ted from contemporaneity; for that would be to separate them from the mind itself. The act of consciousness is indeed identical with time considered in its essence. I mean time per se, as contra-distinguished from our notion of time; for this is always blended with the idea of space, which, as the opposite of time, is therefore its measure. * Nevertheless the accident of seeing two objects at the same moment, and the accident of seeing them in the same place are two distinct or distinguishable causes: and the true practical general law of association is this; that what over makes certain parts of a total impression more vivid or distinct than the rest, will determine the mind to recall these in pref erence to others equally linked together by the common condition of contemporaneity, or (what I deem a more appropriate and philosophical term) of continuity. But the will itself by confining and intensifying the attention may arbitrarily give vividness or distinctness to any object whatsoever; and from hence we may deduce the uselessness, if not the absurdity, of certain recent schemes which promise an artificial memory, but which in reality can only produce a confusion and debasement of the fancy. Sound logic, as the habitual subordination of the individual to the species, and of the species to the genus; philosophical knowledge of facts under the relation of cause and effect; a cheerful and communicative temper disposing us to notice the similarities and contrasts of things, that we may be able to illustrate the one by the other; a quiet conscience; a condition free from anxieties; sound health, and above all (as far as relates to passive remem brance) a healthy digestion; these are the best, these are the only Arts of Memory

* [Schelling teaches that the most original measure of Time is Space, of Space Time; and that both are opposed to each other for this reason that they mutually limit one another. Transsc. Id. Tübingen, 180, pp. 216-17. See also Idem, 325-6.—S. C.]

to

I am aware, that this word occurs neither in Johnson's Dictionary nor in any classical writer. But the word, to intend, which Newton and others before him employ in this sense, is now so completely appropriated another meaning, that I could not use it without ambiguity: while to par phrase the sense, as by render intense, would often break up the senten and destroy that harmony of the position of the words with the logic position of the thoughts, which is a beauty in all composition, and mor especially desirable in a close philosophical investigation. I have therefor hazarded the word intensify; though, I confess, it sounds uncouth to my

own car.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SYSTEM OF DUALISM INTRODUCED BY DES CARTES-REFINED FIRST BY SPINOZA AND AFTERWARDS BY LEIBNITZ INTO THE DOCTRINE OF HARMONIA PRÆSTABILITA-HYLOZOISM-MATERIALISM-NONE OF THESE SYSTEMS, OR ANY POSSIBLE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION, SUPPLIES OR SUPERSEDES A THEORY OF PERCEPTION, OR EXPLAINS THE FORMATION OF THE ASSOCIABLE.

To the best of my knowledge Des Cartes was the first philosopher, who introduced the absolute and essential heterogeneity of the soul as intelligence, and the body as matter.* The assumption, and the form of speaking have remained, though the denial of all other properties to matter but that of extension, on which denial the whole system of Dualism is grounded, has been long exploded. For since impenetrability is intelligible only as a mode of resistance; its admission places the essence of matter in an act or power, which it possesses in common with spirit ; and body and spirit are therefore no longer absolutely heterogeneous, but may without any absurdity be supposed to be different modes, or degrees in perfection, of a common substratum. To this possibility, however, it was not the fashion to advert. The soul was a thinking substance, and body a space-filling substance. Yet the apparent action of each on the other pressed heavy on the philosopher on the one hand; and no less heavily on the other

* [Principia Philosophia, P. i. §§ 52-3, 63-4.-S. C.]

+[Compare with Schelling's Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre-Philosophische Schriften. Landshut, 1809. (See note infra.) Compare also with what Leibnitz lays down on this point in the last paragraph of his paper De Prima Philosophic Emendatione— which forms Art. xxxiv. of Erdmann's edition of his works, Berol. 1840, and with the Nouveaux Essais (Liv. ii. c. xxi. § 2, Erdmann, p. 250), where he says that matter has not only mobility, which is the receptivity or capacity of movement, but also resistance, which comprehends impenetrability and inertia.-S.C.1

transform tself into a knowing, becomes conceivable on one only condition; namely, if it can be shown that the vis representativa, or ths Sentient, is itself a species of being: that is, either as a property or attribute, or as an hypostasis or self subsistence. The former-that thinking is a property of matter under particular conditions, is, indeed the assumption of materialism; a system which could not but be patronized by the philosopher, if only it actually performed what it promises. But how any affection from without can metamorphose itself into perception or will, the materialist has hitherto left, not only as incomprehensible as he found it, but has aggravated it into a comprehensible absurdity. For, grant that an object from without could act upon the conscious self, as on a consubstantial object; yet such an affection could only engender something homogeneous with itself. Motion could only propagate motion. Matter has no Inward. We remove one surface, but to meet with another. We can but divide a particle into particles; and each atom comprehends in itself material phænomenon is only possible in this way, that we reduce matter itself to a spectre, to the mere modification of an Intelligence whose common functions are thinking and matter. Consequently Materialism itself is carried back to the Intelligent (das Intelligente) as the original. And assuredly just as little can we succeed in an attempt to explain Being out of Knowing, so as to represent the former as the product of the latter; seeing that betwixt the two no casual relationship is possible, and they could never meet together, were they not originally one in the I. Being (Matter), considered as productive, is a Knowing; Knowing considered as product, a Being. If Knowing is productive in general, it must be wholly and throughout productive, not in part only. Nothing can come from without into the Knowing, for all that is is identical with the Knowing, and without it is nothing at all. If the one Factor of Representation lies in the I, so must the other also; for in the object the two are inseparable. Let it be supposed, for example, that the stuff (or material) belongs to the things, it follows that this stuff, before it arrives at the I, at least in the transition from the thing to the repre sentation, must be formless, which without doubt is inconceivable.”—S. C.] * Abhandlungen. Phil. Schrift. pp. 240-241. Translation. "What mat ter, that is the object of the external intuition, is, we may analyze forever— may divide it mechanically or chemically: we never get further than to the surfaces of bodies. That alone in matter which is indestructible is its indwelling power, which discovers itself to feeling through impenetrability. But this is a power which goes merely ad extra-only works contrary to the outward impact; thus it is no power that returns into itself. Only a power that returns into itself makes to itself an Inward. Thence to matter belongs no Inward. But the representing being beholds an inner world. This is not possible except through an activity which gives to itself its own sphere,

the properties of the material universe.* Let any reflecting mind make the experiment of explaining to itself the evidence of our sensuous intuitions, from the hypothesis that in any given perception there is a something which has been communicated to it by an impact, or an impression ab extra. In the first place,

or, in other words, returns into itself. But no activity goes back into itself, which does not, on this very account and at the same time, also go outward. There is no sphere without limitation, but just as little is there limitation without space which is limited."

See also Schelling's Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. Introd. 2d edit. Landshut, 1803, p. 22.-S. C.]

* [For great part of the remainder of this paragraph see Schelling's Transsc. Id. pp. 149-50. Compare also with Ideen, Introd. p. 22.

Schelling concludes the former passage in the Transsc. Id. as follows: Transl. "The most consistent proceeding of Dogmatism"-(that is, the old method of determining upon supersensible objects without a previous inquiry into the nature and scope of the faculties by which the inquiry is to be carried on,—without “a pre-inquisition into the mind")—“is to have recourse to the mysterious for the origin of representations of external things, and to speak thereof as of a revelation, which renders all further explanation impossible; or to make the inconceivable origination of a thing so dissimilar in kind, as the representation from the impulse of an outward object, conceivable through a power, to which, as to the Deity (the only immediate object of our knowledge, according to that system), even the impossible is possible."

Schelling seems to have had in his mind such doctrine as that which is thus stated by Professor Stewart: "It is now, I think, pretty generally acknowledged by physiologists, that the influence of the will over the body is a mystery, which has never yet been unfolded; but, singular as it may ap pear, Dr. Reid was the first person who had courage to lay completely aside all the common hypothetical language concerning perception, and to exhibit the difficulty in all its magnitude, by a plain statement of the fact. To what then, it may be asked, does this statement amount? Merely to this; that the mind is so formed, that certain impressions produced on our organs of sense by external objects, are followed by correspondent sensations; and that these sensations (which have no more resemblance to the qualities of matter, than the words of a language have to the things they denote), are followed by a perception of the existence and qualities of the bodies by which the impressions are made; that all the steps of this process are equally incomprehensible; and that, for any thing we can prove to the contrary, the connection between the impression and the sensation may be both arbitrary: that it is therefore by no means impossible, that our sensations may be merely the occasions on which the correspondent perceptions are excited; and that, at any rate, the consideration of these sensations, which are attributes of mind, can throw no light on the manner in which we acquire our knowledge of the existence and qualities of body

by the impact on the percipient, or ens representans, not the ob ject itself, but only its action or effect, will pass into the same. Not the iron tongue, but its vibrations, pass into the metal of the bell. Now in our immediate perception, it is not the mere power or act of the object, but the object itself, which is immediately present. We might indeed attempt to explain this result by a chain of deductions and conclusions; but that, first, the very faculty of deducing and concluding would equally demand an explanation; and secondly, that there exists in fact no such intermediations by logical notions, such as those of cause and effect. It is the object itself, not the product of a syllogism, which is present to our consciousness. Or would we explain this supervention of the object to the sensation, by a productive faculty set in motion by an impulse; still the transition, into the percipient, of the object itself, from which the impulse proceeded, assumes a power that can permeate and wholly possess the soul,

And like a God by spiritual art,

Be all in all, and all in every part.*

And how came the percipient here? And what is become of the wonder-promising Matter, that was to perform all these marvels by force of mere figure, weight and motion? The most consistent proceeding of the dogmatic materialist is to fall back into From this view of the subject it follows, that it is external objects them selves, and not any species or images of these objects, that the mind per eives; and that, although, by the constitution of our nature, certain sensa tions are rendered the constant antecedents of our perceptions, yet it is just as difficult to explain how our perceptions are obtained by their means, as it would be, upon the supposition, that the mind were all at once inspired with them, without any concomitant sensations whatever."-Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, pp. 69–70.

Such statements, in the view of the Transcendentalist, involve a contradiction-namely, that the soul can penetrate, by perception, into that which is without itself: or that the human soul, by divine power, has pres ent to it, or takes in essential properties not of mind, but of something alien from mind and directly contrary to it; which is impossible. The exploded hypothesis of species and images was an attempt to do away the contradiction; the doctrine found wanting by Schelling shows the futility of that attempt; but in assuming the real outness or separateness of the objects of perception-that they are, as things in themselves, apart from and extrinsic to our mind, appears to set up the contradiction again, or at least to keep it up. S. C.]

* [Altered from Cowley's All over Love. II-Ed.]