(115 A.) 3. Trial 252 (12) Defendant's prayers, based on theory of contract to spin yarn for particular purpose, held properly refused. In an action for breach of contract to spin yarn for defendant from materials furnished by defendant, defendant's prayers for verdict in its favor, which were based on the theory that the yarn was not suitable for sale to the defendant's customer, for whom it was intended, were properly refused where that theory was not supported by the evidence, and the prayers granted to defendant taken in connection with the court's charge presented the law as favorably to defendant as it could ask. Appeal from Circuit Court, Cecil County; Wm. H. Adkins, Philemon B. Hopper, and Lewin W. Wickes, Judges. "To be officially reported." Assumpsit by the A. J. Reach Company against Charles W. Havens, trading as the Downingtown Woolen Mills. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. Defendant's first prayer (rejected): The defendant prays the court to instruct the jury that, if they find from the evidence that the defendant, on or about August 8, 1919, contracted with the plaintiff for the blending and spinning of approximately 15,000 pounds of 15cut cashmere yarn at the Elkton mill suitable furnished to the plaintiff all the necessary raw for weaving into cloth, and that the defendant stocks, including the trade elements for a proper mixture, and that the plaintiff knew that the defendant was not engaged in the weaving of cloth, but was a manufacturer, carder, or spinner of yarns, and that the said spun yarn was for sale by the defendant to a weaver of cashmere cloth, the whole duty and responsibility was on the plaintiff to select, blend, and mix said raw stocks, so as to make the spun yarn of an uniform shade, for weaving into cloth, and if they shall further find from the evidence that 9,355 pounds of yarn blended, mixed, and spun by the plaintiff were shipped to the Bellevue Worsted Mills, and was found to be productive of an uneven shaded Bolivia cloth, by reason of not being carefully and properly blended and mixed in plaintiff's mill at Elkton, then the jury must find for the defendant for said default; and if the jury further find from the evidence that approximately 6,000 pounds of raw stocks of the ingredients or elements furnished by the defendant as testified to by the witnesses remained in the hands of the plaintiff at its Elkton mill, for spinning under its said contract with the defendant, then the negligence of the plaintiff in spinning said lot of 9,355 pounds, if the jury find the plaintiff was negligent in spinning said lot of 9,355 pounds, justified the defendant in notifying the plaintiff to discontinue spinning under their contract by his telegram of October 3, 1919, offered in evidence. Defendant's second prayer (rejected): The defendant prays the court to instruct the jury that, if they believe from the evidence that at the time of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff knew that the defendant was a spinner and not a weaver of cloth, and that the yarn was to be spun for a customer of the defendant for weaving into cloth, and that before shipping the said yarn the plaintiff knew that the defendant had a contract with the Bellevue Worsted Mills for the sale of the entire quantity of 15,000 pounds of spun yarn, and that the yarn produced by the plaintiff was not of the kind and quality called for by the contract between the parties, resulting in the refusal of defendant's customer, Bellevue Worsted Mills, to accept and pay for the yarn, except 2,693 pounds at the reduced price of $1.05 per pound instead of $2.10 per pound, and that when the defendant's customer, Bellevue Worsted Mills, discovering the shading of the yarn, and declined to accept the same, defendant was unable to have other yarn spun elsewhere in time to supply the trade of the Bellevue Worsted Mills, and to hold the defendant's contract with the said customer, and that the contract price for the sale of said yarn at $2.10 per pound was a fair and reasonable price for the same, and not higher than the market price prevailing at the time, then you should find for the defendant, and award as damages to the defendant for the plaintiff's breach of contract the contract price of said 15,000 pounds of yarn at $2.10 per pound less the price actually obtained by the defendant for amount which the jury may find as the value at the time of the cancellation of said contract of the remaining 6,662 pounds of yarn now in the possession of the defendant, with interest in the discretion of the jury. 2,693 pounds thereof sold to Bellevue Worsted, blended, mixed, and spun, and also less the Mills at $1.05 per pound, and less the price that the plaintiff would have received for spinning said 15,000 pounds at 32 cents per pound. You also should deduct the value of any yarn that remains in the defendant's hands according to what you find the value to be from the evidence. Defendant's third prayer (granted): The defendant prays the court to instruct the jury that the uncontradicted evidence in this case is that the defendant could not go in the open market and buy the blended and spun yarn, which the plaintiff agreed to make and deliver to the defendant under the contract between them offered in evidence, in time for the defendant to fill his contracts during the fall of 1919. Defendant's fourth prayer (granted): The defendant prays the court to instruct the jury that the uncontradicted evidence in this case is that the defendant was not a weaver or manufacturer of cloth. Defendant's fifth prayer (granted): The defendant prays the court to instruct the jury that, if they find for the defendant, then the rule in assessing damages should be such loss as may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising naturally from the breach of the contract, and which, in the usual course of things, was in contemplation of both parties to the contract at the time they made the contract and the probable result of the breach of it. Defendant's sixth prayer (granted): Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, THOMAS, URNER, STOCKBRIDGE, and OFFUTT, JJ. Joshua Clayton, of Elkton (Henry, Pepper, Bodine & Stokes and Isaac A. Pennypacker, all of Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellant. William L. Marbury, of Baltimore (Benjamin O. Frick, of Philadelphia, Pa., and Henry L. Constable, of Elkton, on the brief), for appellee. The plaintiff is a corporation of the state of Pennsylvania, having its principal place of business in the city of Philadelphia. The defendant is an individual person, trading as Downingtown Woolen Mills, and having his main place of business at Downingtown, in the state of Pennsylvania, and also a mill at Elkton, Cecil county, Md. The court instructs the jury that, if they find from the evidence that the contract called for tion in part avers that, on or about the 8th The suit is in assumpsit, and the declaracashmere yarn, and that the plaintiff knew that 50 per cent. of the elements making up the day of August, 1919, the defendant entered yarn spun by it for the defendant under their into an oral contract with the plaintiff wherecontract was composed of cashmere wool, and by the plaintiff agreed to spin for the deshall further find that the said cashmere wool, fendant 15,000 pounds cut cashmere yarn, at as well as the other elements entering into said its mill in Elkton, Md., from raw stock to be yarn, were of good quality, and that the yarn furnished by the defendant, at a fixed comspun for said defendant by the plaintiff under pensation of 32 cents per pound, the yarn to their contract was known in the trade as cash-be wound on cops to be supplied by the demere yarn, and they further find that cloth woven from said yarn would be known in the trade as Bolivia cloth, then the jury may reasonably infer that the plaintiff had notice that the said yarn was to be woven into Bolivia cloth of good quality. Defendant's seventh prayer (granted): fendant; that the plaintiff actually spun more that 10,000 pounds of yarn under the contract, and shipped to the order of the defendant over 9,000 pounds thereof, but the defendant subsequently notified the plaintiff to discontinue the spinning of the remaining part of the 15,000 pounds of yarn stated in the contract, and also refused to furnish the plaintiff with sufficient pounds of material or of raw stock to complete the contract. The declaration then avers that there is due and owing to the plaintiff by the defendant the sum of $3,320 for the yarn actually spun and delivered, and also the sum of $693 as profit which the plaintiff would have made on the remaining 4,622 pounds of yarn which the plaintiff was prevented from earning because of the wrongful breach of the contract by the de The defendant prays the court to instruct the jury that, if they find a verdict for the defendant, then they should allow to the defendant the sum which defendant would have realized from the sale of the cashmere yarn called for by the contract if properly blended, mixed, and spun by the plaintiff in the autumn of 1919 at $2.10 per pound for 15,000 pounds, if the jury find the said price of $2.10 per pound was the fair and reasonable price for such yarn in the open market in the fall of 1919, less the price paid to the defendant by Bellevue Worsted Mills of $1.05 per pound for 2,693 pounds thereof woven into cloth, and less the cost to defendant of 32 cents per pound for spinning said 15,000 The defendant, in addition to his denial of pounds which defendant should have paid said the plaintiff's claim, pleaded the breach of fendant. (115 A.) counterclaim for the sum of $29,417.85 for its breach by the plaintiff in negligently, unskillfully, and improperly mixing the stocks and spinning the yarn, whereby the yarn produced was not of the kind and quality which plaintiff agreed to spin from the materials furnished by the defendant, according to the contract. At the trial of the case the verdict and judgment were in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $4,100.62, and from that judgment this appeal has been taken. [2] By the plaintiff's second prayer, which was granted, the jury was further instructed: "That the fact, if they should find it to be a fact, that the yarn spun by the plaintiff in said contract was not suited for the purposes for which the Bellevue Worsted Mills wanted it is a matter of no consequence to the plaintiff in this case, and cannot affect his rights to recover for the breach of his contract by the defendant, if the jury find there was such breach, provided the yarn was spun in the manner called for by the plaintiff's contract with the defendant." [3] The refusal of the defendant's first and second prayers was clearly correct. These prayers did not contain a correct statement of the law as applicable to the case, and the theory upon which they were based was not supported and sustained by the evidence. The record contains eight exceptions, seven There was no special exception filed to this of which relate to the rulings of the court on prayer, and, as the contract in this case was questions of evidence, and one to its rulings an oral one, the question as to its true meanon the prayers. As the action and ruling of ing was clearly one of fact for the jury, and the court upon the prayers present the prin- not a question of law for the court. We find cipal questions in the case, it will be consid-no reversible error in the granting of this ered by us before passing upon the rulings of prayer. the court upon the admissibility of evidence. The plaintiff's first and second prayers were granted, and its third, fourth, fifth and sixth prayers were rejected. The defendant offered seven prayers, of which five were granted and two were rejected. The court gave an instruction of its own in lieu of the plaintiff's rejected third, fourth, and fifth prayers and in connection with the defendant's seventh prayer. The defendant except ed to the granting of the plaintiff's first and second prayers, to the overruling of a special exception to the first prayer of the plaintiff, to the granting of the court's instruction in lieu of the plaintiff's third, fourth, and fifth prayers, and in connection with the defendant's seventh prayer, and also excepted to the rejection of his first and second prayers. [1] The special exception to the plaintiff's first prayer, it will be seen, is defective and insufficient, in that it does not specify in what respect or distinctly state wherein the evidence was legally insufficient to support the prayer. The form of the exception is simply that the defendant excepts specially to granting the first prayer of the plaintiff, for the reason that no evidence legally sufficient has been adduced in the case to support the same. It has been frequently held by this court that an exception in this form was defective, and not in compliance with rule 4 of this court (111 Atl. vii) which provides in part: "Nor shall any question arise in the Court of Appeals as to the insufficiency of evidence to support any instruction actually granted, unless it appear that such question was distinctly made to and decided by the court below." See Code, art. 5, § 4: 2 Poe's P. & P. § 315, p. 253; B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Mali, 66 Md. 53, 5 Atl. 87. There was no error, for the reasons stated, in overruling the special exception to the plaintiff's first prayer, and, as it was correct in other respects, it was properly granted. The defendant's third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh granted prayers, in connection with the instruction given by the court, it will be seen, presented the law, covering the theory of the defendant's case in as favorable a view as could have been asked by him. We have examined the rulings as to the admissibility of evidence, and have found no reversible error in any of them. As the record contains no rulings of the court below, either on the prayers or the evidence, of which the defendant can properly complain, the judgment will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed, with costs. (139 Md. 535) (No. 32.) FINGLES v. SINGER. had instituted three Appeal from Circuit Court of Baltimore Suit by Thomas J. Fingles against Louisa | vacated, a second suit in ejectment was B. Singer. From a decree dismissing the brought. This, in due course, was heard in bill after demurrer thereto was sustained, the people's court, and again an appeal was complainant appeals. Affirmed. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, THOMAS, PATTISON, URNER, STOCKBRIDGE, and OFFUTT, JJ. taken to the Baltimore city court. Before that case was reached for hearing in the Baltimore city court the present suit was brought in the equity court, which professed to be for the purpose of preventing a multi Royall Tippett, of Baltimore (Emil Budnitz and Richard B. Tippett & Son, all of Balti-plicity of suits and to have the nature of the more, on the brief), for appellant. Myer Rosenbush, of Baltimore, for appellee. STOCKBRIDGE, J. The bill of complaint in the above-entitled cause was demurred to and an amended bill of complaint subse quently filed. A demurrer was also filed to this, and, the case being heard upon this state of pleadings, the demurrer was sustained and the bill dismissed. In 1913 Thomas J. Fingles entered into the occupancy of the premises known as No. 1212 North Fremont avenue in Baltimore City, under a lease for three years, and was given an option to renew that lease at the expiration of the original term. This he did. Mrs. Singer, the owner, brought an action at the expiration of the renewal term in accordance with the local summary, ejectment provision for the possession of the property, claiming that after the 1st of September, 1919, Fingles's tenancy had become a tenancy from year to year, while he took the ground that his continuation in the property amounted to a renewal for a still further term of three years. The action was brought under the local laws of Baltimore city in the peo ple's court, and the judgment rendered in that case was upon appeal to the Baltimore city court reversed. The next step was a notice, given in accordance with the terms of the lease for the termination of the tenancy at the end of the year, and, he not having tenancy under the terms of the lease adjudicated so as to settle the rights of the parties. The ground of the demurrer was that there was a full, complete, and adequate remedy at law, and, such being the case, there was no room to admit of equity jurisdiction. Actions of this class are entirely of statutory origin, and must be dealt with therefore in accordance with the statutes. There is no allegation or suggestion even of any trouble in having the matter fully and completely adjudicated in the city court. The multiplicity of suits is not shown by any fact, but is a mere apprehension on the part of the plaintiff, which may or may not ever arise, and a mere apprehension of numerous suits with no more substantial basis has never been held sufficient in this state for the interposition of a court of equity. No question of title is involved; a construction of the lease is clearly within the powers of the court of law, and it is therefore impossible to arrive at any conclusion other than that there is a full, complete, and adequate remedy at law, and therefore no jurisdiction is vested in the equity courts which will oust those courts of their control of such a case. Moyer v. Mitchell, 53 Md. 177; Roland Park Co. v. Hull, 92 Md. 301, 48 Atl. 366; Md. Hotel Co. v. Engraving Co., 92 Md. 723, 48 Atl. 716; Peninsular Con. Co. v. Merritt, 90 Md. 589, 45 Atl. 172. The decree appealed from will accordingly be affirmed. Decree affirmed, costs to be paid by the appellant. (115 A.) (271 Pa. 492) (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 3, 1922.) 1. Municipal corporations 706 (7)—Rider of bicycle colliding with truck held negligent. Where a collision between a bicycle moving north on P. street and a truck which was being driven south and turned east into an intersecting street occurred after the turn was made, at a point from 12 to 35 feet east of the east curb line of P. street, and the truck driver was then endeavoring to avoid the collision, held, that a nonsuit was proper; the facts showing that the bicycle rider was not giving such attention as he should to the manner of his going, and was guilty of negligence which contributed to, if it did not actually cause, the accident. 2. Municipal corporations 705 (2)-Duties of bicycle rider and truck driver turning into intersecting street were reciprocal. The legal duties of the rider of a bicycle moving north and one driving a truck south and turning east into an intersecting street were reciprocal, and it was the duty of each to so conduct his vehicle as to be able to control it and stop or turn and avoid a collision with those who were first at the corner. 3. Municipal corporations 705(11)-Failure of truck driver to go beyond intersection before turning held not cause of collision. Though it was the duty of one driving a truck south and turning east into an intersecting street, under Act June 30, 1919 (P. L. 678, § 25; Pa. St. 1920, § 990), to go west and south of the intersection before turning, his failure to do so was not the cause of a collision with a bicycle being ridden north, where the truck had traveled on a curve for about 67 feet to a point east of the east curb line, all in plain view of the bicycle rider, before the collision occurred, and there was ample room for him to pass to the west or south of the truck. tersection. Though one riding a bicycle north had superior rights over a truck being driven south and turning east into an intersecting street, he was in no position to raise such superior rights, where the truck was first at the corner, though it reached the corner first by failing to go south and west of the intersection as required by statute. ant, as it was just as much the duty of the bicycle rider to avoid a collision if the truck driver was negligent as if he was not. 6. Municipal corporations ~705(10)-Duty of bicycle rider to see turning truck which he could have seen for some distance. Where a truck turning into an intersecting street and with which a bicycle collided was in plain view of the bicycle rider for a distance of at least 40 feet before he reached the intersecting street, and after he reached such street he had ample room to pass it, it was his duty to see the truck, and the facts showed that he was either not looking or else he was riding too rapidly at the time to avoid the collision. Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Erie County; W. P. Rossiter, Judge. Action by Lillian Mehler against John Doyle and others. From an order refusing to remove a nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. Af firmed. Argued before MOSCHZISKER, C. J., and SIMPSON, KEPFRAZER, WALLING, HART, SADLER, and SCHAFFER, JJ. J. B. Brooks (of Brooks, English & Quinn), of Erie, for appellant. W. P. Gifford (of Gunnison, Fish, Gifford & Chapin), of Erie (M. C. Cornell, of Erie, on the brief), for appellees. PER CURIAM. The refusal to remove the nonsuit entered in this case is affirmed on the following excerpts from the opinion of the court below: [1] "On May 5, 1920, at 10 minutes to 7, on the morning of a clear day, an auto truck, then north of Eighteenth street, was being driven southwardly [near] the center of Parade street, which is a paved [highway] in the city of Erie, 68 feet wide. A bicycle, then south of Eighteenth street, was being ridden northwardly [on Parade street] about 5 feet from the east curb. There were no other vehicles on the * * Driver 4. Municipal corporations 705 (2) having superior rights not entitled to raise such rights where another was first at the in-street in that vicinity. The truck turned 'suddenly' to the east, into East Eighteenth street, There an intersecting street 32 feet wide. were street car tracks in the centers of both streets and a curved switch track, extending round the corner, connected one with the other. (Suddenly' was defined by all the witnesses as meaning in the same manner that a street-car would turn into the same street, as the truck went round the corner on the switch tracks.) The bicycle was propelled northwardly to, and into, Eighteenth street, until it either came in contact with or slipped on the pavement and precipitated its rider against the truck, which east of was then from 12 to 35 feet the east curb line of Parade street, causing injuries to him which resulted in his death. 5. Municipal corporations 705(10)-Truck driver's violation of law did not relieve bicycle rider of duty to exercise care. While one riding a bicycle north had a right to assume that the driver of a truck coming south and turning into an intersecting street The collision took place, according to would go to the right beyond the intersection before making the turn, the nonperformance of the testimony, after the turn was made, at the such duty gave him no right to run into the point of the switch or opposite the poles in truck, and did not release him from his duty to Eighteenth street, which is from 12 to 35 feet have his bicycle under control and to be observ-east of the east curb line of Parade street, with |