SECT. X. Unity why requifite to Vastness 261 SECT. XI. The artificial Infinite 264 The vibrations must be SECT. XII. fimilar 267 268 SECT. XIII. The effects of fucceffion in visual objects explained SECT. XIV. Locke's opinion concerning darkness considered 272 SECT. XV. Darkness terrible in its own nature 275 SECT. XVI. Why Darkness is terri 285 286 SECT. XIX. The phyfical cause of 290 291 SECT. XXII. Sweetnefs relaxing 296 SECT. XXIII. Variation, why beau tiful SECT. XXIV. Concerning Smallness SECT. XXV. Of Colour 299 302 308 PART PART V. SECT. I. Of Words 311 SECT. II. The common effect of Poetry, not by raising ideas of things 313 SECT. III. General words before ideas 317 SECT. IV. The effect of Words 319 SECT. V. Examples that Words may affect without raising images 322 SECT. VI. Poetry not ftrictly an imitative art 333 SECT. VII. How Words influence the Paffions 334 INTRODUCTION. ON TAST E. Na fuperficial view, we may seem to differ very widely from each other in our reasonings, and no lefs in our pleasures: but notwithstanding this difference, which I think to be rather apparent than real, it is probable that the ftandard both of reafon and Taste is the fame in all human creatures. For if there were not fomé principles of judgment as well as of sentiment common to all mankind, no hold could poffibly be taken either on their reafon or their paffions, fufficient to maintain the ordinary correspondence of life. It appears indeed to be generally acknowledged, that with regard to truth and falfhood there is fomething fixed. We find people in their difputes continually appealing to certain tefts and ftandards which are allowed on all fides, pro and are supposed to be established in our common nature. But there is not the fame obvious concurrence in any uniform or fettled principles which relate to Tafte. It is even commonly supposed that this delicate and aerial faculty, which feems too volatile to endure even the chains of a definition, cannot be perly tried by any teft, nor regulated by any ftandard. There is fo continual a call for the exercise of the reasoning faculty, and it is fo much strengthened by perpetual contention, that certain maxims of right reason feem to be tacitly fettled amongst the most ignorant. The learned have improved on this rude fcience, and reduced thofe maxims into a fyftem. If Tafte has not been fo happily cultivated, it was not that the fubject fubject was barren, but that the labourers were few or negligent; for to say the truth, there are not the fame interesting motives to impel us to fix the one, which urge us to ascertain the other. And after all, if men differ in their opinion concern→ ing fuch matters, their difference is not attended with the fame important confequences, elfe I make no doubt but that the logic of Tafte, if I may be allowed the expreffion, might very poffibly be as well digested, and we might come to discuss matters of this nature with as much certainty, as those which feem more immediately within the province of mere reason. And indeed it is very necessary at the entrance into fuch an enquiry, as our prefent, to make this point as clear as poffible; for if Tafte has no fixed principles, if the imagination is not affected according to fome invariable and certain laws, our labour is like to be employed to very little purpose; as it must be judged an useless, if not an abfurd B 2 under |