be a special messenger from God to forewarn men of punitive calamities which were impending over them.*

The conviction which is excited by the results of scientific investigation, relative to the unvarying control of natural law, is not without support from another quarter. Such an arrangement, generally speaking, best harmonizes with our ideas of the wisdom and majesty of God. We should expect that He would stamp regularity upon the operations of Nature. Moreover, the uniformity of Nature-the exemption, in general, of Nature from supernatural intervention-is a most benevolent arrangement. The fixed course of Nature is a vast and indispensable blessing to man. It is essential that we should be able to count upon the future,-to anticipate the rising of the sun at a given hour, to foresee that the bread which we take for the nourishment of life will not turn out to be poisonous, to be certain that when vitality is gone there is no hope of revoking the principle of life. Were it not for the order of Nature, all human calculations would be baffled, human judgments left without a foundation to rest upon, and infinite disorder and confusion everywhere prevail. The ends of a wise benevolence are best met by marking out the course of Nature and leaving it to move on the appointed track.

Such is the force of these considerations that we unhesitatingly reject the testimony by which most alleged miracles are supported. In reading early historians, like Herodotus, or mediæval chroniclers, like Gregory of Tours, or in listening to the modern necromancers, whenever we perceive, and in proportion as we perceive, that an event which they report involves a miracle, we instantaneously disbelieve the narrative. Such disbelief is felt to be the dictate of reason.

*See, for example, Dr. Increase Mather's "Koμnroypapia, or a Discourse concerning Comets, wherein the Nature of BLAZING STARS is enquired into," &c, &c., with "two Sermons occasioned by the late Blazing Stars." Boston: 1683. We have quoted but a small fraction of the title. In the Discourse are stated the horrible massacres, fires, plagues, tempests, hurricanes, wars, and other judg ments" which have followed the appearance of Comets in all ages. It is an amusing instance of the fallacious confounding of the propter hoc with the post hoc.

And this aversion of the mind to give credence to a miracle is augmented by the necessity under which the historical student is placed, of rejecting so vast an amount of miraculous narrative. It may be said, to be sure, that the evidence from testimony is defective; for such is the truth in numberless instances of pretended miracle. Yet, in some cases, were the events, which are too much for our faith, unmiraculous, we should deem the testimony on which they rest to be sufficient. In these cases we deny credence simply and solely on the ground of a rational reluctance to believe in miracles. For example, we credit Herodotus in a thousand places, where the proofs-apart from the character of the events reported-are no greater than those which he brings forward in relating the miraculous.

We fully concede, then, that there is an antecedent, rational presumption against the truth of a narrative involving miracle, a presumption resting proximately upon the experience of the uniformity of Nature, and ultimately upon our conviction of the wisdom and desirableness of such an arrangement; and acquiring additional force from the knowledge, which history and observation afford, of the credulity of mankind and the prevalence of superstition.

HOW MAY THE PRESUMPTION ADVERSE TO MIRACLES BE REMOVED?

The uniformity of Nature, in the sense of excluding supernatural intervention, is not an intuitive truth-a truth of reason. That like causes will produce like effects is indeed—as far as the physical world is concerned, for we leave out of consideration the will-an axiom of reason. But the uniformity of Nature involves another proposition, namely, that the sum of forces operating in Nature remains the same-with no introduction of supernatural power. And our belief in the uniformity of Nature has no greater strength than belongs to the presumption that supernatural interposition will not occur.

But every theist knows that supernatural interposition has occurred in the past; that all things which he beholds owe their existence to such an exertion of the Divine will. For he traces them all to an act of creation.

Moreover, science affords a kind of historical proof that acts of creation have occurred. The origination of all the types or species of living beings found on the earth, requires the supposition of a creative act, since Geology points back to a time when no germs of animated being existed on the globe. If the old doctrine of the original distinctness of existing species be still held, which no facts have thus far disproved, we are led to the necessary assumption of a series of creative. acts. The uniformity of Nature is thus seen to be no absolute truth.

But for what end does material Nature exist? Surely not for its own sake. The end for which Nature exists must be sought outside of Nature itself. Nature is only a part of a more comprehensive system. Nature is an instrument, not an end. The moral administration of God is superior and allcomprehensive. The fixed order of Nature is appointed to promote the ends of wisdom and goodness. The same motive which dictated the establishment of this order may prescribe a deviation from it; or rather may have originally determined that the natural order should at certain points give way to supernatural manifestation.

That is to say, if the object to be secured is sufficiently commanding, or, in other words, if the benefit to result outweighs all the evils which may be supposed to attend a Divine intervention, the antecedent presumption against the miracle is set aside and overborne.

Supposing an end worthy of the intervention of God, a miracle is perfectly consistent with the immutable character of the Divine administration. This lies in the unity of the end. The same end is pursued, but the means of attaining it are varied. Now He makes use of Natural law, and now of special intervention. There is no disturbance of the grand harmony that pervades the Divine administration. The acts of Divine Providence, both natural and miraculous, form together one consistent whole. A commander, who commonly issues his orders through subordinates, does not interfere with the ends he has in view, if he chooses, now and then, to ride over the field and personally convey his commands.

He is guilty of no fickleness, if he alter the disposition of his forces to suit a new set of circumstances. This alteration may even have been embraced in his foresight. Nor is the Ruler of the country inconsistent with himself, when he augments, or diminishes, or wholly disbands the military force which he has himself organized. For this force does not exist for its own sake. It was created for a special end outside of itself, and is moulded with sole reference to the benefit sought. A miracle is not a prodigy, a mere wonder (répas), fulfilling no moral end, a disturbance of the natural order, carrying with it no advantage. But a miracle is also a sign (nusov), signifying something, fulfilling an idea, and serving an end.*

Hence, a miracle implies no after-thought on the part of God-as if he resorted to a measure which He had not originally purposed. In the plan of this world, miracles not less than natural events had their appointed place. The Divine being as truly determined to exert supernatural power at the point where miracles occur, as to act elsewhere through general laws. In short, miracles are fully accordant with the laws of the Universe, or of the universal system which includes God. A departure, in one sense of the terms, from the law of Nature, they are yet harmonious with, and required by, the law of the Universe. The higher law prescribes their occurrence.†

*Of the three terms used in the New Testament to designate a miracle, répas corresponds to miraculum and denotes the subjective effect on the mind; onpetov denotes the significance of the event; and dvváμcis the supernatural energies to

which it must be due.

It is a relief to turn from the vagueness of many modern writers to the greater precision of the Schoolmen. Thomas Aquinas (Summa, P. I. Quæst. 105, Art. 6) handles the question whether God can do anything praeter ordinem rebus indutum. He explains that every order is dependent upon a cause, and that one order may be subject to another that is higher and more comprehensive: as the family which is dependent on the father is embraced in the city, which, in turn, is included in the kingdom. A miracle is no violation of the order of things, as dependent upon the First Cause.

In another passage (P. I. Quæst. 110, Art. 4), Thomas discusses the question utrum angeli possint facere miracula. He admits that superhuman creatures can bring to pass events which are miracles quoad nos; that is, events which surpass the power of any created causes with which we are acqua nted. But he responds to the question negatively, because a miracle, properly speaking, is praeter ordinem totius naturæ create-something, therefore, which only God

can do.

It will be objected that we are unqualified to say when a moral emergency that calls for a miracle is constituted. To a certain extent, this may be granted. We cannot take into view the entire divine system. We may be disposed to set up a claim for the intervention of God in cases where a wiser being would be of another mind. This, however, may fairly be demanded of every theist, that as he believes in an intervention of God at the successive epochs of creation, so he shall be prepared to expect a similar intervention at epochs equally momentous in the new spiritual creation, or the redemption of mankind from their bondage to evil. The antecedent presumption against the occurrence of miracles may exist in different degrees of strength. It may, in a given set of circumstances, be greatly weakened without wholly disappearing. But a crisis can be conceived to exist, an exigency can be conceived to arise, where this presumption wholly vanishes and even yields to an expectation of the opposite character. The need of Revelation, and of miracles to verify and give effect to Revelation, constitutes an occasion justifying the Divine intervention.

THE FALLACY OF HUME'S ARGUMENT.

The preceding remarks suggest the proper answer to the reasoning of Hume against the possibility of proving a miracle. He ignores the fact of a supernatural moral government over the world of Nature and of men. Our belief both in the constancy of Nature and in human testimony, says Hume, is founded on Experience. In regard to the former point, this experience is uniform, (since the cases of supposed miracle, being under discussion, are not to be assumed as exceptions). In respect to the credibility of testimony, however, if we suppose apparently credible testimony to be piled never so high, nothing more is required for believing it to be falsely given than to suppose a violation of natural law-that is of the laws connected with the giving of credible testimony. But if we accept the testimony, and believe the fact it alleges, we are obliged to assume the same thing; namely, the violation of natural law. In other words, we are required by the reporters of a