(115 A.) The prohibition by Const. art. 3, § 3, against passage of a bill containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, applies only to direct legislation, and not to the incidental operation of statutes, valid in themselves, on subjects other than those with which they expressly deal. license to marry Mrs. Longstreet, made affi- 4. Statutes 105(1)-Constitution as to title davit that his wife had died the previous and subject of act applies only to direct legislation. year, which was untrue; and upon discovery of her body refused to identify it as that of his wife, although dressed in the clothes he said she wore when he last saw her. Finally the money he claims to have given her was not found on her person. While the evidence against defendant was entirely circumstantial, we agree with the court below that it was sufficient, if believed by the jury, to justify the conclusion that he was responsible for his wife's death. The seventh assignment refers to the instructions given the jury, and alleges, as a whole, they were inadequate and prejudicial to defendant, in that the court failed to comment on the strong points of the defense, and gave undue prominence to testimony adduced on behalf of the commonwealth. We find no merit in this assignment. The charge was fair, and covered every phase of the commonwealth's case, as well as that of the defense, and counsel for defendant was apparently well satisfied with the instruction, since, in reply to a question by the court whether there were other matters he desired to be covered in the charge, he stated there were none. The rights of the defendant were fully protected, and we find no reversible error in the record. The assignments of error are overruled, the judgment is affirmed, and the record remitted to the court below for the purpose of execution. (272 Pa. 189) COMMONWEALTH ex rel. WEIMER, Dist. 1. Statutes 109-Title of amended act re- The title of an act sought to be amended, being recited in the title of the amendatory act, is to be treated as part thereof relative to the sufficiency of its title under Const. art. 3, § 3. 2. Statutes 109-Enough that provisions of amendatory act are germane to subject of original act per its title recited in title of amendatory act. If provisions of an amendatory act are germane to the subject of the original act expressed in its title recited in the title of the amendatory act, the amendatory act satisfies Const. art. 3, § 3, as to subject and title. 3. Statutes 109-Title must fairly give notice of contemplated legislation. Under Const. art. 3, § 3, the title of an act must fairly give notice of the contemplated legislation, so as to reasonably lead to inquiry as to what is contained in the body of the bill. 5. Statutes 120(5)-Title of act as to cities of third class recited in title of amending act insufficient for provision requiring borough council to pass an ordinance asking annexation. The title of Act June 27, 1913 (P. L. 568), an act "for the incorporation, regulation, and government of cities of the third class," recited in the title of the amendatory act of July 6, 1917 (P. L. 751; Pa. St. 1920, § 4162), is insufficient under Const. art. 3, § 3, to authorize the provision in the amendatory act requiring the council of a borough to pass an ordinance asking annexation to such a city when a certain proportion of the borough's taxable inhabitants so request. Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Cambria County; Marlin B. Stephens, President Judge. Mandamus by the Commonwealth, on the relation of D. P. Weimer, District Attorney of Cambria County, against the Burgess and Town Council of the Borough of Dale. Peremptory writ issued, and defendant appeals. Reversed and dismissed. Argued before MOSCHZISKER, C. J., and FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER, and SCHAFFER, JJ. George C. Keim, D. P. Weimer, and Wm. A. McGuire, all of Johnstown, for appellant. Howard W. Stull, of Johnstown, and Lee C. Beatty, of Pittsburgh, for appellees. SADLER, J. The Borough of Dale adjoins the city of Johnstown, and certain of its citizens desired that it be annexed thereto. A petition, purporting to be signed by threefifths of the taxable inhabitants, was presented to the town council, requesting that appropriate municipal action be taken to effect this end. After investigation, the borough authorities determined that the requisite number of signers, as fixed by the act of July 6, 1917 (P. L. 751; Pa. St. 1920, § 4162), had failed to join. Further, the existence of any valid legislation requiring the passage of an ordinance such as asked for, without approval by council of the action proposed, was challenged. It therefore refused to act affirmatively upon the application. The court of common pleas subsequently issued a writ of peremptory mandamus, and from the judgment this appeal is taken. [1, 2] It is contended: First, that the act of assembly upon which the proceeding rests is void in that the legislation is violative of action by the grand jury, predicated upon [3, 4] "While we have repeatedly said that the title to an act of assembly need not be a complete index to its contents, embodying all of the distinct provisions of the bill, we have as often declared that if it does not fairly give notice of the contemplated legislation, so as reasonably to lead to inquiry as to what is contained in the body of the bill, the third section of the third article of the Constitution is violated, and legislation in disregard of it must fall. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to give information to the members of the Legislature, or others interested, by the title of the bill, of the contemplated legislation, and thereby to prevent the passage of unknown and alien subjects which may be coiled up in [its] fold." Fedorowicz v. Brobst, 254 Pa. 338, 341, 98 Atl. 973, 974. The prohibition applies only, however, to direct legislation, and not to the incidental operation of statutes, valid in themselves, upon subjects other than those with which they expressly deal. Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, 43 Atl. 985; Allentown v. Wagner, 214 Pa. 210, 63 Atl. 697. [5] The title to the act of 1913, repeated in and to be read with that of the Supplement of 1917, is broad and comprehensive, indicating clearly an intention to regulate the affairs of cities of the third class. In this respect it is like the earlier law of 1889 (May 23, P. L. 277), and is couched in general terms, similar to those used in the enactments fixing the powers of municipalities of the various classes. By its third article provision was made for annexation of an adjacent borough upon its application, and for the addition of other lands adjoining, after | A different situation arises in dealing with the act of 1917. It attempts, not to regulate what the cities of the third class may do in the matter of increase of limits, but imposes an entirely new obligation upon an independent municipality in requiring the borough council to pass an appropriate ordinance asking annexation when three-fifths of its taxable inhabitants so request. A reading of the title in connection with that of 1913, expressly defined to be applicable only to third class cities, would indicate no such legislative purposes. Such mandatory action by the council of an adjoining borough is more than an incident to the operation of the earlier statute. The placing of new burdens and imperative duties upon it finds no suggestion in the title, and, under such circumstances, statutes have always met with condemnation when brought to our attention. Quinn v. Cumberland County, 162 Pa. 55, 29 Atl. 289; Payne v. School District, 168 Pa. 386, 31 Atl. 1072; Mt. Joy v. Lancaster Turnpike, 182 Pa. 581, 38 Atl. 411; Dailey v. Potter County, 203 Pa. 595, 53 Atl. 498; County Commissioners' Petition, 255 Pa. 88, 99 Atl. 225; Wright v. Luzerne County, 67 Pa. Super. Ct. 618. We see no reason for departing from this rule in the present case, and conclude, therefore, that the act of July 6, 1917, is void and unen forceable. reached. Another question raised on this appeal becomes unimportant in view of the conclusion It was insisted that an improper method was adopted in determining who were "taxable inhabitants," entitled to become petitioners for annexation. A discussion of the rulings made by the court below is now unnecessary, but the failure to comment upon the objections made is not to be understood as indicating an approval of the principles applied. The decree of the court below is reversed, and it is ordered that the petition be dismissed at the cost of the appellee. (271 Pa. 512) (115 A.) KESLER et al. v. HUGUS. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 3, 1922.) Wills324 (3)-Evidence held insufficient for submission to jury of question of fraud or undue influence. In son's contest of his father's will leaving property to collateral heirs, evidence held insufficient for submission to jury of question of whether will was procured by fraud or undue influence. Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Westmoreland County; Charles D. Copeland, Judge. Proceedings to probate will of William A. Nicolls, deceased, contested by Samuel O. Hugus. Judgment for contestant, and Alice J. Kesler and eight other beneficiaries separately appeal. Reversed and rendered. In addition to the facts stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court, the following relevant evidence is noted: Contestant, Samuel O. Hugus, testified that, when he was about 7 years old, he met his father, William A. Nicolls, whose will is attacked in these proceedings and the latter spoke to him, saying, simply, "Well, Samuel;" when he was about 10 or 12 years of age he met his parent again, and the latter did not speak to him at all. At various times thereafter they met, his father some times speaking and at other times failing to notice him; they had one conversation in 1909, in which contestant said to his father: "I wish you would come to see me; I have two sons and a wife, and would like to have you come and visit me." The reply was, "I would not dare to come on account of the Hannas" (his sister's family, the members of which were most benefited by the will). Shortly after this, contestant met his father and said, "You have never got over to see us yet." The father answered: "Well, I would not dare come; I am not in a position." Decedent was invited to his son's wedding in 1892, but did not attend; on another occasion they met at the Ligonier Fair, and the father avoided speaking. Hugus further testified: "Q. When were the times as it appeared to you that he recognized you, and when were the times that he did not recognize you? A. The times there was any person around. If he was at a sale or any place like that he would always get away from me. If I would meet him alone he always spoke and talked to me after that one time." On cross-examination Hugus testified that his father had consulted seven of the best attorneys to find out whether he could make a will disinheriting contestant, and had been Contestant's wife testified that in 1910 or 1911, she went to decedent's home and invited him to come and visit them and see his grandchildren; decedent answered, "O, well, I am not in a position to go;" decedent met her on one occasion at a church and said, "I ought to know your face, but really I cannot name you;" when he learned she was Sam Hugus' wife, "he quickly turned, got lost in the crowd and did not say anything more." Again, she met decedent at a wedding and tried to make her way through the crowd to speak to him, She further testified: "I saw he was not wanting to speak to me. He went out of the door, and I did not see him any other time in the evening after that." Simon Baum, another witness for contestant, said that in 1896 or 1897 he was called upon to go to decedent's farmhouse, to do some chiropodist work for Mrs. Dorcas Nicolls, decedent's mother. He testified: * She doings, about his drinking and running after "Mrs. Hanna was saying about Sam's bad bad women, that Mrs. Nicolls she turned on her chair and looked at William (the decedent) and said, 'William, didn't I tell you he (the son) was a bad man?' said he was doing no good whatever, running after bad women and drinking. Q. How far was William Nicolls sitting away from his sister, Mrs. Hanna, at the time this conversation took place? A. As far as from here to the When she said this, he just dropped his head and did not say anything." window. * Upon another visit by Baum to the farmstead for the purpose of cutting decedent's hair, the latter's mother said, "Sam was doing no good; he was drinking and running after bad women;" that "William paid no attention; he was so tired of it." Upon another occasion, in 1903, he heard Mrs. Hanna, decedent's sister, say, "I was just telling Mr. Nicolls about Sam again." Baum testified that, at a later time, he met decedent, who told him: "Things are going to ruin; • just to think, they have elected Sam, my son, as school director; he is no more fit than I am." Contestant, who was defendant in the court below, is testator's son; his father and mother were married in 1865, and lived to Squire Graham testified for contestant, no evidence produced sufficient to carry the that some time in 1910 decedent said to him, case to the jury; therefore it is necessary to "Have you heard about Sam Hugus?" that consider only the twelfth assignment of er he replied, "Yes, I heard something, but I ror, which complains of the refusal of judgdid not know whether there was anything in ment non obstante veredicto. it." Then decedent said, "It is true, only too true." Decedent further said he (the son) had lost his money; it was his own fault; he had squandered thousands of dollars drink-gether about a year, when they separated ing and running after bad women. Again, the following remark is attributed to dece dent: "I was not able to help him, but I would have felt like doing so if he had not acted as he has." Upon another occasion decedent said his son "had been such a dirty dog." permanently, Mrs. Nicolls returning to her parents' home, where contestant was born January 7, 1867. On March 31, 1869, Nicolls was granted an absolute divorce from his wife, and contestant grew to manhood in his mother's care, adopting her family name and calling himself Samuel O. Hugus. April 2, On the other hand, the testimony produced 1898, decedent made the will here in controby plaintiffs is uniformly to the effect that versy, and subsequently executed two codicils, decedent was a man of sound business judg-dated November 24, 1911, and November 6, ment; that he never was on more than 1913, respectively; he died October 8, 1914. By speaking terms with his son; that he was a director to a bank, several of his fellow directors testifying he was a firm, determined man who used good judgment in handling the affairs of others as well as his own, and it was always his fixed idea to disinherit his son because of his unfilial attitude; further, that he had consulted numerous attorneys to make certain he could do so. It is undisputed that the will and codicils were drawn by attorneys, at testator's request, and without any apparent outside influence operating on his mind then or on the occasions of their execution. the terms of the will and codicils, testator's property was given to certain collateral heirs, none going to contestant. The court below, while apparently agreeing there was no direct evidence of fraud or undue influence, operating on the mind of testator, at the times the will and codicils were executed, nevertheless thought sufficient facts and circumstances, indicating such to be the case, appeared to warrant the submission of the issues involved to the jury. Appellee's counsel devote their brief of argument to the point that there was evidence to justify the course pursued by the Argued before MOSCHZISKER, C. J., and trial judge; but to this we cannot agree. Bell & Bell and Charles C. Crowell, all of The law on the general subject in hand has been so thoroughly considered by us in several recent cases, it would serve no useful purpose to go over the field again at this time. See Phillip's Est., 244 Pa. 35, 90- Atl. 457; Herr's Est., 251 Pa. 223, 96 Atl. 464; Gongaware v. Donehoo, 255 Pa. 502, 100 Atl. 264; Warton's Est., 256 Pa. 201, 100 Atl. 653; Watmough's Est., 258 Pa. 22, 101 Atl. 857; White's Est., 262 Pa. 356, 105 Atl. 549; Kustus v. Hager, 269 Pa. 103, 112 Atl. 45; Tetlow's Est., 269 Pa. 486, 112 Atl. 758. It is sufficient to say, we have before us a case where the testator had the benefit of advice of counsel, MOSCHZISKER, C. J. Nine separate appeals, which we shall dispose of in one opinion, are before us in the present case, all taken by beneficiaries under the will of William A. Nicolls, deceased, from a judgment, entered pursuant to a verdict for the contestant, in an issue devisavit vel non, grant-and his will was executed, at a time when ed by the orphans' court, and certified to the common pleas of Westmoreland county, for trial of the following questions: none of the beneficiaries were present, pursuant to an oft-repeated, openly expressed intention to disinherit a son who had so far repudiated his father as to refuse his name, which fixed purpose was deliberately persisted in over a period of 16 years, as evidenced by the republication of the will on two occasions; while, on the other hand, to strike "(1) Whether or not the paper writings alleged to constitute the last will and testament of William A. Nicolls were procured by fraud or undue influence, operating on the mind of testator and controlling the disposition of his property to the extent that he gave it to collateral heirs instead of his lineal descendant. down this solemnly made and twice repub(2) Whether the will of testator is inofficious or unnatural. And (3) whether the probate of this alleged will should be set aside and the letters testamentary * revoked?" Upon an investigation of the record, we lished testamentary instrument, we have a mere mass of oddly assorted circumstances and inclusive statements, in which, together or singly, no good reason can be found to justify that course. (115 A.) case to the jury, and the court below erred in submitting it, as may be seen by considering the facts hereinbefore stated and those shown by the testimony published in the notes of the reporter. The judgment is reversed, and judgment is here entered for plaintiff. (272 Pa. 24) BERLIN SMOKELESS COAL & CLAY ING CO. et al. v. ROHM et al. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 3, 1922.) Sterling, Higbee & Matthews, of Uniontown, and Chas. H. Ealy (of Uhl & Ealy), of Somerset, for appellees. SADLER, J. Hillegass was the owner of certain coal rights, which he conveyed to the Berlin Smokeless Coal & Clay Mining Company, of which he was president. This corporation became indebted to Valentine Hay, who, in 1916, entered a judgment, confessed by the company for $7,000, payable in installMIN-ments, the first of which amounted to $2,235. As collateral security, Hillegass and one Miller executed a note for a like amount, which was likewise made a matter of record. In 1917 an execution was issued upon the portion of the lien then due. Later, in September, 1. Mines and minerals 59-Lessor repudiat-a lease of the property was made to M. J. ing lease for false representations held entitled to execution for amount paid on judg-Rohm and James C. Long, who agreed to protect the property against the Hay judgment. The amount necessary was to be advanced by the lessees and repaid from royalties of not less than $500 a year. Rohm paid the portion then due, taking an assignment thereof, and of a like part of the collateral ment assumed. Where lessee of coal rights, assuming a judgment debt and paying part of it and taking an assignment of part of the judgment, repudiated the lease immediately on discovering that representations inducing the making of the contract were false, he was entitled to have exe-lien. cution issue against the lessor to recover the At the time of the making of the contract, amount paid on the judgment, and a bill by it was represented that a siding was located defendants in equity, insisting that under the lease agreement payment of the claim had been upon the property, which was available for assumed by lessee was properly dismissed. the shipping of coal, but investigation showed it to be built upon the land of an2. Appeal and error 1009(1)—Findings of other, and impossible of use by the lessees. Further inquiry elicited the fact that the statements as to the character and amount of fact in equity case binding. Findings of fact by trial court in equity are binding on appeal, unless manifest error ap-coal were false. The contract was immedi pears. 3. Equity 271-Allowance of amendments rests in reasonable discretion of court. Discretion of trial court properly exercised in refusing, after findings of fact and law had been made and decree nisi entered, to permit amendment to bill as to facts which must have been fully known to the plaintiff earlier in the proceeding, and where the matter set forth could have been offered in contradiction of the defense interposed to the original bill. ately repudiated, but the sum advanced by Rohm was not returned. Later, the executrix of Rohm issued an execution on the part of the Hay judgment which had been assigned to him. Defendants then took a rule to open the judgment, insisting that, under the agreement of lease, the payment of the claim had been assumed by Rohm, and that it should be equitably treated as satisfied. This was dismissed 4. Equity 323-Refusal to permit with- without prejudice, and a bill in equity was drawal of bill held proper. Court did not err in refusing to permit a plaintiff to withdraw his bill after a decree nisi was entered. Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Somerset County; John A. Berkey, President. Suit by the Berlin Smokeless Coal & Clay Mining Company and others against Bertha Rohm, executrix of M. J. Rohm, deceased, and another. Decree for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. filed having the same purpose in view. After the hearing of testimony, the learned court below refused the relief prayed for on the ground that the agreement of lease was void and unenforceable, and that therefore the provisions for payment of the outstanding lien were of no effect. [1, 2] The chancellor found that the false representations were the inducing cause to the making of the contract, and that there was a prompt repudiation when the truth was discovered. If this is so, then the conclusion that the agreement was unenforce Argued before MOSCHZISKER, C. J., and able is correct, and the bill here filed was FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER, and SCHAFFER, JJ. L. C. Colborn, of Somerset, F. A. Millott, of Windber, Kooser & Kooser, of Somerset, and A. H. Bell (of Bell & Bell), of Greensburg, for appellants. properly dismissed (Braunschweiger v. Waits, 179 Pa. 47, 36 Atl. 155; Browning v. Rodman, 268 Pa. 575, 111 Atl. 877; Delafant v. Shapiro, 73 Pa. Super. Ct. 186); and, under the well-settled rules, the findings of fact are binding upon us unless manifest error ap |