law yields in those particulars, in which such actual collision arises, but remains valid in all other respects.

The States have, accordingly, acted upon this construction to a great extent. Thus, the power to lay and collect taxes, is admitted on all hands to be concurrent. It is constantly exercised by the States, in every form, and both real and personal estate have frequently been taxed by the national and local governments, at the same time. So, under the power to lay and collect excises, the same article has frequently been taxed by both governments. And the power to lay imposts, or duties on exports, and imports, and tonnage, is also concurrent, except that no State can lay any duty on imports and exports, or duty of tonnage, unless. such as are absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws. So, also, the power to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, is a power

which may be exercised by the States. A State
may make it an offence to, counterfeit the coin of
any foreign country within its territory. Thus,
New-York has provided for the punishment of
counterfeiting" any of the species of gold or sil-
ver coins, now current, or hereafter to be current
in this State." And Congress has provided for
the punishment of counterfeiting "any gold or sil-
ver coin of the United States," or of any "foreign
gold or silver coins, which, by law, now are, or
hereafter shall be made current, or be in actual
use and circulation as money, within the United
States."
New-York has punished the counte
feiting of "any promissory note, for the payment
of money," including notes made by any body
corporate; and under this the counterfeiting of
the notes of the bank of the United States is
punished. Congress has punished the same of-
fence in the law incorporating the bank of the
United States." In all these acts of Congress,
relating to coins and bank notes, it is provided,
"that nothing in them contained shall be so con-
strued as to deprive the Courts of the individual
States of jurisdiction, under the laws of the seve-
ral States, over any offence made punishable by
these acts." This shows that Congress considered
the power to punish these offences as concurrent,
and that it could be exercised by the States on the

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1824. ground of their own inherent authority, as it is held that Congress cannot delegate any part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States to the State tribunals." Again: the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, is a concurrent power, according to the same principles. But the States have been in the constant habit of superadding to the regulations of Congress, additional provisions, suited to their own views and local circumstances. These instances, which might be greatly multiplied, show the practical construction put, both by Congress and the State Legislatures, upon these concurrent powers.

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The learned counsel here recapitulated the principles laid down, and proceeded to apply them to the discussion of the cause, which he divided into two branches. (1.) The supposed repugnancy of the laws of New-York to the power of Congress on the subject of patents and copy-rights. (2.) Their supposed conflict with the power of Congress to regulate commerce.

As to the first, the words of the constitution are, "Congress shall have power to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."

a Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 69. Per Story, J.
-b Id. 51.

c 1 K. L. of N. Y. 216. Laws of Georgia, 468. 6 Laos of Pennsylvania, 320.

This power is concurrent, according to all the principles before laid down. It is clearly a power appertaining to sovereignty, and, as such, vested in the Legislature of New-York, before the formation of the United States' constitution. A power to promote science and the useful arts, is highly important to every civilized society. It embraces all the means of education, and all kinds of mechanical labour and improvements. It is .constantly exercised by all governments, as a sovereign authority, by laws for the promotion of education in all its branches, by bounties for the encouragement of discoveries and new methods of business, and by the grant of exclusive rights and privileges for the same end. It has frequently been exercised by the State of New-York, and by other States, before the adoption of the constitution. It is not granted exclusively to Congress. No exclusive terms are used. The grant is affirmative and general, like all the other powers. There is no express prohibition upon the States against the exercise of it. Nor is it exclusive in its nature. It does not owe its existence or creation to the Union. When exercised by a State, it does not operate in any manner beyond the territorial jurisdiction of that State. From its nature, it admits of a great variety of regulations, both by local and general laws, which may exist harmoniously together. Being thus a concurrent power, it follows, according to the principles already established, that the State may exercise it at all times, and in every mode, until an actual and practical conflict arises between a right exer

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