fuch a distinct emotion of mind, and no other; or why the body is at all affected by the mind, or the mind by the body. A little thought will fhew this to be impoffible. But I conceive, if we can difcover what affections of the mind produced certain emotions of the body; and what distinct feelings and qualities of body shall produce certain determinate paffions in the mind, and no others, I fancy a great deal will be done; fomething not unufeful towards a distinct knowledge of our paffions, fo far at least as we have them at present under our confideration. This is all, I believe, we can do. If we could advance a step farther, difficulties would ftill remain, as we should be still equally distant from the firft caufe. When Newton first discovered the property of attraction, and fettled its laws, he found it ferved very well toexplain feveral of the most remarkable phæ nomena in nature; but yet with reference to the general fyftem of things, he could confider

confider attraction but as an effect, whose cause at that time he did not attempt to trace. But when he afterwards began to account for it by a fubtle elastic æther, this great man (if in fo great a man it be not impious to discover any thing like a blemish) seemed to have quitted his usual cautious manner of philofophifing; fince perhaps, allowing all that has been advanced on this fubject to be fufficiently proved, I think it leaves us with as many difficulties as it found us. That great chain of causes, which linking one to another even to the throne of God himfelf, can never be unravelled by any industry of ours. When we go but one step beyond the immediately fenfible qualities of things, we go out of our depth. All we do after, is but a faint ftruggle, that fhews we are in an element which does not belong to us. So that when I speak of caufe, and efficient caufe, I only mean, certain affections of the mind, that cause certain changes in the body; or R 2

7

certain

certain powers and properties in bodies, that work a change in the mind. As if I were to explain the motion of a body falling to the ground, I would fay it was caused by gravity, and I would endeavour to fhew after what manner this power operated, without attempting to fhew why it operated in this manner; or if I were to explain the effects of bodies ftriking one another by the common laws of percuffion, I fhould not endeavour to explain how motion itself is communicated.

SECT. II.

ASSOCIATION.

T is no small bar in the way of our

enquiry into the cause of our paffions, that the occafion of many of them are given, and that their governing motions are communicated at a time when we have not capacity to reflect on them; at

a time of which all fort of memory is worn out of our minds. For befides fuch things as affect us in various manners according to their natural powers, there are affociations made at that early season, which we find it very hard afterwards to distinguish from natural effects. Not to mention the unaccountable antipathies which we find in many perfons, we all find it impoffible to remember when a steep became more terrible than a plain; or fire or water more terrible than a clod of earth; though all these are very probably either conclufions from experience, or arifing from the premonitions of others; and fome of them impreffed, in all likelihood, pretty late. But as it must be allowed that many things affect us after a certain manner, not by any natural powers they have for that purpose, but by affociation; so it would be abfurd on the other hand, to say that all things affe&t us by affociation only; fince fome things must have been originally and naturally agreeable

R 3

agreeble or difagreeable, from which the others derive their affociated powers; and it would be, I fancy, to little purpofe to look for the caufe of our paffions in affociation, until we fail of it in the natural properties of things,

SECT. III.

Caufe of PAIN and FEAR.

Have before observed*, that whatever

is qualified to cause terror, is a foundation capable of the fublime; to which I add, that not only thefe, but many things from which we cannot probably apprehend any danger have a fimilar effect, because they operate in a fimilar manner, I observed too that † whatever produces pleasure, pofitive and original pleasure, is fit to have beauty engrafted on it. Therefore, to clear up the nature of thefe qualities, it may

be ne

ceffary

Part 1. fect. 8.

+ Part 1. fect. 10.