This court has adopted the rule there laid down. Griffith v. Maxfield, 63 Ark. 548; Leroy v. Harwood, 119 Ark. 418; Mays v. Blair, 120 Ark. 69, and Shelton v. Ratterree, 121 Ark. 482. The doubt, however, must be reasonable, or such as would induce a prudent man to hesitate. It does not mean a captious or frivolous objection.

We now come to consider the title in the present case tendered by Reeher to Fenner under the contract in question and must determine whether it is so far free from reasonable doubt as to justify the affirmance of the decree ordering the contract to be specifically performed. There was an incumbrance of $400 which John C. Ashley, who abstracted the title for Reeher, testified had been fully satisfied. His testimony was not disputed. Hence this alleged incumbrance passes out of the case.

This brings us to the mortgage made by Reeher to Michael. In the first place, Reeher all the way through claimed that he would pay off this mortgage and only declined to pay to Michael's attorney because Michael was not there to satisfy the record. He again offered to pay off this indebtedness at the trial, and the court credited his judgment against Fenner with the amount of the indebtedness. Under these circumstances, it did not constitute an encumbrance which would warrant Fenner in refusing to carry out the contract on his part. It seems that there was some other objections to the title, but the evidence does not disclose what they were. Ashley testified that the title was a merchantable one, and that Fenner told him he would not take anything less than a perfect title. This, as we have already seen, he was not entitled to under the terms of the contract. The contract gave him a merchantable title, and this Reeher offered to give him at all times. He could not refuse to accept the title thus offered on the ground that there was a possibility of there being a flaw in it. The record does not show any reasonable ground which would warrant Fenner in turning down the title offered him by Reeher. The title which Reeher seeks to compel Fenner to accept

is a merchantable one, within the meaning of our decisions cited above, and the court properly entered a decree for the specific performance of the contract.

It follows that the decree must be affirmed.

SOVEREIGN CAMP WOODMEN OF THE WORLD V. KEY.

INSURANCE

Opinion delivered May 16, 1921.

FRATERNAL SOCIETY ESTOPPED BY KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL AGENT. The local agent of a fraternal society, through whom only a member may commuicate with the ruling officials of the society, and whose duty it is to report the standing of members, is the agent of the society, and a member's duty under the rules of the society to give notice of engaging in a more hazardous employment was complied with by giving notice to such agent; and where notice was so given, and the member was not notified of any increase of assessment, the order was estopped to deny payment of the proper dues, though the laws of the society provided that no officer or agent could waive the provisions of the laws.

Appeal from Clark Circuit Court; George R. Haynie, Judge; affirmed.

T. E. Helm, for appellant.

1. Under the constitution and by-laws of the order employment in an electric current generating plant is classed as hazardous, and appellee failed to give notice and pay the increased assessment rate and his certificate of benefit was null and void.

2. Under the facts of the case plaintiff was not entitled to recover. He made no offer to pay the additional rate.

3. There was no waiver; at least, the clerk of the local camp had no authority to waive the provision in the constitution and by-laws requiring the payment of the monthly installment rate. It was Key's duty to acquaint himself with the provisions of his certificate and the constitution and by-laws of the order, and a failure to pay the additional rate avoided his benefit certificate.

104 Ark. 538; 129 Id. 159; 133 Id. 411. Act 462, Acts 1917, § 20, is applicable here, and it is not within the power of a clerk of a local camp to waive the payment of the additional assessment for hazardous occupation. 142 Ark. 154.

4. There was no estoppel, as that doctrine does not apply. There was no conduct of defendant or the clerk of the local camp such as to induce action or inaction in reliance thereon, or which could have operated to mislead Horace Key to his injury. There was no fraud or advantage taken. There is nothing to show that any one at any time did anything to discourage, hinder or prevent him from paying the additional dues required. 142 Ark. 154. 188 S. W. 941 is a very similar case and is controlling here. See, also, 2 Bacon on Life & Acc. Ins., p. 1496.

5. It was error to give instruction No. 1 for plaintiff. It does not declare the law properly, and in effect told the jury that the clerk of the local camp could waive the requirements of the constitution and laws of the order, which the clerk could not do. Act 462, Acts 1917, § 20. The peremptory instruction asked by defendant. should have been given, as the evidence plainly showed that Horace Key was a member of the order and insured as a machinist, an ordinary or preferred occupation, and that he afterward changed to the hazardous one of an electric current generating plant, and that he never paid or offered to pay the increased rate.

McMillan & McMillan, for appellee.

It is not absolutely clear that defendant was entitled to win this case, even if there had been no estoppel shown. The policy was incontestable after five years except where the policy-holder dies while engaged in a hazardous occupation. The burden was upon the insurer to bring itself within the exception, and it has failed. 140 Ark. 612.

Horace Key was an enlisted man and exempt from the additional premium required by § 43. 140 Ark. 313.

Defendant is clearly estopped to claim a forfeiture. Horace Key was misled by the belief that his policy was still in force. The clerk of the local camp was the agent of the sovereign camp, and his knowledge was that of the principal or sovereign camp. 127 Ark. 133. See, also, 140 Ark. 289.

SMITH, J. On the 15th day of June, 1914, the appellant, Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World, issued its beneficiary certificate for a thousand dollars to H. C. Key, of Arkadelphia, Clark County, Arkansas, naming as beneficiary in said certificate appellee, Mrs. Albey Key, the mother of the insured. In his application Key stated that he was a machinist, which occupation was and is classed as an ordinary or preferred occupation, and required payment of the ordinary or preferred rate. Key paid this rate until the time of his death.

About August 1, 1917, Key removed to Malvern, Arkansas, where he entered the employment of the Arkansas Light & Power Company at its electric current generating plant as engineer, in which capacity he worked about a year. He then entered the United States army, where he served until discharged in June or July, 1919, and on his discharge he returned to the employment of the Arkansas Light & Power Company, where he again worked as engineer for two months and until the time of his death.

On the night of September 16, 1919, Key was found dead at said electric current generating plant. No one saw him die, but the body was found lying in the water at the bottom of the condenser pit, and those who attempted to remove the body received electric shocks in coming in contact with the water. The body was burned and blistered.

The constitution and by-laws of the order in force during all the time Key was a member contained the following sections and parts of sections:

"Section 43. Persons engaged in the following occupations, towit:

"(a) Sailors on seas, electric linemen, employees in electric current generating plants and enlisted men in the army and navy during war, may be admitted to membership if accepted by the sovereign physician, but their certificates shall not execeed two thousand dollars each and their rates of assessment shall be 30 cents for each one thousand dollars of their beneficiary certificate in addition to the regular rate while so engaged in such hazardous occupation.

"(b) If a member engages in any of the occupations or business mentioned in this section, he shall within thirty days notify the clerk of his camp of such change of occupation, and while so engaged in such occupation shall pay on each assessment thirty cents for each one thousand dollars of his beneficiary certificate in addition to the regular rate. Any such member failing to notify the clerk and to make such payments as above provided shall stand suspended, and his beneficiary certificate be null and void."

"Section 69 (a). No officer, employee or agent of the sovereign camp, or of any camp, has the power, right or authority to waive any of the conditions upon which beneficiary certificates are issued, or to change, vary or waive any of the provisions of this constitution or these laws, nor shall any custom on the part of any camp or any number of camps with or without the knowledge of any sovereign officer have the effect of so changing, modifying, waiving or foregoing such laws or requirements. Each and every beneficiary certificate is issued only upon the conditions stated in and subject to the constitution and laws then in force or thereafter enacted.

"(b) The constitution and laws of the sovereign camp of the Woodmen of the World now in force, or which may hereafter be enacted, by-laws of the camp now in force, or which may be hereafter enacted, the application and certificate shall constitute a part of the beneficiary contract between the order and the member."

The testimony shows that one Waldrop was the local clerk of the appellant order, and that he served in that