There is no declaration of rights in this Constitution, and the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws and conftitutions of the several States, the declarations of rights in the several state conftitutions are no fecurity-ǹor ale the people secured even in the enjoyment of the benefits of the common law. Owing to the fmall number of Members in the House of Representatives, there is not the substance, but the shadow only of representation, which can never produce proper information in the Legislature, or inspire confidence in the people -the laws will therefore be generally made by men little concerned in, and unacquainted with, their effects and confequences. The Senate have the power of altering all money bills, and of originating appropriations of money, although they are not the immediate representatives of the people, or amenable to them, these and their other great powers, viz. their power in the appointment of Ambassadors, and all public officers, in making treaties, and trying all impeachments; their influence upon, and connection with, the fupreme executive. From these circumstances, their duration of office, and their being a conftant existing body, almost continually fitting, joined with their being one complete branch of the Legislature, will detroy any and every balance in the government, and enable them to accomplish what ufurpation they please upon the rights and liberties of the people. The Judiciary of the United States is fo conftructed and extended as to absorb and destroy the Judiciaries of the several States, thereby rendering law as tedious, intricate, and expensive, Justice as unattainable, by a great part of the community, as ind, and enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the The The Prefident of the United States has no conftitutional Council-a thing unknown in any safe and regular Government--he will therefore be unsupported by proper information and advice, and will generally be directed by minions and favourites, or he will become a tool to the Senate, or a Council of State will grow out of the principal officers of the great departments, the worst and most dangerous of all ingredients for fuch a Council in a free country; for they may be induced to join in any dangerous or oppreffive measures to fhelter themfelves, and prevent an inquiry into their own misconduct in office: whereas, had a conftitutional Council been formed, as was faid to have been propofed, of fix Members, viz. two from the Eastern, two from the Middle, and two from the Southern States, to be appointed by vote of the States in the House of Reprefentatives, with the fame duration and rotation of office as the Senate, the executive would always have had safe and proper information and advice; the Prefident of fuch a Council might have acted as Vice President of the United States, pro tempore, upon any vacancy or difability of the Chief Magiftrate, and the long-continued feffions of the Senate would, in a great measure, have been prevented. From this fatal defect of a constitutional Council has arifen the improper power of the Senate in the appointment of public officers, and the alarming dependence and connection between that branch of the legiflature and the executive. Hence alfo fprung that unneceffary and dangerous office of the Vice President, who, for want of other employment, is made President of the Senate, thereby dangerously blending the legislative and executive powers; befides always giving to fome one of the States an unnecessary and unjust pre-eminence over the others. The Prefident of the United States has the unreftrained power of granting pardon for treasons, which may be fometimes exercised to screen from punishment those whom he had fecretly fecretly inftigated to commit the crime, and thereby prevent the difcovery of his own guilt. By declaring all treaties fupreme laws of the land, the executive and fenate have, in many cafes, an exclufive power of legislation, which might have been avoided by proper distinctions with respect to treaties, and requiring the affent of the House of Representatives, were it could be done with safety. Under their own conftruction of the general clause at the end of the enumerated powers, the Congress may grant monopolies in trade and commerce-conftitute new crimes inflict unusual and fevere punishments, and extend their power as far as they fhall think proper-so that the State Legislatures have no fecurity for the powers now prefumed to remain to them, or the people for their rights. There is no declaration for preserving the liberty of the press, the trial by jury in civil causes, nor against the danger of standing armies in time of peace. MR. M'KEAN faid, there was an indiscreet haste in running fo immediately into the particular examination of the feveral parts of the fyftem; although he admitted that the fubject generally was fully and fairly before them. Our first object, Mr. President, (faid he) must be to ascertain the proper mode of proceeding to obtain a final decision. We are without precedent to guide us; yet thofe forms, observed by other public bodies, fo far as they are eligible, may generally be proper for us to adhere to. So far, therefore, as the rules of the Legislature of Pennsylvania apply with convenience to our circumftance, I acquiefce in their adoption. I now think it neceffary, Sir, to make you a motion, not that Tomprehend it can be determined until a full investigation of ect before us has taken place. This motion will be, this convention do affent to and ratify the conftitution agreed to on the 17th of September laft, by the convention of the United States of America, held at Philadelphia. Upon this motion being feconded, fir, the confideration of the conftitution will be neceffarily drawn on. Every cbjection that can be fuggefted against the work, will be liftened to with attention, anfwered, and perhaps obviated. And finally, after a full difcuffion, the ground will be afcertained, on which we are to receive or reject the fyftem now before you. I do not wifh this question to be decided to day; tho? perhaps it may be determined this day week. I offer you this for the fake of form, and fhall hereafter trouble you with another motion, that may bring the particular parts of this conftitution before you, for a regular and fatisfactory invef tigation. In this motion, Mr. M'Kean was feconded by Mr. Allison. MR. WILSON. The fyftem propofed, by the late convention, for the government of the United States, is now before you. Of that convention I had the honor to be a member. As I am the only member of that body, who have the honor to be alfo a member of this, it may be expected that I should prepare the way for the deliberations of this affembly, by unfolding the difficulties, which the late convention were obliged to encounter; by pointing out the end, which they propofed to accomplish, and by tracing the general principles, which they have adopted for the accomplishment of that end. To form a good fyftem of government for a single city or state, however limited as to territory, or inconfiderable as to numbers, has been thought to require the ftrongeft efforts of human genius. With what confcious diffidence, then, m the members of the convention have revolved in their i the immenfe undertaking, which was before them. views could not be confined to a fmall or a fingle com but were expanded to a great number of ftates; f which contain an extent of territory, and refourc pulation, equal to thofe of fome of the most refped doms on the other fide of the Atlantic. Nor thefe the only objects to be comprehended with berations. Numerous ftates yet unformed: 7 human race, * vill inhabit regions hitherto were to be was neceff fcale comm the refult of their to form their D |