changed from the serpent to the dove, and have the righteousness of the law established in us by faith in Jesus Christ, every sin being slain in us which the law condemns, and every grace made alive which the law requires. Thus are we made sons and daughters to the LORD GOD ALMIGHTY, brethren of Jesus Christ, flesh of his flesh, bone of his bone; joint-heirs with him of the kingdom of heaven. Thus we become entitled to all that he is entitled to, and he is ours as virtually as we are his; we are beloved of the Father as he is beloved, and all the blessings which the Father has in store, he will surely bestow upon his children, viz: those who believe and are united to his beloved Son by faith.

Had christians but a small sense of their heavenly inheritance, they would be willing to renounce all their carnal gratifications in one earnest attempt to get hold of spiritual good, and to enjoy more of heaven here below. "As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O my God."

J.

ON CONSCIENCE.

MR. PILGRIM,

THE human soul is one of the wonderful works of God; and doubtless the brightest display of his perfections to be found among the creatures which compose our world. Inquiries, therefore, into its nature and properties, must be highly interesting to all who delight in contemplating the power and wisdom of God, which are here illustriously unfolded. In the hope of seeing inserted in your excellent publication, more on this subject; and that in this day of light and improvement in human and divine knowledge, the sources of knowledge in ourselves may be opened, and truth diffused; I have ventured to communicate for publication the following observations on the nature and operations of Conscience.

There have been various opinions entertained concerning this power of the human soul. Some have supposed it a sensitive, and others a rational faculty: others that it is not a distinct faculty of the soul, but only our judgment or reason, exercised on moral subjects. But without attending to these and other differing opinions concerning Conscience it will be my object, briefly to exhibit that opinion which I conceive correct.

The most literal meaning of the word Conscience is to know inwardly, or in one's self; being derived from the Latin verb scio, to know, and the preposition con, within or inward. Conscience is then literally that power of the soul by which it discovers the nature and quality of what passes within it; or of its own exercises; and it ascertains equally the quality of our thoughts, considered as intuitions, and our affections, appetites and passions, as approved by the will. Let it be here observed, that when the soul is described as possessing different powers or faculties, it is not meant that the soul is divided into parts; and that one part operates at one time, and a

nother at a subsequent time: but only, that the soul is capable of different kinds of action at different times; and that these, where the difference is general and manifest, are, with propriety, called by different names. It is the whole soul that reasons, loves, hates and chooses or refuses, and not a part: "so it is the whole soul that is conscious of its own acts, and their moral quality: but this inward light and discernment, particularly, of the moral quality of actions, being a distinct kind of action from reasoning, or any of those above named, and attended with manifestly different effects in the soul, implies a different power, and therefore, conscience is with propriety denominated a distinct faculty."

Respecting the operation of this faculty, I observe,

1. As we are sensible in ourselves of pleasure and happiness, and of pain and misery, and are acquainted with various causes which contribute to produce them; we feel a pleasantness or approbation toward those which promote our happiness, and a displeasure or opposition toward those which occasion our misery: and as rational creatures, like ourselves, are often intentionally the causes of our happiness or misery, we feel an approbation or resentment toward them on that account.-(We do indeed most clearly discern that the one kind of conduct deserves approbation and the other disapprobation and punishment.) Now as we know others to be capable of the same happiness and misery as ourselves; if we intentionally perform toward them the same kind of actions which cause pleasure or happiness in us, we discern in ourselves, or are conscious that we act consistently: that is, that we do that to them which is agreeable when done to us, and so that which appears to us agreeable and right in itself: on the contrary, when we perform toward them those actions which cause pain or misery when performed toward ourselves, we see that we act inconsistently: for we cannot but know that these actions must be as offensive to them, as they would be to us; and therefore that we choose to perform what is disagreeable and oppressive in our own view: which conscious inconsistency with our clear discernment of what is morally right, and the feelings which accompany it, constitute what is called selfcondemnation, or the condemnation of our consciences.

2. In a similar manner also conscience approves or condemns our conduct toward God. All the idea we can possibly have of God and his attributes, is taken from ourselves. By removing defects, and adding the idea of infinity or perfection to all those attributes which we discover to be excellent in ourselves and others, we obtain our best idea of God; defective no doubt, but we can obtain no other. And as we discover the relations and duties of children to parents, and of subjects to rulers, in the manner before described, by realizing what would be suitable and agreeable to be done to us in those circumstances; so by transferring the idea of a perfect parent or ruler to God, and adding his infinity and our entire and continual dependance on him, we obtain our most correct view of religious obligation, and the love and duty generally which we owe to God and we are conscious that the moral law, which requires the performance of these, is right and good, and conse

quently when we violate its injunctions, acting contrary to our own views of right, we discover in ourselves the wrong, and feel condemnation.

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3. As conscience, in agreement with the knowledge which the soul possesses of its relations to God and man, discovers the moral quality of our actions as good or evil, and so causes inward peace and delight, when the action accords with our relations to God or man, and uneasiness and distress when it violates these relations : so in strict connexion with this it discerns the merit or demerit, the praise or blame-worthiness of our actions: for we clearly discover a fitness and propriety, that the person who loves should be loved, that he, who does good, should receive good; and on the contrary that he, who hates, should be hated, and that he, who designedly does evil to another, should receive evil or punishment, and that he who opposes the general good, should be opposed by the general good, or rather by God, whose prerogative it is to promote it. When therefore we love and do good to others, according to the relations we sustain to them, we manifestly do that which renders it suitable and proper that they sould love and do good to us: and as the receiving love and good is very pleasant and desirable to the soul, conscience therefore approves this conduct as praiseworthy : and whether we receive the deserved approbation from them or not, there is the same inward approbation, or what is called in the scriptures a good conscience. But if we hate and injure others, from the same mode of reasoning it is evident that we deserve hatred and injury in return; and the soul is equally conscious of this.desert of evil or punishment, whether we receive it or not, and therefore must be the subject of a guilty conscience. This conscious guilt in many instances produces a very wretched state of mind, which in a person truly benevolent will be in proportion to the hatred exercised, or the evil intended: but in one supremely selfish, the distress will be proportioned to the degree of exposedness to punishment, as this appears in the view of the mind. This difference has given rise to the two different meanings assigned to the word guilt; for some have explained it to mean conscious desert of punishment, and others conscious exposedness to punishment. There is doubtless in the most selfish person, unless his conscience be seared as with a hot iron, an uneasy and painful feeling within, from the consciousness of having violated his duty to God or man; but I do not know that a selfish person feels any distress from a conscious desert of punishment, if he feels no exposedness to suffer it. This however is rarely or never the case; for if the sinner feels secure from the punishment of men, he cannot avoid feeling some exposedness to the punishment of God: The person who is thus condemned by his conscience, as deserving of and exposed to punishment, feels guilty, or, as it is often expressed, has a guilty conscience.

4. When we see others acting in the same manner, and apparently with the same views and feelings which have been described, and which we discover in ourselves to be right or wrong, praiseworthy or blameworthy; we readily transfer the conclusions in our own case to theirs; and so determine their actions to be morally good or

evil, and deserving of reward and punishment: and this is the foundation of our judgment on the moral conduct of others. It is indeed the province of conscience, strictly speaking, to discover only the quality of our own actions, as they agree or disagree with our known relations to each other and to God, and so to condemn or approve us accordingly but as this consciousness of right and wrong in ourselves is the foundation of ideas of right and wrong in others; not only in men, but also in angels and in God; therefore, in a more general view, it is the province of conscience to determine our judgment of right and wrong, in all cases which come under our observation.

5. The exercise of conscience being continual in all our relations and intercourse with God and man, the particular way in which the soul comes to feel a consciousness of moral right and wrong, and of desert of praise or blame, is frequently overlooked, or little noticed by the mind; and the person who is prompted to perform any action scarcely observes any more than this, that his conscience approves or condemns his choice: and hence some have called conscience the moral sense of the soul; and have considered its operations as similar to those of the natural senses; and that its decisions are as certain and safe on moral things as those of the natural senses are in natural things; but this seems not to comport with fact and experience. There are many instances in which even the most candid and pious are long in doubt respecting what is right, and duty; and in which very careful enquiry into the nature and consequences of the action proposed, is necessary, in order to determine whether it is right or wrong. These instances abundantly prove that the decisions of conscience are not formed like those of the natural senses, but that, however instantaneously we may sometimes feel their effects, they must all be formed in the light of that knowledge which we possess of the relations existing between ourselves, our fellow creatures, and our God.

From these observations we may remark,

1. Conscience is that faculty which distinguishes man from all the inferior creatures of God. The parrot may talk, and the elephant and other animals may reason; but none of them exhibit evidence of a power to discern moral good and evil. This they would doubtless manifest, if they possessed it; and some sort of moral government would be found among them. The man who can neither hear nor speak, still shows that he has a conscience; and that guilt and remorse may distress his soul and break his rest, when, to outward appearance, he has nothing to alarm and disturb him. He shows, therefore, by the operations of his conscience, that he is thereby distinguished from them, and is a proper subject of moral government, while they are not..

2. We ought always to obey the dictates of conscience. If conscience be that power in us, which in view of the knowledge we possess determines the moral quality of our actions, and the only power which God has given us for that purpose; then we ought certainly to obey its dictates; for if we do not, we are

without a guide; and have no possible way to determine what we ought, or ought not to do.

If it should be said, the scriptures ought to be our rule, and not our conscience; the answer to this is plain: we know nothing of our duty from the scriptures, except by those powers of the soul which God has given us for that purpose :-a Bible if we had no faculties would afford us no light: and, consequently, conscience is as necessary in view of the light of scripture, as of any other light by which we may be directed in our actions.

The truth of this remark further appears, from considering the total impropriety of ever acting contrary to our conscience: we must certainly obey or disobey its decisions; and as it would be evidently wrong to disobey, it must be right to obey.

3. It is highly important that our minds should be well informed on moral subjects.

If conscience be not a mere sense of the soul, but depends in its decisions, on the knowledge we possess of our relations to each other and to God; it must be very important that we understand these relations, and the obligations here arising; for ignorance on these subjects, we may be led to violate the commandments of God; and do injury to ourselves and others, and yet act agreeably to our consciences! This seems to have been the case with the apostle Paul, before his conversion, and no doubt it has been the case with many others. But it will here be asked, shall we follow conscience to disobey God and injure ourselves and others? I answer, conscience never dictates that we should do either; when the action is seen to possess this quality; and when in ignorance or error this appears to be the case, the fault is not in conscience, but in our first violating its dictates in neglecting to obtain that information, and to exercise that candor, which are necessary for a right decision.

P.

THE CHRISTIAN'S REST.

THE word rest, although it is a delightful sound to every ear, is heard by different persons with very dissimilar emotions. To the labourer, it is nothing but the return of evening, which tells him that his task for one day more is accomplished. To the man, whose worldly cares and labours are many, it is permission to lay his head upon his pillow, and for a little while to forget the troubles both of body and mind. To the scholar, it is an hour stolen from books, in order to gain strength for pursuing his studies with increased ardour. To the philosopher, it is a release from the company of foolish men, and permission to seek satisfaction in his own contemplations. To the man, who dreams of none but earthly sorrow, it is to lie down in the peaceful, narrow grave, and there to sleep his guilt and grief away. To the infidel, it is dark, long, and cold forgetfulness," the eternal end of his existence.