was most important, and most critical, every one must have felt when it was brought to a determination; every one must now be sensible that it was most wise. He challenged the annals of Europe to produce an instance of a warlike enterprize, in which so much entreaty had been resorted to before success, and so much forbearance manifested after it. What his majesty's ministers had planned with decision, they had carried into effect with a force which could not leave to the Danes any hope of triumphing in a contest. And he confessed, that he could no more consider the Danish government as justified in sacrificing the lives of so many gallant men in a hopless resistance, than he could admire the heroism of the prince, who, himself escaping from the dangers with which he was environed, coolly devoted his capital to destruction, and its inhabitants to slaughter. Accustomed as we had been lately to witness extraordinary events, he could not avoid expressing his astonishment at seeing the emperor of Russia, the champion of the continent, secured by his situation from the calamities which had overtaken other countries, voluntarily put the last hand to the degradation of the continental powers of Europe; to see him descending from the proud eminence on which he had been placed, for the purpose, of violating his engagements, and crouching under the throne of that usurper, whom he bad so lately insulted and defied. The contrast which the firmness and magnanimity of the king of Sweden displayed, commanded equally our admiration and support. And lord H. was sure, that the house would gladly enable his majesty not only to fulfil

his engagements to that gallant prince, but also to shew to the world, that it was not by the quantum of immediate interest that we measured our national faith and friendship.

Of many important subjects of consideration presented by his majesty's speech, none were more important than the principle adopted, and the steps taken by our government, to frustrate the enemy's designs against our commerce: the principle of retaliation and self-de fence. In a moment of frenzy, France had issued edicts levelled against our commerce. Had the objects of these measures been attained, had they even partially crippled our means, the consideration that a temporary distress to ourselves was utter ruin to our opponeats, must have induced us to persevere in the contest with tranquillity and firmness; but the very reverse was the fact. So far from our means being diminished, although the different branches of our commerce might vary in extent, the aggregate exceeded that of the most prosperous period of our history: insomuch that his majesty, in his most gracious speech, expressed his confidence, that no material increase of the burthens of his people would be necessary.

There was one subject, from the contemplation of which unalloyed pleasure must be derived in every point of view; namely, the rescue from the power of France of one of the oldest and most faithful of our allies, transferred from a country weak and indefensible to one secure and powerful: an occurrence which afforded a field for the most brilliant anticipations, commercial and political. Lord Hamilton then

said, that under the impression of the feelings which he experienced, he should move that an humble address should be presented to his majesty, &c. The address, which, as usual, was an echo to the speech, being read by the clerk at the table,

Mr. C. Ellis seconded the motion. With respect to the design entertained by France, of compel ling Denmark to join the confederacy against Great Britain, if ministers were in possession in July of the information alone, which had since been publicly disclosed, they would have failed in their duty if they had not acted as they did. A similar attempt had been made by France on Portugal. But the frankness of the court of Lisbon, and its determination neither to lend its aid to the confederacy against Great Britain, nor to abandon British persons and property to the possession of the French, entitled it to the confidence of his majesty's government, and justified it in pursuing a line of conduct different from that adopted in the case of Denmark. Adverting to the Russian declaration, he contended, that a character very different from that of Russia marked the composition, not only in the sort of argument made use of, but in the peculiarities of the style, which, if not French, was the most happy imitation of French that he had ever seen. The magnanimity of his majesty in offering reparation for injury to the United States of America, was most praise worthy. He trusted the Anglo-Americans would see that it was not their true policy to unite themselves to France. We had ample means of carrying on In our navy we had not only

war.

the most efficient defence, but a greater power of active hostility than, perhaps, we ourselves were yet aware of. By exerting our naval force in every possible direction, we might shew the enemy that a predominant navy gives a power scarcely inferior to that of a conquering army.

Lord viscount Milton regretted, that ministers had not expressed their willingness to enter into a negotiation, on suitable terms, for peace. At the same time, he did not approve of any idle clamours for peace before the terms of negotiation should be ascertained. The attack on Copenhagen he considered to be prima facie unjustifiable. Copenhagen was left defenceless, while the Danish troops were pouring towards Holstein, thus evincing an unaffected confidence in the amity of the British nation, and at the same time a sincere distrust of the French army. Yet he did not deny that there might have been circumstances as yet unrevealed, by which the attack on that capital might be justified.

Mr. Ponsonby observed, that his majesty's speech embraced such a variety of topics, that it was not easy to express one's sentiments upon it. Had it been made known, as was the usual custom, two or three days before it was delivered, members would have had less difficulty in stating their opinions upon its contents. And this was the more to be wished, that it was the longest perhaps that was ever heard from the throne since the days of James I. Its principal object he understood to be, the elucidation of our relations of peace and war with other powers. But before he could deliver an opinion of the conduct,

on

on which these relations depended, he must be in possession of the correspondence which had taken place between our own government and the governments of foreign nations. It was right in ministers to assume an attitude of dignity, worthy of the character and resources of the country.

Whether a prolongation of the war with France, or the commencement of hostilities with other powers was the only alternative left us, he was not in possession of information sufficient to form an opinion. The house, he asserted, was equally destitute of information on the question relative to America and neutral nations. There was another subject of much importance, which might have been introduced into the speech, namely, the present state of Ireland. As to the affair of Copenhagen, he would on a future occasion move for the production of necessary documents, so that it might, at least, be fairly brought into discussion.

Mr. Milnes, after an eulogy on the present administration, observ ed, that it would indeed have been impolitic to adopt any measure by which the character of the country might be affected, if the powers of Europe retained their independence, if the government of Denmark had been free to follow that course which its honour and interest dicta ted. But there was not a power on the continent which could have resisted the mandates of the enemy. It was the first duty of ministers to act upon the necessity of the case, and it was equally their duty to use their discretion in judging of that necessity. And if, in acting upon this, they were to err at all, it was best that they should err upon the side of public security. If Denmark

had been really worse disposed towards this country than she was, could she have pursued any other course than that precisely which she had followed? The extraordinary concentration of French troops on the frontiers of Holstein, the submission of Denmark to the decrees of France, and her remonstrances against our maritime rights, together with her active and formidable naval equipments, were sufficient evidences of her submission to Buonaparte.-Was Buonaparte's system, that "all Europe should be devoted, excepting Denmark?" With a large navy, with a more extended commerce, and with the keys of the Baltic in her hand, would he have allowed her to remain as a monument of reproach to the vassalage of surrounding countries, and to have broken the coutinuity of the chain which binds every country of Europe? It was the declared opinion of a noble lord (Milton) that the expedition should be condemned, because the crown prince was in Holstein, and his forces unprepared for action. Strange as that sentiment might appear to his mind, it excited no surprize. It was a doctrine of the school of which the noble lord was a disciple, or perhaps the leader. And when a noble lord (Petty) announced, that their motto was"Nos Rebus Servamus Secundis ;" or that they would never afford any assistance to friends till they were in a condition not to want it, he could not but think the advice of the noble lord perfectly natural, that we should never resist an enemy till he should be in a condition to despise our resistance. As to peace, Buonaparte would certainly, in bis terms, wish to question our

maritime

maritime supremacy, a patrimony entailed upon us, and therefore not a matter of negotiation; ministers would judge how far a peace was promising under such auspices, Were Buonaparte to abdicate his throne, and to depose all his minion princes; were he to restore to France her legal government, and to Europe her balance of power, they would not, in his mind, be equivalents for the sacrifice of our. command at sea.-We had, seen the original principles of revolutionary devastation settled into a savage tyranny, which bad armed, by its menaces or corruption, the rest of Europe against us. We saw that it had a leader pledged to our ruin, who, after exhausting the other sources of his malignity, renounced at length that commercial law which mitigated the war to both, and converted into the instruments of his hostility the want and misery of his own people. We saw, however, that in this spirit of destruction, disengaged from all its other objects, and concentrated on the downfal of this single country, he had not advanced one single step towards it; that the time was still to come, when the glories of the great nation were to burst on Britain, and when, execrating the oligarchy of our constitution, we were to become happy in the monarchy he was to give us. In the mean time, he declared us blockaded, not by the presence and assault of his navies, and the consequent destruction of our commercial strength, but by shutting the gates against his own shipping. Seeing all this, and reflecting how far the predictions of Buonaparte had been fulfilled, and on whom this species of warfare pressed heaviest, the whole nation

might learn a lesson of encouragement and of admonition: to bear what they had so steadily borne, and to commaud success by deserving it.

Mr. Whitbread said, that if there was no other justification of the attack on Denmark than what had been given that evening, he had no hesitation in declaring it base and treacherous. He declared, that he would rather have seen the fleet of Denmark in forced hostilities against us, manned by her sailors, acting under compulsion, than he would, after what had happened, see them moored in our own ports. In addition to the inveterate animosity of Denmark, to which this act had given rise, had it not also been the means of cutting off our com

unication with the continent, as well as of throwing Denmark into the hands of France? But we were told it would be dangerous to grant the information desired. To whom would it be dangerous? To ministers? He verily believed they had none to give. To those who gave them the information on which they acted? This he could not well conceive, since they had asserted their being in possession of it: and it was not very material, after avowing this fact, whether they imparted the substance of the information or not. As to the fact in question itself, we had assertion against assertion: the assertion of the crown prince of Denmark on the one hand, and an assertion which ministers had put into the mouth of their sovereign on the other. And, for his own part, he had no hesita tion in saying, that he gave credit to the former in preference to the lat ter.

Mr. Whitbread here adverted

to

to expressions used by the noble lord who moved the address, highly derogatory to the courage of the crown prince, and such certainly as never ought to have been applied to any man who, like him, had been tried, or indeed to any man who was untried. He saw, however, with regret and sorrow, that it was quite the fashion to deal out sarcasms, and sometimes abuse on those powers who, in consequence of the pressure of circumstances, had been compelled to abandon our cause. He was far from thinking that the emperor Alexander had deserted us in a moment of despondency and alarm as.had been stated, and was persuaded that he had been forced to the step he took by the necessity of the case.-As to the emigration from Portugal, it was brought about by the menacing proclamation of Buonaparte, and the approach of a French army to Lisbon, not, in any degree by the dexterity and address of ministers, and their agent, lord Strangford, as had been given out. Of our relations with Vienna and Petersburgh, he would forbear to speak till the promised papers were on the table; but if the principles of common sense were applied to the present conjuncture, a more favourable opportunity for negotiating a peace with France could not be hoped for.

Mr. secretary Canning was surprized, that Mr. Ponsonby should have required a day's preparation to marshal his arguments or opinions on the matter of the address; to deliver his sentiments upon topics on which the public mind had long since formed a decided opinion. For the discussion of these, he had stated, as an additional ground of delay, the necessity

of communications respecting the intercourse between his majesty's ministers and the courts of Austria and Russia. These powers were not in a situation to mediate impartially. If this fact should be proved by the notes to be produced, he hoped for Mr. P's. approbation of ministers, in not consenting to treat till they should know upon what basis; a question that had occupied three months in the late negotiation. As to the expedition to Copenhagen, it was possible that Mr. P. might move for some information that might be produced safely. But if he should move for the secret information on which that expedition was undertaken, as far as his judgment went, he believed he would never have ocular conviction.-Was it possible, that a time when there was no capital on the continent where the power of Buonaparte could not drag the offender against him to execution, should be fixed on for divulging the sources of secret intelligence? Was this country to say to the agents who served it from fidelity, or from less worthy motives, "You shall serve us but once, and your life shall be the forfeit?"-What had happened to Portugal was sufficient to convince every fair thinking man of the truth of the information respecting Denmark: for the communications from the Portugueze government related as well to the Danish as the Portuguese navy. In the expedition to Copenhagen the present ministers had the example of those before them. It was only necessary to apply to Denmark the principle they had applied to Portugal; to threaten and coerce secret enemies, or at least suspicious neutrals, intsead of old