The laft obfervation refpects the judges. It is faid that if they dare' to decide against the law, one houfe will impeach them, and the other will convict them. I hope gentlemen will fhew how this can happen, for bare fuppofition ought not to be admitted as proof. The judges are to be impeached, because they decide an act null and void, that was made in defiance of the conftitution! What houfe of reprefentatives would dare to impeach, or fenate to commit jud ges for the performance of their duty? Thefe obfervations are of a fimilar kind to those with regard to the liberty of the prefs.

I will now proceed to take fome notice of those qualities in this constitution, that I think entitle it to our refpect and favour. I have not yet done, fir, with the great principle on which it ftands; I mean the practical recognition of this doctrine, that in the United States the people retain the fupreme power.

In giving a definition of the fimple kinds of government known throughout the world, I had occafion to defcribe what I meant by a democracy; and I think I termed it, that government in which the people retain the fupreme power, and exercife it either collectively or by reprefentation-this conftitution declares this principle in its terms and in its confequences, which is evident from the manner in which it is announced. "WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. After all the examination, which I am able to give the fubje&t, I view this as the only fufficient- and the moft honorable bafis, both for the people and government, on which our conftitution can poffibly reft. What are all the contrivances of ftates, of kingdoms and empires?-What are they all intended for? They are all intended for man, and our natural character and natural rights are certainly to take place, in preference to all artificial refinements that human wifdom can devife.

I am aftonifhed to hear the ill-founded doctrine, that ftates alone ought to be reprefented in the federal govenment; thefe muft poffefs fovereign authority forfooth, and the people be forgot-No-Let us reafcend to first principlesThat expreflion is not ftrong enough to do my ideas justice.

Let us RETAIN firft principles. The people of the United States are now in the poffeffion and exercife of their original rights, and while this doctrine is known, and ope, rates, we hall have a cure for every difeafe,

I fhall mention another good quality, belonging to this fyftem.In it the legiflative, executive and judicial powers, are kept nearly independent and diftinct. I exprefs nyfelf in this guarded manner, because I am aware of fome powers that are blended in the fenate. They are but few; and they are not dangerous. It is an exception, yet that exception confifts of but few inftances, and none of them dangerous. I believe in no conftitution for any country on earth is this great principle fo ftrictly adhered to, or marked with fo much precifion and accuracy, as in this. It is much more accurate, than that which the honorable gentleman so highly extols, I mean the conftitution of England.-There, fir, one branch of the legiflature can appoint the members of another. The king has the power of introducing members into the houfe of Lords. I have already mentioned that in order to obtain a vote, twelve peers were poured into that houfe at one time; the operation is the fame, as might be under this conftitution, if the prefident had a right to appoint the members of the fenate. This power of the king's extends into the other branch, where, though he cannot immediately introduce a member, yet he can do it remotely by virtue of his prerogative, as he may create boroughs with power to fend members to the house of commons. The houfe of lords form a much stronger exception to this principle than the fenate in this fyftem; for the houfe of lords poffefs judicial powers, not only that of trying impeachments, but that of trying their own members, and civil caufes when brought before them, from the courts of chancery, and the other courts in England.

If we therefore confider this conftitution, with regard to this fpecial object, though it is not fo perfect as I would wish, yet it is more perfect than any other government that I know.

I proceed to another property which I think will recommend it to thofe who confider the effects of beneficence and wifdom. I mean the divifion of this legiflative authority into two branches. I had an opportunity of dilating fomewhat on this fubject before. And as it is not likely to afford a fubject of debate, I fhall take no further notice of it, than barely to mention it. The next good quality, that I remark, is, that the executive authority is one; by this means we obtain very important advantages. We may difcover from hi ftory, from reafoning and from experience, the fecurity

''

The laft obfervation refpects the judges. It is faid that if they dare' to decide against the law, one houfe will impeach them, and the other will convict them. I hope gentlemen will fhew how this can happen, for bare fuppofition ought not to be admitted as proof. The judges are to be impeached, because they decide an act null and void, that was made in defiance of the conftitution! What houfe of reprefentatives would dare to impeach, or fenate to commit judges for the performance of their duty? Thefe obfervations are of a fimilar kind to thofe with regard to the liberty of the prefs.

I will now proceed to take fome notice of thofe qualities in this constitution, that I think entitle it to cur refpect and favour. I have not yet done, fir, with the great principle on which it ftands; I mean the practical recognition of this doctrine, that in the United States the people retain the fupreme power.

In giving a definition of the fimple kinds of government known throughout the world, I had occafion to defcribe what I meant by a democracy; and I think I termed it, that government in which the people retain the fupreme power, and exercise it either collectively or by reprefentation-this conftitution declares this principle in its terms and in its confequences, which is evident from the manner in which it is announced. WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. After all the examination, which I am able to give the fubject, I view this as the only fufficient- and the moft honorable bafis, both for the people and government, on which our conftitution can poffibly reft. What are all the contrivances of ftates, of kingdoms and empires?-What are they all intended for? They are all intended for man, and our natural character and natural rights are certainly to take place, in preference to all artificial refinements that human wifdom can devife.

I am aftonifhed to hear the ill-founded doctrine, that ftates alone ought to be reprefented in the federal goveninent; thefe muft poffefs fovereign authority forfooth, and the people be forgot-No-Let us reafcend to firft principlesThat expreflion is not ftrong enough to do my ideas justice.

Let us RETAIN firft principles. The people of the Uni ted States are now in the poffeffion and exercife of their original rights, and while this doctrine is known, and ope, rates, we hall have a cure for every difeafe,

I fhall mention another good quality, belonging to this fyftem.---In it the legiflative, executive and judicial powers, are kept nearly independent and diftinct. I exprefs inyfelf in this guarded manner, because I am aware of fome powers that are blended in the fenate. They are but few; and they are not dangerous. It is an exception, yet that ,exception confifts of but few inftances, and none of them dangerous. I believe in no conftitution for any country on earth is this great principle fo ftrictly adhered to, or marked with fo much precifion and accuracy, as in this. It is much more accurate, than that which the honorable gentleman so highly extols, I mean the conftitution of England.-There, fir, one branch of the legiflature can appoint the members of another. The king has the power of introducing members into the houfe of Lords. I have already mentioned that in order to obtain a vote, twelve peers were poured into that houfe at one time; the operation is the fame, as might be under this conftitution, if the prefident had a right to appoint the members of the fenate. This power of the king's extends into the other branch, where, though he cannot immediately introduce a member, yet he can do it remotely by virtue of his prerogative, as he may create boroughs with power to fend members to the house of commons. The houfe of lords form a much stronger exception to this principle than the fenate in this fyftem; for the houfe of lords poffefs judicial powers, not only that of trying impeachments, but that of trying their own members, and civil caufes when brought before them, from the courts of chancery, and the other courts in England.

If we therefore confider this conftitution, with regard to this special object, though it is not fo perfect as I would wish, yet it is more perfect than any other government that I know.

I proceed to another property which I think will recommend it to thofe who confider the effects of beneficence and wifdom. I mean the divifion of this legislative authority into two branches. I had an opportunity of dilating fomewhat on this fubject before. And as it is not likely to afford a fubject of debate, I fhall take no further notice of it, than barely to mention it. The next good quality, that I remark, is, that the executive authority is one; by this means we obtain very important advantages. We may difcover from hiftory, from reafoning and from experience, the fecurity

The laft obfervation refpects the judges. It is faid that if they dare' to decide against the law, one houfe will impeach them, and the other will convict them. I hope gentlemen will fhew how this can happen, for bare fuppofition ought not to be admitted as proof. The judges are to be impeached, because they decide an act null and void, that was made in defiance of the conftitution! What houfe of reprefentatives would dare to impeach, or fenate to commit judges for the performance of their duty? Thefe obfervations are of a fimilar kind to thofe with regard to the liberty of the prefs.

I will now proceed to take fome notice of thofe qualities in this constitution, that I think entitle it to our refpect and favour. I have not yet done, fir, with the great principle on which it ftands; I mean the practical recognition of this doctrine, that in the United States the people retain the fupreme power.

In giving a definition of the fimple kinds of government known throughout the world, I had occafion to defcribe what I meant by a democracy; and I think I termed it, that government in which the people retain the fupreme power, and exercise it either collectively or by reprefentation-this conftitution declares this principle in its terms and in its confequences, which is evident from the manner in which it is announced. "WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. After all the examination, which I am able to give the fubject, I view this as the only fufficient- and the moft honorable bafis, both for the people and government, on which our conftitution can poffibly reft. What are all the contrivances of ftates, of kingdoms and empires?--What are they all intended for? They are all intended for man, and our natural character and natural rights are certainly to take place, in preference to all artificial refinements that human wifdom can devife.

I am aftonished to hear the ill-founded doctrine, that ftates alone ought to be reprefented in the federal govenment; thefe muft poffefs fovereign authority forfooth, and the people be forgot-No-Let us reafcend to first principlesThat expreffion is not ftrong enough to do my ideas justice.

Let us RETAIN firft principles. The people of the Uni ted States are now in the poffeffion and exercise of their original rights, and while this doctrine is known, and ope rates, we thall have a cure for every difeafe,