and reside in the Lord Protector and such Parliament, in manner herein expressed.

XXIII. That the Lord Protector, with the advice of the major part of the council, shall at any other time than is before expressed, when the necessities of the State shall require it, summon Parliaments in manner before expressed, which shall not be adjourned, prorogued, or dissolved, without their own consent, during the first three months of their sitting: And in case of future war with any foreign State, a Parliament shall be forthwith summoned for their advice concerning the same.

XXIV. That all bills agreed unto by the Parliament shall be presented to the Lord Protector for his consent; and in case he shall not give his consent thereto within twenty days after they shall be presented to him, or give satisfaction to the Parliament, within the time limited, that then, upon declaration of the Parliament, that the Lord Protector hath not consented, nor given satisfaction, such bills shall pass into, and become laws, although he shall not give his consent thereunto; provided such bills contain nothing in them contrary to the matters contained in these presents.

XXX. That the raising of money for defraying the charge of present extraordinary forces, both at land and sea, in respect of the present wars, shall be by consent in Parliament, and not otherwise, save only that the Lord Protector, with the consent of the major part of the council, for preventing the disorders and dangers which may otherwise fall out both at sea and land, shall have power, until the meeting of the first Parliament, to raise money for the purposes aforesaid, and also to make laws and ordinances for the peace and welfare of these nations, where it shall be necessary, which shall be binding and in force, until order shall be taken in Parliament concerning the same. . .

XXXII. That the office of the Lord Protector, over these nations, shall be elective, and not hereditary; and upon the death of the Lord Protector, another fit person shall be forthwith elected to succeed him in the government, which election shall be by the council; who, immediately upon the death of the Lord Protector, shall assemble in the chamber where they usually sit in council; and having given notice to all their number of the cause of their assembling, shall, being thirteen at least present, proceed to the election, and before they depart out of the said chamber, shall elect a fit person to succeed in the government, and forthwith cause proclamation thereof to be made in all the three nations as shall be requisite: And the person that they or the major part of them shall elect, as aforesaid, shall be, and shall be taken to be Lord Protector over these nations of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and the dominions thereto belonging; provided that none of the children of the king, nor any of his line, or family, be elected to be Lord Protector, or other chief magistrate over these nations, or any of the dominions thereto belonging: And until the aforesaid election be past, the council shall take care of the government, and administer in all

things as fully as the Lord Protector, or the Lord Protector and council are enabled to do.

XXXIII. That Oliver Cromwell, Captain-General of the forces of England, Scotland, and Ireland, shall be, and is hereby declared to be Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and the dominions thereto belonging for his life.

XXXIV. That the Chancellor, Keeper, or Commissioners of the Great Seal, the Treasurer, Admiral, Chief Governors of Ireland and Scotland, and the Chief Justices of both the benches, shall be chosen by the approbation of Parliament, and in the intervals of Parliament, by the approbation of the major part of the council, to be afterward approved by the Parliament.

XXXVII. That such as profess faith in God by Jesus Christ (though differing in judgment from the doctrine, worship, or discipline, publicly held forth) shall not be restrained from, but shall be protected in the profession of the faith, and exercise of their religion, so as they abuse not this liberty, to the civil injury of others, and to the actual disturbance of the public peace on their parts; provided this liberty be not extended to Popery or prelacy, nor to such as, under the profession of Christ, hold forth and practise licentiousness.

XXXVIII. That all laws, statutes, ordinances, and clauses in any law, statute, and ordinance to the contrary of the aforesaid liberty, shall be esteemed as null and void.

XLI. That every successive Lord Protector over these nations shall take and subscribe a solemn oath, in the presence of the council, and such others as they shall call to them, That he will seek the peace, quiet, and welfare of these nations, cause law and justice to be equally administered, and that he will not violate or infringe the matters and things contained in this writing; and in all other things will, to his power, and to the best of his understanding, govern these nations, according to the laws, statutes, and customs.

XLII. That each person of the council shall, before they enter upon their trust, take and subscribe an oath, That they will be true and faithful in their trust, according to the best of their knowledge; and that. in the election of every successive Lord Protector, they shall proceed therein impartially, and do nothing therein for any promise, fear, favor, or reward.1

WHERE there is, then, a righteous and good constitution of government, there is first an orderly union of many understandings together, as the public and common supreme judicature or visible sovereignty, set

1 See the Constitutional Bill of the First Parliament of the Protectorate (1654), Gardiner's Doc. Purit. Rev. lx. 353. The adoption of this was prevented by a dissolution. The Second Parliament, in 1657, presented amendments to the existing instrument under the name of "The Humble Petition and Advice" (2 Scobell, 378), including the establishment of a second chamber. Most of these were accepted by the Protector. Meantime interesting speculations were put forward by Vane and Harrington. Ed.

in a way of free and orderly exercise for the directing and applying the use of the ruling power or the sword to promote the interest and common welfare of the whole. . . .

A supreme judicature thus made the representative of the whole is that which we say will most naturally care and most equally provide for the common good and safety. . . . And if this which is so essential to the well-being and right constitution of government were once obtained, . . . what could be propounded afterwards, as to the form of administration, that would much stick? Would a standing council of State settled for life in reference to the safety of the commonwealth, and for the maintaining intercourse and commerce with foreign States, under the inspection and oversight of the supreme judicature, but of the same fundamental constitution with themselves, - would this be disliked? Admitting their orders were binding in the intervals of supreme national assemblies, so far only as consonant to the settled laws of the commonwealth; the vacancy of any of which, by death or otherwise, might be supplied by the vote of the major part of themselves. Nay, would there be any just exception to be taken, if, besides both these, it should be agreed, as another part of the fundamental constitution of the government, to place that branch of sovereignty which chiefly respects the execution of laws in a distinct office from that of the legislative power, and yet subordinate to them and to the laws, capable to be intrusted into the hands of one single person, if need require, or in a greater number, as the legislative power should think fit; and for the greater strength and honor unto this office, that the execution of all laws and orders, that are binding may go forth in his or their name; and all disobedience thereunto, or contempt thereof, be taken as done to the people's sovereignty, whereof he or they bear the image or representation, subordinate to the legislative power, and at their will to be kept up and continued in the hands of a single person or more, as the experience of the future good or evil of it shall require. . . .

And unto this the wisdom and honesty of the persons now in power may have an opportunity eminently to come into discovery; for in this case, and upon the grounds already laid, the very persons now in power are they unto whose lot it would fall to set about this preparatory work, and by their orders and directions to dispose the whole body and bring them into the meetest capacity to effect the same. The most natural way for which would seem to be by a general council, or convention of faithful, honest, and discerning men, chosen for that purpose, by the free consent of the whole body of adherents to this cause, in the several parts of the nations, and observing the time and place of meeting appointed to them, with other circumstances concerning their election, by order from the present ruling power, but considered as general of the army. Which convention is not properly to exercise the legislative power, but only to debate freely, and agree upon the particulars, that, by way of fundamental constitutions, shall be laid and inviolably observed, as the conditions upon which the whole body so represented

doth consent to cast itself into a civil and politic incorporation, and under the visible form and administration of government therein declared, and to be by each individual member of the body subscribed in testimony of his or their particular consent given thereunto. Which conditions so agreed, and amongst them an act of oblivion for one will be without danger of being broken or departed from, considering of what it is they are the conditions, and the nature of the convention wherein they are made, — which is of the people represented in their highest state of sovereignty, as they have the sword in their hands unsubjected unto the rules of civil government, but what themselves, orderly assembled for that purpose, do think fit to make. And, the sword, upon these conditions, subjecting itself to the supreme judicature thus to be set up, how suddenly might harmony, righteousness, love, peace, and safety unto the whole body follow hereupon, as the happy fruit of such a settlement, if the Lord have any delight to be amongst us. SIR HENRY VANE, A Healing Question Propounded and Resolved, published in 1656, 6 Somers's Tracts (2d ed.), 304.1

THE power or function of the prerogative 2 is of two parts, the one of result [i. e., of deciding, or coming to a result, upon the propositions of the Senate], in which it is the legislative power; the other, that of judicature, in which regard it is the highest court, and the last appeal in this commonwealth. . . . But the prerogative tribe has not only the result, but is the supreme judicature, and the ultimate appeal in this commonwealth. For the popular government that makes account to be of any standing, must make sure in the first place of the appeal to the people. As an estate in trust becomes a man's own if he be not answerable for it, so the power of a magistracy not accountable to the people from whom it was received, becoming of private use, the commonwealth loses her liberty. Wherefore the right of supreme judicature in the people (without which there can be no such thing as popular government) is confirmed by the constant practice of all commonwealths. HARRINGTON, Oceana (published in 1656); Works (3d ed.) 155, 158.3

Where the people are not overbalanced by one man, or by the few, they are not capable of any other superstructures of government, or of any other just and quiet settlement whatsoever, than of such only as consists of a senate as their councillors, of themselves or their representatives as sovereign lords, and of a magistracy answerable to the people, as distributors and executioners of the laws made by the people. And thus much is of absolute necessity to any or every government, that is or can be properly called a commonwealth, whether it be well or ill ordered.

1 See Professor Hosmer's Life of Vane. — ED.

2 By this term Harrington means the Assembly of the Representatives of the People. - ED.

3 See an account of Harrington in 2 Pol. Sc. Quart. 1 (1885) by Professor Dwight.

But the necessary definition of a commonwealth, anything well ordered, is, that it is a government consisting of the Senate proposing, the people resolving, and the magistracy executing.

Magistracy is a style proper to the executive part: yet because in a discourse of this kind it is hardly avoidable, but that such as are of the proposing or resolving assemblies, will be sometimes comprised under this name or style, it shall be enough for excuse to say, that magistracy may be esteemed of two kinds; the one proper or executive, the other improper or legislative. Ib. The Art of Lawgiving, 393 (1659).

The Humble Petition of Divers Well-affected Persons, delivered the 6th day of July, 1659. With the Parliament's Answer thereto.

To the Supreme Authority, the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England. The humble petition of divers well-affected persons shows: That your petitioners have for many years observed the breathings and longings of this nation after rest and settlement, and that upon mistaken grounds they have been ready even to sacrifice and yield up part of their own undoubted right, to follow after an appearance of it.

Upon serious thoughts of the premises, your petitioners do presume with all humility, and submission to your wisdom, to offer to your Honors their principles and proposals concerning the government of this nation: whereupon, they humbly conceive, a just and prudent government ought to be established, viz.:

1. That the constitution of the civil government of England by king, lords, and commons, being dissolved, whatever new constitution of government can be made or settled according to any rule of righteousness, it can be no other than a wise order or method, into which the free people's deputies shall be formed for the making of their laws, and taking care for their common safety and welfare in the execution of them: for, the exercise of all just authority over a free people, ought (under God) to arise from their own consent.

2. That the government of a free people ought to be so settled, that the governors and governed may have the same interest in preserving the government, and each other's properties and liberties respectively; that being the only sure foundation of a commonwealth's unity, peace, strength, and prosperity.

3. That there cannot be a union of the interests of a whole nation in the government, where those who shall sometimes govern, be not also sometimes in the condition of the governed; otherwise the governors will not be in a capacity to feel the weight of the government, nor the governed to enjoy the advantages of it: and then it will be the interest of the major part to destroy the government, as much as it will be the interest of the minor part to preserve it.

4. That there is no security that the supreme authority shall not fall into factions, and be led by their private interest to keep themselves always in power, and direct the government to their private advantages, if that supreme authority be settled in any single assembly whatsoever, that shall have the entire power of propounding, debating, and resolving laws.