Kirk V. Smith. only. When, then, we come to the enacting part 1824. of the clause, which ordains that the "same lands and other hereditaments, shall be held free and discharged therefrom, and from the payment thereof, for ever;" and ask, what are the same lands? and from what are they discharged? the only answer which can be made to the question is, that "the same lands" are lands not within the manors; and that the discharge is "from all quitrents other than the quit or other rents reserved within the proprietary tenths or manors, before mentioned," "and arrearages of purchase money for lands not within the tenths or manors afore said." That the Legislature deemed it necessary, by one of these sections, to take from the proprietaries the arrearages of purchase money not within the manors, and by the other, to vest them in the Commonwealth, is proof that this was not done by the 5th. The inference to be drawn, as we think, from the 9th section, that the Legislature never lost sight of the distinction set up between manors and the general territory of the Commonwealth, is strengthened by the language of the 10th section, which provides and enacts, " that, in order to preserve equality among the purchasers of land under the said late proprietaries, the said arrears of purchase money, other than for lands within the said tenths and manors, shall be accounted to be due and payable to the Commonwealth." Now, if the Legislature had supposed itself, by the preceding section, to have abolished all the arrears of purchase money due from lands within Kirk V. Smith. 1824. the manors, how would it " preserve equality among the purchasers," to coerce the payment of the purchase money for lands without the manors, to the Commonwealth? Or, what motive can be assigned for discharging those within the manors from paying for their lands, and requiring payment from those without the manors. It would be a caprice for which it would be impossible to account. Where the language of the Legislature is clear, Courts cannot be permitted to assume an intention repugnant to that language, because it imports what they think unreasonable; but words are not to be forced out of their natural meaning, to produce what is unreasonable, if not absurd. The plaintiffs in error also rely on the 6th section of the act establishing a land office, passed in 1781, as amounting, unequivocally, to a confiscation of the rights of the proprietary in the land in contest. This proposition is sustained, by applying to all lands, words which are, indeed, general in themselves, but which are, obviously enough, used by the Legislature with reference to particular lands, the right to which was vested in the Commonwealth by the act of 1779. This act does not purport to be an act of confiscation, but an act for opening a land office for the lands of the Commonwealth. It does not purport to be an act-of acquisition, but of disposition of that which had been previously acquired. It commences with a recital, that "many of the lands in the State, heretofore taken up," &o.. "are yet unpatented, and the purchase money, and arrearages of purchase money, thereon due, are vested in the Commonwealth;" " and the owners and holders of such rights, since the shutting up of the land office, have not had it in their power to pay in the purchase money and obtain patents: for remedy whereof, be it enacted, that an office be erected," &c. The subsequent regulations, then, respecting the payment of the purchase money, were in tended for such purchase money only as was already vested in the Commonwealth; and the unpatented lands referred to, are those only, the purchase money due on which was then vested in the Commonwealth. It is important, too, in the construction of this act, to recollect that the framers of the act of 1779 could not have intended any interference, by means of a land office, or otherwise, with the manors. They remained the property of the proprietaries, who were themselves to receive the arrears of purchase money, and to complete the titles. The whole act being framed for the property of the Commonwealth, the general words of the 6th section must be understood to be limited to the subject matter of the act; that is, to the property of the Commonwealth. The act directs, that patents shall be issued for lands for which the purchase money shall be received: and the 16th section directs, that the land, so granted, "shall be free and clear of all reservations and restrictions, as to mines, royalties, quit-rents, or otherwise " Now, the act of 1779 1824. Kirk V. Smith Kirk V. Smith. 1824. expressly reserves for the proprietors the quitrents within the manors. This act, then, cannot be construed to authorize the issuing patents for lands within the manors, unless it be also construed to be a confiscation, by implication, of property expressly reserved for, and vested in individuals, by a preceding act of the Legislature. This construction, to be justified, must be unavoidable. But the 12th section appears to the Court to deserve some consideration. That section declares, “that nothing in the act shall be construed to extend to lands, not granted in the usual forms of the land office." There were, then, lands in Pennsylvania, "not granted in the usual forms of the land office." As this case comes on after a general verdict, on an exception to a charge given by the Court to the jury, it is incumbent on the person taking the exception, to show that the charge is erroneous. If it comprehended this act, of which the Court is not satisfied, still it is incumbent on the exceptor to show that lands within manors were "granted in the usual forms of the land office." This fact is not shown. The act of 1783 is obviously limited to the same subject to which the act of 1781 applies. All arguments founded on this act are liable, too, to this additional objection. It was enacted after the treaty of peace, when the power of the State Legislature over the estate of William Penn, real and personal, had ceased. We come now to that part of the argument which Kirk ry, while another remained valid. The words 1824. make no such distinction, and we can perceive nothing in the nature of the property which will justify the Court in making it. If we trace these words, "manors," and "proprietary tenths," to their first use, we shall find reason to confirm, not to change, the sense in which we suppose them to have been used in the act of 1779. By the 19th section of the charter, license is granted to William Penn, and his heirs, "to erect any parcels of land, within the province aforesaid, into manors." There is no restriction on this power, which confines its exercise to lands which are vacant at the time. There was, then, no want of power in Penn to comprehend within a manor lands which were actually sold.. The rights of the purchaser, the tenure by which he held his property, could not be charged, nor would they be changed, by including his land within the survey of a manor. The proprietary tenths originate in the "conditions or concessions agreed on between William Penn and certain adventurers and purchasers, on the 11th of July, 1681. The 9th condition, or concession, is: "In every 100,000 acres, the governor and proprietary, by lot, reserveth ten to himself, which shall lie but in one place." Now, it is very apparent that, supposing this stipulation to be a fundamental law, and to enure to the benefit of all the inhabitants, it can only restrain the proprietary from reserving more than ten out of every 100,000 acres of land, and compel him to lay it off in one body. If within any survey v. Smith. |